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I. OVERVIEW
The Internet is at once a new communications medium and a new locus
for social organization on a global basis. Because of its decentralized, open,
and interactive nature, the Internet is the first electronic medium to allow
every user to "publish" and engage in commerce. Users can reach and create
communities of interest despite geographic, social, and political barriers.
The Internet is an unprecedented mechanism for delivering government and
social services, from education and healthcare to public information. As the
World Wide Web grows to fully support voice, data, and video, it will
become in many respects a virtual "face-to-face" social and political milieu.
However, it remains an open question whether the Internet's democratic
potential will be achieved. The Internet exists within social, political, and
technological contexts that can impede its democratic potential.
Governments tout the Internet, but worry about its threat to their traditional
authority. The private sector sees the economic potential of the Internet, but
anti-competitive impulses are also part of the landscape. Users bring not
only their social aspirations to the Internet, but also their potential for
antisocial behavior. Adopting the frontier metaphor, we are now witnessing
the struggle over governance of the Internet. After the revolution, what type
of constitution do we want? Will it be pluralistic and democratic? Will it
incorporate a bill of rights that protects individual liberty and equality?
Protection of privacy is one of the critical issues that must be resolved.
Will the "Digital Age" be one in which individuals maintain, lose, or gain
control over information about themselves? Will it be possible to preserve a
protected sphere from unreasonable government and private sector
intrusion? In the midst of this uncertainty, there are reasons for optimism.
Individuals operating on the Internet can use new tools for protecting their
privacy. From anonymous mailers and web browsers that allow individuals
to interact anonymously, to encryption programs that protect e-mail
messages as they pass through the network; individuals can harness the
technology to promote their privacy. Equally important is the new found
voice of individuals. Using e-mail, Web sites, listservers, and newsgroups,
individuals on the Internet are able to quickly respond to perceived threats to
privacy. Whether it be a proposal before the Federal Reserve Board
requiring banks to "Know Your Customers,"' or the release of a product like
1. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,563 (1998).
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Intel's Pentium III, that will facilitate the tracking of individuals across the
World Wide Web. Internet users have a forum for discussion, a simple
method to find like-minded souls, and a platform from which to spread their
message. This active vigilance is forcing the government and the private
2sector to reckon with a growing and vocal privacy constituency.
But it is not just individuals' self-interest leading us toward increased
privacy protection. Faced with numerous surveys documenting that the lack
of privacy protections is a major barrier to consumer participation in
electronic commerce, businesses are beginning to take privacy protection
more seriously. Numerous efforts at self-regulation have emerged; both
cooperative, such as TRUSTe, 3 the Better Business Bureau's Online Privacy
Program, 4 and the Online Privacy Alliance;5 and perhaps more importantly
for the long-run, company specific. A growing number of companies, under
public and regulatory scrutiny, have begun incorporating privacy into their
management process and actually marketing their "privacy sensitivity" to the
public. The collective efforts pose difficult questions about how to ensure
the adoption and enforcement of rules in this global, decentralized medium.
Governments, are also struggling to identify their appropriate role in
this new environment. To date, the United States policy appears to be
largely based on the principle "first do no harm." The restraint shown thus
far can be credited with providing the room for all affected parties to wrestle
with the difficult issues presented by this new environment and move
towards consensus. The principles to be abided by, and to some extent the
enforcement schemes, are becoming more robust. Most importantly, the
dialogue in recent months, evidenced by developments such as the recently
passed Children's Online Privacy Protection Act ("COPPA") 6 -which was
supported by children's advocates, privacy advocates, and companies-has
taken an important turn. Less is heard about the means to achieve privacy
protection-self-regulation versus legislation-and more focus is on the
ends-privacy protections for individuals. These developments provide
tangible evidence that common ground is within reach.
While expectations of privacy are under serious challenge, the self-
interest of the various constituencies that make up the Internet-users,
advocates, industry, and government-are all pushing toward the adoption of
2. Center for Democracy & Technology, Privacy Not Price: Keeping People Off The
Internet, CDT's Analysis of Recent Privacy Surveys <http:/Iwww.cdt.org/privacy/survey/findin
gs/surveyframe.html>.
3. TRusTe: Building a Web You Can Believe In <http://www.etrust.org/>[hereinafter
TRuSTe].
4. BBB Online <http://www.bbbonline.orgprivacy/frjbdjix.html>.
5. Online Privacy Alliance <http://www.privacyalliance.orgl>.
6. 15 U.S.C.A. § 6501 (1998).
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technologies and rules that provide individuals with greater control over
their information and their privacy.
I. WHAT MAKES THE INTERNET DIFFERENT?
If we are to design systems that protect privacy on the Intemet-a
globally, networked environment-we must understand the specific
challenges to privacy posed by its functions and use. The Internet presents a
series of new challenges for achieving public policy goals-be they
protecting children from inappropriate material or protecting privacy.
A. Increased Data Creation and Collection
The Internet accelerates the trend toward increased information
collection, which is already evident in our offline world. The data trail,
known as transactional data, left behind as individuals use the Internet is a
rich source of information about their habits of association, speech, and
commerce. Transactional data, click stream data, or "mouse droppings," as
it is alternatively called, can include the Internet protocol address ("IP
address") of the individual's computer, the browser in use, the computer
type, and what the individual did on previous visits to the Web site, or
perhaps even other Web sites. This data, which may or may not be enough
to identify a specific individual, is captured at various points in the network
and available for reuse and disclosure. Some of the data generated is
essential to the operation of the network, like the phone number that
connects a calling party to the intended recipient, the IP address is necessary,
for without it the network cannot function. However, other pieces of data
may serve purposes beyond network operation. Along with information
intentionally revealed through purchasing or registration activities, this
transactional data can provide a "profile" of an individual's activities. When
aggregated, these digital fingerprints reveal the blueprint of an individual's
life. This increasingly detailed information is bought and sold as a
commodity by a growing assortment of players.
B. The Globalization of Information and Communications
On the Internet, information and communications flow unimpeded
across national borders. The Internet places the comer store, and a store
three continents away, equally at the individual's fingertips. Just as the flow
of personal information across national borders poses a risk to individual
privacy, citizens' ability to transact with entities in other countries places
individual privacy at risk in countries that lack privacy protections. National
[Vol. 23:549
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laws may be insufficient, on their own, to provide citizens with privacy
protections, across borders. Whether it is protecting citizens from fraud,
limiting the availability of inappropriate content, or protecting privacy,
governments are finding their traditional ability to make and effectively
enforce policies challenged by the global communications medium.7
C. Lack of Centralized Control Mechanisms
While developing appropriate domestic policy may be sufficient in a
paper-based world or a centralized and closed network, where nations can
control the flow of information about citizens thereby protecting them from
areas where protection is insufficient, information in a networked
environment flows effortless from country to country, organization to
organization, and policy regime to policy regime. Effective monitoring of
the generation, collection, and flow of information on this vast scale may tax
the resources of those currently responsible for data protection or other
policies.
In addition to the difficulty of enforcing rules, governments around the
globe are struggling with how to develop appropriate and effective rules.
Efforts to use legal and regulatory instruments developed to address issues in
other media-broadcast, telephone, print-may not be effective, and in cases
like the United States' Communications Decency Act, may be found
impermissible. The need for global, decentralized solutions has prompted
7. The United States Congress' first effort to regulate speech on the Internet, the
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as
amended 47 U.S.C. 230 (1997)) [hereinafter "CDA"], was held to violate the First Amendment
by the Supreme Court. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). Congress' second attempt, the
Child Online Protection Act (Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1401-06, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998))
(codified at 65 U.S.C.A. § 6501 (1998)) [hereinafter "CDA II"], is currently the subject of a
legal challenge. On February 1, 1999, a federal district court issued a preliminary injunction
prohibiting the government from enforcing CDA II until the court is able to issue a decision on its
merits. ACLU v. Reno II, E.D. Pa. Case No. 98-5591, Preliminary Injunction Order (February
1, 1999). In contrast, the Clinton Administration's November report on Electronic Commerce
advocates the voluntary use of filtering and blocking tools as the appropriate means of addressing
concerns with children's access to inappropriate information on the intemet. See generally U.S.
Gov't Working Group, on Electronic Comm., First Annual Report (1998). The report also states
that the Administration did not support CDA II. See generally id.
8. Concerns over children's access to inappropriate content were raised early on.
Therefore, we have the most information about efforts to address this problem. We know that in
the United States, applying standards developed for broadcast is unconstitutional. We have
information about activities in other countries. Many have acknowledged the difficulty of
controlling inappropriate content through regulation and are now looking toward decentralized
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various international bodies including the European Union, the Organization
for Cooperation and Development, and the United Nations to examine how
to best advance their missions in this new environment.9 As Dr. Malcolm
Norris, Data Protection Commissioner for the Isle of Man, concluded in his
paper, Privacy and the Legal Aspects of the Information Superhighway, "I
believe the Internet will rove to be very difficult to govern in the way that
Governments may wish."' 0
Together, the characteristics of the new medium pose challenges to our
traditional, top-down methods of implementing policy and controlling
behavior. Providing a seamless web of privacy protection to data as it flows
through this international network will require us to harness the business
community's interest in promoting commerce, the government's interest in
fostering economic growth and protecting its citizens, and the self-interest of
individuals in protecting themselves from the overreaching of the
government and the private sectors. It requires us to use all of the tools at
our disposal-international agreements, legislation, self-regulation, public
education, and the technology itself. We must begin by reaching consensus
on what we mean by protecting privacy, but we must keep the characteristics
of the online environment sharply in focus. Concentrating in this manner is
essential for the nature of the Internet and may alter the manner through
which we achieve our goals.
Ill. WHAT DO WE MEAN BY PRIVACY? AND HOW Is IT BEING ERODED?
Privacy means many things to many people and different things in
different contexts." For the purpose of our discussion, we will examine
9. In October 1995, the European Union ("EU") adopted the Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data. 1995 J.O. (L28) 31. The Directive
seeks to establish a common ground of privacy protection for personal data within the
community and to ensure that the privacy of EU citizens was protected during "cross-border
data flows,"-transfers of data to non-EU countries. OECD guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data <http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti
/ii/secur/prod/PRIVEN.HTM> [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. Member States must comply
with the Directive through the implementation of national provisions. Id. In February 1998,
the OECD held a conference on Data Protection in International Networks. OECD Workshop
on "Privacy Protection in a Global Networked Society" (February 1998) <httpllwww.oecd.org
//dstilstilitlsecur/prod/reg985final.pdf>. The Workshop provided an overview of various effor
ts to ensuring privacy protection. See United Nations Human Rights Website<http:lwww.unh
chr.ch/htmlmenu3/b7 1.htm>.
10. Dr. Malcolm 0. Norris, Privacy and the Legal Aspects of the Information
Superhighway <http://www.odpr.org/restofit/Papers/Papers/Privacyjntemet.html>.
11. This discussion focuses primarily on information privacy. Information privacy
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several core "privacy expectations"12 that individuals have long held, and
which should carry over to their interactions on the Internet that are under
siege.
incorporates two components-at times distinct and at times inextricable---"the right to be let
alone" first articulated by Justice Louis Brandeis over a century ago in his dissent in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), and the right to control
information about oneself, even after divulging it to others, as discussed by Professor Alan F.
Westin in Privacy and Freedom. See generally ALAN F. WESrIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM
(Atheneum 1967). While there is no definitive case finding a constitutional right for information
privacy, the Supreme Court acknowledged that such a privacy right exists in Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (upholding a state statute that required doctors to disclose information on
individuals taking certain highly addictive prescription drugs for inclusion on a state database).
'The information... is made available only to a small number of public health officials with a
legitimate interest in the information .... Broad dissemination by state officials of such
information, however, would clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy rights ... ." Id
at 606. The lack of strong constitutional privacy protection has placed added emphasis on federal
and state statutory protections. See, e.g., The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; The Right to Financial Privacy
Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3401; The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18
U.S.C. § 2510 (1995); The Communications Assistance and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat 4279 (1994) (providing heightened protections for
transactional data); The Cable Communications Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat.
2779 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); The Video Privacy
Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994); Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of
1996, 15 U.S.C. 1681-s2 (1997); Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention
Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108; Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 USC §
2721 (1994); Privacy of Customer Information (The Customer Proprietary Network Information
Rules of the Telecommunications Reform Act of 1996), 47 U.S.C. § 222 (c), (d) (1996). While
statutory privacy protections for personal information have been crafted on a sector by sector
basis, many are based on a common set of principles set forth in the CODE OF FAIR INFORMATION
PRINCIPLES, which was developed by the Department of Health Education and Welfare in 1973.
See generally DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH EDUCATION & WELFARE, CODE OF FAIR INFORMATION
PRNciPLs (1973), in SECRETARY'S ADVISORY CoMMrr=E REPORT ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL
DATA SYSTEMs, Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC. &
WELFARE, July 1973.
12. The phrase "expectations of privacy" is used here with intent. Despite case law
suggesting that the legal protections afforded to our expectations of privacy are limited by the
technical and social possibilities for surveillance, the authors believe that, as a society, we do
share some basic expectations of privacy. Privacy legislation enacted by Congress in response to
some of the Court's decisions lends some credence to this notion.
The "reasonable expectation" test was articulated in the seminal privacy case, United States
v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), in which the Supreme Court ruled that
the Fourth Amendment protects "people, not places" from unwarranted searches and seizures. Id.
at 351. Thereby reversing United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), which held that the
Fourth Amendment covered only physical places, and thus the warrant requirement did not apply
1999]
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A. The Expectation of Anonymity
Imagine walking through a mall where every store, unbeknownst to you,
placed a sign on your back. The signs tell every other store you visit exactly
where you have been, what you looked at, and what you purchased.
Something very close to this is possible on the Internet.
When individuals surf the World Wide Web, they have a general
expectation of anonymity, more so than in the physical world where an
individual may be observed by others. If an individual has not actively
disclosed information about herself, she believes that no one knows who she
is or what she is doing. But the Internet generates an elaborate trail of data
detailing every stop a person makes on the Web. This data trail may be
captured by the individual's employer if she logged on at work, and is
captured by the Web sites the individual visits.13 Transactional data, click
stream data, or "mouse-droppings," can provide a "profile" of an
individual's online life.
to police wiretaps. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Although hailed as a landmark privacy
decision, the Katz test has been applied in later cases to undermine privacy interests. In Katz's
progeny, the Court has applied the "reasonable expectation" test as a relative standard informed
by the technological and social realities of the day. As technology has advanced, and as societal
demands for sensitive personal information have increased, the Court has increasingly
circumscribed the "zones" one may justifiably consider private. See California v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (quoting United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir.
1981) (holding that people have no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage once it is
removed from the home and placed on the curb for pick-up, because garbage is placed "'in an
area particularly suited for public inspection and.., for the express purpose of having strangers
take it"')); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214-15 (1986) (holding that the use of a fixed-
wing aircraft to observe marijuana on defendant's property from 1,000 feet did not violate his
protected "zone of privacy" because the defendant's subjective expectation of privacy was not
one "that society is prepared to honor... [i]n an age where private and commercial flight in the
public airways is routine."). The Court's application of this standard has proved particularly
troublesome in the information privacy context. The Court has continually held that individuals
have no privacy interest in information divulged to the private sector, even though modem
society leaves citizens no option but to disclose to others, e.g., disclosure as a condition of
participation in society and technology accumulating transactional data. See Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding that individuals have no privacy interest in the numbers
dialed from their homes); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (holding that
individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in personal financial records maintained by
the bank). However, both Smith and Miller were later "overturned" by Congress through the
enactment of statutes that created legally enforceable expectations of privacy. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.
§ 3401 (1994).
13. See The Center for Democracy and Technology's Snoop Demonstration at
<http://snoop.cdt.org> for an example of the information that can be easily captured by sites
on the World Wide Web.
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Technologies such as "cookies, 14 written directly onto your hard drive,
enable Web sites to surreptitiously collect information about your online
activities and store it for future use. Designed for the benign purpose of
enabling Web sites to recognize a repeat visitor and respond accordingly,
cookies were quickly adopted by Web sites to facilitate the tracking of
specific individual's activities at Web sites for the purpose of customizing
content and advertising. The surreptitious collection of information about
individual's activities, across multiple Web sites enabled through some
"cookie" implementations, gained the attention of Internet users, technicians,
and policy makers. 15  Companies, such as Doubleclick, use this detailed
transactional information to provide targeted online advertising. Others,
such as Adfinity, combine these "mouse-droppings" or "click-stream data"
with personal information collected from other sources into fully identifiable
profiles of the individual's online and offline behavior.
The increased data collection enabled by the Internet and electronic
commerce are part of a larger phenomena-the growing market in personal
information. As one reporter stated:
Let's face it: Companies are fascinated by me.
Okay, maybe not me personally, but "me"--the consumer-
collectively. I possess something nearly as valuable as spendable
cash: information about myself. Before they can get to "me" to buy
something, they need to know a lot about me: how old I am, how
much I make, who I voted for, what I eat, wear, drive think or do.16
14. "Cookies" is a browser feature that assists Web site operators in tracking a user's
activities. It was initially designed to address the "static state" problem of the World Wide Web,
the fact that Web sites don't know whether a user is a first time or repeat visitor. See Joan E.
Rigdon, Internet Users Say They'd Rather Not Share Their 'Cookies,' WAL ST. J., Feb. 14,
1996, at B6.
15. The initial response was the addition of a "cookie prompt" which alerts individuals
that a Web site wishes to place a "cookie" on their browser. Peter Lewis, Web Cookies: Trail of
Crumbs, SEATrLE TIMEs: Search Results <http:llarchives.seattletiJdisplay?storylD=-55840
&query--cookie+AND+%22Ari+Schwartz%22>. Broader responses include the current attempt
by members of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF") to address privacy concerns with a
rewrite of the "cookie" standard, and the availability of various technological tools that allow
users to delete and/or disable "cookies." D. Kristol & L. Montulli, H1ITP State Mangament
Mechanism IETF Network Working Group, Request for Comments: 2109, D. Kristol Bell
Laboratories, Lucent Technologies, L. Montulli Netscape Communications, February 1997
<http://www.ietf.orgfrfc/rfc2109.txt>.
16. Paul Farhi, ME INC.: GETTING THE GOODS ON CONSUMERS; Marketing
Firms Want Basic Data About You and Me, But We're Wising Up to What Those Facts Are
Worth, WASH. PosT, Feb. 14, 1999, at H01.
1999]
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Evidence of the growing market for detailed "personal profiles" of
individuals is rampant on the Internet. Be it personalized search engines and
"portals," the pervasive use of "cookies" and other sticky bits of data that
Web sites store on visitors' computers to aid the site in personalizing and
targeting content and advertising, or the recent move by Intel to stamp each
computer-and once the individual using the computer releases information,
each individual-with a unique and traceable identity in cyberspace. The
business communities rapacious appetite for information is all too apparent.
Last August, some of the largest commercial sites on the World Wide Web
announced that they would feed information about their customers' reading,
shopping, and entertainment habits into a system developed by a
Massachusetts company that was already tracking the moves of more than
thirty million Internet users, recording where they go on the Internet and
what they read, often without the users' knowledge. 7 In a sense, the system
does what direct mail companies have done for years. But Internet based
systems can be more precise, determining not only which magazines you
subscribe to, but also which articles you read. More recently stories about
"free" computers, valued at approximately $999, provided to individuals in
exchange for detailed information about themselves and their families and
permission to track their Internet usage, provide some indication of the value
placed by a section of the business community on personal information and
the lengths to which they will go to solicit it.'
8
While the private sector uses of personal information generated by use
of the Internet have been scrutinized by the public and the press, the
governments interest in and use of it has received less attention. But
governments are interested in this data too. As the Federal Trade
Commission revealed in its report to Congress on the Individual Reference
Service Industry ("Look-up Services"), the government is a major customer
of personal information about us. 19 While marketing information is not the
fodder for "look-up services," it too is attractive to the government. A battle
being waged today, over the "location" information available through many
17. Saul Hansell, Big Web Sites to Track Steps of Their Users, N.Y. TIMES ABSTRACT,
Aug. 16, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 5422846.
18. Karen Kaplan, In Giveaway of 10,000 PCs, the Price is Users' Privacy Marketing:
Recipients Must Agree to Let Pasadena Firm Monitor Where They Go on Internet and What
They Buy, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1999, at Al.
19. Individual Reference Services: FTC. INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE SERVICES 9 (Dec.
1997), available in 1997 WL 784156. The Individual Reference Services Industry is a sub-set
of the information and industry which compiles information from the public and private
sectors into information products that are used to locate, verify, and identify individuals, and
provide dossiers of information about them. See generally id.
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cellular networks, foreshadows the larger privacy considerations lurking in
the vast data generated by individuals' use of the Internet.20 In the course of
processing calls, many wireless communications systems collect information
about the cell site and location of the person making or receiving a call.
Location information may be captured when the phone is merely on, even if
it is not handling a call.21 Both government and the private -sector have their
eye on this location information. While the government seeks to build added
surveillance features into the network and ensure their access to the
increasingly detailed data it captures, the private sector is considering how to
use this new form of information. A company in Japan is experimenting
with a World Wide Web site that allows anyone to locate a phone, and the
person carrying it, by merely typing in the phone number.2 As one reporter
20. In October of 1994, also commonly known as the "Digital Telephony" legislation,
Congress enacted the Communications Assistance and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
providing heightened protections for transactional data. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat 4279
(1994) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.) [hereinafter "CALEA"]. The
statute requires telecommunications carriers to ensure that their systems contain sufficient
capability and capacity to permit law enforcement to conduct electronic surveillance. Although
law enforcement officials must still obtain a search warrant in order to conduct a wiretap, the
statute granted law enforcement new authority to influence the design of telecommunications
networks. § 103(a), 108 Stat. at 4280.
Since its enactment, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") has tried to use CALEA to
require expanded surveillance features in the nation's telecommunications systems. Through
statutory provisions which require public accountability and oversight over government design
authority, telecommunications carrier liability, standards setting, and cost reimbursement, the
Center for Democracy and Technology ("CDT') has attempted to curb the government's efforts
to vastly increase surveillance capability. Telephone companies have yielded to some of the
FBI's demands and have resisted others. In April 1998, acting upon a petition by CDT, the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") launched an inquiry into whether the FBI's
demands go farther than the law requires and infringe on privacy. Federal Communications
Commission DA 98-762, In the Matter of. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,
Docket No. 97-213 (April 20, 1998) (petition for Rulemaldng under Sections 107 and 109 of the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, filed by the Center for Democracy and
Technology). In September 1998, the FCC delayed implementation of CALEA by 20 months,
until June 2000. In October 1998, the FCC tentatively approved many of the FBI's demands,
including a proposal to turn cellular and other wireless phones into tracking devices. Action by
the Commission, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 98-223 (Sept. 10, 1998) (Chairman
Kennard, Commissioners Ness, Powell and Tristani with Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth
concurring and Commissioners Ness and Powell issuing a joint statement and Commissioner
Furchtgott-Roth issuing a separate statement). At the same time, the FCC launched an inquiry
into surveillance in pocket-switched networks. Id.
21. Albert Gidari, Locating Criminals by the Book, CELLULAR Bus., June 1996, at 70.
22. Edward W. Desmond, The Scariest Phone System, FORTUNE, Oct. 13, 1997, at 168.
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put it: "Cellular telephones, long associated with untethered freedom, are
becoming silent leashes. 23
Now we head to the register. In the physical world, individuals can
choose to purchase goods and services with a variety of payment
mechanisms, the most common being cash, check, bank card, credit card,
and a prepaid stored value mechanism, such as a travelers check or smart-
card. Individuals can, and often do, pay by cash.24 An individual's choice of
payment mechanism impacts on her privacy. The amount of personal
information generated and collected varies from theoretically none in a cash
transaction to identity, item or service purchased, merchant, and date and
time in a credit transaction. Similarly, the list of parties who have access to
personal data can range from the individual and the merchant in a cash
transaction, to the merchant, affiliated issuer, transaction processor, credit
card company, and individual in a credit card transaction. In general, cash
provides the most privacy protection during financial transactions in the
25offline world. It is fungible, largely untraceable, and because its value is
inherent and irrefutable, it requires no additional assurance of authenticity
which often drives the collection of identity information.
In the online environment, the digital equivalent of cash has not yet
achieved widespread use. Most online purchases are made with credit cards,
which identify the individual and facilitate the collection of purchasing data.
The lack of a cash equivalent in the online world, and its reduced use in the
physical world, will seriously alter the privacy of individuals' financial
26dealings.
For example, consider the differences between an auction/yard sale in
the physical world and Ebay, the premiere auction/classified listing/yard sale
on the World Wide Web. Attendees at a traditional auction while physically
23. Peter Wayner, Technology that Tracks Cell Phones Draws Fire, N.Y. TIMES
mRAcTs, Feb. 23, 1998, at D3.
24. In many countries, offline consumer-initiated financial transactions are dominated by
cash and checks. The reference is to the number of transactions not to the relative economic
value they represent. Many of the transactions represented are likely to involve relatively modest
sums. For example, newspaper purchases, meals, and phone calls to name a few. See
FRB: Federal Reserve Board Speech from Mar. 7, 1997 <http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/boarddocs/s
peeches/19970307.htm> (remarks by Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan at the
Conference on Privacy in the Information Age, Salt Lake City, UT, Mar. 1997).
25. However, even "ordinary cash itself, after all, is less than completely anonymous since
it is usually exchanged in person, bears a unique serial number, carries fingerprints, and can
easily be marked for identification." A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information
Ocean: Living with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395,
471 (1996).
26. As financial transactions in the physical world continue to migrate to stored value
cards, smart cards and chip-based systems, the need to build privacy protections into these
payment systems becomes more urgent.
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present do not reveal who they are prior to participation. At Ebay, prior to
bidding individuals must provide a name, home address, phone number and
e-mail address. The differences between the information collected to
support a similar activity in these two environments to some degree reveals
the increased emphasis placed on knowing the identity of the individual with
whom you are interacting where the payment mechanism is less secure than
what cash affords. The translation of cash, the most privacy protective of
payment mechanisms, into an online equivalent, is a pressing privacy issue.
27
Without it we will quickly move from a world of cash-based anonymity to
one of full identification and increased tracking of individuals' purchases.2
B. The Expectation of Fairness and Control Over Personal Information
When individuals provide information to a doctor, a merchant, or a
bank, they expect that those professionals/companies will base the
information collected on the service and use it for the sole purpose of
providing the service requested. The doctor will use it to tend to their
health, the merchant will use it to process the bill and ship the product, and
the bank will use it to manage their account-end of story. Unfortunately,
current practices, both offline and online, foil this expectation of privacy.
27. As Froomkin points out, a privacy-enhancing feature of digital cash transactions in
general is that, unlike traditional financial transactions, they do not occur face-to-face. Id. at 471.
28. Law enforcement is eager to access the vast data available about individuals' financial
transactions. Under a new set of proposed regulations, United States banks must monitor their
customers and alert federal officials to "suspicious" behavior. The proposed regulations were
filed with the Federal Register on December 7, 1998 by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Federal Reserve, Department of the Treasury's Office of Comptroller of the
Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision. See Minimum Security Devices and Procedures and
Bank Secrecy Act Compliance, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,529-67,536 (Dec. 7, 1998) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 326). The regulations require banks to review every customer's "normal and expected
transactions" and tip off the IRS and federal law enforcement agencies if the behavior is unusual.
Id. Under the so-called 'Know Your Customer" rules the Federal Reserve, the Office of Thrift
Supervision, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation have published identical requirements. Id. Today, if a bank detects any "suspicious
activity," they must file a five-page report including your name, address, Social Security number,
driver license or passport number, date of birth, and information about the transaction. Id. Under
the new regulations they will also have to determine the "source of a customer's funds"--such as
payroll deposits-and authorize federal agents to inspect "all information and documentation" of
accounts upon request. Id. The information all goes into the Suspicious Activity Reporting
System, a mammoth searchable database jointly administered by the IRS and FinCEN, around
since April 1996. Over a dozen agencies including the FBI, IRS, Secret Service, bank regulators,
and state law enforcement share access to this data. Declan McCullagh, Banking With Big
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Whether it is medical information, or a record of a book purchased at the
bookstore, information generated in the course of a business transaction is
routinely used for a variety of other purposes without the individual's
knowledge or consent. Some entities go so far as to declare the information
individuals provide them as company "property."
There are multiple examples of companies using and disclosing
personal information for purposes well beyond what the individual intended.
For example, recent news stories have focused the public on misuses of
personal health information by the private sector-particularly when it is
digitized, stored and manipulated. Recently, the Washington Post reported
that CVS drug stores and Giant Food were disclosing patient prescription
records to a direct mail and pharmaceutical company. The company was
using the information to track customers who failed to refill prescriptions,
and then sending them notices encouraging them to refill and to consider
other treatments. Due to public outrage and perhaps the concern expressed
by senators crafting legislation on the issue of health privacy, CVS and Giant
Food agreed to halt the marketing disclosures. 3' But the sale and disclosure
of personal health information is big business. In a recent advertisement
Patient Direct Metromail advertised that it had 7.6 million names of people
suffering from allergies, 945,000 suffering from bladder-control problems,
and 558,000 suffering from yeast infections.
32
While many expect strong concern for privacy to surround sensitive
information such as health and financial records, several recent incidents
involving the sale and disclosure of what many perceive as less sensitive
information indicate a rising of privacy concerns among the public. 33 In
recent years, a number of corporations, as well as government entities, have
learned the hard way that consumers are prepared to protest against services
that appear to infringe on their privacy. In 1996, public criticism forced
Lexis-Nexis to withdraw a service known as P-Trak, which granted easy
online access to a database of millions of individuals' Social Security
numbers. Also in 1996, Yahoo faced a public outcry over its People Search
service. The service, jointly run with a marketing list vendor, would have
29. See Robert O'Harrow Jr., Prescription Sales, Privacy Fears, CVS, Giant Shares
Customer Records With Drug Marketing Finn, WASH. PosT, Feb. 15, 1998, at Al.
30. Id.
3 1. See Robert O'Harrow Jr, CVS Also Cuts Ties To Marketing Service; Like Giant, Firm
Cites Privacy on Prescriptions, WASH. PoT, Feb. 19, 1998, at El.
32. Cheryl Clark, Medical Privacy is Eroding, Physicians and Patients Declare, SAN
Dm, oUNIONTRIm., Feb. 21, 1998, at B2.
33. Internet Power Feeds Public Fear, USA TODAY, Aug. 13, 1997, at BI. When news
spread across the Internet about the availability of individuals' Social Security numbers through
the Lexis-Nexis service P-track the public and policy makers were outraged. Pat Flynn, Lexis-
Nexis E-Mail Scare Proves Wrong, SAN DIEGo UNONTRm., SEPT. 21, 1996, at Cl.
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allowed Net searchers to put an instant finger on 175 million people, all
culled from commercial mailing lists. After hearing the complaints, Yahoo
decided to delete 85 million records containing unlisted home addresses.
During August of 1997, American Online ("AOL") announced plans to
disclose its subscribers' telephone numbers to business partners for
telemarketing.34 AOL heard loud objections from subscribers and advocates
opposed to this unilateral change in the "terms of service agreement"
covering the use and disclosure of personal information. 5 In response, AOL
36decided not to follow through with its proposal. At the beginning of the
year, the Washington Post reported that several states had entered into
agreements to sell state drivers' license photos to Image data. Under public
scrutiny the deal seemed quite different,-state governors and legislatures
quickly moved to block the contract. Florida Governor Jeb Bush terminated
the contract saying: "I am personally not comfortable with the state
mandating license photos for the purpose of identifying authorized drivers,
and then selling those photos at a profit for a completely different purpose."
The technologies' surveillance capacity to collect, aggregate, analyze
and distribute personal information coupled with current business practices
have left individual privacy unprotected. While recent surveys37 and public
pressure have raised the privacy consciousness of companies, particularly
those operating online, individuals' information is frequently used anddisclosed for purposes well beyond what the individual provided it for.
34. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, AOL Will Share Users' Numbers for Telemarketing, WASH.
POST, July 24, 1997, at El; Rebecca Quick, Soon AOL Users Will Get Junk Calls, Not Just Busy
Signals and E-mailAds., WALL ST. J., July 24, 1997, at B6. Its important to note that while AOL
has been taken to task for failures to protect subscribers privacy, the AOL privacy policy has been
recognized by many advocates as one of the best in the industry. See Department of Commerce
Workshop on Online Privacy, June 1998 <http:llwww.doc.govl>.
35. See Letter from the Center for Democracy and Technology, Electronic Frontier
Foundation, EFF-Austin, National Consumers League, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, and Voters
Telecommunications Watch to Steve Case, President, AOL (on file with the author).
36. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, AOL Cancels Plan for Telemarketing; Disclosure of Members'
Numbers Protested, WAH. PosT, July 25, 1997, at G1.
37. For an overview of recent surveys of consumer concerns with privacy see,
The Center for Democracy and Technology, <http:lwww.cdt.orglprivacy/surveys/findings/intr
obody.html>.
38. The "Online Industry" has been active on the privacy front by creating self-regulatory
principles, funding and developing mechanisms to provide accountability and service consumer
complaints, and developing seals to identify Web sites that abide by industry-developed privacy
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C. The Expectation of Confidentiality
When individuals send an e-mail message, they expect that it will be
read only by the intended recipient. Unfortunately, this expectation too is in
danger. For starters, if an individual is using an office computer, it is
possible, and legal, for her boss to monitor her messages. If she is using her
home computer, her privacy is still not fully assured.
While United States law provides e-mail the same legal protection as a
first class letter, the technology leaves unencrypted e-mail as vulnerable as a
postcard. Compared to a letter, an e-mail message travels in a relatively
unpredictable and unregulated environment. As it travels through the
network, e-mail is handled by many independent entities: in comparison, a
letter is handled only by the United States Postal Service. To further
complicate matters, the e-mail message may be routed, depending upon
traffic patterns, overseas and back, even if it is a purely domestic
communication. While the message may effortlessly flow from nation to
nation, the statutory privacy protections stop at the border. In addition,
unlike the phone or postal systems, the Internet does not have central points
of control. While the decentralized nature of the Internet allows it to cope
with problems and failures in any given computer network, by simply
routing in another direction, it also provides ample opportunities for those
seeking to capture confidential communications. The rogue action or
policy of a single computer network can compromise the confidentiality of
information.
But e-mail is just one example, today our diaries, our medical records,
our communications, and confidential documents are more likely to be out in
the network than under our bed. This has drastic consequences for our
privacy-as information moves further out onto the network our existing
statutory framework provides less and less protection.
It's useful to look at the weak state of privacy protections for other
personal papers and records. Individuals traditionally kept their diaries
under their mattress, in the bottom drawer of their dresser, or at their writing
table. Situated within the four walls of the home, these private papers are
protected by the Fourth Amendment. With the advent of home computers,
individual diaries moved to the desktop and the hard drive. Writers, poets,
and average citizens quickly took advantage of computers to manage and
39. Attempts to regulate the availability of encryption on the Internet highlight the
frustrations that regulators may experience. As many scholars and advocates have pointed out,
national attempts to restrict the availability of encryption are likely to be ineffective. For if even
one jurisdiction or one network in one jurisdiction fails to restrict it, individuals worldwide will
be able to access it over the Internet and use it.
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transcribe their important records and thoughts. Similarly, pictures moved
from the photo album to the CD-ROM.
Today, network computing allows individuals to rent space outside their
home to store personal files and personal World Wide Web pages. The
information has remained the same. A diary is a diary is a diary. But storing
those personal thoughts and reflections on a remote server eliminates many
of the privacy protections they were afforded when they were under the bed
or on the hard drive. Rather than the Fourth Amendment protections-
including a warrant based on probable cause, judicial oversight, and notice-
the individual's recorded thoughts may be obtained from the service provider
through a mere court order with no notice to the individual at all.
The weak state of privacy protection is evident in the business setting
too. Let's look at medical records. Hospitals, their affiliated clinics, and
physicians are using intranets to enable the sharing of patient, clinical,
financial, and administrative data. Built on Internet technologies and
protocols, the private networks link the hospital's information system, to
pharmacy and laboratory systems, transcription systems, doctor and clinic
offices and others. The United States government is contemplating the
development of a federal government-wide computer-based patient record
system.40 According to news reports, the Internet and World Wide Web-
41based interfaces are under consideration. The private sector is moving to
integrate network computing into a sensitive area of our lives, the doctor's
office.42
As computing comes to medicine, the detailed records of individuals'
health continue to move not just out of our homes, but out of our doctor's
offices. While the use of network technology promises to bring information
to the fingertips of medical providers when they need it most, and greatly
ease billing, prescription refills, and insurance preauthorizations, it raises
privacy concerns.
In the absence of comprehensive federal legislation to protect patient
privacy, the legal protections afforded medical records may vary greatly
depending upon how the network is structured, where data is stored, and
how long it is kept. If records are housed on the computer of an individual
40. Why the Government Wants a Computerized Patient Record, Health Data Network
News, Vol. 7, No. 6, Mar. 20, 1998, at 1.
41. Id. at 8.
42. See generally Six Boston Hospitals Turn To the Internet as a Clinical Network
Tool, Health Data Network News, Vol. 6, No. 6, June 20, 1997, at 1; More Clearinghouses
Conclude the Internet Makes Economic Sense, Health Data Network News, Vol. 6, No. 6,
June 20, 1997, at 1; Hospital Banks on Web Technology for Integration, Health Data Network
News, Vol. 6, No. 16, Nov. 20, 1997, at 3.
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doctor then access to that data will be governed by the Fourth Amendment.
43
Law enforcement would be required to serve the doctor with a warrant or
subpoena and the doctor would receive notice and have the chance to halt an
inappropriate search. Under federal law, the patient however, would receive
no notice and have no opportunity to contest the production of the records.
When information is in transit between a doctor and a hospital through a
network, law enforcement's access is governed by the warrant requirements
of The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA"); and,
neither doctor nor patient receive prior or contemporaneous notice. If the
records are stored on a server leased from a service provider, the protections
are unclear. They may be accessible by mere subpoena. If they are covered
by the "remote computing" provisions of ECPA this would severely
undermine privacy in the digital age.44
The confidentiality of our sensitive information is challenged by a legal
framework that hinges protections on who maintains the information, how
the network is structured, where data is stored, and how long it is kept. As
our wallets become "e-wallets" housed somewhere out on the Internet rather
than in our back-pockets, and as our public institutions, businesses, and even
cultural institutions find homes online, the confidentiality of our
communications, papers, and information is at risk of compromise.
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
It is clear that our existing legal framework did not envision the
pervasive role information technology would play in our daily lives. Nor did
it envision a world where the private sector would collect and use
information at the level it does today. Our legal framework for protecting
individual privacy in electronic communications while built upon
constitutional principles and statutory protections, reflects the technical and
social "givens" of specific moments in history. From a belief that the
government's collection and use of information about individuals' activities
and communications was the only threat to individual privacy and that a
solid wall separated the data held by the private and public sector; to the
notion that the Internet would be used primarily for a narrow slice of
activities and that private and public spaces were easily demarcated, these
43. The recordkeeper would have Fourth Amendment protections. Whether the
patient's privacy is protected at all would largely depend upon state law, which is scattered
and inconsistent. Until a federal law protecting individual's privacy in health information is
crafted to protect data regardless of where it is stored or whose control it is under, privacy is in
danger.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (1994).
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vestiges of a pre-Intemet, pre-networked world, stress our existing privacy
framework.
Crafting proper privacy protections in the electronic realm has always
been a complex endeavor. It requires a keen awareness of not only changes
in technology, but also changes in how the technology is used by citizens,
and how those changes are pushing at the edges of existing laws. From time
to time these changes require us to reexamine our fabric of privacy
protections. The issues raised in this article indicate that it is time for such a
review.
The Internet has changed the quantity and quality of data available
about individuals' lives, but unfortunately our business practices, norms, and
laws have not progressed to ensure individuals' privacy. At the outset, there
are six areas where we must step up our activities to strengthen privacy
protections. Clear proposals can be attached to some, while at this time
others require further consideration.
A. Maintain a Consistent Level of Privacy Protection for Communications
and Information Regardless of Where They are Stored
Increasingly, our most important records are not "papers" in our
"houses" but "bytes" stored electronically at distant "virtual" locations for
indefinite periods of time and held by third parties. As discussed in Part I,
the Internet, and digital technology generally, accelerate the collection of
information about individuals' actions and communications. Our
communications, rather than disappearing, are captured and stored as well on
servers controlled by third parties. With the rise of networking and the
reduction of physical boundaries for privacy, we must ensure that privacy
protections apply regardless of where information is stored.
Under our existing law, there are now essentially four legal reimes for
access to electronic data: 1) the traditional Fourth Amendment standard
for records stored on an individual's hard drive or floppy disks; 2) the Title
rll-Electronic Communications Privacy Act 46 standard for records in
transmission; 3) the standard for business records held by third parties,
available on a mere subpoena to the third party with no notice to the
individual subject of the record;47 and 4) for records stored on a remote
server such as the research paper, or the diary, of a student stored on a
university server, or the records, including the personal correspondence, of
45. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
46. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2570-2711 (1994).
47. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1).
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an employee stored on the server of the employer, the scope of which is
probably unclear.
As the third and fourth categories of records expand because the wealth
of transactional data collected in the private sector grows and people find it
more convenient to store records remotely, the legal ambiguity and lack of
strong protection grows more significant and poses grave threats to privacy
in the digital environment. Independent Counsel Starr's investigation into
books purchased by Monica Lewinsky highlights the potential sensitivity of
records routinely collected by businesses and the intersection of privacy and
48First Amendment concerns. During his investigation into President
Clinton's relationship with White House intern Monica Lewinsky, Starr
sought information confirming the purchase of a specific book by Miss
Lewinsky. Starr served a subpoena upon Kramer Books, a local DC
bookstore, demanding the production of records reflecting purchasing
activities. 49 While the book store valiantly objected to the subpoena on First
Amendment and privacy grounds, and Starr eventually obtained Miss
Lewinsky's records through other channels, this incident raised concern
among the book-buying public.50 To search Miss Lewinsky's residence for
information about her reading habits Starr would have needed a warrant, but
in the hands of the bookstore the records were available under a less
stringent standard.
Sometimes the equation is flipped-the government has collected the
data and the private sector seeks access to it. During the law suit brought by
several states, including Massachusetts, against the tobacco industry for
repayment of state health care costs for smoking related illnesses, lawyers
for the tobacco industry sought access to a Massachusetts database
containing records on every hospital visit by every person in the entire state
population. 51  While the State's purpose for collecting the data was to
compare what it paid for health care to private insurers, it failed to enact
52privacy protections to limit access to the database. Because the State's
argument for repayment was premised on its ability to prove damage to state
residents from tobacco products, the tobacco companies wanted to see the
data supporting it.53 Massachusetts acted responsibly, hiring a team of
48. DAVID STOUT, Lewinsky's Bookstore Purchases Are Now Subject of a Subpoena, N.
Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1998, at Al.
49. DOREEN CARVAJAL, Testing a President: The Investigation; Book Industry Vows to
Fight 2 Subpoenas Issued Kenneth W. Starr, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1998, at Al.
50. STEPHEN LABATON, Lewinsky's Lawyers to Turn Over Records of Book Purchases,
N. Y. TIMES, June 22, 1998, at Al.
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cryptographers to ensure that the data released wouldn't identify individuals,
however the fact remains that the data was not protected by law.
54
Even our communications are vulnerable under today's law. Under the
existing legal framework, the same e-mail message would be afforded
different privacy protections depending on whether it was sought: while on
the individual's computer; in transmission; unread in storage for less than
180 days; or, read but left on the service provider's server. The differences
in protection afforded e-mail depending on whether it is captured in
transmission, accessed in storage while unread, or accessed in storage after it
has been read seem unwarranted, for the communication and individuals'
expectations of privacy remain the same. In an era where e-mail is more
commonly accessed as a stored record than through an interception, the
concepts developed for governmental access to business records in the
relatively static, paper-based environment are an ill-fit and provide weak
protections for individual privacy. It is time to provide a framework that
reflects individuals' expectations.
B. Raise the Legal Protections Afforded to Transactional Data When it is
Collected
Where information is needed, we must ensure that it is protected from
misuse and unfettered government access. Congress acted by legislation to
establish a right of privacy in bank records in the wake of a Supreme Court
decision finding they were without constitutional protection.5 5 Institutions
all across the economy are quickly becoming store houses of information
about individuals' marketplace behaviors,-unlike records held by banks,
these new databases are unprotected. The possibilities of computer analysis
have given value to tidbits previously considered meaningless: the little
digital footprints individuals leave showing who they called, where they
used their credit cards, what websites they visited, what products they
purchased, and when they entered the "intelligent" highway using the
automatic toll booth. While a certain website or product registration card
may only ask for a few minor pieces of personal information, together they
constitute a fairly complete profile of one's associations, habits, health
condition and personal interests, combining credit card transactions with
magazine subscriptions, telephone numbers, real estate records, car
registrations and fishing licenses.56 The digital deposits of these transactional
54. Id.
55. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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details are so deep that the practice of exploiting their commercial value is
called "data-mining," evoking the intensive, subterranean, and highly
lucrative labors of an earlier age.
It's time to ensure that the records of our reading habits, our online
browsing, and all the details of our lives left behind, online and in electronic
commerce, are not treated as mere "business records" available, without our
knowledge or permission, at the government's request. For even the most
mundane of records can harbor risks to privacy. A December Washington
Post article revealed that Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA")
officials were reviewing records of grocery store purchasing data collected
to support "frequent shopper" or loyalty programs.57 What would DEA
officials possibly hope to uncover? According to the Post, they were seeking
to identify purchasers of large numbers of small plastic bags and baking
powder - common grocery supplies used by drug dealers to dilute and
package cocaine and other drugs.58 As businesses intensify their data
collection efforts we must take steps to strengthen the privacy protections
afforded this data.
Congress took the first small step towards recognizing the changing
nature of transactional data in the networked environment with amendments
to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act59 enacted as part of the
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994
("CALEA"). 6 The 1994 amendments recognized that transactional data was
emerging as a hybrid form of data, somewhere between addressing
information and content, and was becoming increasingly revealing of
personal patterns of association. For example, addressing information was
no longer just a number and name, but contained the subject under
discussion and information about the individual's location. Therefore,
Congress raised the legal bar for government access to transactional data by
eliminating subpoena access and requiring a court order, albeit one issued on
a lower relevance standard. 61 This Congress passed legislation to foster
online interactions between citizens and the government by facilitating the
57. ROBERT O'HARROw, JR., Bargains at a Price Shoppers' Privacy, Cards Let
Supermarkets Collect Data, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1998, at Al. See also ROBERT O'HARROW,
JR. Behind the Instant Coupons, A Data Crunching Powerhouse, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1998,
at A20.
58. ROBERT O'HARROW, JR., Bargains at a Price Shoppers' Privacy, Cards Let
Supermarkets Collect Data, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1998, at Al.
59. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2711 (1994).
60. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-414,
108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1001 and scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47
U.S.C.).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(2)(A)-(B), (c)(1)(B), (d) (1994).
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government's acceptance of digital certificates.62 The legislation includes
forward looking privacy protections for the transactional data generated by
63
citizens' use of digital certificates. On a case by case basis, the courts are
addressing the privacy issues raised by this revealing data. However, as
electronic commerce becomes pervasive, transactional data will continue to
proliferate. A piecemeal approach may not provide the privacy protections
that this potentially sensitive information deserves.
C. Encourage Technologies that Limit the Collection of Personally
Identifiable Data
Law is only one tool for protecting privacy. In this global,
decentralized medium, we must promote applications of technology that
limit the collection of transactional information that can be tied to
individuals. 64 Some tools developed to protect privacy by limiting the
disclosure, or cloaking it, of infqrmation likely to reveal identity, or
decoupling this identity information from the individual's actions and
communications, exploit the decentralized and open nature of the Interaet.
65
For example, Crowds provides anonymity to individuals surfing the Web by
66
mingling their requests for access to Web sites with those of others. By
routing Web site access requests in a series of unpredictable paths, the
identity of the requester is hidden. Similarly, Onion Routing uses the
decentralized nature of the Internet coupled with public key encryption to67
provide privacy protections for Interet communications. Communications
62. The Government Paperwork Elimination Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1701-1710,
112 Stat. 2681, 2681-749 (1998) (codified at 44 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1998)).
63. § 1708, 112 Stat. at 2681-750.
64. For a thoughtful discussion of the privacy protection possible through technologies
that limit data collection, see Tm NETHERLANDS AND INFORMATION AND PRIVACY
COMMISSIONER, I, II Privacy-Enhancement Technologies: The Path to Anonymity (Ontario,
Canada Aug. 1995) [herinafter NErHERLANDS]. In his paper, "Privacy-Enhancing Technolo-
gies: Typology, Critique, Vision," Herbert Burkert suggests that Privacy-Enhancing Tech-
nologies ("PETs") can be differentiated into four categories: subject-oriented; object-
oriented; action-oriented; and, system-oriented. Burkert's approach provides a heuristic
method useful for thinking broadly about the role of PETs. Herbert Burkert, Privacy-
Enhancing Technologies: Typology, Critique, Vision, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE
NEW LANDSCAPE, 125-142 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg, eds. MIT Press 1997).
65. For a review of several privacy-enhancing technologies see, volume 42, no. 2, Feb.
1999 of the Communications of the ACM on Internet Privacy, guest editor Lorrie Faith
Cranor. February 1999.
66. Crowds Home Page < http://www.research.att.con-projects.crowds/>.
67. David Godschlag et. al., Onion Routing: Publications Onion Routing for Anony-
mous and Private Internet Connecting <http://www.onionrouter.net/publications/htm>.
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are passed through a series of routers before reaching the recip-
ient. Resembling an onion, the message is encircled in a series of lay-
ers. Each router is able to peel one layer of the onion enabling it to learn the
next stop in the messages path. Passing messages in this fashion protects an
individual's identity by obfuscating the originator and recipient of the
message from points in the network. These technical advances, if adopted
by users, can provide protections for privacy.
Of particular importance are payment mechanisms that preserve
anonymity. By using cash, individuals can engage in many daily
transactions without revealing their identity. Depending on the design
choices we make, the online environment could wipe out the expectation of
privacy that the physical world's cash purchase provides or the technology
of electronic payments could preserve privacy. Similarly, digital certificates,
if guided by privacy concerns, could be designed to limit the instances in
which identity is used as a broad substitute for specific traits or abilities.
A number of companies have attempted to craft cash-like payment
mechanisms. Digicash is a frequently mentioned payment mechanism that
provides cash-like anonymity to individual users. Digicash relies on blind
digital signatures, a cryptographic technique, to prevent the bank, or other
money issuer, and merchant from linking the individual's identity to specific
transactions. 70  Blind signatures provide the merchant with the ability to
determine the value and establish the authenticity of the payment while
shielding the individual's identity. The bank, while privy to information
about the user's identity, and able to deduct the appropriate sum from the
individual's account, is incapable of tying the particulars of a transaction to
the individual.7 '
68. Catherine Lee Wilson, Banking on the Net: Extending Bank Regulation to
Electronic Money and Beyond, 30 CREIGHTON L. REv. 671 (1997).
69. Digi-Cash Welcome <http://www.Digi-Cash.com./digicashlindex.html>. However,
unlike cash, Digi-Cash in its current applications does not provide anonymity to the recipient.
Generally, other available digital cash systems use digital signatures but do not provide for
anonymity.
70. Ecash-An Introduction to ecash <http:llwww.digicash.com/ecash/intro/index.html>.
Digi-Cash couples its blind digital signature technology with online clearing of transactions. Id.
Online clearing of transactions means that prior to accepting a payment the recipient is able to
check to ensure the obligation will be met. Id. This is similar to the online check used in credit
card authorization. Id.
71. Id. The decoupling of accounting and identity are facilitated by front-end debiting.
The user produces a digital document containing both her identity and a pseudonym. She sends it
to her bank with only the identity readable. The bank verifies the document, deducts the
appropriate amount from her account, and sends it back to the user as a document of fixed value
with a stamp indicating its authenticity. The user then gives the digital document to a merchant
obscuring her identity and revealing her pseudonym. The merchant can read the value and the
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The ability to engage in cash-like transactions in the online environment
is important to the protection of privacy. The enhanced data generation and
collection that occurs during the process of browsing a virtual store front, a
merchant's World Wide Web site, increases the privacy concerns associated
with the revelation of identity during the payment process. The capacity to
connect information far in excess of the specifics of a given financial
transaction to the individual's identity increases the risks to individual
privacy relative to the concerns in the offline world.
Digital cash technology can vastly reduce the need for the collection
and revelation of identity information. By providing alternative methods of
authenticating value, the online environment can afford cash-like anonymity
while providing some of the protections against theft associated with
traditionally data intensive payment mechanisms. For example, Digicash's
reliance on blind digital signatures may limit the risk of theft by providing
for non-identity dependent methods of verifying the transaction at the point
that value is removed from the individual's account.
The development of electronic payment mechanisms that protect
privacy hinges on the use of strong cryptography and the creation of a robust
public key infrastructure to support its use. By designing payment
mechanisms to limit the collection of personally identifiable information by
banks, clearinghouses, and merchants, it is possible to preserve the privacy
which individuals currently enjoy during cash transactions and perhaps move
the developers of other payment mechanisms to enhance privacy protection.
The private sector and the government should foster the development of
payment mechanisms and other technologies that foster anonymity and
privacy.
D. Establish Rules and Implement Technologies That Give Individuals
Control Over Personal Information During Commercial Interactions
We must adopt enforceable standards, both self-regulatory and
regulatory, to ensure that information provided for one purpose is not used or
redisclosed for other purposes. At the same time, we must recognize that in
this freewheeling, open marketplace, there will be limits to the effectiveness
of regulation and self-regulation. Therefore, we must look to technological
tools that will empower individuals to control their personal information.
stamp on the document indicating its authenticity. When presented to the bank the merchant's
account will be credited. See NEERLANDS, supra note 64, at 40-42.
72. Law enforcement desires to monitor financial transactions and the interest of
merchants and others involved in commerce in exploiting data about individuals for marketing
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The Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Commerce are
engaged in initiatives designed to promote "fair information practice
principles" in the online environment. The business community is also
engaged in efforts to protect privacy through self-regulatory guidelines and
enforcement mechanisms. All such efforts should focus on the Code of Fair
Information Practices ("CFIP") developed by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare ("HEW") in 19737' and the Guidelines for the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, adopted by
the Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
in 1980.7 4 Coupled with the World Wide Web Consortium's Platform for
73. Secretary's Advisory Comm. on Automated Personal Data Systems, Records,
Computers, and the Rights of Citizens, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, July 1973.
There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence
is secret.
There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him
is in a record and how it is used.
There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him that
was obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other
purposes without his consent.
There must be a way for the individual to correct or amend a record of
identifiable information about him.
Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their
intended use and must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.
Id.
74. 1. Collection Limitation Principle: There should be limits to the
collection of personal data and any such data should be obtained by lawful
and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the
data subject.
2. Data quality: Personal data should be relevant to the purposes
for which they are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes,
should be accurate, complete and kept up-to-date.
3. Purpose specification: The purposes for which personal data
are collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection
and the subsequent use limited to the fulfillment of those purposes or such
others as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on
each occasion of change of purpose.
4. Use limitation: Personal data should not be disclosed, made
available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in
accordance with the "purpose specification" except: (a) with the consent of
the data subject; or (b) by the authority of law.
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Privacy Preferences ('T3P")75, rules based on the FIP will provide a
framework that protects privacy by limiting data collection to that which is
necessary for transactions and ensuring that individuals are the arbiters of
their personal information. The challenge of implementing privacy
practices, such as notice and consent, on the Internet is ensuring that they are
implemented in a fashion that builds upon the medium's real-time and
interactive nature and uses it to foster consumer privacy.
While the path to this policy is currently quite contested, there is some
indication of a growing willingness to collaborate in order to develop
privacy protections. Debate over the capacity of self-regulation and market
forces to adequately address privacy concerns is common in the privacy and
consumer protection arenas, and will continue to rage. Advocates often take
the position that self-regulation is inadequate due to both a lack of
enforcement and the absence of legal redress to harmed individuals. Industry
tends to strongly favor self-regulation, stating that it results in workable,
market-based solutions while placing minimal burdens on affected
companies. These positions, while in tension, have both accurately
5. Security safeguards: Personal data should be protected by
reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized
access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data.
6. Openness: There should be a general policy of openness about
developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means
should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of
personal data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and
usual residence of the data controller.
7. Individual participation: An individual should have the right:
(a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or
not the data controller has data relating to him; (b) to have communicated to
him, data relating to him:
- within a reasonable time;
- at a charge, if any, that is not excessive;
- in a reasonable manner, and,
- in a form that is readily intelligible to him; (c) to be given
reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and (b)
is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and, (d)
to challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is
successful to have the data erased, rectified completed or
amended.
8. Accountability: A data controller should be accountable for
complying with measures which give effect to the principles stated above.
OECD Guidelines, supra note 9.
75. For an overview, see Joseph Reagle & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Platforn for
Privacy Preferences, Comm., at 48-55.
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described the self-regulatory process. A close look at the enactment of
federal privacy legislation over the years reveals that the battle itself, with all
its sound and fury, is the path to legislation.
Historically, for privacy legislation to garner the support of at least a
section of the industry, which is generally critical to successful legislative
efforts, it must build upon the work of some industry members-typically
binding bad actors to the rules being followed by industry leaders-or, be
critically tied to the viability of a business service or product as with the
Video Privacy Protection Act and the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act. 76
76. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), which updated the
1968 Wiretap Act, was the result of a collaborative public interest/private sector effort. 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2711 (1994). Industry feared that without legal protection against
eavesdropping and interception, consumers would be reluctant to use emerging electronic
media, such as cellular phones and e-mail, to communicate. The resulting law extended legal
protection akin to that provided First Class mail, and was developed and supported by a
diverse coalition of business, civil liberties, and consumer advocates who understood that
consumers would be unwilling to fully embrace electronic mail and other new technologies
without strong privacy protections.
Similarly, the 1995 amendments to ECPA crafted privacy protections for transactional
information that was content-like in its ability to reveal facts about a person's life. In these
instances, developing and enacting a legislative privacy regime was viewed by the business
community as a necessary component of creating and supporting a flourishing market for their
products. The nexus between privacy protection and business necessity resulted in a diverse
public interest/industry coalition supporting increased protections for transactional data.
Communications Assistance and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 207,
108 Stat. 4279 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2711 (1994)). There is dispute over whether
other sections of CALEA solve or create privacy problems.
Other privacy legislation supported by the public and private sectors The Cable
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 reflect a
similar coalescing of interests. Enacted within a couple of years of each other, both laws
resulted from the affected industry's realization that a lack of assurance that viewing
preferences were protected from prying eyes, would have a chilling effect on consumers'
viewing and renting habits. The revelation in a Washington, DC, weekly paper, that a
reporter,--or anyone for that matter-could walk in off the street and discover Supreme Court
nominee Judge Bork's taste in movies provided privacy advocates with the perfect story to
gain Congress's attention. Privacy advocates arrived on the Hill with Erols, the Video
Software Dealer's Association, the Direct Marketing Association, and others who realized that
the viability of their businesses depended on consumer trust and confidence that video rental
lists were safeguarded by strong legal restrictions on government and private sector access.
In other instances, industry has been moved to support privacy legislation in the wake of
public revelations of bad practices or a particularly compelling horror story. The Fair Credit
Reporting Act of 1970 ("FCRA") was initially drafted and supported by the credit reporting
industry in response to congressional hearings which revealed widespread misuse of credit
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Today, the dialogue over assuring privacy on the Internet and in
electronic commerce is well situated for a successful legislative effort.
Privacy-aware companies are seeking to develop and implement self-
regulatory programs. Surveys have shown that the viability of online
commerce depends upon the existence of real protections for consumers'
privacy. Similar to the development of early privacy laws, some industry
actors have led the way crafting self-regulatory policies that are the
prototype for subsequent legislation supported by self-regulated players who
for reasons of public trust, liability, and/or government concern want to bind
bad industry actors.
Advocates of both self-regulation and legislation each have a vested
interest in exploring and resolving the hard issues. Questions of what is
personally identifiable information in the context of the Internet, what does
access require, and what is the appropriate way to police and provide
remedies in this environment must all be explored. The work of the Online
Privacy Alliance to develop principles to protect children's privacy became a
starting point for the recently passed Children's Online Privacy Protection
Act." The collective desire to provide privacy protections that protect
individuals' privacy, and encourage them to participate in the online
environment, provides the common ground for the development of sound
policies and enforcement strategies in the coming year.
E. Create a Privacy Protection Entity to Provide Expertise and
Institutional Memory, a Forum for Privacy Research, and a Source of
Policy Recommendations on Privacy Issues
The work outlined above, and the state of privacy today, all weigh in
favor of creating a privacy entity within the federal government. The
existing approach has hindered the development of sound policy and failed
to keep pace with changes in technology. The United States needs an
independent voice empowered with the scope, expertise, and authority to
guide public policy. Such an entity has important roles to play on both
information and an alarming rate of inaccuracies in credit reports. An enraged Congress, with
the support of privacy and consumer organizations, indicated a commitment to passing a law
regulating the use of consumer credit information. Realizing that legislation was inevitable,
the industry set about crafting a policy that they could support. The Driver's Privacy
Protection Act of 1994 was largely triggered by the murder of actress Rebecca Shaffer and
eventually garnered the support of the majority of the affected industries. Through information
in her driver license file at the department of motor vehicles, Shaffer's stalker was able to
learn her whereabouts.
77. The Privacy Act of 1974,5 U.S.C. § 552a (1973).
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domestic and international fronts. It would serve as the forum for
collaboration with other governments, the public interest community, and the
business community.
There are a myriad of functions an entity charged with promoting
privacy could perform. Unfortunately, the debate over the scope and power
of such an agency or office has consistently stymied attempts to create one.
As in many areas, the perfect has been the enemy of the good. At this
junction, foremost on this entity's agenda should be developing and
articulating a comprehensive vision of privacy protection for the United
States, and coordinating efforts to advance it in both the public and private
sector. The emergence of the Internet and other advanced technologies
require us to reflect, study, adapt, and apply existing privacy principles and
at times develop new ones. Without expertise and devoted resources this
task will not be undertaken.
To function well, such an entity should have the ability to
1. monitor and evaluate developments in information
technology with respect to their implications for personal
privacy;
2. conduct research, hold hearings, and issue reports on
privacy issues in both the public and private sector;
3. develop and recommend public policy appropriate for
specific types of personal information systems;
4. comment upon government and private sector proposals
that impact on privacy;
5. review agency activities under the Privacy Act;
6. participate in government proposals that impact on
privacy.7
8
The level of 1) public concern; 2) agency activity; 3) private sector
investment; and 4) non-governmental organization focus on individual
privacy, cry out for the formation of an entity able to comprehensively and
effectively address privacy issues.
In July, Vice President Gore announced the Administration's intent to
appoint an individual to oversee and coordinate the governments privacy
78. A number of these recommendations mirror those made by Flaherty in his
recommended responsibilities for a United States privacy protection commission. He goes on
to state that such a commission should have a statutory mandate and as much independence as
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activities as part of the "Electronic Bill of Rights."79 While the duties and
powers of this individual are unclear, the announcement signals the
Administration's recognition that privacy is an issue of growing importance
and one that the Administration must play a role in coordinating. As of
publication, no appointment has been made.
F. We Must Question Our Tendency to Rely on Government as the Central
and Sometimes Sole Protector of Privacy
In the decentralized and global environment of the Internet, the law's
impact will be limited. In an area such as privacy, where the government's
actions have often been detrimental rather than supportive, we must ask if
other options-such as technology may provide stronger protection. We
must encourage the development and implementation of technologies that
support privacy. They are critically important on the Internet and other
global medium. Strong encryption is the backbone of technological
protections for privacy. Today technical tools are available to send
anonymous e-mail, browse the World Wide Web anonymously, and
purchase goods with the anonymity of cash.
Public policy is quickly becoming as much a product of computer code
and product decisions as law. Advocates who once focused nearly
exclusively on federal and state legislatures and agencies are increasingly
seeking to influence the design of technical standards and specifications, and
even specific product designs. From the Internet Engineering Taskforce and
the World Wide Web Consortium, to the United States Telephone
Association, decisions that will affect the future of privacy are made each
day. Advocates, the public, and policy-makers have taken fire at specific
products ranging from Lexis-Nexis Ptrak 8° to the soon to be released Intel
Pentium III Processor seeking to ward off privacy invasions. But as we ward
off the bad, we must move for the development of the good-seeking to
foster technologies,-both standards and specific products,-that protect
privacy.
Future technical developments have the capacity to provide an
underlying framework for privacy, providing greater anonymity,
confidentiality, and a platform for fair information practices.81 Technologies
79. Vice President Gore Announces New Steps Toward an Electronic Bill of Rights
Presswire, July 31, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 16515766.
80. See supra Part IV.
81. These incorporate the basic concepts of three recommendations of the Danish and
Canadian Privacy Commissioners: 1) eliminate the collection of identity information, or if it is
needed, keep it separate from other information; 2) minimize the collection and retention of
identifiable personal information; and 3) make data collection and use transparent to data subjects
1999]
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must be a central part of our privacy protection framework, for they can
provide protection across the global and decentralized Internet where law or
self-regulation may fail us.
V. CONCLUSION
No doubt, privacy on the Internet is in a fragile state, however, there is
new hope for its resuscitation. The business community, enlightened by
survey upon survey documenting consumers' privacy concerns, has recently
begun serious efforts at self-regulation. The White House, the Federal Trade
Commission, the Department of Commerce, and Congress all show interest
in ensuring that privacy is protected as the digital economy is embraced. A
growing number of advocacy organizations, ranging from consumer to civil
liberties to libertarian organizations, have begun to focus on privacy. Thanks
to the Internet, the public voice is being heard more clearly than ever-more
often than not weighing in strongly in support of privacy protections through
law and technology.
There is a special need now for dialogue. Providing a web of privacy
protection to data and communications as they flow along networks requires
a unique combination of tools-legal, policy, technical, and self-regulatory.
Cooperation among the business community and the nonprofit community is
crucial. Whether it is setting limits on government access to personal
information, ensuring that a new technology protects privacy, or developing
legislation-none will happen without a forum for discussion, debate, and
deliberation.
and provide them with the ability to control the disclosure of their personal information,
particularly identity information. See supra Part IV.
582 [Vol. 23:549
34
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss2/1
Amelia H. Boss
Professor Temple University, School of Law
Amelia H. Boss, a graduate of Bryn Mawr College and Rutgers-Camden Law
School, is a Professor of Law at Temple University School of Law, where
she teaches in the commercial law, bankruptcy, and electronic commerce
areas. She is a member of the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform
Commercial Code, and the former chair of the Uniform Commercial Code
Committee of the American Bar Association. She serves as the American
Law Institute member of the Drafting Committee to revise Article 2 of the
UCC on sales, of the Drafting Committee on the new Article 2B on licensing
of software, and of the Drafting Committee to revise Article 1 on general
provisions. In the past, she served as an advisor/observer to the revisions on
Article 5 (letters of credit) and Article 8 (investment securities). She is a
member of the American Law Institute and served on the Members
Consultative Group on the Restatement of the Law of Suretyship. Professor
Boss is a member of the Council of the Section of Business Law of the
American Bar Association, and will assume the role of secretary of the
section in August. She is a member of the former fellow of the American
College of Commercial Financial Lawyers and is a member of the Board of
Directors of the Institute of International Commercial Law.
Professor Boss currently serves as advisor and as the United States Delegate
to the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNICITRAL) on issues relating to electronic commerce. She represented
the U.S. in the development of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic
Commerce, and is now representing the U.S. in UNCITRAL work on digital
signatures. She serves as the American Bar Associations representative to an
effort by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
to draft a Uniform Electronic Commerce Act, dealing with inter alia with
digital signatures. She is Editor-in-Chief of The Data Law Report (published
bi-monthly by Clark Boardman Callaghan), is on the editorial board of The
EDI Law Review and the Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Policy, and is the
editor of the new book series, ABC's of the UCC, published by the American
Bar Association.
35
: Nova Law Review 23, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Searching for Security in the Law of Electronic Commerce
Amelia H. Boss
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 585
I. THENEED FOR SECURITY ............................................................. 590
III. THE DEBATE: A CONFLUENCE OF TWO STREAMS ...................... 596
IV. SURVEYING THE BATrLE FRONT .................................................. 602
V. ENABLING VERSUS PROMOTING: THE DEBATE IN THE ............... 608
UNIFORM LAW PROCESS ............................................................... 608
VI. UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT ............................... 608
VII. ARTICLE 2B OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE .................... 611
VIII. INTO THE BREACH: LEGISLATING FOR SECURITY ........................ 615
IX . CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 622
I. INTRODUCTION
Since before the time Gutenberg invented the printing press, centuries
of jurisprudence have been devoted to and predicated upon paper-based
systems of communication, particularly in the area of commercial law. With
advances in technology and the implementation of electronic modes of
communication in businesses and market places in general, however, the
world has begun to move away from paper as the primary mode of
communication and the primary method of doing business.' This continues
the process begun with the introduction of the telegram and the telephone,
both of which contributed to the elimination of paper in the conduct of
business negotiations.
Electronic commerce, however, is fundamentally different from either
telephonic or paper-based commerce. First, there is no tangible piece of
paper that one can treat as the final expression of the parties' intent; reliance
must be placed upon electronic messages, which are either stored in an
electronic medium or, in the case of risk-averse business people, printed out at
1. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD"), the volume of electronic commerce may rise to $1 trillion by 2005. Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Economic and Social Impacts of
Electronic Commerce: Preliminary Findings and Research Agenda, ch. 1 (1998)
<http://www.oecd.org/subject/e-commerce/summary.htn>; see generally Id. at ch. 3. See
generally U.S. Department of Commerce, The Emerging Digital Economy (1998)
<www.doc.gov/ecommerce/EmergingDig.pdf>.
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one end. Second, the electronic message is often generated by a computer and
may not provide the typical indicia of trustworthiness. For example, with paper,
we can recognize the handwriting, identify the stationery, check the postmark
and address, and check for visible changes to the writing. On the telephone, we
can recognize the voice and verify the number we are calling. Third, commercial
transactions have traditionally required time and, frequently, additional verifiable
information for completion. For example, in the sale of goods, the time between
the execution of the sales agreement and the ultimate shipment or delivery of
goods allows for verification of creditworthiness and of other information such
as shipment details. Electronic transactions, on the other hand, are often executed
online instantaneously between computers, and the ability to verify the identity of
the parties and other information is radically reduced. Indeed, one emerging
characteristic of much of electronic commerce, such as the web-based
transaction, is the transitory nature of the relationship between the parties. Last,
the tangible nature of the transaction, e.g., the sale of goods, has allowed for
security measures such as the creation and potential enforcement of security
interests in the property that was sold. By contrast, the subject matter of
electronic commerce is increasingly intangible,2 reducing the ability to monitor
and enforce the obligations of the other party.3
2. Although tangible goods are frequently sold in electronic commerce, online
transactions involving intangibles such as software and information are multiplying. On the
emergence of a new species of property, information, as one important aspect of the devel-
opment of electronic commerce, see Amelia H. Boss, The Emerging Law of International
Electronic Commerce, 6 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 293, 298-300 (1992); Katherine Mahoney,
Information as a Commodity: New Imperatives of Commercial Law, 55 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 77, 103 (1992); Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia Ann Krauthaus, Electronic
Commerce: New Paradigms in Information Law, 31 IDAHO L. REv. 937, 937 (1995); Margaret
Jane Radin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15 L.J. & CoM. 509, 511-13 (1996). The in-
creasing predominance of information as the subject matter of the deal has given rise to efforts
to create legal structures accommodating these new transactions, the main one of which has
been the drafting of a new article to the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2B, to cover
transactions in software and information, see U.C.C. art. 2B (Proposed Draft Dec. 1998),
available at <http:www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm#UCC2B>, or, alternatively, computer
information transactions. See U.C.C. art. 2B (Proposed Draft Feb. 1, 1999), available at
<http:www.law.upenn.edu/bllIulc/ulc.htm#UCC2B>. Evolution of new types of transactions
creates concern about the rules applicable to those transactions, and concomitantly, there is
some desire for certainty and predictability in developing a legal framework. As with the case
of electronic contracting, which is discussed in this article, there are instances where the
demand for such rules may be misplaced, arising from the assumption that only positive law
may create an environment where transactions may be trusted.
3. Traditional factors in commercial transactions that contribute to amicable and
effective resolution of disputes, e.g., ongoing relationships between the parties, sufficient time
to structure the transaction, and potential collateral, are often absent in online transactions.
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The emergence of electronic commerce has raised a host of questions
about our existing rules and legal system. One frequent plea is to remove the
barriers to electronic commerce, barriers that are, to a great degree, the
vestiges of a commercial law system based on paper. Legal requirements,
such as those for a "writing," a "signature," and an "original" need to be
reconsidered in the context of electronic commerce. Efforts are underway to
respond to these demands in the following ways: in the domestic arena, the
Uniform Commercial Code4 and the proposed Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act ("UETA");5 and on the international level, the formulation
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") Model Law on Electronic Commerce.6
4. Pending revisions to Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as well as the
pending proposal to include computer information transactions in a new Article 2B, include
provisions addressing the application of such requirements in an electronic environment. See
Raymond T. Nimmer, Article 2B: An Introduction, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
211, 227-37 (1997) (reviewing electronic and online commerce provisions of Article 2B);
Raymond T. Nimmer, Electronic Contracting: Legal Issues, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 211, 212 (1996); Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Commerce and the Symbiotic
Relationship Between International and Domestic Law Reform, 72 TULANE L. REV. 1931,
1956-63 (1998) (reviewing the changes being made in Article 2B and the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act to accommodate electronic commerce). Other completed revisions to the
Code do so through a variety of techniques. Article 5, for example, adopts terms such as
"record" in place of "writing" and contemplates presentation of non-paper documents. See
U.C.C. § 5-102 (a)(14) (1997) (defining record); id. § 5-102(a)(6) (defining document to
include presentation in any media permitted by the letter of credit or standard practice); id. §
5-102 cmt. 2 (revised Article 5 "contemplates and facilitates the growing recognition of
electronic and other nonpaper media as 'documents"'). See also R. David Whitaker, Letters of
Credit and Electronic Commerce, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 699, 699-701 (1995). Article 8
eliminates any statute of frauds writing requirement for contracts transferring interests in
securities. See James S. Rogers, An Essay on Horseless Carriages and Paperless Negotiable
Instruments: Some Lessons From the Article 8 Revision, 31 IDAHO L. REv. 689, 691 (1995);
U.C.C. § 8-113 (1997). Completed in 1999, revised article 9 also uses the terms "record" and
"authenticate" in place of "writing" and "signed." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(7) (authenticate); id. §
9-102(a)(69) (record).
5. Currently scheduled for completion in August of 1999, the Act contains electronic
contracting rules for transactions outside the scope of the Uniform Commercial Code. See
Uniform Law Commissioners Drafts <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulclulc.htm> (for drafts
of the UETA).
6. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") has
taken the lead at the international level in formulating the law governing electronic commerce,
and in 1996, it gave its final approval to a new Model Law on Electronic Commerce which
contains many provisions adapting the formalities of the law to an electronic environment.
See REPORT OF THE UNrrED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW ON THE
WORK OF rrs TWENTY-NINTH SESSION, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N.Doc.
A/51/17 Annex I (1996), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 200 (1997). See Amelia H. Boss & Jane
Boss
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In many arenas, however, demands are being made on legislators and
lawmakers to go beyond mere removal of legal barriers and to "support" the
development of electronic commerce by the establishment of a legal
framework that encourages and promotes its use. The argument is that the
law should build confidence in the system by providing rules that support
and promote these new ways of doing business.
In many respects, these demands are quite understandable, as they
combine two needs. The first is the perceived need for rules to guide
conduct on the Internet. The public and the press have in recent years
become so enamored of technology that they use phrases such as
"revolutionary" to describe it. The characterization of cyberspace as
something new and alien creates in people a fear that it is indeed unknown
and unknowable, and people distrust the unknown. The result is concern
about what will govern this unknown and uncharted territory. Some have
argued that the Internet as a unique jurisdiction should be subject to its own
body of rules,7 while others have attempted to resolve issues on the Internet
by analogizing it to other areas of law.8 The real challenge is to examine the
Kaufmann Winn, The Emerging Law of Electronic Commerce, 52 Bus. LAW. 1469, 1469
(1997); Judith Y. Gliniecki & Ceda G. Ogada, The Legal Acceptance of Electronic
Documents, Writings, Signatures, and Notices in International Transportation Conventions:
A Challenge in the Age of Global Electronic Commerce, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 117
(1992); Daniel J. Greenwood & Ray A. Campbell, Electronic Commerce Legislation: From
Written on Paper and Signed in Ink to Electronic Records and Online Authentication, 53 Bus.
LAW. 307, 307-09 (1997) (comparing provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law with
domestic legislation). For an overview of the relationship between the domestic efforts and
the international efforts, see supra note 4. There are, of course, other efforts both within
UNCITRAL and other international organizations to consider other aspects of electronic
commerce.
7. See, e.g., David G. Post & David R. Johnson, Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent:
Towards a New Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 Cm. KENT
L. REV. 4 (forthcoming 1999). In other contexts, the tendency to see the Internet as a separate
place necessitating different legal rules has been criticized. Andrew L. Shapiro, The
Disappearance of Cyberspace and the Rise of Code, 8 SETON HALL CONsT. L.J. 703, 703
(1998) (concluding that the Internet is simply an alternative communications technology, and
that there is no more a need for the 'law of cyberspace' than there ever was for the "law of the
alphabet.").
8. One scholar surveyed the evolution of "Internet law," tracing it through two stages.
In the first stage, the Internet was analogized to other areas where the legal doctrine was well
established. In the second stage, a more advanced analysis focused on the nature and quality
of the activity taking place. See Michael A. Geist, The Reality of Bytes: Regulating Economic
Activity in the Age of the Internet, 73 WASH. L. REv. 521 (1998). Professor Geist's analysis
was limited to developments in the area of jurisdiction and did not encompass the area of
security and electronic commerce. Similarly, others trying to find trends in the law applicable
to the Internet have focused on First Amendment issues. See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Regulating
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need for rules in context and determine whether the issue under
consideration is sufficiently different in an Internet or online context to
justify a different set of rules than would otherwise exist.9
The second need is security. In large part, the newness of the
technology, unfamiliarity with the operation of the Internet, and the potential
for fraud and error have given rise to concerns about the "trustworthiness" of
the system. Indeed, "security" is one of the key words that is often bandied
about in the context of electronic commerce; that is, the need for security
and trustworthiness in online transactions.10 Concerns about "security" are
heard in all venues: legal," technological, 12 business,
13 and theoretical. 4
Cyberspace: Metaphor, Rhetoric, Reality and the Framing of Legal Options, 20 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 541, 554 (1998). Each area is distinguishable, however, from the
concerns of the present Article. For example, in the area of jurisdiction, the primary forum for
the development of "Internet law" has been the courts, not the legislature. By contrast, to
date, the primary forum for the development of Internet law in the commercial context has
been the private sector, and there have been few judicial decisions. Only recently have the
legislatures become involved.
9. See, e.g., Allan R. Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace,
32 INT'L LAW 1167, 1167 (1998) (arguing that "there is nothing about legal relations over
computer networks that in any way challenges our conventional notions about how sovereign
authority is allocated in the world"); Amelia H. Boss, The Jurisdiction of Commercial Law:
Party Autonomy in Choosing Applicable Law and Forum Under Proposed Revisions to the
Uniform Commercial Code, 32 INT'L LAw 1067, 1068 (1998) (nothing about electronic
commerce requires different rules on enforceability of choice of law and forum clauses). In
Canada, a study for the federal government reached the same conclusion. Industry Canada
(1998), The Internet is not a No-Law Land, available at <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/>. See also
John D. Gregory, Solving Legal Issues in Electronic Commerce, CAN. Bus. L.J. (forthcoming
1999) (some legal issues in electronic commerce can be and are being resolved by application
of existing rules, once people become familiar with the new medium).
10. A sampling of the legal literature in the area of electronic commerce demonstrates
the currency of the theme of "security." See Public Key Infrastructure Symposium, 38
JURlMmucs J. 241 (1998).
11. Frequently, the legal arguments concerning security focus on restrictions on
cryptography. See STEWART A. BAKER & PAUL R. HURST, THE LIMITS OF TRUST:
CRYPTOGRAPHY, GOVERNMENTS, AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (The Hague, London & Boston,
1998).
12. Recently, there has been an extensive amount of writing on concepts of trust from a
technological perspective. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON INFO. SYS. TRUSTWORTHINESS, TRUST IN
CYBERSPACE (Fred B. Schneider ed. 1999), available at <http://www.nap.edu/readingroom/>.
13. See Dan Greer, Risk Management Is Where the Money Is, THE RISKS DIG., Col. 20,
Issue 6 (Nov. 12, 1998) <http://catless.ncl.ac.ukrisks/20.06/htm>: "The focus of 'security'
research today is the study of 'trust management'-how trust is defined, created, annotated,
propagated, circumscribed, stored, exchanged, accounted for, recalled and adjudicated in our
electronic world." Id.
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The need to provide "security" or "secure systems" for electronic commerce
is being expressed not just at the technical and implementation levels but in
legislatures as well.
15
Combined with this is the reality that many legislators also want to be
seen as at the cutting edge of technology and have introduced legislation at
both the state and the federal levels. 16 State legislators, in particular, want to
be the first to enact "electronic commerce" statutes, thereby attracting
businesses into their region and appearing to be global leaders to their
constituents. There might be, however, a problematic result: the passage of
"technology" legislation that is premature and potentially counter-
productive.
II. THE NEED FOR SECURITY
Concerns about security, whether real or perceived,18 need to be put
into perspective. Security cannot be "legislated." It is a combination of
factors: the technology utilized, 19 its business implementation and state of
development, and the legal structure. Doing business "securely" on the
information highway is not a simple matter of developing the right
technologies to "lock up" information sent electronically to protect it against
14. Ed Gerck, Towards Real-World Models of Trust: Reliance on Received Information
<http://www.mcg.org.br/trustdef.htm> (presenting an abstract definition of trust derived from
different application areas, including communication systems, digital certificates, cryptogra-
phy, law, linguistics, social sciences, etc.).
15. The United Kingdom has framed the issue as "building confidence in electronic
commerce." See Building Confidence in Electronic Commerce (Mar. 5, 1999)
<http://www.dti.gov.uk/cii/elecelec_com.html>.
16. See, e.g., Philip S. Corwin, Electronic Authentication: The Emerging Federal Role,
38 JURIMETRICs J. 261 (1998) (discussing federal bills during the 105th Congress).
17. Australian Electronic Commerce Expert Group, Electronic Commerce: Building the
Legal Framework, Executive Summary <http://www.law.gov.au/aghomeladvisory/ecegl
welcome.html> ('There is the risk, particularly given the lack of any internationally uniform
legislative approach, that an inappropriate legislative regime may be adopted without regard to
market-oriented solutions.").
18. There is a view, generally accepted by persons familiar with technology, that in
certain areas technology has the capability of offering more security in commercial
transactions than paper-based systems. See WARWICK FORD & MICHAEL S. BAUM, SECURE
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR DIGITAL SIGNATURES AND
ENCRYPTION (Upper Saddle River, NJ 1997); MICHAEL S. BAUM & HENRY H. PERRIrrT, JR.,
ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING, PUBLISHING, AND EDI LAW (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1991).
19. See Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia Krauthaus, Electronic Commerce: New
Paradigms in Information Law, 31 IDAHO L. REv. 937, 945 (1995) ("the creation of system-
based assurances of authenticity constitutes a condition precedent for continued expansion in
the modem use of the systems in important marketplaces").
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theft or alteration, nor is it a simple matter of developing authentication
techniques that allow us to determine with extreme accuracy the actual
originator or creator of a given message. "Secure" electronic commerce
cannot be achieved merely by legislating those circumstances when requisite
"security" is present. Rather, the "security" which business people seek
when they begin doing business electronically requires the creation of an
entire infrastructure-legal, social, economic, and political-one that is
based on practice which recognizes, validates, and supports electronic
commerce.
By comparison, many of us feel secure in our homes. This security
does not necessarily flow from the existence of technological devices to keep
out unwarranted intrusions: fences, burglar alarms, bolts, locks, or caller
identification on the telephone. To a great degree, the availability of those
devices does contribute to our sense of security, but the relationship is not
necessarily a direct correlation. Indeed, the more such technological security
devices there are in a home, the less likely it is that the inhabitant feels
"secure." While some locks or keys may be necessary, the strongest feelings
of security flow from the knowledge that locks and bolts are not needed, that
one can leave the house unlocked with the expectation that upon return,
things will be as they were upon departure.
Security is more than the technological exclusion of others from our
premises and more than mere legislation. Security flows in large part from
the ability to predict, with a fair degree of certainty, what lies ahead in our
daily lives, the ability to control it, and the ability to identify, again with a
fair degree of certainty, the risks that we may face so that we can take
protective measures. It also comes from the knowledge that there is a social,
political, economic, and legal system that protects us and recognizes our
rights. It is the overall structure, not any particular technology or law, that
creates that security. In our society, that overall structure includes the right
to use and control property, the ability to acquire and hold that property, the
knowledge that ownership of the property is free and clear of the claims of
others, the ability to exclude others from one's property, the ability to move
freely about the property and come and go as desired, the ability to allow
others access to one's property as desired, the ability to sell or otherwise
dispose of one's property, and the right to enforce that sale or transfer.
Security flows from the knowledge that the economic, social, and legal
systems recognize these rights, and that redress is available from those who
violate or infringe them.
20
20. Security in the home also flows from the knowledge that there is an economic,
social, political, and legal structure out there that protects our home that sends firemen and
police as needed, arrests trespassers or thieves and brings them to justice through the court
system, and provides us with the services needed to use and enjoy our property.
Boss
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Similarly, for businesses involved in electronic commerce, "doing
business securely" means an entire complex of things. It encompasses the
ability to enter into a commercial transaction that proposes an exchange on
terms beneficial to each party, whether a sales, services, or commodities
agreement, with the reasonable expectation that it will be performed.
Contracts are performed because our economic, social, and legal structures
support these types of transactions and provide incentives for performance as
well as disincentives for breach. These economic, social, and legal
consequences of breach are the main reasons contracts are performed. Thus,
security in transactions means the knowledge that transactions will be
performed as expected and the stability and certainty that come with that
knowledge. Risk management, the ability to assess the possibilities and risks
of non-performance and to take the steps necessary and approvriate to
encourage performance or guard against breach, is a key ingredient.
In the electronic environment, what is arguably lacking at the moment is
a discernable legal and social structure that allows the parties to adequately
assess the risks of electronic commerce and to respond by making intelligent
choices concerning their own rights and liabilities, including allocation of
risks in transactions with others. For example, without an appropriate legal
structure that recognizes and validates electronic commerce, the presence of
all the encryption or authentication devices in the world will not give
businesses the security they need to conduct business in the electronic
environment. The legal structure must include laws recognizing the ability
to contract electronically, enforcing deals entered into electronically, and
setting forth the rules applicable to the transaction while recognizing the
power of the parties, within reason, to set the terms as between themselves
and choose the applicable law. This type of security-"legal security"-
flows from a legal framework, one that may, to a large extent, already exist,
but to the extent the application of that framework in the online environment
is less than clear, the resulting sense of security may be impaired. It must be
recognized, however, that "legal security" is only part of the overall
"security" picture.
21. A companion to the concept of "security" is that of "trust": the argument is that
systems, both legal and technological, need to be created which people may trust. Again, trust
has many meanings. To some, "trust" in electronic transactions may mean "I can count on this
transaction being enforced." Alternatively, the trust issue may be expressed as "I can count on
that this transaction will be carried out." A third possible phrasing: "I can trust the parties to
and persons involved in the transaction." And last: "I can trust that the systems themselves
are 'trustworthy."' Thus, you may have trust in the legal structure supporting the transaction,
trust in the parties to the transactions, trust in the performance of the transactions themselves,
without regard to legal enforcement, and trust in the systems. There are, additionally, a variety
of sources for "trust:" knowledge, experience, familiarity, and authority.
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The desire for "security" has manifested itself in online commerce in
somewhat traditional ways. Early on, in the absence of legislative and
judicial recognition and validation of electronic commerce and the
corresponding lack of industry-wide standards, customs, or standards to
guide conduct, attempts were made to set the rules for electronic commerce
through "trading partner agreements" between the parties doing business
electronically.Y Numerous regional and national model trading partner
agreements, or" interchange agreements, were developed to provide
commerce with a contractual framework for facilitating the adoption and use
of electronic commercial practices, thereby providing the parties with some
degree of certainty as to the terms applicable to their transactions. Although
there are differences between the various proposed interchange agreements,
a key ingredient of virtually all of them was the parties' articulation of the
technological security measures to be employed in transacting business
electronically, and delineation of the circumstances under which each party
would be bound by messages purportedly originated by that party.23
In situations where the parties were not in prior contact or direct
contact, or where the transactions were such that prior negotiation of such
agreements was impossible or impractical, alternative contractual models
were adopted. One tactic is the articulation by one of the parties to the
contract of the applicable terms, e.g., by posting of the terms on the relevant
22. "The idea of a model interchange agreement was first raised at the international
level by the Nordic Legal Community in the early 1980s." Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Data
Interchange Agreements: Private Contracting Toward a Global Environment, 13 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 31, 38 (1992). In turn, the idea spread, and during the 1980s and early 1990s, there
was a proliferation of "model interchange agreements" produced by EDI user groups
representing specific industries by electronic data interchange associations, attorney groups,
government agencies, and international organizations, Id. See also Amelia H. Boss & Jeffrey
B. Ritter, ELEcTRoNIc DATA INTERCHANGE AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE AND SOURCEBOOK (1993).
In the United States, such a model interchange agreement was proposed by a group within the
American Bar Association. See The Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, The
Commercial Use of Electronic Data Interchange-A Report and Model Trading Partner
Agreement, 45 Bus. LAW. 1645 (1990).
23. Many of the following issues are addressed in those agreements: selection of EDI
messages, message standards, and methods of communication; responsibilities for ensuring
that the equipment, software, and services are operated and maintained effectively; procedures
for making any systems changes which impair the ability of trading partners to communicate;
security procedures and services; the points at which electronic messages have legal effect; the
roles and contracts with any third party service providers; procedures for dealing with
technical errors; the needs, if any, of confidentiality; liabilities in the event of any delay or
failure to meet agreed EDI communications requirements; the laws governing the interchange
of EDI messages and the arrangements of the parties; and methods for resolving any potential
disputes. See Boss, supra note 22; Boss and Ritter, supra note 22.
Boss
44
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
website 24 or by postings stating that any transactions were to be governed by
a given set of practices.25 A variation of this type of contract was the
development of operating rules within defined systems that purport to bind
26 oall participants in the system. Establishment of voluntary "codes ofconduct and the development of industry standards are two other options
24. The desires of commercial parties to govern online transactions by posting, or
having available on a website, the terms and conditions that purport to cover the transactions
entered into on the website have led to the use of what have been called "click-wrap" or
"shrink-wrap" licenses. Questions as to the enforceability of such terms and conditions have
in turn given rise to litigation. Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 103 (3d Cir.
1991); ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996); Vault Corp. v. Quaid
Software Let., 847 F.2d 255, 258 (5th Cir. 1988). They have also stimulated efforts to address
such terms on the state level, the national level, and the international level, amidst
considerable controversy. For an overview of the range of reactions to these issues, see
Symposium, Intellectual Property and Contract Law in the Information Age: The Impact of
Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Future of Transactions in Information and
Electronic Commerce, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 809 (1998); Symposium, Intellectual Property
and Contract Law for the Information Age: The Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform
Commercial Code on the Future of Information and Commerce, 87 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1999).
See also Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REv.
1239 (1995); Apik Minassian, The Death of Copyright: Enforceability of Shrinkwrap
Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L. REv. 569 (1997); Jennett M. Hill, Note, The State of
Copyright Protection for Electronic Databases Beyond ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Are
Shrinkwrap Licenses A Viable Alternative for Database Protection?, 31 IND. L. REv. 143
(1998); Joseph C. Wang, Note, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and Article 2B: Finally, the
Validation of Shrink-Wrap Licenses, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 439 (1997);
Christopher L. Pitet, Note and Comment, The Problem With "Money Now, Terms Later":
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and the Enforceability of "Shrinkwrap" Software Licenses, 31
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 325 (1997); Thomas Finkelstein & Douglas C. Wyatt, Note, Shrinkwrap
Licenses: Consequences of Breaking the Seal, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 839 (1997).
25. In the case of providers of certain services, this was accomplished through the
development of statements of practice, such as the certification practice statements used by
certification authorities in the context of digital signatures. See, e.g., the certification practice
statements published on the Internet by GTEI-CyberTrust, <http://www.bbnplanet.com/
products/security/cytrust/cps.htm>; True Trust Limited <http://fw4.iti.salford.ac.uk/truetrust/
cps/>; and Verisign http://www.verisign.com/ repository/CPS/>.
26. An example is the system rules for international inter-bank transfers, established by
the Society for Worldwide Interbank Funds Transfers ("SWIFT").
27. In 1987, the International Chamber of Commerce took the first step by developing
and producing the Uniform Rules of Conduct for Interchange of Trade Data by
Teletransmission (ICC Publication no. 452). The UNCID rules, the first product in this area,
were aimed at facilitating the interchange of trade data effected by teletransmission through
the establishment of agreed rules of conduct between parties engaged in such transactions. The
UNCID rules were not self-executing but voluntary, requiring the agreement of the parties to
incorporate its terms in their own relationship. See The Working Party on Facilitation of
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that have been explored. One current project proposes to establish a
common set of legal "Eterms" which can be incorporated by parties into
their electronic messages, thereby providing the private legal structure to
guide the transaction. In addition, there has been a move to provide
certainty through the use of choice of law and forum clauses and a
corresponding desire to strengthen the enforceability of such clauses in
electronic commerce"
In 1997, the White House issued its report, A Framework for Global
Electronic Commerce,31 which set forth the administration's policies with
regard to the law of the Internet. The administration firmly emphasized that
in the area of electronic commerce, the private sector should lead, and
government regulation should be discouraged. Governments were urged to
avoid undue restrictions on electronic commerce and at the same time
encouraged to allow new business models and products to evolve. If and
when government intervention is deemed necessary to facilitate electronic
commerce, the administration cautioned that the government's "aim should
be to support and enforce a predictable, minimalist, consistent, and simple
legal environment for commerce."
32
The White House recognized that despite the preferability of private
sector leadership, there might be a need to draft rules governing global
electronic commerce. In that regard, it urged the elimination of
administrative and regulatory barriers to commerce and the recognition of
certain fundamental principles. The primary principle is, of course, freedom
of contract, the ability of "fully informed buyers and sellers" to set their own
rules. Equally important, the administration urged that any legislation or
rules be "technology neutral," i.e., the rules should neither require nor
International Trade Procedures, UN/ECE Trade Facilitation Recommendation No. 26 (March
1995) <http://www.unece.orgttradetrec/rec26en.htm>.
28. E.g., in the context of digital signatures, concerns about certification services and
the fear that the public would be misled has led to exploration of the establishment of private
systems for accreditation of certification authorities according to preestablished industry
standards. Charles R. Merrill, The Accreditation Guidelines-A Progress Report on a Work in
Progress of the ABA Information Security Committee, 38 JURIMETRCS J. 345, 347-48 (1998)
(detailing accreditation guidelines' project and need for developing standards of
trustworthiness).
29. See Andreas Mitrakas & Janjaap Bos, The ICC ETERMS Repository to Support
Public Key Infrastructure, 38 JUIMETRIcs J. 473 (1998).
30. See Boss, supra note 9.
31. See William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework for Global Electronic
Commerce <http://www.iitf.nist.gov/eleccommlecomm.htm>.
32. Id. Two other principles were also iterated: that governments should recognize the
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assume a particular technology and be flexible enough to permit the
development of new technologies in the future.3
In recognizing the need for legislation, and at the same time urging a
minimalist approach, the White House report reflected discussions in
business, academic, and political circles over the past several years. These
discussions, however, revealed two distinct approaches, with distinct policy
recommendations and legislative proposals flowing from them. These need
to be examined in more detail.
I. THE DEBATE: A CONFLUENCE OF TWO STREAMS
The advent of electronic communications technologies and electronic
commerce has, over the years, given rise to two distinct movements with
regard to law reform, each with its own set of adherents.
Initially, concerns about electronic commerce focused on existing legal
structures and principles. The main concern was the application of existing
law to transactions entered into electronically. Attempts were made to
identify existing barriers to electronic commerce and to determine the extent
to which modification of these and other general transactional rules were
required in an electronic environment. On the international level, the notion
that governments should review legal requirements governing trade and
commerce to determine their suitability for electronic commerce surfaced
over fifteen years ago.34 Domestically, the need to review existing laws has
been recognized on both the federal and state levels. Those approaching
these issues tended to view the question as follows: what changes are
33. A concept related to that of "technology neutrality" is that of "implementation
neutrality," the recognition that any rules or laws neither assume nor require the
implementation of certain technology in preset ways. A third concept is neutrality, seeking an
equivalence between transactions regardless of the medium used for communication. The
basic goal of all these efforts is that the law should not discriminate between information on
paper and information in electronic form.
34. The removal of legal barriers to electronic commerce became an international issue
as early as 1985, when the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") called upon all governments to "review legal requirements of a handwritten
signature or other paper-based methods of authentication on trade related documents with a
view to permitting, where appropriate, the use of electronic means of authentication." U.N.
GAOR, 40 th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 72, U.N. Doc. (A/40/17).
35. See, e.g., Matter of National Institute of Standards and Technology-Use of
Electronic Data Interchange Technology to Create Valid Obligations, Dec. of the Comp. Gen.
Of the U.S., File B-245714 (Dec. 13, 1991) <http://www.softwareindustry.org/issues/docs-
org/cg-opinion.pdf> ("Contracts formed using Electronic Data Interchange Technologies may
constitute valid obligations of the government for purposes of 31 U.S.C. § 1501, so long as
the technology used provides the same degree of assurance and certainty as traditional 'paper
and ink' methods of contract formation.").
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necessary, in the area of commercial law, evidence, etc., to accommodate
electronic commerce. Attempts to accommodate electronic commerce
focused on the adaptation of the traditional transactional rules. The goal was
to assure that electronic commerce was not discriminated against solely
because of the medium in which it occurred.
For example, the law has traditionally required "writings" and
"signatures" as a prerequisite for the enforcement of many transactions, 3
and the application of those requirements to electronic commerce has been
problematic. The legislative response, at least within the context of
commercial law,37 was twofold: either to eschew the terms "writing" and
"signature" in new legislation in favor of terms such as "record" and
"authentication, ' '38 or to provide affirmatively that existing writing and
signature requirements could be met by electronic messages. 39 Most of these
changes occurred within the context of more generalized substantive
revisions of commercial law aimed at updating and modernizing commercial
law to accommodate electronic commerce.
By contrast, a second movement started not with a focus on existing
law, but rather with a focus on technology and its implementation. Concerns
about security motivated members of the digital community to begin
36. This, of course, is the notion behind our statute of frauds, which dates back to the
adoption by the British Parliament of the first such statute in 1677. Since then, the writing
requirement of the statute of frauds has been adopted with some modification in nearly all of
the United States. Subject to several exceptions, the statute provides that no suit or action
may be instituted under certain categories of contracts unless that contract is written and
signed by the party to be charged. See generally James J. White & Robert S. Summers,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-1 to 2-12 (3d ed. 1988). However, the British Parliament
repealed its statute of frauds in 1954. Id. See also R. J. Robertson, Electronic Commerce on
the Internet and the Statute of Frauds, 49 S.C. L. REv. 787 (1998).
37. The legislative response was actually preceded by a contractual response by the
parties to the transaction. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
38. The term "record" was developed over time expressly to deal with electronic
records and had been developed and refined by the American Bar Association and the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as a generic term for use
throughout proposed legislation. It has since become standard language in products of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See Patricia B. Fry, X Marks
the Spot: New Technologies Compel New Concepts for Commercial Law, 26 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 607 (1993) (detailing history of the concept of "record"). See also U.C.C. §§ 5-102(14),
5-104, & 8-113 (using the term "record"); §§ 5-104, 8-113 (using the term "authenticate").
39. See, e.g., Uniform Electronic Transactions Act § 106(c) (Proposed Draft Jan. 29,
1999) ("If a rule of law requires a record to be in writing ... an electronic record satisfies the
rule of law."); id. § 106(d) (Proposed Draft Jan. 29, 1999) ("[i]f a rule of law requires a
signature.. ., the rule of law is satisfied with respect to an electronic record if the electronic
record included an electronic signature."). Compare UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic
Commerce, Articles 6 (writing), and 7 (signature).
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exploration of technological means of providing security to participants in
electronic commerce. Three issues were identified as "security" risks: 1)
authenticity-the problem of identifying the source or sender of a message
and authenticating that it did indeed come from that sender; 2) integrity-the
problem of proving that the message is complete and has not been altered
since it was sent; and 3) non-repudiation-the risk that the sender may
repudiate it after receipt.4
One technology, digital signatures, quickly became the "favorite"
among many technology afficionados, who claimed it offered a technology-
based cure for many of the security risks encountered in online commerce.
In many regards, the description of the technology as "digital signatures" is a
misnomer. In essence, what is being advanced is a method of encryption-
or more appropriately, dual key encryption using two mathematically related
numbers, or keys.4' Each key pair consists of two keys: a person's private
key, which is kept private, and the public key which can be made publicly
available. When the private key is applied to a message, the message is
transformed or encrypted, and a string of numbers is created, the "digital
signature" for that message, which is unique to both the key used to encrypt
and to the message itself. The recipient of that message can, by using the
public key corresponding to the key used by the sender, determine whether
the message was sent by the person holding that corresponding private ke
and determine whether the message had been altered since it was made.4
40. Although "non-repudiation" is often referred to as a desirable attribute of security
procedures, a persuasive argument has been made that whether a person may repudiate a
message is actually a legal construct related to the question of the message's authenticity. John
D. Gregory, Solving Legal Issues in Electronic Commerce, CAN. Bus. L.J. (forthcoming
1999).
41. Although the two numbers are mathematically related, in theory it is
computationally infeasible to ascertain what is known as the "private key" of the sender using
the "public key" applied by the recipient to unlock the message. If the key utilized is
sufficiently long, it would apparently take "extremely powerful computers [many] years and
millions of dollars, to crack a single public/private key pair." Greenwood & Campbell, supra
note 6, at n.14.
42. Thus, "digital signatures" have been defined as:
[A] transformation of a message using an asymmetric cryptosystem such that
a person having the intitial message and the signer's public key can accurately
determine whether:
(a) the transformation was created using the private key that
corresponds to the signer's public key; and
(b) the message has been altered since the transformation was made.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-103(10) (1998). For a good tutorial on digital signatures, see
<http:llwww.abanet.orglscitechlecliscdsg-tutorial.html>. See also Information Security
Committee, Section of Science and Technology, American Bar Association, Public Key
Infrastructure Symposium-Tutorial, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 243 (1998).
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One major obstacle to the easy use of this technology is assuring the
potential recipient of a message, and user of one-half of the key pair, of the
identity of the holder of the other key. In situations where the two parties
know one another and can directly exchange keys, there is no problem. In
systems such as on the Internet where the parties do not necessarily know
each other, identity of the holder of a private key is an issue. To resolve this
problem, industry has proposed an implementation of dual key encryption
which involves the creation of a "public key infrastructure," or PKI, under
which a third party, known as a certification authority, or CA, has the task of
verifying the identity of the holder of a key and that the key being used by
the recipient is the reciprocal of the key used by the sender.43
Supporters of the technology began to develop various models-public
key infrastructures-for the use of digital signatures in commerce. 44 In large
part, the development of these models involved decisions as to the
appropriate business structures to use for electronic commerce. Moreover,
the creation of new public key infrastructures raised interesting issues about
the relationship between the various parties in the structure. In attempts to
resolve these relationship issues and to encourage use of the technology,
supporters began to advance the notion that a new legal structure was
necessary to promote and facilitate the development of public key
infrastructures. As a result, the proponents, concerned primarily with
advancing the technology and its business implementations, are now
advancing a legal construct to support and promote their specific
implementation models. 45
43. This explanation is obviously very simplified. Assume that a message purports to
come from Bill Gates and is "digitally signed." The recipient will first want to know that the
key it applies to the message is indeed the reciprocal to one held by Bill Gates. Second, it will
want to know that the person who obtained the key using the name '"ill Gates" was indeed
Bill Gates. Third, the recipient will want to know that the person who actually used the key
was either Bill Gates or someone acting with authority for Bill Gates.
44. Interestingly, the implementation models that have been advanced have changed
over time. Initially, for example, it was contemplated that certification authorities would
provide "certificates" directly to the holders of private keys and that the key holders would
then use these certificates in communications with others. As the various models have
developed over time, however, it appears to be more common for the certification authority to
supply the certificate not to the key holder but to the relying party, the recipient of the
message who wants to verify the identity of the key holder.
45. As one proponent of such legislation has stated:
[I]t is our desire to make current technology more available and more
useful for real-world applications. This can be done by objectively reviewing
what the various available technologies can do, grouping them according to
their attributes of security, reliability, scalability, and so on, and creating
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In 1995, Utah, the home to high technology companies with an interest
in the topic, followed by Minnesota6 and Washington,47 became the first to
enact a digital signature statute setting forth specific rules governing digital
signatures and public key infrastructures.4a The main characteristic of this
legislation is its regulatory nature, providing for a licensing scheme for
certification authorities.49 Licensed certificate authorities under the statutes
are given significant limitations on their liability to other parties within the
public key infrastructure.50 Indeed, it can be argued that the primary purpose
behind the legislation is this limitation of liability, and that the licensing
regime serves that limitation. The liability scheme was seen as necessary to
assure commercial developers "that the risks of potential liability to users of
the system could be kept within tolerable limits." 51 Although the statutes
also attempted to address the rights and responsibilities of other participants
in the public key infrastructure, only a small portion of the digital signature
statutes pertains to the legal effect to be given to the use of the digital
signature. These statutes frequently went further than saying that a person
may use a digital signature and effectively meet any writing or signature
requirements. Consistent with the philosophy of attempting to provide a
comprehensive scheme to apportion all liability of the parties, these laws
provided that where a digital signature was accompanied by a verifiable
certificate issued from a certification authority licensed under the statute, it
was entitled to the presumption that it was affixed by the holder of the
Michael S. Baum, Technology Neutrality and Secure Electronic Commerce: Rule Making in
the Age of "Equivalence" at 4, n.5 (1998) <http:llwww.verisign.comlrepository/
pubs/techneutral/> (emphasis added). Reviewing and grouping may perform wonderful
services to businesses attempting to implement electronic commerce, allowing parties to
choose the attributes of security important to them. Whether legislation and new legal
constructs are needed to facilitate those choices is a different issue.
46. See UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 46, Ch. 3 (1996).
47. Minnesota Electronic Authentications Act, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325 (West 1998)
<http:llwww.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/stats/325K/>.
48. Washington Electronic Authentications Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.34 (West
1998) <http://www.wa.gov/secldsrcq.htm>.
49. For example, the Utah statute confers authority on a state agency to license
certificate authorities that operate within their jurisdiction. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-201-
204 (1998).
50. See, e.g., id. § 46-3-309 (limiting liability of certification authority to amount it
includes in its certificate and specifically excluding consequential damages).
51. Jane Kaufman Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of Internet
Commerce, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1177, 1241 (1998). 'This limit on the potential liability of the
[Certificate Authority] to subscribers and relying parties, above and beyond any liability that it
has expressly undertaken and set forth in its certification practice statement, is a pivotal risk
allocation rule." Id. at 1242.
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private key and was therefore attributable to it.5 2 Although these signing and
attribution provisions were only a part of a larger digital signature statutory
scheme, they overlapped with the efforts begun earlier to define signing and
attribution in the commercial context.
In effect, these two separate movements, one with its origins in the law,
the other with its origins in the technology, represent two philosophies. The
first, which began with a concentration on commercial law issues, has
focused on keeping commercial laws generic and supportive. The goals
have been to remove barriers to electronic commerce, treat electronic
communications on a par with paper communications, and not to favor one
technology over another (technology neutrality) nor one business model over
another (implementation neutrality). As between different technologies or
implementation schemes, the choice was to be that of the parties. This
approach exhibits a degree of confidence in the marketplace to make suitable
options available to parties, allowing them to make intelligent choices. The
second movement has the philosophy-and the express goal-of supporting
and promoting specific technologies, or, more correctly, one specific
technology and one implementation model. The theory is that the
technology and implementation offer such benefits to the users of the
Internet that legislation should recognize those benefits and enshrine them in
the law. Despite their different orientations, both movements ended up
dealing with the same issue: the satisfaction of legal requirements of
writings and signatures through technological means in an electronic
environment.
At the outset, the two movements were relatively separate; those
revising the commercial laws and those building PKI infrastructures
represented two different constituencies: law revisionists and technology
supporters. To a large extent, however, the "digital signature" movement
was the more visible of the two. Commercial law does not tend to have
inherent appeal to either the public or to legislators. On the other hand, mere
mention of certain buzzwords, such as "Internet," "security," or
"technology," immediately piques the interest of both the public and the
legislature. Among the public, the digital signature movement quickly
gained two distinct bodies of followers. The first consisted of those who
saw digital signatures as the answer for Internet security.53 Because of their
belief in the security aspects of digital signatures, the desire was to build a
structure, a business structure as well as a legal structure, to support the
technology. The second body of followers were those business people
attracted to the digital signature movement not because of any interest in the
52. UTAHCODE ANN. § 46-3-406 (1998).
53. Some of these participants were in fact representing businesses that were marketing
digital signature technology; others were simply focused on the merits of the technology.
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technology itself but because of concerns about the ability of the law in its
current state to recognize and validate online business transactions. Their
desire to gain legal recognition of electronic communications contributed to
their support for digital signature legislation. That support, driven out of a
desire to establish the validity of electronic commerce, was given in the
absence of a recognition that other efforts would establish that validity
without the need for a complicated, legal, and regulatory structure for digital
signatures.
Ultimately, the law revision and technology "movements" joined issue
on the question of the legal effects to be given to certain uses of the
technology to "sign" or otherwise authenticate messages. In one regard, the
dispute is between the "removal" of barriers to electronic commerce through
the development of generic rules and the "support and promotion" of
electronic commerce through the creation of rules geared to promoting its
use. In another regard, the dispute is whether specific types of technology
implementations should be given special treatment under the law.
IV. SURVEYING THE BATrLE FRONT
The war between the law revision and technology movements is being
waged on many simultaneous fronts: within the individual states, at the
federal level in Congress, at the uniform law level within the United States,
at the national level abroad, and on the international level as well. On the
individual state level, state legislatures have acted in a variety of ways to
accommodate electronic commerce, but four patterns of statutes have
emerged over time, reflecting the influence of the two movements. Initially,
Utah was the first state to adopt a full-fledged digital signature statute
supporting a public key infrastructure,54 legislation which was based on
efforts of the American Bar Association's Information Security Committee,
which published a set of Digital Signature Guidelines.55 The approach used
by Utah and the Digital Signature Guidelines, however, of setting forth a
highly structured, prescriptive, regulatory environment only for digital
signatures, has not been widely followed by the states.56 California quickly
54. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-101 (1996). The 1996 legislation was a revision of
legislation which originally became effective in 1995.
55. ABA COMM. ON INFORMATION SECURrrY, Digital Signature Guidelines (1996). It is
interesting to note that, while the Guidelines were developed within a committee of the
American Bar Association, that committee consisted of a substantial number of individuals
who were not lawyers but were drawn from various segments of the technology industry.
56. For an excellent survey, see Internet Law and Policy Forum, Survey of State
Electronic & Digital Legislative Signature Initiatives, submitted Sept. 12, 1997
<http://www.ilpf.orgdigsig/digrep.htm>, updated, Internet Law and Policy Forum, UPDATE:
Survey of State Electronic & Digital Signature Legislative Initiatives
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followed on the heels of Utah by enacting legislation that did not follow the
Utah statute in its adhesion to public key cryptography. Rather, it drafted a
technology-neutral law.57  It provided that an electronic signature58 would
have the same legal effect as a manual signature if it has these attributes: it
is unique to the person using it, it is capable of verification, it is under the
sole control of the person using it, it is linked to the data in such a manner
that, if the data are changed, the electronic signature is invalidated, and it
conforms to regulations adopted by the Secretary of State.59  Later
regulations permitted either digital signature using a certification authority
or signature dynamics. 6° The California approach has proven to be more
popular in the United States than the Utah focus on digital signatures alone.
61
While it is more generalized, a person using a certain security procedure
must demonstrate that either it fits within the regulations or within the
generalized criteria set forth in the statute before the digital signature is
given effect.
Florida followed a third approach when, in 1996, it enacted the
Electronic Signature Act.62  Florida represents the enabling approach,
emphasizing the elimination of artificial barriers to electronic commerce.
Under the Act, the term "writing" is defined to include information created
or stored in any electronic medium that is also retrievable in perceivable
form.63  Any such writing containing an electronic signature, defined toinclude any letters, characters, or symbols, manifested by electronic or
<http://www.ilpf.org/digsig/UPDATE.HTM>. Another source of current information on state
and other legislation is the McBride Baker Coles site, <http://www.mbe. com/>.
57. California was influenced, in part, by international legislation, the Model Law on
Electronic Commerce, being drafted by the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law. See supra note 6.
58. California used the expression "digital signature" to cover more than just signatures
using public key cryptography. To avoid confusion in the text, the term "electronic signature"
is used to emphasize that the legislation applies to any signatures in electronic form, whether
or not they are technically dual key encryption "digital" signatures.
59. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16.5 (West 1995). The first four criteria were first
established in a decision of the Comptroller General of the United States in Matter of National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)-Use of Electronic Data Interchange
Technology to Create Valid Obligations, Comp. Gen. File VB-245714 (Dec. 13, 1991)
<http://www.softwareindustry.orgtissues/docs-orgtcg-opinion.pdf>.
60. Signature dynamics is associated with PenOp, a system of signing manually using
computer-recorded strokes. See PenOp, Welcome to PenOp, the World's Leading Electronic
Handwritten Signature <http://www.penop.com/>.
61. See ILPF Survey, supra note 57.
62. Electronic Signature Act of 1996, 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-224 (codified as amended
at FLA. STAT. § 282.72 (1996)).
63. This formulation tracks the definition of a "record" in uniform legislation proposed
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See supra note 39.
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similar means, with intent to authenticate a writing, may be used to sign a
writing and is given the same force and effect as a written signature. This
enabling approach has become increasingly popular among the states that
have considered the question. 64 It does not require an extensive set of
regulations, does not set forth specific technologies and implementations that
it sanctions, nor does it set forth "criteria" for judging whether electronic
signatures will be given legal effect.
A fourth approach developed in Illinois as a "middle ground" between
digital specific statutes and mere enabling statutes: the concept of a hybrid
statute that enabled the use of electronic signatures by validating their use,
but at the same time recognized a category of "secure electronic
signatures." Anyone may use an electronic signature in electronic
commerce and be assured that legal writing and signature requirements are
no obstacle. However, if a signature qualifies as a secure electronic
signature by meeting criteria similar to that found in the California statute,
rebuttable evidentiary presumptions arise as to the authenticity and integrity
of the signature.
The lack of uniformity among the various state enactments has led to
activity on two fronts. Pressure is being placed on Congress to take action,
both from the fear that states will delay in responding to the needs of
electronic commerce and from the fear that their responses will be non-
uniform in character. Thus, the push is on to: 1) develop standards for use
of electronic and digital signatures in transactions with the government; 2)
develop a federal standard for recognition of electronic and digital
signatures; and 3) preempt state law. Several bills have been introduced
over the past few years to deal with electronic commerce, although none
have yet been enacted. The scope and approach of the proposed legislation
has differed drastically. At one end of the spectrum is proposed legislation
merely giving effect to "electronic signatures" as a method of signing;66 this
type of legislation would best be characterized as enabling legislation. Other
proposed legislation, within the banking context, proposed to validate
"secure" electronic techni 9ues of authentication adopted pursuant to
agreement or system rules; to the extent this legislation would merely
64. ILPF Survey, supra note 57.
65. The Illinois statute was enacted in 1998. 205 ILL. CoMP. STAT. § 705/10 (West
1998).
66. See Government Paperwork Elimination Act of 1998, S. 2107, 105th Cong. (1998)
(sanctioning electronic signing of forms submitted to federal agencies); Paperwork
Elimination Act of 1999, H.R. 439, 106th Cong. (1999) (following Government Paperwork
Elimination Act); Millennium Digital Commerce Act, S. 761, 106th Cong. (1999).
67. The Digital Signature and Electronic Authentication Law of 1998, S. 1594, 105th
Cong. (1998) (validating electronic authentication under relevant "agreements" or "system
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reinforce the ability of the parties to govern their transactions by agreement,
it would be consistent with an enabling and validating approach. A bit
further down on the scale is proposed legislation providing that close-us
electronic signatures meeting certain criteria are acceptable as signatures.
To the extent that legislation begins to set additional hurdles for electronic
commerce, it begins to move from merely enabling and starts to introduce a
channeling function-that of telling businesses what technologies they
should adopt. One piece of proposed federal legislation, in the context of
federal tax filings, would create a presumption that the person on whose
behalf a return was filed did indeed subscribe to and submit the return.69 As
will be discussed below, presumptions have become a fertile battleground on
the uniform law level; this proposed federal legislation, however, deals
solely with communications, i.e., tax filings, with the government and
relieves the Internal Revenue Service of proving in each instance that a
particular taxpayer did indeed file the return under consideration. The
proposed bill that goes the furthest in establishing a more regulatory
approach would establish a federal panel to develop a national digital
signature infrastructure.
70
The primary thrust of the federal push is the need for immediate
uniform national legislation. There are other efforts on a state-by-state basis
that should fill that need. The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws will be taking final action in July 1999 on two pieces of
proposed uniform legislation that will address the concerns of at least those
who want to validate and enforce electronic transactions by removing
rules" and authorizing their use by financial institutions pursuant to agreement or pursuant to
a "banking, financial, or transactional system using electronic authentication").
68. Electronic Financial Services Efficiency Act of 1997, H.R. 2937, 105th Cong.
(1997) (stating all forms of electronic authentication meeting certain standards "shall have
standing equal to paper-based, written signatures"). Those standards are: 1) the identification
method be unique to the person sending the communication; 2) the identification technology
be capable of verification; 3) the identification method be under the sole control of the person
using it; and 4) that the identification method be linked to the data in such a way that if the
data is altered, the authentication becomes invalid. Id. This follows the approach begun in
the California legislation--borrowing the standards from NIST, supra note 36, and
subsequently picked up in several states.
69. Internal Revenue Restructuring and Reform Bill of 1997, H.R. 2676, 105th Cong.
(1997) (sanctioning tax returns filed electronically and stating that any return filed
electronically shall be presumed to have been submitted and subscribed to by the person on
whose behalf it was filed).
70. Computer Security Enhancement Act of 1997, H.R. 1903, 105th Congress (1997)
(also authorizing National Institute of Standards and Technology to assist private sector in
developing voluntary standards and guidelines for a public key infrastructure).
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barriers to electronic commerce.71 Driven in large part by concerns about
nonuniformity among the states, these efforts have benefitted greatly from
the "experimentation" that has already occurred on the state level. The need
for uniformity should be achieved, without federal preemption, if either of• • 72
these measures gain sufficient enactment by the states.
On the international scale, a similar pattern is beginning to emerge,
although developments internationally are lagging somewhat behind those in
the United States. Following the lead of Utah, and inspired in large part by
the Digital Signature Guidelines, several countries, including Germany,
74 75 76Italy, Malaysia, and Argentina, have enacted legislation relating to
electronic authentication and adopting to some degree the approach
pioneered by Utah. By contrast, Singapore has adopted an approach loosely
based on the Illinois hybrid approach, drawing a distinction between
electronic signatures on the one hand, which it enables, and secure electronic
records and signatures on the other, including digital signatures.77 Similarly
taking a hybrid approach is the recently released EU Directive on Digital
Signatures and several drafts considered by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law.79
71. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
72. Indeed, recent federal legislation would not preempt state laws in those states that
have enacted uniform state law such as the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act. See
Millennium Digital Conference Act, 1999 S. 761 (Mar. 26, 1999), section 6(c).
73. German Digital Signature Law (Aug. 1, 1997) <http://www.iid.de/rahmen
/iukdgbt.html>, available in English at <http://www.kuner.com/data/sig/digsig4.htm>.
74. See Italian Law N. 59, Art. 15, c. 2 (enacted Mar. 15, 1997), available in Italian at
<http://www.interlex.comltesti/attielet.htm>, and regulations promulgated Nov. 10, 1997
(Presidential Decree No. 513), available in Italian at <http://www.
notariato.it/forum/dpr_513.htm>.
75. See Malaysia Digital Signature Act, Law No. 59 of 15 Mar. 1997
<http://www.mycert.mimasmy/digital.html.>.
76. Legislation has also been passed in Italy. Argentina has also adopted digital
signature legislation by presidential decree. Presidential Decree No. 427/98 <http://www.sfp.
gov.ar/firma.html>, available in English at <http://www.sfp.gov.ar/decree427.html>.
77. Singapore Electronic Transaction Act (adopted June 29, 1998), available at
<http://www.ech.ncb.gov.sg/>.
78. European Commission, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive
on a Common Framework for Electronic Signatures (May 13, 1998) <http://www.ispo.
cec.be/eif/policy/com98297.html>. The articulated goal of the directive was to "[ensure] the
proper functioning of the Internal Market in the field of electronic signatures by creating a
harmonized and appropriate legal framework for the use of electronic signatures within the
[European] Community and establishing a set of criteria which form the basis for legal
recognition of electronic signatures." Id.
79. See the Preparatory Documents for the UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic
Commerce <http://www.un.or.at/uncitral/>. For many years, UNCITRAL adhered to the
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Several other nations, however, have refused to legislate detailed
standards for the use of different authentication techniques or one particular
technique, urging instead a simple enabling approach. In March 1998, the
Australian Electronic Commerce Expert Group issued its report on the laws
of electronic commerce, in which it concluded:
It is our view that the enactment of legislation which creates a
detailed legislative regime for electronic signatures needs to be
considered with caution. There is the risk, particularly given the
lack of any internationally uniform legislative approach, that an
inappropriate legislative regime may be adopted without regard to
market-oriented solutions. Given the pace of technological
development and change in this area, it is more appropriate for the
market to determine issues other than legal effect, such as the levels
of security and reliability required for electronic signatures.
Accordingly, we have recommended that legislation should deal
simply with the legal effect of electronic signatures. While a
number of articles in the Model Law deal with electronic signature
issues that go beyond legal effect, it is our view that these issues
should be left to the existing law in Australia. Whether the existing
Australian law deals with these issues adequately or not, the same
situation should apply to both paper based commerce and
electronic commerce. At this stage we are not persuaded of the
need to give a legislative advantage to electronic commerce not
available to traditional means of communication. If a clear need to
deal with these issues appears in the future the recommended
legislation can be amended.
80
Similarly, the New Zealand Law Commission, in its October 1998
report on Electronic Commerce, rejected the approach of technology specific
legislation as found in Utah and Germany and adopted as one of its guiding
notion that it was important to maintain technology in its rules, and therefore pursued the dual
approach. At its February 1999 meeting, however, the Working Group backed away from the
attempts to develop a "media neutral" set of rules and opted for the moment to pursue
development of public key infrastructure ("PI") or digital signature specific rules.
80. Australian Electronic Commerce Expert Group, Electronic Commerce: Building the
Legal Framework, Executive Summary <http:llwww.law.gov.aulaghomeladvisory/eceg
/summary.html>. Legislation has since been proposed which would follow the provisions of
the UNCITRAL Model Law and therefore have no special recognition given to digital
signatures nor any presumptions attaching beyond those provided for in the Model Law. See
Australian Draft Electronic Transactions Bill <http://law.gov.aul ecommerce/>.
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principles "technological neutrality."'8' The Law Commission recommended
merely that legislation be passed to ensure that electronic signatures would
be acceptable under law.
82
V. ENABLING VERSUS PROMOTING: THE DEBATE IN THE
UNIFORM LAW PROCESS
The debate within the uniform law process, as it is currently
proceeding, highlights the controversy between those who view the
appropriate role of law revision as simply removing barriers to electronic
commerce-with the marketplace providing other necessary incentives and
support-and those who feel that security on the Internet is and should be
promoted by legislation that gives advantages to those who adopt the
appropriate technology. In August of 1999, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws will be presented with two pieces of
proposed uniform legislation: a new Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
("UETA")8" and an addition to the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2B,
that deals with computer information transactions.84 Despite the worthy goal
of uniformity and the original mandate to the drafting committees to be
consistent, these two products are not uniform in their treatment of security
procedures and their use. Indeed, their lack of uniformity exemplifies the
tension between those dedicated to removing barriers to electronic
commerce and those wishing to support and promote by creating confidence
in the systems themselves.
VI. UNIFORM ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT
The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act Drafting Committee, created
in 1997 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, initially explored various means of providing security in electronic
commerce, offering strong presumptions where certified digital signatures
81. New Zealand Law Commission, Report 50, Electronic Commerce Part One: A
Guide for the Legal and Business Community, at 334-335 (Mar. 15, 1999)
<http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/pubindex.html>.
82. "In our view, the needs of the market can be met by making a change to the
proposed Interpretation Act by including a definition of the term 'signature' to ensure that
electronic signatures are acceptable. This could follow the intent of article 7 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce." Id. at 344.
83. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 2. On April 7, 1999, after this article went to press, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws announce that the final form of these
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were involved.85 Thus, in the beginning of the UETA deliberations, the
philosophy of the digital signature legislation was pursued: identifying
certain technological implementations and giving them special legal effect.
Serious skepticism was expressed at the first meetings, however, about the
appropriateness of this approach, and in particular about presumptions, for
many reasons, ranging from concerns about the implementation of digital
signature technology, to the lack of acknowledged standards of care of a
private key, to uncertain certification practices by CAs, and to unfairness of
the presumptions to less sophisticated parties. On the theory that market
practices were not sufficiently developed to permit evaluation of the
presumptions, the presumptions were weakened drastically,8 7 and the special
treatment for digital signatures was replaced with special treatment for
secure signatures. By July of 1998, however, the presumption language was
eliminated.88 No heightened effect was given to a message or record because
of its status as either a digital or "secure" signature.
There was, however, special treatment given where security procedures
were implemented. Under the provisions dealing with attribution, an
electronic message would be attributed to a person if another person, through
the application of a commercially reasonable security procedure, concluded
that it was that of the purported sender.89 Gone was any reference to specific
technologies, or criteria those technologies need to satisfy; as long as the
procedures were commercially reasonable, they were given special legal
effect. In essence, what started as a technological construct (specified
security procedures) evolved into a semi-technological construct (security
procedures satisfying specified criteria) and eventually into a commercial
law construct (commercially reasonable security procedure). Even that
85. The preliminary draft of the UETA was prepared in the spring of 1997 and
considered at an organizing meeting of the drafting committee in Dallas in May. See Uniform
Law Commissioners, Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts Official Site,
<http://www.law.upenn.edubll/ulcuecictaecomm.htni>. It reflected some of the thinking in
both UNCrIRAL's deliberation and the Utah Act, offering strong presumptions that certified
digital signatures bound the purported signer (the person named in the certificate) to the
electronic record. Similar provisions appeared in the August 1997 draft.
86. See Cem Kaner, The Insecurity of the Digital Signature <http:ll
www.badsoftware.comldigsig.htm>.
87. The November 1997 draft of the UETA weakened the presumptions drastically; it
had borrowed concepts from Illinois, as had UNCITRAL at about the same time. Continued
concern about the presumptions led to the inclusion in the March 1998 draft of the UETA
three alternative definitions of a presumption, ranging from a "bursting bubble" approach,
where the proffering of any credible evidence destroys the presumption, to a shifting of the
burden of persuasion. See UETA § 102(a)(15) (Revised Draft Mar. 1998).
88. See Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (Proposed Draft July 1998).
89. See id. § 202. In turn, a security procedure was defined as a procedure required by
law, established by agreement, or knowingly adopted by each party. See id. § 102(a)(17).
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provision raised concerns, in large part for the same reasons that the
presumption language did, but in addition because of the vagueness and
uncertainty inherent in a "commercially reasonable" standard. Eventually,
this special treatment for commercially reasonable security procedures was
also eliminated by the February 1999 draft. 
9
Although, generally, the UETA eliminated presumptions, the February
1999 draft did contain one vestige of presumptions arising in the security
procedure context that proved to be controversial and was ultimately eli-
minated. Under that provision, if one party required the use of a security
procedure, that "requiring party" would be precluded from denying any mes-
sages sent pursuant to that security procedure. In other words, an
irrebuttable presumption was created that the message came from the re-
quiring party.9 1 The other party, however, would not be precluded from
denying any messages under similar circumstances and would retain the
right to deny the message as its own.92 The theory of the section was to
"cast[ ] the risk of misattribution, and informational error on the party that is
responsible for a particular security procedure being used in a transaction. 93
The unintended consequence of this provision, however, was to discourage a
party from resorting to security procedures: it would appear to a party's
advantage never to require a security procedure-a result fundamentally at
odds with the type of behavior, i.e., the use of security procedures, one
would otherwise want to encourage. Even if a party were acting reasonably,
prudently, and in good faith in setting out security procedures, it could not
90. A memorandum prepared by the Chair and Reporter of the UETA Drafting
Committee outlined the reasons for eliminating the presumptions: "certainty and stability
regarding the predicate facts giving rise to the presumption" inherent in creation of statutory
presumptions is lacking; the vague formation of "commercially reasonable procedures" led to
uncertainty; and uncertainty was inherent in the development of the technologies.
Memorandum from Patricia Brumfield Fry and D. Benjamin Beard to NCCUSL
Commissioners (July 18, 1998) <http://www.webcom.comlegaled/ETAForum>. Technology
changes so rapidly that it is difficult to say, two years after a given transaction occurred, what
procedures were "commercially reasonable" at the time. Other considerations that were cited
include: the relative weakness and therefore meaninglessness of the "bursting bubble"
presumption (the presumption exists until denied by the other party), the concern about
creating a regime in which parties selected the medium for their transaction based on their
differing legal effects; the fact that presumptions would operate against the interests of
consumers and other unsophisticated parties; and the fact that presumptions might become a
rationale for other governments to regulate. Id. For a summary of the discussions at the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act Drafting Committee meetings, see id.
91. UETA § 107(a) [Alternative 1] (Proposed Draft Feb. 1999). The other party must
have relied upon that message to trigger the presumption. Id.
92. Id. An alternative proposal would provide simply that "an agreement to be bound
by the results of a security procedure is unenforceable." Id. § 107(a) [Alternative 2].
93. Id. Reporter's Note.
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94
escape liability under this provision, even by contract. Consequently, a
provision intended to encourage the use of security procedures arguably did
just the opposite, and it was eliminated by the UETA Drafting Committee at
its February 1999 meeting.
The current draft of the UETA, as it may be expected to be presented to the
National Conference, treats attribution in a very simple, straightforward manner.
An electronic message is attributed to a person "if the electronic record resulted
from the act of the person, or its electronic agent. '95 Once it is found that a
message or record is attributable to a person, attribution "has the effect Xrovided
for by law, regulation, or agreement regarding the security procedure." Under
this approach, attribution clearly is a factual matter;97 no preference is given to
any particular method of authentication or any particular security procedures, and
at the same time, freedom of contract is recognized. Thus, at least within the
context of the UETA, the view that there should not be any rule which would
provide a specific effect for any security procedure,98 whether it be an identified
security procedure, e.g., digital signatures, a security procedure agreed to by the
parties, or a security procedure which meets some predefined criteria, has carried
the day with regards to attribution.99
VII. ARTICLE 2B OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The proposed new Article 2B to the Uniform Commercial Code, whose
scope is limited to computer information transactions, was intended to forge
94. UETA § 107(b) (Proposed Draft Jan. 29, 1999) (stating the "provisions of this
section may not be varied by agreement"). Id.
95. Id. § 109(a).
96. See id. § 109(b). "'Security procedure' means a procedure employed for the
purpose of verifying that an electronic signature, record, or performance is that of a specific
person." Id. § 102(a)(18).
97. As a result, a certain security procedure may be effective to prove attribution at a
given point in time but will lose its efficacy with advances in technology, or with the ability of
hackers to demonstrate the vulnerability of systems.
98. See Letter from the Bank Working Group to D. Benjamin Beard and Patricia
Brumfield Fry (Feb. 12, 1999) (on file with the author). The Bank Working Group includes
Citigroup, The Chase Manhattan Bank, Visa International, Independent Bankers Association
of America, Consumer Bankers Association, The New York Clearing House Association,
L.L.C., and the Keybank National Association.
99. Under a parallel provision, § 111, an electronic signature "may be proven in any
manner, including by showing that the electronic signature was signed in conformity with a
security procedure for validating electronic signatures, or that a procedure existed by which
the person.., must have engaged in conduct or operations that signed the record or item in
order to proceed further in the processing of the transaction." UETA § 111 (Proposed Draft
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the rules for electronic contracting that would provide the base for the
remaining articles of the Code.1° Although the UETA has gone to great
lengths to eliminate presumptions and to eliminate any special treatment
arising from the use of security procedures, the Article 2B Drafting
Committee has taken the position that such treatment is important and that if
security procedures are present, that treatment encourages the use of security
procedures and promotes electronic commerce.
Article 2B begins with the traditional rule that the person asserting that
a record is that of another person has the burden of proof of attribution. 101
Special legal effect is given, however, to the implementation of security
procedures, or what Article 2B calls an "attribution procedure." 1°2 If the
parties agree to, or otherwise adopt, an attribution procedure'0 3 which is
used by the parties, the attribution procedure is commercially reasonable,
and the recipient "relies on or accepts" the message, then the recipient has
met its burden of attributing the message to the sender." 4 The only way the
purported sender may avoid attribution is to prove the message was not
caused by: 1) someone entrusted by the sender with the right to act on its
behalf; 2) someone who gained access to the transmitting facilities of the
sender; or 3) someone who obtained, from a source controlled by the
purported sender, information facilitating breach of the attribution
procedure. °5 Even if the purported sender is able to overcome this hurdle, it
might still be held liable under negligence-type principles.1
6
The foundation, then, of Article 2B's rules is the presence of a
"commercially reasonable"' 0 7 attribution procedure, a concept that had its
100. Although that was the intent, the Article 2 Drafting Committee voted at its
February 1999 meeting to adopt a minimalist approach, more akin to Article 2B, rather than
following Article 2B's approach. That decision was ratified by the Article 2 Drafting
Committee at its last meeting in March of 1999. Thus, the Article 2 Drafting Committee has
stopped short of adopting the Article 2B provisions discussed above.
101. See U.C.C. art. 2B-116(c) (Proposed Draft Feb. 1, 1999), available at
<http:www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm>.
102. An attribution procedure is defined as "a procedure established by law, regulation,
or agreement, or a procedure otherwise adopted by the parties, [to verify] that an electronic
message.., is that of a specific person." See id. at § 2B-102(a)(3).
103. See id. at § 2B-116(c). At its February meeting, the Article 2B Drafting
Committee discussed a clarification that the attribution procedure must have been
"knowingly" adopted. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id. at § 2B-116(c)(3) (Proposed Draft Feb. 1, 1999) available at
<http:www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm>.
106. Under U.C.C. § 2B-1 16(e), a purported sender is liable for reliance losses if those
losses occurred as a result of the purported sender's failure to exercise reasonable care with
regard to the attribution procedures. U.C.C. § 2B-1 16(e).
107. See, e.g., id.
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genesis in the "security procedure" provisions of Article 4A on funds
transfers. 10 8 Once the presence of such a procedure is established, then the
recipient of the message has carried its burden of establishing that the
message originated with the identified sender. The theory is that such a
standard makes it easier for recipients of messages to "prove up" those
messages in court, and as a result, more people will implement commercially
reasonable security procedures, and confidence in the systems will increase.
Those favoring presumptions' °9 of this nature frequently invoke the
precedent of Article 4A and its treatment of commercially reasonable
security procedures. Crucial differences exist between the two formulations,
however. First, Article 4A applies only where there has been an "agreed"
security procedure. Indeed, under Article 4A, the notion of a "commercially
reasonable security procedure" acts as a limitation on the ability of the
parties to alter traditional rules governing proof of attribution: a contractual
agreement will be recognized only if the agreed procedure is commercially
reasonable. Thus, Article 4A is not a recognition that certain security
procedures should be given special legal effect, but a recognition that the
ability of the parties to agree-and, in particular, the ability of a bank to shift
the liability for an unauthorized message to its customer-is limited.
While Article 4A only applies where there has been an "agreed"
security procedure, Article 2B applies to any attribution procedure
"otherwise [knowingly] adopted by the parties."' 10 According to the drafters
of Article 2B, the provision on attribution "enables electronic commerce in
an open environment, while stating reasonable standards to allocate risk."'
108. See Boss, supra note 4. Article 4A on funds transfers defines a security procedure
as "a procedure established by agreement of a customer and a receiving bank for the purpose
of (i) verifying that a payment order or communication amending or canceling a payment
order is that of the customer, or (ii) detecting error in the transmission or the content of the
payment order or communication." U.C.C. § 4A-201. For the definition of an "attribution
procedure," see supra note 102. The relevance of Article 4A as a precedent in other areas of
electronic commerce has, however, been called into question in large part because of
distinctions between the types of transactions subject to Article 4A and those subject to the
provisions of either Article 2B or the UETA. See Boss, supra note 9, at 1079-80, 1083.
109. The February 1999 draft of § 2B-116 spoke in terms of use of attribution
procedures "creat[ing] a presumption" of attribution. U.C.C. § 2B-1 16 (Proposed Draft Feb.
1, 1999). At its February meeting, the Drafting Committee accepted a proposal put forward by
Chair Carlyle C. Ring, Jr. and Reporter Raymond Nimmer to modify the language to speak in
terms of who has the burden of establishing attribution or non-attribution. See
<http://www.2Bguide.com/docs/299t4.html>. The effect of the proposal was to remove the
problem of characterizing the type of presumption (bursting bubble, burden of going forward,
burden of persuasion), but in effect, the language utilizes the strongest of rebuttable
presumptions: the burden is that of establishing the negative.
110. U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(3) (Proposed Draft Feb. 1, 1999).
111. Id. § 2B-1 16, Reporter's Note 1.
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It is clear that the Article 2B drafters were concerned about parties who were
not otherwise in privity with each other: "Electronic commerce is
anonymous in character and depends upon such procedures and their
recognition in law and practice.' The absence of any requirement of an
agreement has important ramifications. At least where there is an agreement
between the parties as to the relevant procedures to be followed, a party is
arguably on notice that all parties to the transaction will rely on those
procedures. Because of the vague reference in Article 2B to procedures
"otherwise adopted by the parties,"'1 3 such notice is arguably lacking.
Moreover, under the required agreement under Article 4A, the customer
unwilling to assume fraud risks had the ability to protect itself by shifting the
burden back to the bank or requiring the bank to take additional
procedures, 14 an ability lacking under Article 2B.
A second crucial difference is the practical ability of the alleged sender
of a message to overcome the presumption in light of the nature of the
transaction and in light of the state of technology. If a person adopts a PIN
or other attribution method for doing business on the Internet, it will find
that if a message is sent utilizing that PIN, the person will be liable for that
message unless it can invoke the provisions setting forth how the
presumption is overcome. Consequently, rather than the burden being on the
recipient to prove who sent the message, the burden is now on the alleged
sender to prove it did not send the message and that the message did not
originate from anyone who gained access through the alleged sender.
Proving a negative is difficult. In the context of Article 4A, however,
the rationale was explained as follows:
Because of bank regulation requirements, in this kind of case
[wire transfer fraud,] there will always be a criminal investigation
as well as an internal investigation of the bank to determine the
probable explanation for the breach of security. Because a funds
transfer fraud usually will involve a very large amount of money,
both the criminal investigation and the internal investigation are
likely to be thorough. In some cases there may be an investigation
by bank examiners as well. Frequently, these investigations will
develop evidence of who is at fault and the cause of the loss. The
customer will have access to evidence developed in these
112. Id. § 2B-102, Reporter's Note 2.
113. Id. § 2B-102(a)(3).
114. See U.C.C. § 4A-203, cmt. 3 ("A customer may want to protect itself by imposing
limitations on acceptance of payment orders by the bank"). Id. "Some customers may be
unwilling to take all or part of the risk of loss with respect to unauthorized payment orders
even if all of the requirements of Section 4A-202(b) are met." Id. § 4A-203, cmt. 6.
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investigations and that evidence can be used by the customer in
meeting its burden of proof.
11 5
Unfortunately, access to such rigorous investigation and proof will be
lacking in the typical transactions covered by Article 2B.1
6
Third, Article 2B adopts an additional ground for shifting risks: if the
person alleged to have sent the message can nonetheless prove that it did not
send the message-a somewhat difficult task to begin with-that person may
still be liable for losses "in the nature of the cost of performance of the other
party" 117 if the loss occurred because: 1) the purported sender failed to
exercise reasonable care; 2) the other party reasonably relied on the belief
that the purported sender sent the message; and 3) the fraudulent third party
who used the attribution procedure gained access to it from a source under
the control of the purported sender. The net result is that it may well be
impossible for an alleged sender to avoid attribution under Article 2B.119
VIII. INTO THE BREACH: LEGISLATING FOR SECURITY
When the UETA Drafting Committee was first established, the
assumption, and, indeed, the mandate given to that committee, was to avoid
inconsistency with the revisions being proposed to the Uniform Commercial
Code, and, in particular, Article 2B. Theory, however, has diverged from
practice, as illustrated by Article 2B's adoption of a presumption approach,
and its not-so-hidden desire to go beyond mere removal of barriers to
115. U.C.C. § 4A-203, cmt. 5.
116. The difficulties in proving a negative raise another issue: the burden on the party
attempting to avoid liability arguably is the same (to prove the message did not come from a
source controlled by that party) regardless of the security procedure at issue. Yet not all
technological security procedures are created equal; what they involve, what they prove, and
the strength of their proof vary. Even "digital signatures" come in different strengths: the
longer the number used to generate the key pair, the harder it is to crack the code, and the
shorter the number, the easier it is. Yet all commercially reasonable security procedures are
treated equally with respect to the presumption.
117. U.C.C. § 2B-116 (Proposed Draft Feb. 1, 1999).
118. Id. For a history of the evolution of this provision and its source in both Article
4A and the UNCITIRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, see Boss, supra note 4, at
1961-63.
119. Take the situation of a person who has attribution procedures resident on an office
computer and locks the office to attend a weekend meeting, where there are ample witnesses to
confirm that it was physically impossible to send the message at issue. Proof that it was
physically impossible for that person to send the message would not be sufficient to satisfy the
burden of establishing that the electronic message was not caused by anyone entrusted by that
person with the office, someone who gained access to the office, or someone who gained
information facilitating breach from that person.
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actively supporting electronic commerce, and the rejection of that approach
in the JETA. According to the Chair and the Reporter for the UETA,
"perhaps the most significant difference between the UETA and Article 2B
relate[s] to the creation of presumptions when security procedures are
employed by parties to an agreement.
' 12°
These differences continue despite attempts to harmonize the
approaches between those two drafts; the only agreement is continued
disagreement.12 1 "In light of the different character and scope of the
respective drafts, it was agreed that the different approach in the two drafts
can be justified.' 122  What is far from evident'23 is what differences in
character and scope justify the difference in approach to presumptions.
Although it is true that Article 2B has a narrower scope than the UETA in
that it applies only to certain informational contracts while the UETA
potentially applies to any contracts entered into online, the reality is that
under both, there is a wide range of sophistication in the parties potentially
subject to their provisions, and under both, identical arguments may be made
about the need to support electronic commerce. The only conclusion that
can be drawn is that each Drafting Committee has a different view about the
relationship between the law and security.
On one hand, the philosophy of the UETA is the minimalist approach:
as long as the law recognizes and enforces electronic transactions,
businesses gain some "security" in their commercial dealings. The role of
law in technology is enabling, not promotional of certain technologies, nor
channeling, encouraging certain procedures. This approach recognizes that
"technological security" is not monolithic: there are many technological
methods of security, with different strengths and weaknesses, and
technology is in a constant stage of development.124 Thus, promoting certain
technologies or certain implementations would be counterproductive. This
approach also recognizes that the law is of limited utility in encouraging
120. Memorandum, supra note 90.
121. Each Drafting Committee reaffirmed its own approach, and rejected that of the
other, in its last meeting in February 1999.
122. Memorandum from Patricia B. Fry, UETA Drafting Committee Chair, and Carlyle
C. Ring, Jr., U.C.C. Article 2B Drafting Committee Chair, to the UETA and Article 2B
Drafting Committees (Jan. 29, 1999) <http://www.2Bguide.comdocs/199pfcr.html>.
123. This is true even to one who is both on the Article 2B Drafting Committee and the
official American Bar Association Advisor to the UETA Drafting Committee. The statement
may simply be a recognition that different drafting committees, dealing with different subject
matters, came up with different solutions.
124. "While a number of participants argued that fairly strong presumptions are
necessary to promote electronic commerce, others felt that the state of technology and current
market are still too underdeveloped to warrant the creation of any presumptions."
Memorandum, supra note 90.
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certain types of behavior: people will use security procedures because it is
good business, not because the law gives special legal effects if they are
used. The marketplace, rather than the legislature, provides the incentives
and support. The UETA does not view the law as the sole or even primary
source of security; instead, it recognizes that the entire technological, legal,
and social structure contributes to that security.
On the other hand is the view that the law has an important role in
providing "security" in electronic commerce; that the law can indeed
"legislate" security by providing certain benefits to those who use the
available technology. Article 2B, following the lead of Article 4A,12
represents the position that statutory provisions that recognize those security
126procedures can encourage use of security procedures. By assuring parties
involved in "electronic commerce" of the ability to enforce transactions in
which reasonable security procedures are used, the law creates user
confidence and ultimately supports and promotes the use of electronic
commerce.
Each approach has its critics. The minimalist approach, limited to the
removal of barriers, has been criticized as not giving the user of technology
the degree of assurance necessary. Critics emphasize that simply saying
electronic messages "may" suffice or are equivalent to writings and
signatures is insufficient; users want to know what will suffice.
Consequently, it is asserted that the legislation must lay out the indicia of
assurance and certainty necessary for the electronic messages to be deemed
reliable.' 27
The question, however, is whether the Article 2B approach gives any
greater certainty or any greater assurances than the minimalist approach. In
giving special effect when commercially reasonable security procedures are
present, what must be asked is whether Article 2B has met the goals of
125. Article 4A theorized that losses due to fradulent payment orders can best be
avoided by the use of commercially reasonable security procedures, and that the use of such
procedures should be encouraged. U.C.C. § 4A-203, cmt. 3. The rules designed to "protect
both the customer and the receiving bank," were aimed at providing such encouragement. Id.
Thus, the customer may not be held liable unless commercially reasonable security procedures
are agreed to, and the bank is protected if they are agreed to and are implemented. Id.
126. As one letter put it: "Given the limited experience with electronic commerce,
NCCUSL should gravitate towards general legal principles that provide incentives for, and
reward the use of, commercially reasonable and agreed procedures that give courts a basis to
select and adjust to the facts of individual cases." Memorandum from Business Software
Alliance to Article 2B Drafting Committee (Jan. 20, 1999) <http://www.2B
guide.com/docs/0119bsa.html>. Of course, as discussed, Article 2B goes well beyond
agreement.
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"security:" more certainty and predictability in the application of the law;
greater assurances of the validity of the transaction; encouragement of the
use of security procedures; and more faith or trust in the systems.
It is questionable whether, as currently articulated, Article 2B
contributes to the certainty and predictability in the application of the law.
The factual nature of the commercially reasonable standard12 renders it
vague and subjective in nature, 1 9 a result which "could hardly have been
more inconsistent with the drafters' statement that 'the parties ... transfer
need to be able to predict risk with certainty.' 130 It is true that in the context
of funds transfers, the same test has been used, but the funds transfer
situation differs.' Determining what is "commercially reasonable" in anindustry where there is a developed body of commercial practices, where the
128. U.C.C. § 2B-114 (Proposed Draft Feb. 1, 1999) ("commercial reasonableness is
[to be] determined in light of the purposes of the procedure and the commercial circumstances
at the time the parties agree to or adopt the procedure."); id ("How one gauges commercial
reasonableness depends on a variety of factors, including the agreement, the choices of the
parties, the then current technology, the types of transactions affected by the procedure,
sophistication of the parties, volume of similar transactions engaged in, availability of feasible
alternatives, cost and difficulty of utilizing alternative procedures, and procedures in general
use for similar types of transaction."). Id., Reporter's Note 4.
129. This objection has been made on both the domestic level as well as on the
international level (where the concepts of "reasonableness" and "commercial reasonableness"
generally do not have the same level of acceptance as they do within the United States). See
letter from Paul Shupack, Paul S. Turner, and Jane K. Winn (Jan. 20, 1999)
<http://www.2Bguide.com/>.
130. Id. (citing Official Comment to Section 4A-102).
131. In the Article 4A context, the use of the phrase was justified on the grounds that to
the extent one goal of Article 4A was to shield banks from potential catastrophic losses by
shifting some wire fraud risks to customers, the "commercially reasonable security procedure"
requirement was one way of achieving a balance by limiting the bank's ability to shift the risk
in egregious circumstances. According to that line of argument, the national interest of
protecting recipients of messages from catastrophic losses (which was present in the bank
regulation arena) is absent in the more generic area of electronic commerce. Thus, a device
(the requirement of a commercially reasonable security procedure) which was originally
adopted to protect customers from a rule of absolute liability is now being invoked to impose
liability. See Letter from Shupack, Turner, & Winn, supra note 126.
This description of the intent of the "reasonable security procedure" requirement of
Article 4A has been disputed by the Chair of the Article 2B Drafting Committee, who also
chaired the Article 4A Drafting Committee. Memorandum of Carlyle C. Ring, Jr. (Jan. 25,
1999) <http://www.2Bguide.com>. His account points out that, in its application, Article 4A
places the risk of unauthorized orders on the bank; the bank is only able to shift that risk to the
customer if it finds that commercially reasonable security procedures are used. While his
argument correctly interprets the language and structure of Article 4A as it currently existed, it
does not respond to the argument that the alternative in Article 4A was to shield banks from
liability by placing all risks on the customer.
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parties belong to a relatively closed community of players, and where the
major participants are either large, sophisticated commercial parties or banks
subject to strict regulatory oversight 32 is a different burden than proving
what is "commercially reasonable" when such factors are absent. In other
words, although benefits are intended to flow from the use of "commercially
reasonble" security procedures, the introduction of notions of "commercial
reasonableness" is a serious qualification on the legal construct that weakens
its usefulness as a guiding beacon for business.133 Thus, according benefits
when "commercially reasonable" security procedures are used may not
provide the type of "security" that the industry is seeking, given the
vagueness and uncertainty inherent in the formulation and the difficulty in
determining whether a particular procedure may be commercially reasonable
under the circumstances.
Just as it is questionable whether the goal of "certainty" is met, it is also
questionable whether Article 2B gives the user any greater assurances than
would exist under the UETA. To get the benefit of the beneficial treatment
accorded by the statute, the proponent would still have to prove that there
was a method adopted by the parties to authenticate the message as that of
the sender, that the method adopted did operate as an authentication device,
and that under the circumstances of the transaction, it in fact operated
reasonably as an authentication device. In other words, to get the benefit of
the statute, the recipient would have to prove essentially the same set of facts
one would normally need to prove attribution directly. 134 Thus, it is doubtful
132. Boss, supra note 9, at 1079-80, 1083.
133. Of course, to the extent a vague standard of "commercial reasonableness" falls far
short of laying out the indicia of assurance and certainty necessary for reliability, one could
argue for more specificity in the type of security procedures sanctioned by the law. To the
extent a specific technological implementation does indeed provide assurances of reliability, it
is argued that implementation should be given greater efficacy under the law. This can be
accomplished through statutory or legal provisions treating these more secure methods as
conclusively satisfying signature and writing requirements and as providing evidence of
source and identity of the sender, as well as the integrity of the content of the message. The
more detail and "indicia," however, one lays out in a statute, the more regulatory and binding
the scheme becomes. Also, there is less flexibility with respect to emerging technologies and
implementations and the needs of the parties.
134. That is not the case where there is an agreement: then all the recipient would need
to prove was the agreement itself and compliance with its procedures. Similarly, where there
is a specific statute or regulation validating a specific technological method of authentication,
all that the recipient would need to prove is that the specified method was used. The proof
issues become complicated when the recipient must prove "commercially reasonable
attribution procedures," as is the case with Article 2B, or when it must prove that the method
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whether the "commercially reasonable security procedure" standard at all
helps the litigant with her burden of proof.
The goal of encouraging the use of security procedures is also
troublesome, and the risk exists that the statutory scheme may actually
operate as a disincentive. As was observed in the context of the UETA, a
rule placing the risk of loss on the person requiring use of a specified
security procedure might indeed discourage people from designating certain
procedures; 135 a variation of this provision in Article 2B136was deleted at the
Drafting Committee's last meeting for this very reason. The same question
can be raised about the other provisions in Article 2B with regard to
attribution: does adopting presumptions that make it easier for one party to
prove a transaction in court, while at the same time making it difficult, if not
impossible, for the other party to disprove the transaction, result in
encouraging or discouraging the use of security procedures? No special
proof rules exist, for example, in the context of phone orders or mail orders,
yet those businesses thrive. Article 2B's rule encourages recipients of
messages to use "commercially reasonable attribution procedures" by giving
them statutory incentives, but it does not provide similar incentives to
potential senders of electronic messages. Indeed, the rules may arguably
discourage potential senders from adopting certain methods of
communication for fear of having liability imposed, in actions with
strangers, where the alleged sender did not send the message.137 If, indeed,
part of the problem is that people are concerned about the "unknown" and
the potential of unintended liability, rules such as this feed rather than
assuage their fears.
Additionally, Article 2B takes the view that by providing those benefits,
one in turn increases the confidence of those doing business electronically
because they can now reasonably rely on receipt of electronic messages from
strangers. This view of security and its relationship to the law assumes that
the value and security added to electronic commerce in this manner is both
appropriate and acceptable. As noted above, however, that security may be
illusory. First, to the extent that potential users of the technology are
discouraged from its use because of fear of potential liability, their
confidence in the system is decreased. More importantly, however,
whatever confidence flows from the use of security procedures in electronic
commerce arguably comes not from the knowledge that the law gives the
135. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
136. U.C.C. § 2B- 115 (Proposed Draft Feb. 1, 1999).
137. Consumer representatives, for example, have pointed out that the credit card
scheme that currently exists protects consumers in the case of fraud or unauthorized use of
their cards, while in contrast, an Article 2B approach in the consumer context would protect
the merchant. The UETA approach is to favor neither party.
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users benefits but from the knowledge that the technological
implementations themselves are trustworthy.
On the federal level, several agencies have noted the need to avoid
allocations of risk at a time when electronic commerce is still evolving.
Thus, the Federal Reserve Board, considering the question of stored value
cards, noted:
Economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that government
regulation has the potential to foster or hinder technological
progress and the development of new products by influencing
private sector incentives to invest in research and development
activities and private sector choices among alternative
technologies. In deciding whether and, if so, how to regulate...
policymakers must carefully assess the potential effect of their
decisions on the evolution of these new products and the extent to
which they achieve market acceptance.138
In similar words, the White House, which had previously urged governments
to avoid undue regulation of the market, 39 urged flexibility in the drafting of
electronic commerce laws, in large part to prevent unwarranted market
distortion. This is expressed in the following:
The market is very much in the early stages of experimentation
with respect to business models for electronic commerce. The
United States believes it is not wise at this time to attempt to
identify a single model that these transactions will use or to
develop a legal environment using a single model. Indeed, such an
approach would prevent the market from testing different possible
approaches and prematurely impose a particular model on all
electronic commerce, inevitably limiting its growth. Therefore, at
the current state of development, the legal framework should
support a variety of business models so that the market is able to
experiment and select the models that best fit particular types of
electronic commerce.1
40
138. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress on the
Application of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act to Electronic Stored-Value Products (Mar.
1997) <http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/boarddocs/RptCongress/efta-rpt.pdf>.
139. See supra note 30.








No one disputes the fact that security issues in electronic commerce,
both of the technological and non-technological kind, are extremely
important. This is true even of those who adhere to the notion that the law
should, at this stage, simply remove barriers but otherwise stay neutral on the
subject. Indeed, security is one of the primary concerns that should be
addressed by businesses migrating to electronic communication and
businesses online. Thus, in the case of agreements between businesses
doing electronic commerce, it makes sense to go beyond merely requiring
"reasonable security procedures" to explain in specific detail what
procedures are required,14 2 and where the agreement is specific as to the
effects to be given to the use of those procedures, it makes sense to give
deference to that agreement. Similarly, the development of industry
standards and codes of conduct addressing security is of extreme
importance. 4 3  Industry codes and standards operate to inform business
people as to the variety of technological security means at their disposal,
thereby empowering them to make intelligent choices. This type of
education clearly gives the businesses a sense of security.
The real questions go to the relationship between the law and these
"security" issues: what type of "legal security" is necessary? Should the
law set forth a legal regime specific to certain technologies or
implementations, providing certain benefits when that technology is used?
While it may be true that certain technological security procedures are
"uniquely suited to the needs of secure e-commerce, ' 1  two key points
141. See supra note 21, cmt. 1 (1990) ("Adequate security procedures are
recognized... as critical to the efficacy of electronic communication .... The use of adequate
security enhances the reliability of those records and enhances the ability to prove the
substantive terms of any underlying commercial transaction.").
142. See, e.g., Model Electronic Payments Agreement and Commentary at § 7, cmt. 5;
32 JURIMETRICS J. 601, 654 (1992) ("in certain situations a lack of specificity in defining
.reasonable' security procedures may provide inadequate guidance causing such security
procedures to fail in their intended purpose. Specificity may help the parties implement and
comply decisively and unambiguously with security procedures, reduce confusion and offer
better expectations of reliability and certainty. Security procedures should be sufficiently
precise so that they are not subject to discretionary, self-serving interpretation").
143. See Information Security Committee, Section of Science and Technology,
American Bar Association, Digital Signature Guidelines: Legal Infrastructure for
Certification Authorities and Secure Electronic Commerce (1996) <http://www.abanet.
org/scitech/ec/isc/home.html >.
144. This claim, often made of digital signatures within a public key infrastructure, see
Baum, supra note 46, has been disputed both because it assumes all implementations of the
technology are the same when they are not, and it ignores other technological security
procedures such as biometrics.
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remain. First, while certain types of technology today may be considered
sufficiently secure to merit special treatment, future technological advances
raise the possibility that: 1) methods of security currently used may cease to
be secure in the future; and 2) other methods of security and other modes of
technological implementation will provide comparable or even better means
of security. Given the time lags inherent in the updating of laws, 45 drafting
a technology-specific or implementation-specific body of rules may not be
prudent. 46 Drafting a more general body of rules that depend upon such
concepts as "commercially reasonable security procedures" or that set out
criteria that security procedures must satisfy present a different problem: the
creation of a legal regime lacking the certainty desired by many business
people.
The theory that these laws "encourage" the use of security procedures is
questionable. If indeed certain technological security techniques are
uniquely situated to the needs of secure electronic commerce, they may well
be implemented without the adoption of specific rules. "One compelling
example of the dramatic success of open PKI is the ubiquitous use of the
SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) protocol over shared paths such as the Internet
for e-commerce."' 147 That proposition, while asserted as evidence of the need
for PKI specific legislation, arguably proves the opposite: if there is a good,
secure method of doing electronic commerce, that method will be
implemented as a matter of sound business practices, not as the result of PKI
specific legislation. In other words, the technology implementation itself
provides the necessary security and certainty necessary for electronic
commerce without the need for legislative intervention.
148
145. The need to revise our domestic and international laws to accommodate electronic
commerce has been a theme for well over a decade, yet we are still attempting to address that
need through statutory enactment.
146. Cf. C. Bradford Biddle, Legislating Market Winners: Digital Signature Laws and
the Electronic Commerce Marketplace, 34 SAN DiEGO L. REv. 1225 (1997).
147. Baum, supra note 124, at 38. According to Baum, the total number of sites using
SSL has risen from 486 in the third quarter of 1996, to 104,760 in the third quarter with a
projected rise in the fourth quarter" of 1999 to 307,206. The total number of sessions, as
opposed to sites, has similarly increased during that period from 291,600 to 134,775,517, and
is projected to rise to 636,335,396. Id.
148. An example lies within the development of the SET protocol, which involves the
use of digital signatures in the credit card system. MasterCard and Visa, who under current
arrangements potentially bear the risk of fraudulent transactions, charge their participating
merchants a percentage based ,on the risk involved in particular transactions, e.g., the rate
assessed for telephone order charges is much higher than the rate assessed in transactions
evidenced by both the card imprint and card holder signature. They have announced,
however, that when the SET protocol is implemented in the credit card system, and,
presumably, the risks of fraud drop, they will lower their merchant discount rate by several
percent. Thus, the benefits of security implementation are being realized not through the
Boss
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The difficulty with much of this debate over whether or not to recognize
specific means of technological security is that the discussion is misplaced.
If the technology provides reasonable means of security, people will
implement the technology for that reason, not because the law says so. A
person who installs locks on his or her door does not do so because greater
legal protection is afforded those who use the technology; a person installs
locks because experience has shown that locks are one means of stopping
intruders. A business that requires checks to be signed by more than one
officer does so not because the law requires but because it is a good business
practice that reduces risks of fraud, and a bank which institutes the practice
of manually examining the signatures on checks over a given amount does so
not because the law requires it but because it is a prudent banking practice to
reduce risk of fraud. The economic and other benefits to be gained from
implementation of secure systems is not disputed; what is disputed is the
need for the law to enact legislation saying that these secure systems are
secure and therefore are entitled to special treatment. Such legislation may
be neither needed nor wise.
There is no doubt that "security" in electronic commerce is an
important issue, but the debate over electronic signature legislation is
misleading in that it fails to recognize that security is more than merely the
legal effects to be given to certain technological security techniques. Once
we recognize that fundamental point, we can place the discussions about
what type of legislation is necessary and appropriate in perspective and
evaluate the claims for what they are worth.
enactment of any legislation but through marketplace recognition of the risk reduction
additional technological security brings.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutional struggles are, of necessity, most frequently fought out in
terms of law and legal principles. While this is inevitable, it often obscures
the underlying moral issues, the debate over values that always precedes the
formation of constitutional principles and always infuses the effort to
implement and interpret them.
For example, it is often, though mistakenly, said that we support free
speech because of the First Amendment, when the truth is the reverse: we
support the First Amendment because we believe in free speech. If
opponents of free speech succeeded in repealing the First Amendment, it
would not alter support of free speech by those who believed in it. However,
they would be less able to protect it. The First Amendment was the
invention of those who believed in free speech and thought it required
constitutional protection, enforceable in the courts.
Similarly, the belief in the value of privacy preceded the Fourth
Amendment, the latter having been invented by those who thought that a man's
home was his castle' and that the castle required a constitutional moat to inhibit
1. The founders, sensitive as they were to the notion of natural rights, were not yet so
sensitive as to recognize that a woman's home was her castle as well.
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the state's unwarranted trespasses. Therefore, in evaluating and adapting the
values of the Constitution to modem conditions, we need to place ourselves in
the position of the framers, who found themselves without a Bill of Rights and
endeavored to decide, without reference to a prior constitution, what values
should be protected and what rights needed to be legally enforced through the
Constitution. This is not meant to suggest that constitutional adjudication
requires, in any simplistic way, a preconstitutional exploration of original intent.
Rather, it is to argue that in debating what values a constitution should protect,
we need first to identify and debate those values apart from, and prior to, their
constitutional formulations. It may well be, for example, that certain values like
free speech or privacy can be adequately protected by current, properly inter-
preted provisions of the Constitution. Or it may be that they cannot, and
constitutional amendments to do so should be proposed. But, that is a different
question from what values we want the Constitution to protect and it is the latter
question that takes precedent.3
The unexamined premise of this article is that the values of free speech
and privacy, as commonly understood today, are believed by most
Americans to be worth protecting and that it is our task to find ways of doing
so, either by adapting through reasonable interpretations the Constitution we
have or by amending it to include the protections we desire. At the very
least, this article assumes, arguendo, that the rights of free speech and pri-
vacy that we already have should not be eroded by the unintended effects of
technological developments.
Inevitably, technological advances always change the circumstances under
which basic values exist, sometimes nourishing those values and sometimes
threatening them. Both occur at the same time more often than one would ex-
pect, rendering the debate over such values especially complex, and altering the
paradigms that were previously understood to govern constitutional constraints.
I. THE INVENTION OF THE PRINTING PRESS AND HOW IT AFFECTED THE
LAW OF FREE SPEECH
For example, the invention of the printing press had a revolutionary
impact on the value of free speech in fifteenth century England by both
2. See generally IRA GLASSER, VISIONS OF LIBERTY: THE BILL OF RIGHTS FOR ALL
AMERICANS, (1991) and in particular, Ch. 1, at 21; Ch. 3, at 114-18; and Ch. 4, at 165-66.
3. The reference in this context to "values" the Constitution should protect refers not to all
values, but rather to those that define the proper boundaries between what John Stuart Mill called
"individual sovereignty" and the police power of the state. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 14 (John Gray ed., 1991).
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nourishing it and threatening it. Indeed, it is fair to say that the threats to
freedom of speech arose out of its nourishment, out of a fear by the British
government that this new technological device, which made speech more
indiscriminately accessible, required legal curbs not previously thought to be
necessary.
4
Thus, in 1456 when the printing press was invented, fewer than 15,000
books existed in all of Europe.5 Books were a rare commodity, as were
people who were able to read them. Access to the printed word was not
widespread. Suddenly, with the invention of the printing press, speech and
opinion could be widely disseminated. Before the invention of the printing
press, speech and opinion had been audible only to listeners in the immediate
vicinity of a speaker or, if in written form, accessible only to a very limited
number of readers. However, after the invention of the printing press, ideas
and opinions could be spread relatively cheaply by anyone with access to a
printing press to anyone who could read. Moreover, the widespread access
to the printed word meant that people had an incentive to learn how to read.
Although the effect of this change was not immediate-just as the
broad effect of radio, television, and the Internet could not be immediate-
the potential of this means of communication was incendiary, and the British
government was not slow to recognize the threat and take steps to put out the
fire of unfettered thought. Thus, if the printing press would ultimately
nourish the development of free speech, it would also, and more
immediately, provoke governmental restrictions.
Relatively swiftly, Parliament enacted laws to control what could be
published. Censorship was imposed through various mechanisms. For
example, printing presses were required to be registered with the government
as if they were dangerous weapons, 6 the number of printers was limited,
books could not be sold without a government license, and broad powers to
search for illegal publications were established.7 In short, a tissue of legal
4. This is similar to the dynamic that in 1996 led Congress to pass, and President
Clinton to sign, the Communications Decency Act of 1996. Communications Decency Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. II
1997)). This Act consists of legal restraints designed to curb speech on the Internet that
would have been constitutionally impermissible to curb in other forms of media, such as
newspapers, books, magazines, or leaflets. Id.
5. See generally JAMES MORAN, PRINMG PRESSES; HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT FROM
THE FIFrEENTH CENTURY TO MODERN TIMES (1973).
6. An interesting analogy is the current effort by the Clinton administration to construe
strong encryption as a weapon and bring it under the legal constraints of laws restricting the
export of weapons.
7. See MORAN, supra note S.
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constraints was created so that nothing of consequence could be printed,
unless approved in advance, by either the government or the church.
These laws were harshly enforced by special courts called the High
Commission, which was the supreme ecclesiastical tribunal, and the Star
Chamber, which was the highest royal court. The Star Chamber in particular
came to be used to punish critics of the king, and those who published or
circulated unorthodox literature. Playwrights were heavily fined for plays
that made fun of the church. But fines were the least of the punishments
meted out; other punishments included ruinous and torturous physical
mutilations.
This assault by the government was so massive that those who
championed freedom of the press could hardly imagine resisting the
substantive restrictions of the new laws. Instead, free speech advocates
limited themselves to the goal of abolishing those laws requiring advance
approval of printed matter by the government. Freedom of the press thus
became synonymous, not with the freedom to print what one wanted without
fear of government punishment, but rather with the limited idea that no
advance government approval should be required. The goal of ending prior
restraints was the leading edge of the free speech movement. Eventually,
that goal was reached. In 1695, the English licensing law expired and was
not renewed.8 The system of prior censorship was ended.
This, of course, left the substantive restrictions intact. People could
now go ahead and publish without prior approval, but at considerable risk. It
remained illegal to criticize the crown, the government, and the church and it
was perilous to do so. This was called seditious libel and it was nearly
universally believed to be a category of speech legitimately restricted by
law.9 As late as the end of the seventeenth century, violating these laws was
regarded as treason, and was punishable by death, which was often
gruesomely executed. By the eighteenth century, seditious libel remained
illegal, but was no longer considered treason. Therefore, the punishment for
this crime was reduced. For 150 years after the licensing laws requiring
prior approval were abandoned, people in England were prosecuted,
convicted, and punished for their words. 10 They were free to speak and
publish, but they risked punishment afterward. Virtually everyone accepted
8. See Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of the Press, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTrMTlON 798 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986).
9. See id.
10. See David A. Anderson, Seditious Libel, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTUTION 1644 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986). See also LEONARD A. LEVY,
ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTIrrtUTION 197 (MacMillan 1988).
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this as the proper boundary between freedom of speech and government
restraint. In 1769, only a few years before the American Revolution, the
most influential legal scholar of his time, William Blackstone, put it this
way:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free
state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon public
actions, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when
published. Every free man has an undoubted right to lay what
sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy
the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper,
mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own
temerity. 11
Blackstone's view continued to reflect the prevailing view of what was
legally proper at the time the First Amendment was drafted in America.
However, the practice of free speech in America at first exceeded the legal
concept of what constituted a free press. The law in early America
prohibited criticism of the government.F2 Seditious libel laws were common
among the thirteen original states.' 3 Yet, as a matter of practice, the press
vigorously criticized public officials, often in terms that resembled modern-
day tabloid talk radio shows.14
Then, in 1798-scarcely seven years after the First Amendment was
ratified-a major event transformed the early Americans' understanding of
what it took to protect the right to criticize the government. This event
undermined the Blackstonian view that had dominated legal thought during
that time. At the time, John Adams was President, and his administration
and its followers seemed intent upon encouraging a war with France and,
perhaps, reestablishing an alliance with England. This was a matter of such
hot dispute that some newspapers of the day were intensely engaged in a
harsh criticism of the Adams Administration, even attributing to it a desire to
11. Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of the Press, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDiA OF THE AME CAN
CONsrrUTON 798 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., MacMillan 1986) (citing William Blackstone,
Commentaries (1769)).
12. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGiNAL IfENT AND THE FRAMERs' CONSTITUTION 195-
228 (1988).
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undo the Constitution and restore a monarchy. 5 The government's effort to
quash this criticism resulted in the first federal sedition act being passed by
Congress. 16 The Sedition Act made it a crime, punishable by both a fine and
prison, to publish "false, scandalous and malicious" criticism of the
government, Congress, or the President, "with intent to defame" them or to
- 17
heap contempt upon them or damage their reputations.
The war with France never came, but the Sedition Act was widely
enforced against American citizens, all of which were Democratic-
Republicans (Thomas Jefferson's party) and political opponents of President
Adams and his followers. Editors, scientists, pamphleteers, and even one
member of Congress were arrested. 8 While all were fined and imprisoned,
some died in jail awaiting trial. Despite the First Amendment, 19 the Sedition
Act was passed by the Senate 18 to 6, and by the House, 44 to 41.20
Democratic-Republicans were shocked by this. They learned for the
first time how insufficient the Blackstonian view was. The Sedition Act,
after all, was a model of civil libertarian principles, as commonly understood
at the time. It punished speech only after publication, imposed no prior
censorship, and even authorized truth as a defense, which was a great
advance. It thus permitted critics of the government to win acquittal of the
charges against them by proving the truth of their criticisms. Only false
criticisms would be punished, which was what even Jefferson said he
21
wanted. What could be wrong with permitting the government to punish
false criticism while leaving truthful criticism immune?
The Sedition Act of 1798 showed Jefferson and his political colleagues
why truth as a defense was a trap, not a safeguard. A government seeking to
suppress criticism could indict anyone it wished to silence, exposing him to
the cost of a trial and the risk of a serious penalty. Moreover, who would
15. For a general history of this turbulent period written from the point of view of the
Adams administration and utilizing verbatim newspaper accounts from that time, see RICHARD
ROSENFELD, AMERICAN AURoRA (1997).
16. Sedition Act of 1798, Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired in 1801).
17. Merrill D. Peterson, Alien and Sedition Acts, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTrrtMON 43-44 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986). Sedition Act of 1798, Ch. 74, 1 Stat.
596 (1798) (expired in 1801).
18. See Merrill D. Peterson, Alien and Sedition Acts, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OFTHE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 43 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986).
19. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or [of] the right of the people... to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONSr. amend. I.
20. WnijAM O. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OFLIBERTY 12 (1954).
21. LEVY, supra note 12, at 199-200.
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decide what was true and what was false? These were necessarily highly
subjective judgments, vulnerable to precisely the kind of prejudice that led to
the prosecutions in the first place. Judges and juries, who would reflect the
general hysteria as often as they would be likely to curb it, would have the
power to decide what was true and what was not. As the convictions
mounted, it became clear that the power to prosecute speech itself was the
problem. The defense of truth was no defense at all.
A new idea of freedom of expression began to emerge. If the right to
free speech was to be protected against government attempts to suppress
criticism, legal limits on government power would have to extend to
punishment after publication as well as to previewing and censorship before
the material was published. People began to see that a law allowing the
government to impose punishment after publication would have precisely the
same effect as a law allowing the government to censor speech before
publication. James Madison expressed this growing idea pungently: "'It
would seem a mockery to say that no laws shall be passed preventing
publications from being made, but that laws might be passed for punishing
them in case they should be made."'2
That the government should not be able to punish speech after
publication meant that even scurrilous speech, including false accusations
and misrepresentations of fact, would not only be tolerated, but would be
protected by law; a radical departure.2 3  Before this, even advanced
libertarians had assumed that freedom of the press meant only the legal
freedom to publish the truth, whereas falsehoods could and should be
punishable. However, after the experience with the Sedition Act of 1798
people began to realize that if the government had the power to punish false
speech, it would inevitably use that power to silence its critics.
John Thomson expressed this new idea in a book he wrote in 1801
called An Enquiry into the Liberty and Licentiousness of the Press, and the
Uncontrollable Nature of the Human Mind.24  Any laws prohibiting
"licentious" speech, he wrote, would inevitably be used by those who wished
"nobody to enjoy the Liberty of the Press but such as were of their own
opinion." 5 That was what occurred in 1798 when, under the pretext of
protecting America against a foreign menace, the Adams administration used
22. LEVY, supra note 12, at 215.
23. LEVY, supra note 12, at 215-18.
24. JOHN THOMSON, AN ENQUIRY, CONCERNING, THE LIBERTY, AND LIcENTIOusNESs OF
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the Sedition Act of 1798 to target its domestic political critics: all ten men
convicted under this Act were Republicans who had criticized the Adams
administration and its policies, and all were pardoned by the next Republican
president, Thomas Jefferson.26
It may have seemed abstractly logical to protect truthful criticism while
allowing the law to punish false or malicious criticism, but in the world of
political power, that was not the way it worked. Often, the very purpose of
criticism was to damage the reputation and undermine the credibility of the
party in power. Permitting the target of criticism to prosecute his critics
would inevitably destroy freedom of expression. In practice, there was no
way to neatly separate truth from error. Political truth was often a matter of
subjective judgment, not scientific determination. How would a jury
evaluate political truths? It was, said John Thomson, rather like letting a
jury decide which was the most tasty food or the most beautiful color, and
then allowing it to punish anyone who had a different view.27 If the
government was given the power to punish false or malicious speech, would
it not naturally use that power to punish any speech it found too critical?
That was exactly what had just happened with the Sedition Act-why should
it ever be any different?
Furthermore, how could the accused prove to his accusers that what he
said was true? The experience with the Sedition Act had shown beyond
doubt that the defense of truth, long thought to be a safeguard, was no
safeguard at all. It could never protect a critic against prosecution, and it
would hardly ever protect him against conviction. Republicans who were
sent to jail by the Adams administration for their malicious speech came to
understand that the only important question was who had the power to
decide the truth of their statements. Since they could not be certain of
always holding political power, they began to believe that the best way to
protect their own freedom of expression was to prohibit any government
from prosecuting any speech.
The Republicans initially developed this theory out of blatant self-
interest. They were a political minority trying to gain political power by first
persuading people of the folly of the party in power, and second persuading
them of their own virtue. When they did this, they were prosecuted for
seditious libel for maliciously criticizing the government. Therefore, they
championed the right to freedom of speech because they needed it to defend
26. Merrill D. Peterson, Alien and Sedition Acts, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTrrUTION 43-44 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986).
27. See generally THOMSON, supra note 24.
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themselves. They were not political philosophers so much as practical
politicians, activists hoping to advance their own cause. It is also unlikely
that they would have behaved any more magnanimously toward their
opponents had they themselves been in power. Indeed, when they gained
power a few years later, they did not always respect the free speech rights of
their opponents. Even Jefferson himself, when he became president, urged
that his opponents be prosecuted under state sedition laws.28
I. CHALLENGING THE IDEA OF SEDITIOUS LIBEL
For the first time, as a result of the experience under the Sedition Act of
1798, the concept of seditious libel itself was challenged.29 The truly radical
idea that in a democracy the people must have the same right as the
government to voice any opinion and express any thought without fear of
prosecution was advanced. However harsh, however unjust, however
"false," speech had to be legally protected because the power to prosecute
any opinion was the power to prosecute all opinion. There could be no such
thing as a verbal crime. This new idea advocated nothing less than an
absolute right to freedom of political expression. The line between what
should be legally protected and what could be criminally punished was no
longer to be drawn between categories of speech, such as true or false, but
between speech and overt acts.
Not only was this a radical libertarian idea at the time, it was also a
radical democratic idea. It meant that the government could never tell a
citizen what to think or to say, or punish him for his words. It implied an
equality between citizens and their government: a king might insulate
himself from criticism by his subjects, but in a democracy, the concept of
seditious libel was a contradiction because citizens are not subjects; their
relationship to the government is, or ought to be, a legally egalitarian one.
Unlike in a monarchy, where political power was permanently vested in a
single family, political power in a democracy was fluid. It was intended to
pass from party to party, as the people saw fit. Furthermore, how were the
people to decide, if not by being exposed to the full flow of competing ideas,
opinions, and even to competing views of the facts? If the party in power
was allowed to skew a debate by punishing its critics and controlling which
views became available to the public, could it not then manipulate public
opinion and entrench its own political power?
28. See generally LEVY, supra note 12.
29. Sedition Act of 1798, Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired in 1801).
1999]
85
: Nova Law Review 23, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Nova Law Review
Thus, the idea that democracy itself required absolute freedom of
political expression grew. As a practical matter, since this was not possible
without also protecting false and malicious speech, all political speech
would have to be protected from government restriction. Jefferson said that
error could be tolerated, so long as truth was left free to combat it,30 and, he
might have added, so long as government was not permitted to decide which
was which. Therefore, what began as an idea rooted in the narrow self-
interest of the Republican minority grew into a general theory of free
expression that today broadly protects all Americans.
However, this idea did not grow quickly, at least not as enforceable
constitutional law. The Sedition Act of 1798 was never challenged in the
United States Supreme Court because the political turmoil it helped to create
resulted in Thomas Jefferson being elected president, replacing John Adams.
The Sedition Act was repealed and those convicted under it were pardoned
by President Jefferson before any of the cases reached the Supreme Court.
31
As a result, state sedition laws stayed on the books and were mainly used to
prosecute antislavery opinions in the South and labor activists in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Then, in 1917, in the midst of
substantial dissent over the propriety of America's entrance into World War
32I, the first federal sedition law since the Sedition Act of 1798 was passed.
Once again, it became a federal crime to print, speak, write, or publish any
words that heaped contempt or scorn upon the government.33 Over 2,000
prosecutions were brought and more than a thousand convictions obtained,
almost all of them for expressing criticism of the war.34 One man was
sentenced to prison for reading the Declaration of Independence in public;
35
a minister was sentenced to fifteen years for saying that the war was
unchristian. 36  Additionally, a newspaper editor was convicted for
questioning the constitutionality of the draft.37
As late as the early 1920s, more than 130 years after the First
Amendment was ratified and 120 years after Jefferson and his colleagues
30. Speech by Thomas Jefferson (Jun. 13, 1779), in WiIJAM 0. DOUGLAS, AN
ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 362 (1954).
31. Id.
32. See generally WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 124, 193 (1954).
See also Paul L. Murphy, Espionage Act, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE CONSTITUTION 653
(Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986).
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realized what was wrong with the Sedition Act of 1798, the Supreme Court
had still never struck down any such law or overturned any prosecution on
First Amendment grounds. It would take many more years, well into the
1960s, before the First Amendment rights most Americans today take for
granted would finally be enforceable in the courts.
What does all of this have to do with the Internet and with protecting
free speech in cyberspace? First, it is clear that the invention of a radical
new medium, the printing press, though it eventually allowed free speech
and democracy to flourish, at first provoked laws designed to control speech
and which gave the government broad powers to suppress and punish
disfavored speech. Second, once the rules of restriction were set into place
they became reified and legitimate, so that even advocates of free speech
accepted limitations that few Americans, and no current Supreme Court
Justice, would accept today. Third, the impact of these early restrictions
were incredibly enduring, having a substantial impact for centuries, and a
residual impact extending into our own lifetime.
Therefore, it is critically important to the future of free speech on the
Internet that the rules of freedom, not censorship, govern from the outset.
Once established, early rules are likely to determine for many years whether
free speech prevails in what is likely to become the major medium of
American democracy, or whether the new medium instead becomes the
occasion to restore speech restrictions we no longer tolerate in print media.
38
IV. THE INVENTION OF THE TELEPHONE AND How IT AFFECTED THE LAW
OF PRIVACY
The invention of the telephone in the late nineteenth century, and its
intersection with the traditional paradigm of the constitutional law of
38. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to examine the intermediate case of
broadcast media, i.e., radio and television, it is worth pointing out that today Americans live with
greater restrictions on radio and television than are constitutionally permissible in print media
because of the early rules established at the emergence of radio. These early restrictions were
rooted in the notion of the scarcity of broadcast airwaves and the subsequent need to regulate
access to and control of such limited channels of communication. Although cable television and
the likely merging of computer technology and the Internet with television has altered the original
reality of scarcity and may alter it more in the years to come, the laws regulating television and
radio have been slow to shed their original restrictions. Although this is a complex issue not
possible to address fully here, it does illustrate the basic theme of this article, which is that early
rules endure and that the early rules governing speech on the Internet will likely determine the
degree to which Americans enjoy free speech in cyberspace for years to come.
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privacy, also had, and continues to have, a profound transformational effect
on rights the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.
It is often, though mistakenly, claimed that no right to privacy can be
found in the Constitution, and it is true that the word "privacy" does not
appear anywhere in the Bill of Rights. But, there can be little doubt that
maintaining privacy was a fundamental concern of early Americans or that
the Fourth Amendment was explicitly designed to protect it.
Before the American Revolution, British soldiers and customs agents
entered homes and offices at will and searched any person or place they
wished. It is doubtless that the victims of those intrusions came to quickly
value the right to privacy, and to believe that liberty could not be sustained
unless the government was prevented from engaging in such intrusions at its
discretion. Indeed, no less a witness to the cause of the trouble between
England and its American colonies than Samuel Adams said that he regarded
the unrest over general searches "as the Commencement of the Controversy,
between Great Britain and America.
3 9
After the Revolution, there was a strong public demand to prohibit
general searches and to establish constitutional protection for "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects."'40 The
Fourth Amendment represented a fundamental repudiation of traditional
English law and created a presumptive right to privacy against government
intrusion.41 The right to privacy was protected by creating a legal barrier to
physical intrusion. Security was established by the physical walls of one's
home or place of business and the Fourth Amendment prohibited general
searches of such private premises. What conversations took place there, and
what papers and effects were stored there, would safely remain private
except under the narrow, limited circumstances permitted by the Fourth
Amendment. Privacy would be protected by the Fourth Amendment's
limitation against physical trespass.
The invention of the telephone eroded this premise. Before the
telephone, private conversations could take place only if the participants
were physically contiguous. Additionally, conversations within the four
walls of one's home or place of business were private because the
government had no effective way to listen in. However, the telephone
changed all that. With this invention two people could have a conversation
while each stayed in his own home. The wire through which such
39. LEVY, supra note 12, at 227-28.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
41. This right was at first applied only against the federal government, a problem that
would require 170 years to fully resolve. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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conversations would pass, was initially thought to be opaque and
impenetrable, like an envelope that no one could open. Thus, it was not
believed to be necessary to construct special legal safeguards against
listening in on telephone conversations to parallel those that protected the
privacy of sealed paper letters. It was clear though that no one had
anticipated wiretapping.
The first constitutional issue involving the telephone surfaced during
the days of alcohol prohibition. 42 During the days of alcohol prohibition,
Roy Olmstead, a suspected bootlegger whom the government wished to
search, was the subject of a government wiretapping operation.43 Utilizing
this brand-new technique, the government placed taps in the basement of the
building where his office was located and on wires in the streets near his
home.44 No physical trespass that breached the walls of his office or home
took place; none was necessary.
Olmstead was convicted entirely on the basis of evidence from those
wiretaps. In his appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, Olmstead
argued inter alia that the taps constituted a search conducted in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, in that no warrant was issued and no probable cause
existed, and so the evidence that had been admitted into evidence against
him should have been excluded.45 In a narrow but fateful 5 to 4 decision, the
Court rejected Olmstead's arguments and upheld the federal government's
power to wiretap without limit, and without any Fourth Amendment
restrictions on the grounds that no actual physical intrusion of the premises
had taken place and that physical intrusion of the premises was what the
Fourth Amendment restricted.
46
Justice Louis D. Brandeis dissented.47  He said that the Fourth
Amendment was designed to protect privacy and that the Fourth
Amendment's restrictions on physical trespass were merely instrumental, not48 g
primary. Brandeis warned against allowing the "progress of science [to
furnish] the Government with means of espionage."49 He said that such
electronic methods would become more sophisticated and ubiquitous and
42. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,442 (1928).
43. Id. at 455-56.
44. Id. at 456-57.
45. See generally id.
46. Id. at 469.
47. Olnstead, 277 U.S. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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would render Fourth Amendment rights meaningless unless the Court ruled
50that they were not immune from Fourth Amendment restrictions.
Brandeis not only argued that the Fourth Amendment should apply to
wiretapping, he thought that if it did, it must bar wiretapping instead of
merely restricting it.51 He felt that no wiretap warrant could be limited, as
the Fourth Amendment required, to describing particularly the conversations
52to be overheard, seized, and recorded. Wiretaps, he said, indiscriminately
picked up every conversation over the wires that were tapped, not only every
conversation of the target, many or most of which would be personal and not
germane to the investigation, but also every conversation of anyone else who
lived in the house, as well as anyone else who phoned in. 3 Wiretaps,
Brandeis argued, could not be precise, as the Fourth Amendment required,
but were instead like vacuum cleaners, sweeping up everything. 54 In this
respect, he concluded, wiretaps constituted the kind of general search
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 55 Referring to colonial history, he
said that the old British "general warrants are but puny instruments of
tyranny and oppression when compared with wiretapping."
56
But Brandeis did not prevail. By the margin of one vote, the Supreme
Court failed to meet the challenge of adapting the Fourth Amendment's
protection to emerging new technology.57 If the Court had focused on the
right the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect, and not upon the
instrumentality of that right-the limitation upon physical trespass-
electronic communication might have enjoyed the same privacy protections
as paper mail. But by protecting the four walls of the home, when the
private conversation no longer took place there, the Court allowed such
conversation to be prey to government intrusions. This early decision was
enduringly consequential because, just as the early laws governing the
printing press restricted free speech for centuries, the Olmstead decision
restricted privacy for decades and in some essential respects restricts it
still. 8
50. Id.
51. Id. at 438.
52. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438.
53. Id. at 476.
54. Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 479.
56. Id. at 476.
57. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
58. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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For forty years the Court's decision in Olmstead totally exempted
wiretapping and other forms of electronic spying from any constitutional
restrictions. Then in 1967, in a similar case involving gambling, the Court
overruled Olmstead by an 8-1 margin, and recognized that the Fourth
Amendment applied to wiretapping and electronic surveillance.
59
Even then, Brandeis was only partially vindicated. The Court, in Katz
v. United States, 6 did rule that warrants were required before wiretaps could
be authorized, and that warrants could be issued only if there was evidence
sufficient to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's requirement of probable
cause.61  However, Brandeis' view, that wiretapping was necessarily a
general search because it inevitably recorded many innocent conversations
and should therefore be entirely prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, was
rejected by Katz.62
To a substantial extent, the failure of the Katz Court to take the second
part of Brandeis' dissent into serious consideration can be said to have been
a result of the reification over time of Olmstead. By the time Katz was
decided, wiretapping and electronic surveillance (as the result of Olmstead)
had been institutionalized in America for forty years. In fact, it was part of
the landscape at both the federal and state level, and had become too habitual
to stop. Just as even the avant-garde of free speech advocates in the
eighteenth century could not see their way clear to challenge the
government's prerogative to enforce substantive limits on dissent and
criticism but were instead content to challenge the doctrine of prior restraint,
leaving postpublication speech vulnerable, so even the avant-garde of
privacy advocates in 1967 could not see their way clear to challenge Katz but
instead celebrated it, content to have the warrant requirement now apply to
wiretapping and electronic surveillance but remaining oblivious to what a
nearly empty victory that turned out to be.
Following the Katz decision in 1967, Congress passed the Omnibus
63Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. This new law authorized law
enforcement officials to conduct wiretaps and other electronic surveillance
under court ordered wiretaps.6 It required that records be kept to show how
many taps were authorized, how many conversations and people were




63. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
236 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1994)).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1994).
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overheard, how many interceptions led to arrests and convictions, and for
which crimes.
65
From the beginning, these statistics showed how right Brandeis had
been when he dissented in Olmstead and how Katz had overruled Olmstead
only formally, while leaving the underlying intrusion intact. For example,
only a few years after the 1968 law was passed, government reports showed
that wiretaps were indeed a vacuum cleaner, sweeping many innocent people
and conversations into its net. Every incriminating conversation captured
produced huge violations of the privacy rights of the innocent for only
meager returns in criminal convictions.
6 6
* In 1968, when there was no federal eavesdropping, state
officials listened in on 66,716 conversations.
67
* In 1969, when both federal and state officials
eavesdropped, 173,711 conversations were overheard.
68
* In 1970, the amount of eavesdropping doubled to 381,865
conversations.
69
* In 1971, at least 498,325 conversations were overheard, a
jump of 30 per cent [sic] over 1970.70
What were the results of all this expanded surveillance?
* In 1968, out of 66,716 overheard conversations, no
convictions were reported.
71
* In 1969, out of 173,711 conversations, 294 convictions
[were obtained] 72
* In 1970, out of 381,865 conversations, 538 convictions
resulted.73
65. Id. § 2519.
66. Ira Glasser & Herman Schwartz, Your Phone is a Party Line, HARPER's MAG., Oct.
1972, at 108.




71. Glasser & Schwartz, supra note 66, at 108.
72. Id. at 111.
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* In 1971, out of at least 498,325 conversations, 322
convictions [were obtained].
74
In the first four years after the 1968 bill was passed, 1.1 million
conversations were overheard, 93,080 people were spied upon, 6131 people
were arrested and a total of 1154 were reported convicted-barely more than
one percent. 75 Moreover, it is not clear, because the government reports do
not say, how many of those convictions depended upon wiretapping
evidence.
In 1970 and 1971, there was not a single federal tap involving either a
homicide or kidnapping. On the state level, from 1968 to 1971, only three
taps involved kidnapping and only a few involved homicide.76  The
overwhelming bulk of court ordered wiretaps were for gambling and drugs.
77
"In 1971, gambling alone accounted for [ninety] per cent of federal
tapping," drugs, six percent, and all other offenses combined, four percent.
78
Most of the gambling taps were on bookies and their customers.
79
In subsequent years, these results did not significantly vary. For
example, according to statistics released by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts and the Department of Justice, of the 2.2 million
conversations captured by the government in 1996, 1.7 million-more than
three-quarters--were deemed not incriminating by prosecutors.8 0 Moreover,
most of those conversations that were incriminating were in cases involving
drugs or gambling, much of it petty.8' In 1996, none of the wiretap orders
were issued for investigations involving arson, explosives, or weapons, and
in thirty years the vast majority of wiretaps and other forms of electronic
surveillance have occurred in vice crimes, like gambling and drug offenses.8 2








80. American Civil Liberties Union, Big Brother on the Wires: Wiretapping in the
Digital Age <http:llwww.aclu.orglissueslcyber/wiretapbrother.htrrd> [hereinafter Big
Brother] (as of Feb. 5, 1999 this site had changed).
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and hardly ever in crimes involving bombings, arson, firearms, homicide,
83
assault, rape, robbery, or burglary.
If as many homes had been intrusively entered, and three-quarters of the
targets had turned out to be innocent, while most of the others where
incriminating evidence was found were in cases involving gambling and
drugs and not those involving crimes of violence, most modern Americans,
and certainly most of the early Americans, would have felt violated. It was
precisely the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to target searches narrowly
so that when warrants were issued the privacy rights of innocent people
would be minimized. Wiretapping stands that purpose on its head, as
Brandeis predicted at its dawn.
Here again, as in the area of free speech, the lesson is that when new
technologies develop the law must develop along with them to maintain a
proper balance between individual rights and government power. Just as the
invention of the printing press ushered in new laws that upset the balance
and weakened the right of free speech for centuries, so did the invention of
the telephone when the law failed to keep pace at the outset, permanently
altering the balance of power between the government and the individual,
and ushering in an era of declining privacy rights that has not yet ended. It is
therefore critically important to the future of privacy at the dawn of the era
of cyberspace that the rules be drawn now in a way that insulates privacy
from government intrusions, because those early rules, once established, are
likely to determine for many years whether the value of privacy prevails in a
digitalized world of electronic communication.
V. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT AND ITS PROGENY
The Communications Decency Act of 1996, ("Act"), 84 presented the
United States Supreme Court with its first opportunity to decide, in a
fundamental way, how the First Amendment would apply to cyberspace. A
detailed analysis of the Act and of the Supreme Court decision that struck it
down is beyond the scope and purpose of this article.85 What is significant,
and what this article proposes to examine, is the way in which this Act
presented both Congress and the President on the one hand, and the Supreme
83. See generally BRUCE SCHNEIER & DAVID BANISAR, ELwrRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS:
DOCUMENTS ON THE BATrIE FOR PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF SURVE ANCE, Ch.10, at 463 (1997).
See also Big Brother, supra note 80.
84. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. II 1997)).
85. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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Court on the other, with an early opportunity to adapt the traditional
paradigms of First Amendment case law to the startling new technology of
the Internet. Because these early decisions are likely to endure and to set the
terms of the intersection of the law with rapidly emerging new technology,
they are especially interesting and, in all probability, disproportionately
significant.
As the Internet developed, it began to come to the attention of a wide
variety of interest groups and eventually of governments worldwide, many of
whom were alarmed by the decentralized, uncontrolled, and unlimited nature
of the communication taking place.86 In a reprise of the alarm like that
which caused Parliament to impose comprehensive censorship schemes on
the then-new printing press four centuries ago, Congress moved swiftly to
pass the Act, thereby making it a crime to "publish" or communicate by
means of a telecommunications device or through the use of an "interactive
computer service" certain content described in some sections of the law as
"indecent" and in other sections as "patently offensive."
87
The statute also barred communications that were obscene, but this part
of the statute was less legally interesting because it essentially sought to
transfer to the Internet legal standards that already were embedded in
longstanding constitutional case law as it applied to print media, films, etc.88
On the other hand, in extending criminal bans to material that was
"indecent ' 89 or "patently offensive" even if not legally obscene, the statute
sought to criminalize speech and expression that it clearly could not
constitutionally prohibit in books, magazines or films. This squarely raised
86. The Internet grew from its experimental origins in 1969 as a project linking
computers and computer networks owned by the military, defense contractors, and university
laboratories conducting military research to include without limit networks and computers
throughout the world. Id. at 849-50.
87. Id. at 849.
88. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133 (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C.§ 223 (Supp. H 1997)). Even with respect to obscenity law, however,
the new technology presented challenging new problems for the law to resolve. A key element of
current obscenity laws, as governed by Miller v. California, rests on the notion of "community
standards." 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Thus, what is legally obscene in Tupelo, Mississippi may be
different than what is obscene in San Francisco, California. But how can the idea of local
community standards be maintained in the world of cyberspace, where something can be posted
in San Francisco, or, for that matter, in Finland, and downloaded by someone in Tupelo?
89. The statute banned "indecent" communications without anywhere defining the term.
Communication Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-04, 110 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at
U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. H1 1997)).
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the question of whether the Internet could be governed by different
substantive constitutional standards than those that governed print and film.
Those who believed that the Internet would in the not too distant future
become the principal means of mass communication well understood the
significance of the answer to this question. Advocates of free speech sought
to have the standards currently applying to books and newspapers applied to
the Internet. Those who were frustrated by their inability to restrict sexual
content in print media saw in the Internet a rare occasion to embed more
restrictive constitutional standards in a new and emerging means of
communication. Central to the outcome of this constitutional contest was
the struggle over the appropriate metaphor. What exactly was the Internet?
Was it what one judge called "a never-ending worldwide conversation"
which, as "the most participatory form of mass speech yet developed"
deserved "the highest protection from governmental intrusion"? 90 Was it
like broadcast television because communications were received visually on
a screen? Or was it more like an electronic version of a book or newspaper?
Because the law had long permitted government restrictions of content on
radio and television that it had not permitted in books, magazines, or
newspapers, this factual question, this struggle over the correct analogy, was
critical to the outcome of the litigation that challenged the Act. Thus, at the
trial, expert witnesses were exhaustively presented; the contest over what the
applicable legal standards should be was preceded by, and was based upon, a
contest over the facts. In the end, both the trial court and the Supreme Court
rejected the analogy of broadcast television and applied the traditional First
Amendment standards governing print media to Internet communications,
thus striking down as unconstitutional those provisions of the Act that
expanded the law's restrictive reach. 9
The Court also ruled that the state's interest in protecting minors from
certain sexually explicit content could not, in a situation where minor
audiences could not effectively be segregated from adult audiences, justify
restricting access by adults to constitutionally protected content if less
restrictive alternatives were available.92  The Court stated that the
availability of user based blocking software by parents is one such
alternative. 93 This led to a rapid and explosive growth of such software94 as
90. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
91. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
92. Id. at 855-56.
93. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 883.
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parents exercised their prerogative to guide their children's Internet access in
much the same way that they might wish to guide their access to books,
magazines, and films. The use of blocking software has also become an
instrument of government. An increasing number of city and county library
boards began to require public libraries to install such blocking software,
over the objection of the American Library Association and library users.
The struggle over such government-mandated blocking software has now
become the biggest free speech controversy in cyberspace since the legal
challenge to the Act. Lawsuits challenging the required use of blocking
software by local libraries are now pending, and a battle looms in Congress,
where a bill has been introduced that would require all public libraries and
schools to use blocking software in order to qualify for a federal funding
program designed to promote and assist universal Internet access.
95
To some extent, the controversy over the constitutionality of
government blocking schemes once again turns on the facts. Blocking
software that was able to narrowly limit its reach to unprotected speech, e.g.,
obscenity, might be at least presumptively constitutional. But such narrowly
targeted software is now quite impossible and is likely to remain so. Some
blocking software relies on key words and phrases, such as "xxx" (meant to
block triple x-rated pornography) "which blocks out Superbowl XXX sites;
"breast," which blocks websites and discussion groups about breast cancer;
and the consecutive letters 's,' 'e' and 'x,' which block sites containing the
words 'sexton' and [even] "Mars exploration," among many others". 96 Any
blocking software that relies on key words and phrases will inevitably be
overbroad. Ironically, at the same time that it blocks benign sites, such
software often lets targeted material through. According to a recent survey,
one software vendor's own test showed that its software blocked fifty-seven
sites containing nothing objectionable while failing to block a number of
pornographic sites.97 The definitional problems inherent in this filtering
approach are thus both under- and over-inclusive.
98
Blocking software also relies on the judgment of individuals hired by
software vendors who browse the Internet for sites to block according to the
manufacturer's criteria, which may include such imprecise categories as
94. Sales were estimated at $14 million in 1997 and are projected to increase to $75
million over the next three years. American Civil Liberties Union, Censorship in a Box
<http://aclu.orglissueslcyber/ box.html/> [hereinafter Censorship in a Box].
95. Internet School Filtering Act, S. 1619, 105th Cong. (1998).
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"hate speech," "criminal activity," "sexually explicit speech," "adult
speech," "violent speech," "religious speech," and even "sports." Using
such criteria, the vendor maintains lists of unacceptable sites, and makes
judgments that update such lists. These methods are inevitably subjective
and vague, often surprising their supporters with unanticipated results. The
American Family Association ("AFA") a strong advocate of blocking
software, was angered to learn that their own site had been blocked by
software that blocked discussion of homosexuality because of the AFA's
opposition to homosexuaity!99
Thus, the censorship offered by such software is often like poison gas:
it seems like a good idea when aimed at a target you oppose, but the wind
has a way of shifting. Ultimately, the First Amendment considerations are
no different from traditional problems of vagueness and overbreadth that are
inherent in any language attempting to define categories of impermissible
speech. The Internet has therefore become the locus for the replay of
traditional struggles between censorship and First Amendment rights.
Between 1995 and 1998, twenty-five states considered or passed one form or
another of Internet censorship laws. This year alone at least seven states
plus Congress are considering bills that require libraries and/or schools to
use blocking software.'0 The struggle over the application of First
Amendment principles to this new medium is unlikely to abate anytime
soon.
10'
VI. BIG BROTHER IN THE WIRES: DIGITAL TELEPHONY, ENCRYPTION, AND
COMPUTER PRIVACY
The values of privacy articulated by Justice Brandeis in Olmstead are
now at stake as never before in our history. 1°2 Electronic communications,
including telephone conversations, fax messages, e-mail, fund transfers,
commercial transactions, trade secrets, and health records are all floating in
the air, waiting to be scooped up by governments, private groups, and
individuals. The black strips on the backs of our credit, ATM, and
identification cards, the electronic wands being distributed by gasoline
companies to make purchases easier, the E-Z passes for paying tolls
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Currently, this author's research reveals that federal district courts in New York,
Georgia, New Mexico and Virginia have found Internet censorship laws unconstitutional on
First Amendment or other constitutional grounds, and that other cases are pending.
102. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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effortlessly and electronically, and the imminent arrival of a new generation
of compact digital PCS phones that also function as wireless computers, e-
mailers, pagers, and data transmitters compound the problem.10 3 Americans
are on the edge of a degree of vulnerability to both governmental and private
sector spying and surveillance that was unimaginable only a decade
ago. One can scarcely contemplate how the new potential for total surveil-
lance of the most personal details of our private lives would have stunned
those who valued privacy, like Justice Brandeis in 1928, or like the majority
of citizens who supported the Fourth Amendment in the late 18th century,
fueled by their rage against the intrusions of British soldiers.10
4
Strong encryption of all such data is the modem electronic equivalent of
the door that blocked the King of England from entering the tenements of
British subjects.105 It is also the equivalent of the opaque envelope that
provides a constitutionally mandated shield to paper communications.
Without an individual, constitutionally-based right to strong encryption,
there will be no way to prevent private communications from being swept
up. The King of England, and all other governments and private sector
entities, will be empowered to enter any data door at will, to join any
conversation, to monitor and record any communication. Without an
enforceable right to strong encryption, the general search our ancestors so
justifiably hated will be resurrected to a degree unimagined by those who
value personal privacy.
Most countries in the world today do not have legal controls on the use
of encryption, which may be used, manufactured, and sold without
restriction. 0 'There are a small number of countries where strong domestic
[legal] controls on the use of cryptography are in place."'1 7 These include
countries that are not noted for their traditional respect for individual rights:
103. Big Brother, supra note 80.
104. 'Thus our houses and even our bed chambers, are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes
chests [and] trunks broke open ravaged and plundered by wretches, whom no prudent man would
venture to employ even as menial servants." BERNARD ScHwARTZ, 1 RooTS OF THE BIL OF
RIGHTS 206 (Leon Friedman ed., 1980) (citing THE RIGHTrs OFTE COLONIES (1772)).
105. " he poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may ehter, the rain may
enter, but the King of England may not enter." William Pitt, Opposing a Bill to Authorize
General Searches, Speech Before Parliament (1763) in LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT
AND THE FRAmEs' CONsrrroN 222 (1998).
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Belarus, China, Israel, Pakistan, Russia and Singapore.108  A few other
countries are currently considering the adoption of new controls, limiting the
right to encryption and therefore threatening the right to privacy; among
these is the United States.
The debate in the United States regarding whether encryption will be
limited, though of immense consequence to citizens, has yet to engage the
general public.1°9 On one side of this debate are law enforcement and
national security agencies, i.e., the Department of Justice, the Federal
Bureau of Investigations ("FBI"), the National Security Council, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, and many state and local law enforcement
agencies-those who typically and traditionally seek wider powers to
penetrate zones of personal privacy. On the other side are privacy and civil
liberties advocates, those who typically and traditionally seek to limit the
powers of government by legally enforceable rights, joined in this instance
by leading cryptographers and computer scientists, and also by much of the
communications industry, whose products depend upon their ability to
guarantee security of information to users.
Conceptually, modern techniques of encryption are not difficult to
understand. Computers generally transmit data in digital form, that is, data
translated into strings of ones and zeroes.110 Encryption programs scramble
those numbers using a mathematical formula that can be reconverted only
with the proper "key."111 "Thus, only an authorized person with the secret
key can convert a scrambled message back to its original state or readable
form."' 12 If one sends an encrypted e-mail message to a friend or colleague
and the sender and the recipients are the only ones with the key code, that
message is effectively inaccessible to any third party who may intercept
it. Encryption thus provides, in effect, an electronic opaque envelope.
But just as paper envelopes may be steamed open, so encrypted
messages may be decoded. The strength of encryption generally depends on
the length of the mathematical formula or key that is required to decrypt the
data. '13 This key is measured by its "bit length."'1 4 Generally, the longer the
108. Id.
109. KENNETH W. DAM, CRYPTOrRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
xvi-xvii (1996). Professor Darn chaired the National Research Council's Committee to Study
National Cryptography Policy, and has warned that a "policy crisis" is upon the nation. Id. at xv.
110. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, Wiretapping in the Digital Age (as of Feb. 5,
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bit length, the more difficult it is to crack the code."15 Thus, a 56-bit length
key, which is fairly weak, could quickly be decoded by a hacker or thief,
whereas a 128-bit length key is exponentially more difficult and could be
impossible to decode within a lifetime.1 6 Although the powerful series of
computers available to governments and some private-sector corporations
could shorten the time needed to unlock longer keys, the use of still longer
keys is an effective barrier to most unauthorized interceptions. Thus, the
right to manufacture, sell, and use such strong encryption becomes the key to
protecting the right to privacy of data and communications. Thus, it is no
surprise that the government has sought to pass laws banning strong
encryption or, in the alternative, demanding access to the keys that unlock it.
The arena in which this struggle is taking place is Congress.
In 1993, the Clinton administration announced its so-called "Clipper
Chip"' 7 proposal, which would have, in effect, "required every encryption
user (that is, every individual or business using a digital telephone system,
fax machine, [e-mail,] the Internet, etc.)" to provide their decryption keys to
the government, "giving it access to both stored data and real time
communications."" 8 That would have been the equivalent of a law requiring
all home and office builders to embed microphones or cameras in the walls
of homes and offices.1 19 As soon as this proposal became known, opposition
was fierce; a Time/CNN poll conducted soon after the proposal was made
found that eighty percent of the public was opposed, and the Clinton
administration withdrew the proposal.12
Shortly thereafter, the Clinton administration proposed "Clipper lI,
' 121
which required anyone using encryption to leave the key with a government
approved "escrow agent," a third party that would give the government the
key upon the issuance of a warrant by a court, but without the knowledge of
the user.1 " That, too, provoked substantial public opposition and was
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. DAM, supra note 109.
118. Id.
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withdrawn. Later, a subsequent version, dubbed "Clipper ],"'123 was
proposed but did not differ significantly.1 24
In addition to these proposals, none of which has thus far been enacted,
the FBI has pushed for sweeping expansions of its wiretapping powers in
numerous bills. Some have passed, including the so-called anti-terrorism
legislation passed in 1996.125 Perhaps the best example of the current policy
conflict is the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
("CALEA") passed in 1994.126 This law requires telecommunications
carriers and manufacturers to build special wiretap capabilities into its new
digital telephones. Among the FBI's demands was one that would require
every cell phone to be able to transmit information about the location of
users to police, in effect turning the phone into a homing device. In response
to objections by opponents, CALEA, which was scheduled to be
implemented by October of 1998, has now been delayed by the Federal
Communications Commission.
In contrast, in 1996, a bill was introduced to protect the right to strong
encryption.1 27 The FBI has strongly opposed this bill. FBI Director Louis
Freeh has justified his position by claiming that the FBI only seeks to
maintain the balance between privacy and government power that the Fourth
Amendment set 200 years ago.'2 According to Freeh, the bills to protect the
right to strong encryption:
will dramatically shift that balance for the first time in 200 years.
What it means is that with probable cause, the judge signs the order
for me to access the conversations, but I cannot understand
it ... because no one has ... required that there be some key safely
placed somewhere, only attainable with a court order. That
123. Id.
124. See generally The Rights of Key Recovery, Key Escrow and Trusted Third-Party
Encryption, a report by eleven prominent cryptographers and computer scientists (1997) (source
on file with author).
125. Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
126. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108
Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as assembled in sections of 18 U.S.C. & 47 U.S.C.).
127. The Security and Freedom Through Encryption Act, H.R. 3011, 105th Cong. (1997).
See also The Encrypted Communications Privacy Act, S. 376, 105th Cong. (1997).
128. FBI Director Louis Freeh's testimony on June 26, 1997 at a closed briefing session
of the House International Relations Committee on the subject of encryption. See generally,
<http://www.netltynews.com> (as of Feb. 5, 1999, this site had changed). The transcript of
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dramatically changes the balance of the Fourth Amendment to the
detriment of public safety.
12 9
Freeh poses the public policy question precisely, but he is wrong on
several counts. First, the claim that the right to strong encryption would
alter the balance struck by the Fourth Amendment 200 years ago ignores the
fact that the balance was fatally altered in 1928 when the Olmstead decision
permitted government wiretaps upon the fictional claim that the Fourth
Amendment did not protect the privacy of citizens but rather only barred the
government from physical trespass of their homes and offices. 130 It was
Justice Brandeis who, at that time, argued for maintaining the balance struck
131by the Fourth Amendment in 1791. If Freeh truly advocated the original
balance he would, like Brandeis, have to oppose wiretapping, which, of
course, he does not. The balance Freeh wishes to maintain is not the original
balance of 1791 but the dramatically altered balance of 1928, an alteration
that expanded the government's surveillance power at the expense of the
individual privacy of millions of innocent citizens not even suspected of any
crime.
132
Second, because the expansion of electronic communication now and
into the future dwarfs the communication that used to take place along
telephone wires, and already includes or will soon include the wireless
digital transmission of virtually all data and communications, commercial,
political and personal, the vacuum cleaner sweep of government wiretapping
powers will, if not curtailed, be infinitely greater than anything seen before
with respect to traditional wiretapping. In the pre-digital era,
communications over telephone wires was limited and data transmissions
minimal. Moreover, the labor-intensive cost of wiretaps, conducted by
human agents listening to and transcribing conversations, tended to limit its
use. Even so, between 1985 and 1995, more than twelve million
conversations were tapped and all but a relative few were completely
innocent. In 1995 alone, two million innocent conversations were
intercepted.134 Digital surveillance, on the other hand, will mean massive
129. Id. (this testimony was delivered on June 26, 1997 at a closed briefing session of the
House International Relations Committee on the subject of encryption. A declassified and
redacted transcript of this session was obtained by Netlynews, an online service, pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act).
130. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
131. Id. at 471-85 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
132. See supra Part 111.
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scanning of many more conversations and data transmissions, by computers
coded to look for digital representations of key words like "drugs," "bombs,"
"civil rights," etc. Like software filters, these scans will necessarily capture
more than they intend, rendering puny by comparison the overbroad sweep
of traditional wiretapping.
The dragnet quality of electronic eavesdropping, which Brandeis first
noted in Olmstead, will turn out to be a prophecy of exponential proportions.
Allowing the government to rummage through all the data transmissions sent
or received by any warranted target will necessarily capture immense
amounts of unrelated data and a substantial number of innocent people. This
has, according to the government's own statistics, been precisely the result
of wiretapping since 1968,135 and it will necessarily be substantially more so
in the world of ubiquitous electronic communications we are rapidly
entering.
Third, the claim frequently made by Freeh and his superiors that a right
to strong encryption will "devastate our ability to fight crime and prevent
terrorism ''136 is demonstrably disproved by the government's own statistical
evidence. 137 The plain facts are that even traditional wiretapping has been
used overwhelmingly in cases involving drugs and gambling,138 only
negligibly in cases involving bombing, arson, or firearms 139 and hardly at all
in cases of homicide, rape, assault, robbery, or burglary. The record of
wiretapping over the past three decades is a record that justifies Justice
Brandeis' concern. It is fair to say that electronic surveillance is of some
value to law enforcement. However, it is hyperbole to claim that it is an
"indispensable" tool to prevent serious crimes of violence, crimes for which,
in fact, it is rarely used. Government surveillance through wiretapping has,
as Brandeis predicted, always picked up far more innocent conversations
than incriminating ones. In this light, the prospect of permitting the
government to widen its surveillance as the amount of electronic
communication and data transmission widens promises nothing but an
immolation of the right to personal privacy. Without an individual right to
strong encryption, the right to personal privacy for which our ancestors
fought a revolution will be in great peril.
135. See supra Section IL
136. Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Congress, (July 18, 1997) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Letter from Janet Reno].
137. See supra Section III.
138. Letter from Janet Reno, supra note 136 (83% over the past 11 years).
139. Letter from Janet Reno, supra note 136 (2% over the past 11 years).
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VII. ADAPTING OLD VALUES TO NEW MEANS OF COMMUNICATION
The values of free speech and privacy have been fundamental to what
has distinguished America from the rest of the world. Our nation began not
only by inventing a new form of government but also by declaring a new
purpose for government. That new purpose was the protection of individual
rights. No government had ever before been created with that as one of its
primary purposes.
The early Americans fundamentally redefined the proper legal
relationships between the individual and the government. They did not
endorse anarchy nor abandon the need for government to protect the safety
of the community. But they meant to draw the lines of government power in
such a way as to legally and constitutionally prevent the government from
interfering with individual rights. "Over himself, over his own body and
mind, the individual is sovereign," John Stuart Mill would write more than a
half-century later.14° Once, the concept of "sovereignty" was meant only to
include the unlimited powers of the king; later, it described the powers of
nations and governments. In America, it came to describe the rights of
individuals. "To secure these rights," wrote Thomas Jefferson in the
Declaration of Independence, "governments are instituted among men."
141
Primary among those rights were the rights to free speech and to
personal privacy, what Brandeis called "the right to be let alone."142 It is our
task to protect those traditional rights under the conditions and
circumstances of a new world never imagined by our founders.
140. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 14 (John Gray ed., 1991).
141. THm DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
142. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Today's copyright concerns often center on the new digital
technologies, especially the Internet and its friendly interface, the World
Wide Web ("the Internet"). Even though the Internet is relatively new and
poses new challenges for copyright law, "technology," as such, and a
constant change in technology are certainly not new. To the contrary,
inventors, innovators, and entrepreneurs have been changing the landscape
of American life ever since the country's founding. Not surprisingly,
copyright law-having existed for almost as long'-has repeatedly had to
accommodate new technologies over the two centuries of its existence.
Congress has repeatedly stated its intention to make the Copyright Act2
flexible enough to adapt to new technologies over time without requiring
repeated amendments. Much of the talk in hearings for the 1909 Copyright
1. The first Copyright Act was enacted in 1790. See generally Act of May 31, 1790,
ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
2. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-118 (1976)).
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Act3 focused on this goal, and even more of the hearings for the 1976
Copyright Act4 focused on it as well. Yet, since its effective date of 1978, the
most recent major copyright revision has been amended at least twenty-eight
times,5 more than once every year on average, and as of this writing, has just
undergone some very significant amendments relating to new technology.
6
Something is out of kilter here. On the one hand, Congress has tried to
make the Copyright Act flexible enough to survive technological change; on
the other hand, every new technological change seems to lead to further
amendments to the Copyright Act. Why is it so hard to make the Copyright
Act flexible, particularly when Congress has declared that doing so is a
signal value?
Two reasons account for the failure of Congress to craft an enduring
Copyright Act, though only the second of these is addressed here. The first
reason is essentially a matter of politics: a Copyright Act written to survive
significant technological change would necessarily be very broadly and
generally worded. But broad and general language neither clearly requires
the imposition of liability nor clearly renders a potential defendant immune
3. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1994)).
4. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §
101 (1994)).
5. See Preface to the Copyright Act <http:/Icweb.loc.gov/copyrightl
titlel7/preface.html> (the U.S. Copyright Office World Wide Web site). See also H.R. REP.
No. 104-554, at 6 (1996) (stating "[s]ince 1976, Congress regularly has had to address new
issues, especially those raised by new technologies or new methods of exploitation. Each
session of Congress has produced at least one major amendment to the Copyright Act").
6. See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act ["DMCA"], H.R. 2281, 105th Cong.
(1998), signed into law by President William Clinton in the fall of 1998 as Pub. L. No. 105-
304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. 101). The Copyright Office
summarized the law as follows:
The DMCA is divided into five titles:
Title I... implements the WIPO treaties.
Title II... creates limitations on the liability of online service providers for
copyright infringement when engaging in certain types of activities.
Title III... creates an exemption for making a copy of a computer program
by activating a computer for purposes of maintenance or repair.
Title IV contains six miscellaneous provisions, relating to the functions of
the Copyright Office, distance education, the exceptions in the Copyright Act
for libraries and for making ephemeral recordings, "webcasting" of sound
recordings on the Internet, and the applicability of collective bargaining
agreement obligations in the case of transfers of rights in motion pictures.
Title V ... creates a new form of protection for the design of vessel hulls.
U.S. Copyright Office, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: U.S. Copyright Office
Summary <http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/legislation/dmca.pdf> (emphasis in original).
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from liability in a given context. Political interest groups therefore seek
legislative provisions not only favorable to their interests, but provisions that
clearly and unambiguously favor those interests. To accomplish the latter
goal, those groups press Congress for narrow and specific statutory wording,
wording that cannot be expected to survive much technological
change. Conversely, the more general the language of an act-and hence the
more likely that it is to survive a long while-the greater the incentive of
interest groups to oppose it.
7
The second reason for Congress's failure is a matter of policy, however,
and is within the scope of this article: Congress has perceived and hence
tried to solve only one-fourth of the problem of copyright and new
technologies-the other three-fourths have never been adequately addressed,
let alone solved. The one-fourth of the problem that has been reasonably
well solved is the issue of copyright's subject matter. At times, new
technologies create new media for recording the creative expression of
authors, such as photography, motion pictures, laser-etched disks, and so
on. This kind of technological evolution has often in the past given rise to
the corresponding issue of whether those new media should be protected by
copyright. By and large, the 1976 Copyright Act avoided the questions-
and the need for repeated Copyright Act amendments-for future media by
defining copyright's subject matter to be "works of authorship", something
that is by definition an abstraction and independent of any particular medium
of fixation. The three-fourths of the problem that has not been addressed
makes up an enormous portion of the issues that surround new technology
and copyright. Those issues, first proposed in a report written for the United
States Copyright Office,8 include the following.
7. For more on the politics of copyright revision, see Professor Litman's excellent
analysis in Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REv.
275, 277 (1989), written 10 years ago and more timely than ever.
Throughout its history, copyright law has had difficulty accommodating
technological change. Although the substance of copyright legislation in this
century has evolved from meetings among industry representatives whose
avowed purpose was to draft legislation that provided for the future, the
resulting statutes have done so poorly. The language of copyright statutes has
been phrased in fact-specific language that has grown
obsolete .... Whatever copyright statute has been on the books has been
routinely, and justifiably, criticized as outmoded. In this article, I suggest that
the nature of the legislative process we have relied on for copyright revision
is largely to blame for those laws' deficiencies.
Id. at 277 (citations omitted).
8. I. TROTTR HARDY, PROJECT LOOKING FORWARD: SKETCHING THE FUTURE OF
COPYRIGHT IN A NETWORKED WORLD-FINAL REPORT 238 (1998) [hereinafter HARDY I] (source
on file with author).
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New subject matter. First, new technologies sometimes allow new
forms of creative expression that are independent of any particular
medium.9 These new forms of expression raise questions of copyright's
subject matter that are not solved by the current Copyright Act's separation
of copyrightable "works" from particular media because the issue has
nothing to do with the particular medium of fixation.' 0 For example, the
hierarchy of menu commands that is part of many computer programs is a
form of expression that can be fixed in a variety of media.11 Yet, in early
1996 the Supreme Court split four-to-four on the question of the
copyrightability of menu command hierarchies. 2
Decentralized infringement. Second, technologies like photocopying
and computers sometimes allow widespread noncommercial uses of
copyrighted works in ways that would clearly be infringing if done on a large
scale for commercial purposes. 13 When they are done on a small scale,
typically for noncommercial purposes, the issue arises whether these
"decentralized infringements" should be legitimized as a fair use, considered
to be infringements even if they are largely undetectable by copyright
owners, declared to be non-infringing by Congress, or dealt with in some
other way.14
New uses. Finally, new technologies often create new ways of using
existing copyrighted works.'! Radio in the early 1920s raised the issue
whether music broadcasts infringed composers' performance rights, for
example. 16 Cable television in the 1960s similarly raised the issue whether
retransmitting copyrighted television programs or movies infringed the
copyright owner's performance rights.
This article will summarize these three issues of copyright and new
technologies, and then concentrate on the last, the "new-use" issue from the
perspective of copyright as an incentive to creative efforts. The article will
demonstrate that much of the affected parties' and Congress's understanding
of the new-use issue is faulty because it is heavily biased toward the then
present state of the technology in issue. A proper analysis of the issue
requires thinking ahead. Some new-use technologies will eventually grow to
supplant "old use" technologies and should therefore be required to pay
9. Id. at 238.
10. Id.
11. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an
equally divided court 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
12. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 31-34.
13. HARDY I, supra note 8, at 240.
14. Id. at 241.
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royalties to preserve authors' incentives at their previous level. Other new-
use technologies may not grow to any particular importance, and
consequently need not be required to pay royalties to preserve authors'
incentives. Unfortunately, neither courts nor Congress can predict the future
growth of a new technology in order to make this determination. The issue
is then how to make a determination about a new-use technology's royalty
obligation that depends on foretelling the future when the future cannot be
foretold.
This article proposes one answer to this apparently intractable problem
by analyzing the issue in terms of the statistician's "Type r' and 'Type II'
errors. Essentially, this approach asks: "How bad could it be" if the
copyright decision-maker (court or Congress) guesses wrongly about a new
technology's future? If one type of wrong guess is likely to be less harmful
than other types, than absent information to the contrary, that is the guess
about the future that the decision-maker ought to make. Finally, this same
analysis implies that in the absence of other information to the contrary,
when courts or Congress face the issue of whether a copyright royalty
obligation applies to a new-use technology, they should find that it does
apply.
I. NEW MEDIA AS SUBJECr MATrER
The way we view copyright's "subject matter" has evolved over the two
centuries of copyright law's existence. In 1790, the first copyright statute
included "maps, charts, and books" within its protection. Although not
expressly confined to tangible media-a court could always interpret "map"
or "chart" or "book" in a broad and nonliteral way were the occasion to do
so arisel -this statute nonetheless seemed to focus on tangible media as the
object of copyright's protection.
Over the succeeding two hundred years, the focus of copyright's subject
became more varied, including some subject matters defined or phrased as
tangible objects, and others suggesting more abstract types of works. In an
1853 case, for example, the Supreme Court said clearly that copyright was
an abstract right, thoroughly separate from any tangible embodiment:
But from the consideration we have given to the case, we are
satisfied that the property acquired by the sale in the engraved
plate, and the copy-right of the map secured to the author under the
18. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
19. See Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 89 (1899) (stating "the word 'book' as used in
the statute is not to be understood in its technical sense of a bound volume, but any species of
publication which the author selects to embody his literary product").
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act of Congress, are altogether different and independent of each
other, and have no necessary connection. The copy-right is an
exclusive right to the multiplication of the copies, for the benefit of
the author or his assigns, disconnected from the plate, or any other
physical existence. It is an incorporeal right to print and publish
the map, or, as said by Lord Mansfield in Millar v. Taylor (4
Burr. 2396) "a property in notion, and has no corporeal tangible
substance."
2
Yet when Congress added photography to copyright's subject matter in
1865, it used words that focused on the medium itself: protection applied to
"photographic prints. 21 On the other hand, musical compositions were for
years registered by the Copyright Office in the category of "books,"22 a
practice that implied a recognition of "music" as a more abstract entity,
capable of being fixed in a variety of forms. Congress only expressly added
"musical compositions" to copyright's subject matter in 1831. "Dramatic
works" were added to the statute as a category in 1856,24 another phrase
suggesting a focus on the abstract work regardless of its medium of
fixation. Yet, this abstract sounding focus was not so broad that it was
thought expressly to include "ogeratic compositions," a subject matter only
added to the statute in 1894. Moreover, in 1908 the Supreme Court
declared without reservation that copyright's subject matter consisted only
of tangible media:
20. Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. 528, 530 (1852).
21. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540. Interestingly, the issue of photography
as a new type of copyrightable subject matter was litigated a year later, in 1866, on facts that
had arisen before passage of the 1865 Act. See Wood v. Abbott, 30 F. Cas. 424, 425
(S.D.N.Y. 1866) (No. 17,938). The court concluded that photographs did not fit within any of
the existing categories of protectible subject matter and hence were not copyrightable. Id.
22. See Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents,
60th Cong. (1908) (statement of Albert H. Walker), reprinted in E. FULTON BRYLAWSKI &
ABE GOLDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT AcT (1976) [hereinafter
BRYLAwSKI] Part K at 46 (noting that English courts had protected sheet music as "books"
since 1777, and that American courts had always followed that precedent).
23. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16,4 Stat. 436.
24. See Act of Aug. 18, 1956, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (1856).
25. See H.R. 6835, 53d Cong. § 4966 (1894). Apparently Congress omitted "operatic
compositions" from the category of "dramatic works" from simple oversight. See JAMES W.
COVERT, AMENDING THE COPYRIGHT LAW, H.R. REP. No. 1191, at 1 (stating "the omission to
include protective provisions for operatic compositions in the law sought to be amended [in
1856] was, doubtless, the result of oversight").
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The statute has not provided for the protection of the intellectual
conception apart from the thing produced, however meritorious
such conception may be, but has provided for the making and filing
of a tangible thing, against the publication and duplication of which
26it is the purpose of the statute to protect ....
Finally, in the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress formally adopted the
"meritorious conception" that was rejected sixty-eight years earlier by the
Supreme Court, namely that copyright's subject matter is abstract "works of
authorship" regardless of the medium of a work's fixation. 27  By
"generalizing" copyright's subject matter that way, Congress hoped to
permit copyright law more gracefully to accommodate technological
change-to apply to new media of fixation, whether "now known or later
developed."28 Relative to other issues of copyright and new technology,
Congress has succeeded reasonably well in that endeavor.29 To the author'sknowledge, no issues of copyright subject matter have arisen over "video
26. White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908). Apparently
contra is the ten-years' earlier opinion in Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 89 (1899) (stating:
"It is the intellectual production of the author which the copyright protects and not the
particular form which such production ultimately takes" though the Court may have intended
"form" to refer to some form of paper publication).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
28. Id.
29. But see HARDY I, supra note 8, at 246 stating:
Even under the 1976 Act, subject matter issues that spring from new media of
fixation have not always been resolved as cleanly and simply as the statutory
language suggests. Notably in the 1980's, it took a major, highly contested
case, Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corporation, [714 F.2d 1240
(3rd Cir. 1983)], to determine that although computer programs written on
paper or on a disk were the subject matter of copyright, so were computer
programs fixed in read-only memory. One would have thought that the
"medium-neutral" design of the 1976 Act would have made this an easy
answer to reach.
Id. See also Matthew Bender & Co., v. West Pub. Co., 158 F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998), where
despite its claims to the contrary, the Second Circuit returned to putting copyright's subject
matter focus on the particular medium of fixation instead of the abstract work that results from
"selection and arrangement." Id. at 703.
But the relevant statutory wording refers to material objects in which "a
work" readable by technology "is fixed," not to another work or works that
can be created, unbidden, by using technology to alter the fixed embedding of
the work, by rearrangement or otherwise. The natural reading of the statute is
that the arrangement of the work is the one that can be perceived by a
machine without an uninvited manipulation of the data.
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cassettes," "audio CDs," "CD-ROMs," "laser disks," "DVD disks," "DIVX
videos," three-dimensional photographs in holograms, or over any other
modem developments in media technology. That such disputes have not
arisen is a tribute to Congress's wisdom in abstracting copyright's subject
matter away from the medium of fixation.
I. NEW WORKS AS SUBJECr MATTER
Tributes pretty much have to stop with Congress's handling of the
medium-of-fixation issue, alas. Less successfully treated in the Copyright
Act is the issue of whether new types of works should be treated as
30copyrightable subject matter. The First Circuit's decision in Lotus
Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.,31 a case involving the
question of extending protection to the menu command structure of a
computer program, illustrates the problem.32
Lotus had developed the widely used computer spreadsheet program
known as "Lotus 1-2-3."
Lotus 1-2-3 is a spreadsheet program that enables users to perform
accounting functions electronically on a computer. Users
manipulate and control the program via a series of menu
commands, such as "Copy," "Print," and "Quit." Users choose
commands either by highlighting them on the screen or by typing
their first letter. In all, Lotus 1-2-3 has 469 commands arranged
into more than 50 menus and submenus. 33
Competing software company Borland developed its own spreadsheet
program, "Quattro," which could make use of the same menu commands-
indeed, Quattro had implemented "'a virtually identical copy of the entire 1-
2-3 menu tree"' though with a different on-screen appearance. 34 Lotus sued
Borland, arguing that Borland had infringed Lotus's copyright in hierarchy
30. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1994).
31. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), affirmed by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233
(1996).
32. Id. at 810.
33. Id. at 809.
34. Id. at 810 (quoting Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 202, 212
(D. Mass. 1993) (emphasis in original)).
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of menu commands. The First Circuit concluded that the menu hierarchy
was a "method of operation"-something not copyrightable by definition.35
A more useful way of looking at the case, though, is to see it as an issue
of new subject matter. Personal computers and the software sold for them
constituted a new technology that led to a new type of authorial effort, the
creation of a computer program's "menu hierarchy." The fundamental issue
in the case was whether copyright law should recognize that type of
36
authorship as an appropriate type of subject matter for protection.
The issue arises because of ambiguity in the statutory
language. Section 102 defines tvo things: things that copyright protects as
subject matter, and things that copyright does not protect as subject
matter.37 These twin provisions, intended no doubt to serve as an abundance
of caution in ensuring that the Copyright Act withholds copyright protection
from ideas, facts, and the like, actually open up a middle ground of
uncertainty. If there were but a single definition of what is copyright's
subject matter, courts would focus on new types of works with but a single
question: Does this type of work fall within that definition of subject
matter? With two definitions, one inclusive and one exclusive, the Lotus
court understandably felt obliged to ask three questions: Does the new type
of work fall within the definition of copyrightable subject matter? Does the
work also fall within the definition of non-copyrightable subject
matter? And finally, what is the effect of a work's falling within both
categories of expressly protected and expressly unprotected subject matter?
Lotus apparently concluded that a computer program's menu hierarchy did in
fact fall within both categories:
[WIhile original expression is necessary for copyright protection
[that is, falls within copyright's included subject matter], we do not
think that it is alone sufficient. Courts must still inquire whether
original expression falls within one of the categories foreclosed
from copyright protection by [section] 102(b) [that is, falls within
copyright's excluded subject matter], such as being a "method of
operation."
38
35. Id. at 815. The Copyright Act, section 102(b), notes: "'In no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any... method of operation."' Lotus,
49 F.3d at 815 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994)).
36. Id. at 813.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1994).
38. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 818.
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The court implicitly found that falling within both categories meant that the
new type of work, menu command hierarchies, was not eligible for
copyright's protection.39
I. THE "DECENTRALIZED INFRINGEMENT" ISSUE
One major problem in copyright enforcement today is the fact that
many modem communications technologies exhibit very low reproduction
costs. Low costs mean that small firms, or even individuals, can make low
volume copies without coming to the attention of copyright holders. When
copying costs are high, infringement tends to be "centralized" because
economies of scale dictate that a business enterprise-a store, a copy
center-provide the copying equipment. Business enterprises are few
enough in number, and visible enough through advertising, that copyright
holders can locate and bargain with them.
Before the invention of mimeography and xerography, for example, the
copying of books or other printed matter would have to be undertaken byhand, a severe practical limit, or by a printer. Printing required typesetting,
an expensive and time-consuming process. Because of the high initial
overhead of printing, copying would not be worth undertaking unless a fairlylarge run of books was envisioned. A large run of books by a commercial
printer would constitute a "centralized" infringement and would be relatively
visible to a copyright holder:
The unauthorized publication of a copyrighted book may ordinarily
be adequately punished through civil proceedings and under theprovisions of existing law. The offender in such case is ordinarily
a person of fixed habitat, and has a press and the implements of his
business. The ordinary processes of the courts may readily be
served upon him, and he may be compelled to respond in damages
for his wrongdoing.4
°
When technology reduces the costs of copying, the phenomenon of
"decentralized infringement" results: individuals can duplicate copyrighted
works in a way that is not easily detected by the copyright holder. Today,
high quality copies can be made in low volume by ubiquitous photocopy
machines. Such copying takes no overhead, little time, and even the
machinery is priced low enough for home use, where the copying is
essentially invisible to a copyright holder.
39. Id. at 819.
40. See COVERT, supra note 25, at 2.
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The photocopier and the video recorder are obvious examples of
dramatically lowered costs over printing presses and television studios for
the making of copies of paper documents and television
programs. Similarly, the falling cost of home audio taping equipment in the
form of tape cassettes during the 1960s and 1970s allowed individuals to
make high quality copies of sound recordings that previously could only be
made with expensive reel-to-reel tape machines in professional sound
studios. Making such copies was lawful under federal law until 1972.41
Decentralized infringement is not confined to physical reproduction of
copyrighted materials. The distribution right42 can also be affected by
technology. Today's computer networks and electronic mail provide an easy
way to distribute information to literally millions of Internet users. In spite
of recent amendments to the Copyright Act4 3 to deal with digitized music,
new developments in digital audio and the Internet raise the familiar issue of
decentralized infringement once again.
Music has been available in a digital format in the form of audio
"compact disks" or "CDs" for many years.44 For some years, it was far from
easy for home users to make a copy of the digital audio data resident on a
CD. CD players and computers with CD-ROM drives converted the digital
format to analog immediately upon use. Consequently, home audio taping
equipment that was used to copy a CD produced an analog tape recording,
one that would decline in quality with multiple generations of subsequent
copies. Both home audio equipment and computer CD-ROM drives today,
however, are commonly able to copy the digital format directly, without
conversion to analog form. Readily available software can read the digital
files from a CD and copy them onto a personal computer's hard disk.45
41. See Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §
1(f)); see also Goldstein v. California, 412 U. S. 546 (1973) (discussing California's state-law
approach to the problem).
42. The Copyright Act confers several defined rights on copyright owners:
reproduction, distribution, public performance, public display, and the preparation of
derivative works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
43. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994) (codifying the Audio Home Recording Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4327 (1992)).
44. The Philips Corporation introduced the first CD system in 1979. Sony followed
with improvements to the Philips design in 1983. RUSSELL SANJEK & DAVID SANJEK,
AMERICAN PoPuLAR Music BuSINEss IN THE 20TH CENTURY 241 (1991).
45. See, e.g., Audiograbber <http://www.audiograbber.com-us.net> (stating:
Audiograbber is a beautiful piece of software that grabs digital audio
from cd's. It copies the audio digitally - not through the soundcard - which
enables you to make perfect copies of the originals. It can even perform a test
to see that the copies really are perfect. Audiograbber can also automatically
normalize the music, delete silence from the start and/or end of tracks .... ).
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However, the resulting computer files are quite large. 46  For most home
users, wide-spread distribution of such files electronically over the Internet
would be impracticably time consuming.47  However, a compression
technology called "MP3" has arisen that reduces the sizes of such files by a
factor of ten, with little or no noticeable loss in music quality.48  This
combination of copying and compression technologies has resulted in the
rapid spread of nonprofessional Internet sites that feature digitized music for
downloading, typically copied from CDs. 49 This development now threatens
to decentralize the formerly highly centralized system for the distribution of
recorded music.
50
46. CD music occupies roughly 10 million bytes of computer storage per minute of
playing time. A three minute song, for example, copied to one's computer hard disk would
take up roughly 30 megabytes of disk storage.
47. A typical home-to-Internet connection today operates at 28.8 kilobits per
second. At that speed, downloading or uploading a three-minute song, about 30 million bytes
(which at eight bits per byte equals 240 million bits), would take roughly 140 minutes or over
two hours (that is 240 million bits divided by 28,800 bits per second which equals 8333
seconds). Obviously, anything that speeded up such downloading--other things being
equal-would increase the amount of such downloading. Faster modems or other access
technologies would do it; smaller file sizes would also do it. It happens that the latter came
first.
48. See Jason Chervokas, Music Industry Fears Digital Music Pirates
<http://search.nytimes.combooks/search/bin/fastweb?getdoc+cyber-lib+cyberlib+20671+3+w
AAA+mp3> (source on file with author). See also David Thom, MPEG Audio FAQ Version
9 <http:llwww.tnt.uni-hannover.delprojectlmpeglaudio/faql> (source on file with author).
49. The Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") refers to these non-
professional sites as "Music Archive Sites," defining them as sites that
host an inventory of full-length sound recordings for Internet users to
download and play and in some cases upload as well. Music Archive Sites
may contain hundreds of full-length sound recordings that, for the most part,
are of near CD quality. The sites often actively encourage -- sometimes
require -- users to upload additional full-length sound recordings to the site in
exchange for being able to download.
RIAA, Record Industry Protects Copyrighted Sound Recordings On the Internet:
Enforcement Campaign Expands, Music Archive Sites Targeted <http://www.riaa.com/
antipir/releases/maslit.htm>.
50. See, e.g., Jon Pareles, With A Click, A New Era of Music Dawns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
15, 1998, at AR-1 (stating: "Digital distribution is likely to revolutionize the economics of the
music business. Some advantages of large recording companies, like their centralized
manufacturing and distribution and their domination of retail display space, vanish if the
Internet becomes the main outlet for music") (emphasis added). These new music distribution
technologies have strong analogies to jukeboxes, radio, retail CD stores, and so on, suggesting
that courts will find that distributing music in this particular form will be infringing. Yet, on
October 26, 1998, federal district court Judge Audrey B. Collins denied the recording
industry's motion for a preliminary injunction against the sale of a device for storing music in
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These previous illustrations feature changing costs making certain uses
of works so cheap that they are no longer centralized and hence no longer
"visible" or readily controllable by copyright owners. This phenomenon can
arise even without sophisticated technology. Early in the twentieth century,
witnesses in copyright hearings testified about the difficulty of finding and
suing professional play pirates, who operated in this fashion:
An expert stenographer secretes himself somewhere in the theater
and he takes down word for word everything that is spoken in the
play .... After he has gotten all that, he takes down the makeup of
the actor, everything he wears, the arrangement of the face, the
beard or wig if he wears one, the costume. Then he comes down to
the scenery; the properties that are used. All of the play is stolen in
that way.
How does he get that stolen manuscript on the market? He does
not put out a sign "Play broker," 'Play agent," as a reputable
vendor of manuscripts would do. But he has in front a beer
saloon. You enter ostensibly to get a glass of beer. What you go
for is to get the play. By knocking on a door or by some other
means you obtain access to the manuscript room, and you get a
copy for $5.51
Another witness similarly complained about the difficulty of enforcing
play copyrights when unauthorized "performances are usually given at points
remote from the location or headquarters of the dramatic author or producer,
and by irresponsible persons, who jump their companies nightly from town
to town."52 Obviously, modem digital technology had nothing to do with
these nineteenth to early twentieth century play performances. Rather, the
its MP3 format. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 29 F.
Supp. 2d 624 (C.D. Cal. 1998). Actions against private individuals for "decentralized
infringement" in the form of copying MP3 files may be foreclosed by the digital audio
amendments to the Copyright Act made in 1992. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994).
51. Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 60th
Cong. (1908), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part K at 22 (statement of Harry P.
Mawson, representing the American Dramatists' Club).
52. Id. at 24 (statement of Ligon Johnson, representing the National Association of
Theatrical Managers). Similarly, the 19th century saw the wide-spread unauthorized
reproduction and distribution of sheet music. Canadian music publishers maintained secret
publishing houses in the United States. They sent thousands of salesmen out with trunks of
sheet music, keeping only a few sheets at recognized warehouses so that they could not be
caught with much on hand. See H.R. REP. No. 1289-55.
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problem grew from the fact that the performances, at least when done with
limited props and scenery, had only small economies of scale and could
therefore be produced with a small number of people and equipment and
hence in a decentralized fashion.
Courts and Congress have responded to the decentralized infringement
issue in a variety of ways. At times, stiff penalties have been imposed on the
conduct;53 at times, Congress has adopted a compulsory license with
prescribed payments;54 at times, private parties have worked out their own
arrangements in the form of "guidelines; '55 at times, Congress has rendered
the activities immune, perhaps in exchange for a tax/royalty on some related
activity; 56 at times, one who facilitates decentralized infringement has been
found liable for contributory infringement; 57 at times, a court has declared
the activity to be a fair use. And doubtless, at times, the activity in
question continues, undetected, without litigation, and hence without any
definitive resolution of the infringement question.
IV. THE NEW-USE ISSUE
All three problems so far discussed-new media of fixation, new types
of works, and decentralized infringement-raise challenges for copyright
law and merit thoughtful analysis. But the fourth problem is perhaps the
most vexing of all: new technologies that create a new way of using existing
copyrighted works. In short, these technologies raise the new-use question:
Does the new-use of an existing copyrighted work infringe the author's
rights? An abundance of illustrations has emerged from copyright cases
over the last century or so.
For example, musical compositions as such were copyrightable after
1831, well before the advent of radio in thd 1920s. When radio stations
began playing musical compositions "on the air," however, litigation soon
arose over whether such a playing constituted a "performance for profit" of
53. See Act of January 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 482 (amending 60 R.S. ch. 3) (imposing
prison sentences for unauthorized play performances).
54. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(c) (compulsory license for the making of "cover records").
55. See Ad Hoc Committee on Copyright Law Revision, Authors League of America,
and Association of American Publishers, Inc., Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom
Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals,
reprinted in HOUSE REPORT ON COPYRIGrr AcT OF 1976, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 159-60,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5775-76 [hereinafter House Report].
56. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003, 1004 (1994) (tax on digital recording devices and media).
57. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 855 F. Supp.
905 (E.D. Mich. 1994), rev'd, 74 F.3d 1512 (6th Cir. 1996), reh'g en banc and opinion
vacated, 74 F.3d 1528 (6th Cir. 1996), aff'd 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).
58. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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the composition-and hence a copyright infringement under the 1909
Copyright Act.
The same question arose after the arrival of cable television in the
1960s. Cable television began as a means of strengthening the signal of
distant broadcast stations, especially in the valleys of mountainous
areas. These cable stations picked up broadcast signals from the airwaves
and passed them along to cable subscribers without seeking permission from
the broadcast stations or paying royalties. Again, litigation arose over
whether such retransmission by cable constituted a "public performance for
profit" within the scope of the copyright owner's rights.
A. Phonograph Recording
Composers of the 1900s era wanted to be able to collect royalties from
phonograph and piano roll companies that hired orchestras to record their
compositions. Most copyright scholars know that the Supreme Court
rejected that desire in 1908, when the Court decided the White-Smith Music
Publishing. Co. v. Apollo Co.59 case. White-Smith held that the use of
copyrighted music on piano rolls, a popular technology of the day,60 did not
infringe the composer's copyright rights. 1 Less well-known, perhaps, is that
the Supreme Court rested its decision partly on that fact that a number of
earlier lower court cases had declined to offer copyright protection to
recorded sound; Congress, with presumed awareness of those decisions, had
not acted to change that result.
62
59. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
60. Id. at 9.
The record discloses that in the year 1902 from seventy to seventy-five
thousand of such instruments were in use in the United States, and that from
one million to one million and a half of such perforated musical rolls ... were
made in this country in that year.
It is evident that the question involved in the use of such rolls is one of
very considerable importance, involving large property interests, and closely
touching the rights of composers and music publishers.
Id.
61. Id. at 18.
62. Id. at 12-14.
[I]t must be admitted that the decisions, so far as brought to our attention in
the full discussion had at the bar and upon the briefs, have been uniformly to
the effect that these perforated rolls operated in connection with mechanical
devices for the production of music are not within the copyright act.
White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 12.
Since these cases were decided Congress has repeatedly had occasion to
amend the copyright law. The English cases, the decision of the District
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The real story was a bit more circular. True, the early cases of recorded
music found no infringement. In 1888, a Massachusetts case, Kennedy
v. McTammany,63 found that the reproduction of music in the form of
perforated paper rolls for "organette" hand organs 64 did not infringe
composers' copyrights because it was not a "copy" of the composition for
copyright purposes. A similar case in 1901, Stern v. Rosey, relied on
Kennedy to conclude that a phonograph record was similarly not a copy of
the musical composition it recorded.67 Within just a few years of that
decision, Congress began considering a major revision of the Copyright
Act. By the time the first Congressional hearings began in June, 1906, a
bill had already been introduced that provided music composers the right to
control the reproduction of their works in the form of recorded sounds:
[TIhe copyright secured by this Act shall include the sole and
exclusive right...
(g) To make, sell, distribute, or let for hire any device,
contrivance, or appliance especially adapted in any manner
whatsoever to reproduce to the ear the whole or any material part
of any work published and copyrighted after this Act shall have
gone into effect, or by means of any such device or appliance
Court of Appeals, and Judge Colt's decision must have been well known to
the members of Congress... the omission of Congress to specifically
legislate concerning them might well be taken to be an acquiescence in the
judicial construction given to the copyright laws.
Id. at 14.
63. 33 F. 584 (C.C.D. Mass. 1888).
64. For a brief history of organettes, see Peter Schmidt, History of Organettes
<http://www.actionwebcreations.comsmr/history.htm>, where one learns that John
McTammany-presumably the defendant in the case cited-was the inventor of the devices.
Id. Schmidt himself is evidently a collector of antique organettes. Id.
65. Kennedy, 33 F. at 584.
66. 17 App. D.C. 562 (1901).
67. Id. at 565.
68. Three hearings took place: in June of 1906; again in December of that year; and
finally, in March of 1908. See Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint
Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong. (1906), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part H at 102;
Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm on Patents, 59th Cong.
(1906), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part J at 276; Revision of Copyright Laws:
Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 60th Cong. (1908), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI,
supra note 22, Part K at 46.
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publicly to reproduce to the ear the whole or any material part of
such work .... 69
The bill proved controversial, with the "authors" (composers and
publishers) favoring it, and "users" (piano roll and phonograph
manufacturers) opposing it. In classic fashion, though, both sides to the
debate focused on the effect of the new technology on the market for the old
technology, without so much as a nod to the possibility that the new
technology might itself become a major market one day. In the case of
recorded sound, the old market was for the sale of sheet music to individuals
and to orchestras and bands for live performances. 7 Accordingly, much
testimony centered on sheet music sales: Whether a composer's right to
control the making of recordings would help or hurt the composer's income
from the sale of sheet music.7 1 As it turned out, in a very few years severalphonograph recording companies would earn phenomenal amounts of money
69. Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 59th
Cong. (1906), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part H at v (1976).
70. KERRY SEGRAVE, PAYOLA IN THE MUSIC INDUsTRY: A HISTORY, 1880-1991 3
(1994). "In those days [the late 19th century], of course, it was the sale of sheet music that
was the sole source of income for the [music publishing] companies .... Records would not
become a major factor for several more decades." Id.
71. See, e.g., BRYLAWSKa, supra note 22, Part H at 325 (statement of Paul H. Cromelin,
representing the Columbia Phonograph Company). Mr. Cromelin stated that the operators of
a penny arcade that featured coin operated player pianos:
are being paid by certain music publishers for displaying ads of certain
compositions over the automatic piano or piano player which is used to attract
the public.
It seems to us that this would amply demonstrate the fact that publishers
and composers consider the piano player an advantageous medium to increase
the sale of their compositions.
Id. at 325 (statement of Paul H. Cromelin, representing the Columbia Phonograph Company)
Why does [one of several well known music publishers], who claim that we
are stealing the product of the composers' brains, use ... us and paying [sic]
for 250 to 300 records of every song as soon as they publish it? For the
purpose of selling the records? No-absolutely not-but to give them away
to the owners of penny arcades in consideration of their putting them on their
automatic graphophones, so that the public will become acquainted with the
tune and buy the sheet music.
Id. at 326. "We claim, gentlemen, that there has been no more potent influence than the
talking machine and the piano player and these various mechanical devices in bringing about
an increase in sheet music sales of 163 percent in six years." Id. at 333.
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from record sales; 72 however, this possibility was remote from the
discussions.
In any event, Congress and various industry representatives continued
to thrash the music issue throughout the hearings, initially without sign of
any resolution. By the last round of hearings, in March of 1908, the
Supreme Court had just a month earlier issued its decision in the White-
Smith case.73 As already noted, the Court-relying heavily on the fact that
Congress itself had not amended the statute-concluded that under the
statute as it then stood, composers had no right to control recordings of their
works.74
The Court had deferred to Congress-which then deferred back to the
Court.75 Representative Currier observed that composer Victor Herbert,
whose views doubtless represented a great many other composers, was
"asking us to create for him an absolutely new property right, which the
Supreme Court says has absolutely no existence. Representative
Barchfeld added that "[y]ou are coming to Congress and asking for
additional legislation to give you a right which the law does not now give
you. The Supreme Court has declared that you have no standing in court.
7 7
The issue had become a mutual finger-pointing exercise, with the
Supreme Court unwilling to create or recognize rights that Congress had not
chosen to create or recognize, and the Congress apparently unwilling to
create or recognize rights that the Supreme Court had not chosen to create or
recognize. Whereas at an earlier point, a bill to grant rights to composers
might have seemed unremarkable, after the Supreme Court's decision, such a
bill seemed to fly in the face of established authority. With this posture, the
hearings took on the quality of a stalemate.
72. Between 1902 and 1917, assets of the Victor Talking Machine Company,
predecessor to the RCA Victor company, went from $2.7 million to $33.2 million, a twelve-
fold increase. The company's founder, Eldridge Johnson, "had become a tycoon; and several
of the men whose careers dated back to the founding of the company were millionaires, or
well on their way." ROLAND GELLATr, THE FABULOUS PHONOGRAPH: FROM EDISON TO
STEREO 151 (1965). And this was at a time, 1910, when one dollar "would buy a seven-
course dinner at a first-class restaurant." Id. at 149. The British recording company,
Gramaphone, saw its net profits rise from £79,348 in 1901 to £137,268 in 1902 and to
£252,285 (over $1 million) in 1903. Id. at 122.
73. See White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
74. Id. at 14.
75. Id.
76. Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 60th
Cong. (1908), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part K at 193 (comment of
Representative Currier) (emphasis added).
77. Id. (comments of Representative Barchfeld) (emphasis added).
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A stalemate leads Congress to compromise. In the final round of
hearings, members and witnesses seized on the proposal to establish a
"compulsory license" as a compromise between full copyright rights and
none. A compulsory license meant that composers would receive a non-
negotiated, statutorily prescribed royalty when their compositions were
recorded more than once.79  Hearings participants finally struck an
agreement on a compulsory license some time after the hearings closed. In
short order, it became law."°
History now shows us that notwithstanding the vigorous discussion at
the hearings about how recorded music would boost the sale of sheet music,
the sheet music market soon withered under the dual onslaught of the
phonograph and later the radio. 81  Today, music in the home almost
78. In addition to the Supreme Court's ruling in the White-Smith case, the compulsory
license provision in the 1909 Copyright Act was also inspired by fears of a recording industry
monopoly. A leading piano roll company of the day, the AEolian Company, had signed
contracts with many music publishers that would have granted Eolian exclusive rights to the
music for which copyright was held by the publishers. These contracts were conditioned upon
either the Supreme Court or Congress declaring that recording music without permission was
an infringement of the composers' rights. By the end of 1906, about 500 publishers had
signed such contracts. A number of music publishers, in other words, had signed contracts
that would be ineffective if copyright were found not to apply to sound recordings, but would
automatically transfer copyright permissions to Eolian if copyright were found to apply. See
Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong.
(1906), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part J at 277-80 (statement of Albert H.
Walker).
79. Composers were not obliged to permit any recording of their compositions.
However, having once voluntarily negotiated with a recording company to permit recording,
composers were then subject to the compulsory license provision: other recording companies
could record the same composition on payment of the statutorily prescribed fee whether the
composer liked it or not.
80. Representative Currier introduced a bill that included the compulsory license
provision on March 2, 1909. See H.R. 28192 § 1(e), included in H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th
Cong. (1909), reprinted in BRYLAwSIa, supra note 22, Part S at 22-24 (1976). The bill
specified a compulsory royalty of two cents per record for anyone to record compositions that
had already been licensed by the composer for recording. The next day it passed in both the
House and the Senate. See 43 CONG REc. 3768-69 (1909) (House version); 43 CONG REC.
3744 (1909) (Senate version). President Roosevelt signed it the following day, March 4. See
43 CONG REC. 3831-32 (1909).
81. A turning point of sorts was around 1921, when music publishing companies first
began releasing compositions to phonograph recording companies before exhausting sheet
music sales. See SANJEK & SANJEK supra note 44, at 20. By 1924, roughly seven to eight
million phonographs were in use, compared with about five million pianos and less than a
million player pianos. Copyrights: Hearings on H.R. 6250 and H.R. 9137 Before the House
Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong. (1924) (statement of E.C. Mills). As one commentator noted
about the wildly popular "Victrola" phonograph machine introduced in 1906, "[o]nce, a piano
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invariably means radio or recorded music, the income from which easily
82dwarfs that of sheet music sales. Congress, in short, was terribly wrong in
its assessment of the role that recorded music would come to play in
American life-and accordingly in its assessment of the relative significance
of recorded music and sheet music for copyright law.
B. Motion Pictures
Invented toward the end of the 19th century, 3 motion pictures were
confirmed as copyrightable subject matter by an appellate court in 1903.84
had graced the parlor of the middle-class home and gave it an air of refinement and
culture. Now a fine Victrola and a collection of the exclusive Victor Red Seal records made
the same statement." ANDRE MILLARD, AMERICA ON RECORD: A HISTORY OF RECORDED
SOUND 131 (1995). Later, it was radio that nearly drove the phonograph recording business
out of business. Sharply improved sound quality boosted sales of radio receivers in the "radio
Christmas" season of 1924; in that same year, sales of phonograph record players from the
Victor company dropped 60% , and those of Edison's company dropped more than 50%. Id.
at 138. See also GELATr, supra note 72, at 265 (stating "by January 1933, the record business
in America was practically extinct"). Jukeboxes were largely responsible for rescuing the
recorded music industry: in 1936, over half of all records were produced for the jukebox
market. MILLARD, supra at 169. In the ironic flip-flops that have characterized the
commercialization of sound technology, radio broadcasting went into decline when television
began to usurp the market for live musical and variety performances in the late 1940s and
early 1950s. Phonograph records in part accounted for radio's reemergence as an important
medium for music. MICHAEL FINK, INSIDE THE MUSIC BUSINESS 14 (1989) (stating "[r]adio,
which in the early 1920s had nearly destroyed the record business, now owed its own recovery
to its new role as something of a promotional tool for the recording industry"); SEGRAVE,
supra note 70, at 50.
82. See LEONARD FEIST, AN INTRODUCTION TO POPULAR MUSIC PUBLISHING IN AMERICA
47 (1980).
While the American population had swelled [since the 1920s] and its musical
skills and awareness had grown, sheet music has never regained an economic
significance in direct ratio to these changes. Where once a single popular
song frequently sold over one million printed copies, purchase of half that
number in a country with a trebled population was regarded as a phenomenon
in the 1970s.
Id. Interestingly, even the medium of sheet music is adaptable to the digital age. As of this
writing (Fall 1998), one company, called "Sunhawk," which came to the attention of this
writer by accident, has developed a sort of "interactive sheet music" in digital format that can
be bought over the Internet. See Solero and Sunhawk Technology <http://www.sunhawk.
com/hawk/techfct.html>.
83. In 1872, zoologist Eadweard Muybridge designed what he called a
"zoopraxiscope," a rotating disk with still images on it. Viewers would look through a small
hole at the rotating disk and see a form of animation. Muybridge designed the device to
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The new-use issue-whether motion pictures made use of and hence
infringed some preexisting copyrighted work-appears not to have arisen in
the early days of the industry. Most likely, the absence of major new-use
infringement questions can be attributed to the fact that movies, at first, did
not record or make use of some already copyrightable works in the way that
the phonograph made use of already copyrightable music. In addition, not
until the mid-1920s was sound added to motion pictures; necessarily, the use
of music or other sounds on films as a possible new-use copyright
infringement would not arise before that time.
85
Indeed, for the first ten or so years of development, most motion86pictures were recordings of live events and scenes, which are not
copyrightable. The early years of motion picture performance in one
American city, Rochester, New York, for example, featured films of
wrestling matches, dancing performances, horse racing, railroad trains
entering a station, "a tub race, the coronation of the present czar, a
watermelon match, a Parisian street scene, march of the French school
children," and other "views": travel scenes from Moscow, Budapest,87
Venice, Dresden, and the United States. Much of the appeal of movies was, 88
that they brought distant and exotic scenes to one's hometown. Not until
resolve a major controversy of his day: whether all four feet of a horse are ever off the ground
at the same time when the horse is galloping. M. JACKSON-WRIGLEY & ERIc LEYLAND, THE
CINEMA 7-8 (1939). By 1885, William Friese-Greene had demonstrated a motion picture
projected onto a screen. Id. at 6. Thomas Edison's assistant, William Dickson, was
pioneering many of the advances later credited to Edison himself in the late 1880s. JOHN
FELL, A HISTORY OF FILMS 10-11 (1979) (source on file with author).
84. Edison v. Lubin, 122 F. 240 (3d Cir. 1903).
85. See MILLARD, supra note 81, at 152-55.
86. For that matter, many early phonograph recordings were of nonmusical events, such
as lectures, comedy monologues, religious evangelism, and the like. See GELATT, supra note
72, at 88-89; MILLARD, supra note 81, at 81. In part, turn of the century recording was driven
by the fact that some sounds reproduced much better than others: banjo sounds, for example,
were much easier to reproduce than violin sounds, and male voices could more easily be
reproduced than female voices. MLARD, supra note 81, at 81. Unlike motion picture
technology, however, sound recordings required considerable equipment and typically were
done in a recording studio.
87. GEORGE C. PRATT, "No Magic, No Mystery, No Sleight of Hand": The First Ten
Years of Motion Pictures in Rochester, in "IMAGE" ON THE ART AND EVOLUTION OF THE FILM:
PHOTOGRAPHS AND ARTICLES FROM THE MAGAZINE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MUSEUM OF
PHOTOGRAPHY 39, 39-42 (Marshall Deutelbaum, ed., 1979) (quoting a contemporaneous
newspaper account).
88. See KRISTIN THOMPSON & DAVID BORDwELL, FILM HISTORY: AN INTRODUCTION 12
(1994) (stating "most [film] subjects were nonfiction, or 'actualities.' These might be
'scenics,' or short travelogues, offering views of distant lands") (source on file with
author). Films like this were only a minute or two long. Films were widely offered for rental
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some years' worth of these vignettes had passed and the public's attention
had begun to wane did motion pictures as a vehicle for dramatic storytelling
come to the fore. After years of frequent showings of the travel oriented
"views," for example, the city of Rochester went nearly two years, between
1901 and 1903, with no motion picture showings at all.89 At that point, films
"were still in danger of permanent extinction .... Their rescue came single
handedly from the introduction and advance of the 'story'
film... comprising a series of scenes related to a central character or group
of characters." 9
The first "stories" told were, perhaps not surprisingly, adaptations of
stage dramas. Two notable films of this period are often cited as turning
points in motion pictures' history, Edison Films' The Great Train Robbery
in 1903, and D.W. Griffith's The Birth of a Nation in 1915. The former
film was based on a road show drama of the same name,91 while Griffith's
was based on a 1905 play, The Clansman.
92
When motion pictures became a vehicle for the adaptation of stage
plays, the first new-use issue involving motion pictures arose. Toward the
end of the century, publisher Harper & Brothers had bought the copyright to
a recent popular novel by General Lew Wallace, Ben Hur, for the purpose of
"dramatizing" the novel as that term was then used: making a stage
play. Around the same time the Kalem Company decided to make a motion
picture of the Wallace novel, hiring a writer to develop what today we would
call a screenplay. It then made the film from the screenplay and licensed
theaters to show it. Harper & Brothers brought suit.
93
At that time, dramatic works themselves had been explicit
copyrightable subject matter for about thirty-five years-since 1856-long
before motion pictures had been invented.94 When the right to "dramatize"
in film catalogs, such as those of the American Mutoscope and Biograph company in 1902,
which classified its films as "'Comedy, Vaudeville, Trick, Sports and Pastimes, Notable
Personages, Railroads, Scenic, Fire and Police, Military, Parades, Marine, Children,
Educational, Expositions, Machinery, Miscellaneous."' DAvID ROBINSON, FROM PEEP SHOW
TO PALACE: THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN FILM 71 (1996) (quoting the American Mutoscope and
Biograph catalogue), a litany strongly suggestive of nonfiction content. Exceptions were
notable: Parisian Georges Mdli6s "transformed the cinema into a narrative
medium ... creating [around 1900] his own fantasy universe at a time when mostfilmmakers
were still content simply to photograph the world as it appeared before them." Id. at 74-75
(emphasis added).
89. PRATT, supra note 87, at 52.
90. Id. at 52.
91. ROBINSON, supra note 88, at 81.
92. PRATr, supra note 87, at 46.
93. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 60 (1911) [hereinafter Kalem I1].
94. Daly v. Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1133 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552).
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an existing nondramatic work was added in 1891, 95 it encompassed only
stage plays: although motion picture research was well underway by 1891,
the first public showing of a motion picture was not until 1895.96
The district court found for the plaintiff, Harper & Brothers.97 The
Second Circuit heard the first appeal and concluded that Kalem had indeed
infringed Harper's right to dramatize the novel.98 The court determined that
showing a film was the same as putting on a play.99 Kalem apparently
argued that a play contained spoken dialog and that its movie was, like other
movies of the day, a silent film.1°° This sort of factual distinction seems
wholly irrelevant today, and struck the court as not much more even then:
live dramatic productions include pantomime, noted the court, so that the
absence of sound in a movie simply made the movie like a pantomime. 10 1
Kalem also argued that it could not be an infringer because it had taken
only the novel's ideas, not its "writing."'' 2 Today we might look on this as
The act of August 18, 1856 (11 Stat. 138), provides, that any copyright
thereafter granted under the laws of the United States, "to the author or
proprietor of any dramatic composition, designed or suited for public
representation, shall be deemed and taken to confer upon the said author or
proprietor, his heirs and assigns, along with the sole right to print and publish
the said composition, the sole right also to act, perform, or represent the same,
or cause it to be acted, performed, or represented, on any stage or public
place, during the whole period for which the copyright is obtained."
Id.
95. Today we know the right at issue as the broader one of either controlling the
making of "derivative works" or the making of a "public performance" of the work under
section 106 of the United States Code.
96. ALBERT R. FULTON, MOTION PicruREs: TiE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ART FROM SILENT
FILMS TO THE AGE OF TELEVISION (Norman ed., 1960).
97. Harper & Bros v. Kalem Co., 169 F. 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1909) [hereinafter Kalem I].
"A final decree granting a perpetual injunction was entered in the court below, from which
this appeal is taken." Id.
98. Id. at 63. "When the film is put on an exhibiting machine, which reproduces the
action of the actors and animals, we think it does become a dramatization, and infringes the
exclusive right of the owner of the copyrighted book to dramatize it .... ." Id.
99. Id.
100. See Kalem 1, 169 F. at 64.
101. Id.
102. Id. In the Supreme Court, Kalem also argued that motion pictures are just part of
a machine and hence could not infringe copyrights. Kalem II, 222 U.S. at 58. 'he exhibition
of the pictures, arranged upon a film which is, during all the time of its use, a part of a
machine, is not an infringement of the book copyright." Id. The "just-part-of-a-machine'
argument followed arguments made earlier that piano rolls did not infringe copyright. See
Kennedy v. McTammany, 33 F. 584, 584 (C.C.D. Mass. 1888) (stating "I cannot convince
myself that these perforated strips of paper are copies of sheet music, within the meaning of
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the familiar argument that copyright protects only "expressions" of ideas, not
the actual ideas themselves. But the court viewed the argument more as
going to a combination of subject matter and infringement: can a movie
made from a novel itself be a "writing" and hence infringe the rights in the
novel? 10 3 The court misunderstood the nature of infringement, which does
not depend on the infringing work being itself copyrightable, 104 but no
matter: the court concluded that the Constitutional term "writing" had over
the years been broadly applied to paintings, statutes, etc and so was not
offended by being extended to cover "film dramatizations.";05
The Supreme Court agreed with the Second Circuit in an opinion by
Justice Holmes issued in 1911.1°6 Unlike the Second Circuit, the Supreme
Court understood that the issue was not the copyrightability of the
film. More precisely, where the appeals court had seemed to think that
infringement by the film depended on the film itself sustaining a copyright
(being considered a "writing"), the Supreme Court noted that the film's own
copyrightability had nothing to do with escaping the charge of
infringement. But like the Second Circuit, even the Supreme Court
focused on the matter of the movie's silence as being the touchstone of the
question whether it could be a dramatization.10 8 Again, the familiar analogy
of pantomime carried the day, with the Supreme Court finding only a slight
and legally insignificant difference between a "live" pantomime and a filmed
one:
We are of opinion that Ben Hur was dramatized by what was
done .... Action can tell a story, display all the most vivid
relations between men, and depict every kind of human emotion,
without the aid of a word. It would be impossible to deny the title
of drama to pantomime as played by masters of the art. Daly v.
the copyright law. They are not made to be addressed to the eye as sheet music, but they form
part of a machine"); see also White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 7
(1908) (stating "[tihings intended for mechanical function-for use in themselves-will not
infringe copyright .... ) (argument of Charles S. Burton and John J. O'Connell, counsel for
defendant player-piano manufacturer Apollo Company). It also foreshadowed similar
arguments raised nearly a hundred years later over computer programs in read-only memory,
in Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating
"[d]efendant argues that there can be no copyright protection for the ROMs because they are
utilitarian objects or machine parts"). However, these arguments had little effect in Kalem II.
103. See Kalem I, 169 F. at 65.
104. Id. at 63.
105. Id. at 64-65.
106. Kalem II, 222 U.S. at 63.
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Palmer, 6 Blatcbf. 256, 264. But if a pantomime of Ben Hur
would be a dramatizing of Ben Hur, it would be none the less so
that it was exhibited to the audience by reflection from a glass and
not by direct vision of the figures-as sometimes has been done in
order to produce ghostly or inexplicable effects. The essence of
the matter in the case last supposed is not the mechanism employed
but that we see the event or story lived. 1°9
The Court reached past superficial arguments to see "the essence of the
matter" without being distracted by a focus on the "mechanism
employed."' 0 Perhaps this was a mild retreat from the White-Smith case's
insistence only three years earlier that copyright applied only to the
mechanism, and not to the essence of the matter." In any event, the motion
picture industry fell under the obligation to pay royalties for stories used and
nevertheless rapidly grew to become the major economic force it is today.
C. Cable Television1
2
Rural homes in the 1950s, especially those in valleys or on the far side
of mountains, were often unable to receive television signals clearly. With
hindsight, it seems a logical improvement for someone to erect a large
receiving antenna on the top of a mountain and "pipe" the received signal
along a wire cable to those rural homes. The first term coined for what we
call "cable television" today was "CATV," which stood for "Community
109. Id. at 61. The actual basis of the motion picture studio's liability for
"dramatization" of the novel in theaters-under the control of independent contractors-was
the doctrine of contributory infringement.
The defendant not only expected but invoked by advertisement the use of its
films for dramatic reproduction of the story. That was the most conspicuous
purpose for which they could be used, and the one for which especially they
were made. If the defendant did not contribute to the infringement it is
impossible to do so except by taking part in the final act. It is liable on
principles recognized in every part of the law.
Id. at 62-63 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
110. Kalem II, 222 U.S. at 61.
111. See supra text accompanying note 26.
112. Much of the discussion of cable television is drawn from HARDY I, supra note 8, at
252-56 and from I. Trotter Hardy, Computer RAM "Copies": Hit or Myth? Historical
Perspectives on Caching as a Microcosm of Current Copyright Concerns, 22 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 423,442-46 (1997) [hereinafter Hardy 11].
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Antenna Television."' 1 3 Quite simple in concept, the idea of bringing
television signals over a wire instead of through the air was novel. But it
was successful, and the cable industry began to grow.
Not surprisingly, the copyright owners of the television programs being
picked up by cable receiving antennas and transmitted to additional homes
began to demand royalty payments from the cable companies. These
demands were refused; lawsuits for copyright infringement followed shortly
thereafter. Two similar cases involving these facts reached the United States
Supreme Court a few years apart, Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc.114 and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc.1
1 5
The issue in both cases was whether a cable station that, without
authorization, received and further transmitted a copyrighted program should
be held to be a copyright infringer. 116 Plaintiff's theory was that such a
transmission constituted a "performance" of the copyrighted works.117 As
the performances were to the public and for profit (cable companies were
not, to put it in Justice Holmes's famous words, "eleemosynary"
institutions)118 and were accomplished without permission or royalties,
plaintiffs argued that the cable stations infringed their copyright rights.
The defendant cable companies argued, quite straightforwardly, that merely
by picking up a signal and passing it on, they did not "perform" anything. 2 ° The
Supreme Court found for the defendant cable companies, determining that cable
systems did not "perform" the shows they transmitted. 21 This conclusion was
113. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 391
(1968). See also MARY ALICE MAYER PHILIPS, CATV: A HISTORY OF CoMMuNrrY ANTENNA
TELEVISION 4 (1972).
114. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
115. 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
116. Fortnightly dealt with broadcast signals picked up from the local area and
transmitted over cable. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390
(1968). Teleprompter dealt with broadcast signals picked up from distant markets.
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974). For purposes of the
discussion in this article, both raise the same issues.
117. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 395; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 402.
118. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 594 (1917). One early cable system was
created by John Walson, part owner of an appliance store, in 1948 to boost sales of television
sets in the local, rural area. PHaLMS, supra note 113, at 8-9. Initially given away, this cable
service proved so popular that the very next year, 1949, Walson began charging a $100
installation fee and two dollars per month. Id.
119. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 390; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 404.
120. "Ihe petitioner maintains that its CATV systems did not 'perform' the copyrighted
works at all." Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 395.
121. Id. at 402.
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founded largely on the reasoning that cable companies were merely passive
carriers'2 that did not rise to the level of "performing" in the ordinary sense of
that term-or as the Court put it, "Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not
perform."'l2 The Court viewed cable as merely an extension of broadcast
television, of little economic or other significance in itself.124 "Essentially, a
CATV system no more than enhances the viewer's capacity to receive the
broadcaster's signals ... 125 Cable systems
"have nothing to do with sponsors, program content or
arrangement. They sell community antenna service to a segment of
the public for which [broadcasters'] programs were intended but
which is not able, because of location or topographical condition,
to receive them without rebroadcast or other relay service by
,,126community antennae ....
In other words, the Court saw cable television functioning mainly to promote
some other already paid for medium-in this case, broadcast television-in
much the same way that phonograph recordings were first seen as merely
promoting sheet music. 27
122. Note that the cable companies were not "passive carriers" as that term is often
used in connection with telephone companies or Internet Service Providers. In the latter
cases, the carrier is in a contractual relation with the sender of the information in
question. With the cable companies, there was no contractual relation with the sender-the
broadcasting companies-at all. In addition, cable companies have the ability to choose what
signals to receive and retransmit, and to what audiences they will perform the retransmission.
123. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398 (citation omitted). The Court announced that it
would not simply look to the ordinary meaning of the word "perform," noting instead that
[a]t the outset it is clear that the petitioner's systems did not "perform"
the respondent's copyrighted works in any conventional sense of that term, or
in any manner envisaged by the Congress that enacted the law in 1909. But
our inquiry cannot be limited to ordinary meaning and legislative history ....
Id. at 395 (citations omitted). But in fact, the majority opinion largely did limit itself to
ordinary meaning, especially in concluding that: "Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not
perform. Thus, while both broadcaster and viewer play crucial roles in the total television
process, a line is drawn between them. One is treated as active performer; the other, as
passive beneficiary." Id. at 398-99 (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 399.
125. Id. See also id. at 400 (where the court stated "[b]roadcasters procure programs
and propagate them to the public; CATV systems receive programs that have been released to
the public and carry them by private channels to additional viewers").
126. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 400 n.28 (quoting Intermountain Broad. & Television
Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, Inc., 196 F. Supp 315, 325 (D. Idaho 1961)).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
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Just as Congress was shortsighted in its assessment of recorded music a
generation earlier, so the Supreme Court was dramatically shortsighted in its
assessment of the significance of cable television. Far from remaining
merely an adjunct to broadcast television, by the time Congress was revising
the Copyright Act in the mid-1970s, the cable industry was a major
economic force: nearly 3500 cable operators served 7700 communities,
reaching 10.8 million homes and earning revenues of $770 million. 128 Cable
was well beyond the point of simply extending existing broadcast signals to
a wider and rural audience. It had become an alternative network, competing
with broadcast networks' 29-- and for that matter, growing much more rapidly
in urban, affluent areas than among the rural poor.
In a replay of what had happened with recorded sound a generation
earlier when Congress debated the protection of musical compositions
against the backdrop of a negative Supreme Court ruling, near endless• 131
Congressional debates over cable television's copyright obligations arose
against the backdrop of a negative Supreme Court ruling. In the end, as with
the phonograph, a compromise was reached: Cable companies would pay a
royalty, but the royalty would be fixed by Conress, and copyright owners
would have no choice but to accept that royalty.
D. Current New-Use Issues
The Internet has begun a new round of new-use issues. One such issue
is whether audio and video sent over the Internet infringe any copyright
rights. Digitizing audio or video signals-whether live or recorded-is quite
simple with today's computers. Once digitized and resident on a computer's
hard disk, these digital files can be set up to be played on demand. A
number of new uses have appeared that depend on this digitizing
capability. One innovative company developed a technique to play digitized
music files over a telephone line as a customized aural greeting, in the
process fulfilling one of Alexander Graham Bell's predictions about the
128. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 at 88 (1976).
129. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE, § 5.8.2 at p. 642
(1996).
130. See Phillips, supra note 113, at 171-72 (stating: "Industry leaders have recently
expressed concern for a neglected sector of the American public-the rural dweller")
(emphasis added; statement published in 1972).
131. See Litman, supra note 7, at 332 (stating "[i]t took eleven years and the combined
efforts of the Copyright Office, the bar associations, the House and Senate Subcommittees, the
FCC, and the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy to force interested parties to
reach an agreement on the revision bill's treatment of cable television").
132. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987). See also 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1994).
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telephone's use for music some hundred years after he first made it.133 A
trade association representing music recording companies, the Recording
Industry Association of America ("RIAA"), filed suit against this telephone
music provider in early 1996 and soon thereafter a settlement was reached in
which the defendant company agreed to stop making this use of copyrighted
music. 134 As a settlement, of course, this proceeding did not establish that
the new-use in question was infringing, though that seems likely to have
been the outcome had the matter continued to trial.
Many Internet sites make recorded music available on demand over the
Internet. Apparently these sites, at least initially, did not obtain licenses for
their distributions. The RIAA sent a cease-and-desist letter to one such site,
then called AudioNet.com, in early 1996 for exactly that activity. 35 The
site-since renamed broadcast.com-has apparently removed the allegedly
infringin6 materials and claims to have licensed the materials it continues to
provide. This same site provides links to live radio and television
broadcasts, as well as various concerts and other audio and video
events. This author is not aware of any conclusive legal determination that
133. See LEWis COE, THE TELEPHONE AND ITS SEVERAL INvENTORS: A HISTORY 78
(1995).
134. See Recording Industry Association of America, Nine Record Companies Reach
Settlement In Infringement Action <http:llwww.riaa.comlantipir/ releases/nine.htm> (stating
Send-A-Song operates a commercial service for customers to order particular
recordings to be played over the telephone, accompanied by a personal
message, in the form of an "aural greeting card." Prior to the settlement,
Send-A-Song made copies of the plaintiffs' sound recordings without the
plaintiffs' consent, stored them in Send-A-Song's computers, and then
transmitted these copies over the telephone to the recipients of Send-A-
Song's services).
135. See Recording Industry Association of America, RIAA Demands Internet Service
Stop Violating Record Companies' Rights <http://www.riaa.comlantipir/releases/rights.htm>.
136. See broadcast.com, Terms and Conditions <http://www.broadcast.com/about
terms.html> (stating "[a]l material on this site, including but not limited to images,
illustrations, audio clips, and video clips, is protected by copyrights which are owned and
controlled by broadcast.corn or by other parties that have licensed their material to
broadcast.con") (emphasis added); Recording Industry Association of America, RIAA
Releases Midyear Anti-Piracy Stats: CD Seizures, Dominated by Bootlegs, Increase
Astronomically and Overtake Cassette Seizures <http:llwww.riaa.comlantipir/releases/
midstats.htm> (stating:
the RIAA demanded an Internet service stop violating record companies'
rights when it sent a cease and desist letter to AudioNet. The company was
providing an interactive service that offered 400 digital performances of full-
length albums from a variety of musical genres, without the authority of many
of the various sound recording copyright owners. AudioNet dropped all the
infringing works within days).
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such Internet live "broadcasts" infringe copyrights, so technically this new-
use issue remains an open question. Nonetheless, the brief dispute with the
RIAA and even the name change to broadcast.com certainly suggest that the
site regards itself as a kind of broadcasting station, presumably subject to the
same copyright rules as other more traditional broadcasters like radio and
television.
V. NEW USES: ANALYSIS
When new technologies raise the new-use issue, the debate unfolds in a
surprisingly predictable way. Whatever the forum, whether in congressional
hearings or in court, representatives of authors and composers and those
who, like publishers and distributors, are allied with those interests appear
on one side. These parties tend to stress that copyright has long
accommodated new technologies, that Congress intended to protect works of
authorship in general, and that authors make little enough money as it is such
that they need all the incentives that a new technology can give them; and
consequently, that Congress ought to ensure that the new technology falls
under a full regime of copyright liability applicable to existing technologies.
Opposing these arguments will be representatives of user groups: the
owners of the new technology like radio that enables the new-use of others'
copyrighted works, along with perhaps libraries, schools, research
organizations, or the like. These parties concentrate their arguments either
on a narrow reading of the statute as not applicable to the technology, or on
the broader and more appealing argument that the new technology deserves a
chance to grow without the encumbrance of exposure to copyright liability,
or that the new-use of copyrighted works merely advertises the old use and
as an affirmative benefit to copyright owners should not be held to infringe
the existing works.
The arguments on both sides encompass two important policy
considerations: the benefits of giving new technologies "room to grow" by
not encumbering them with full copyright liability; and the benefits of
ensuring that as a technology grows to become economically significant,
those who create works of authorship for it will have an adequate incentive
to continue their creative efforts. Sometimes the "no encumbrance" side of
this argument has won out, as happened in the Supreme Court's decisions
that cable television did not have to pay royalties to the creators of broadcast
television programs. 37 At other times the reverse has been true, as happened
137. See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968);
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
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when courts decided that radio broadcasters did have to pay royalties for the
copyrighted material they broadcast.
38
The argument that a new-use merely "advertises" an old use and hence
should not be held to infringe is a particularly familiar one and leads
naturally into the heart of this article's analysis of the new-use
issue. Representatives of the phonograph recording industries in the 1900s
strongly argued to Congress that records merely served as advertising for the
sheet music market; 139 the producers of the motion picture Ben Hur argued
before the Supreme Court that their movie would benefit sales of the
book;140 radio station owners in the 1920s argued to Congress that radio
served mainly to advertise the sales of sheet music;14' library photocopying
of journal articles in the 1950s and 1960s was described by some as
primarily a beneficial advertisement for the journals;142 the Supreme Court
found that cable television in the late 1960s merely promoted broadcast
television;' 43 representatives of an Internet news site argued that "framing"
others' web sites benefited the sites framed; 44 the owner of an Internet site
celebrating widely available digitized music over the Internet argued that the
availability of such music benefited the bands whose music was thus made
available.
138. See e.g., M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776, 780 (D.N.J.
1923).
139. See supra text accompanying note 71.
140. Kalem II, 222 U.S. at 57 (1911). "Not only is there no evidence here that the
copyright proprietors were injured even in the slightest degree; but, on the contrary, the
defendant asserted by letter that its films would benefit the complainants, and this they did not
deny, but stood upon their naked assertion of legal right." Id.
141. See To Amend the Copyright Act: Hearings on S. 2600 Before the Subcomm. of
the Comm. on Patents, 68th Cong. 31-32 (1924) (statement of Charles H. Tuttle of the
National Association of Broadcasters).
142. John C. Koepke, Assessment of Documentation Practices in Reprography, IN
REPROGRAPHY AND COPYRIGHT LAW 50,53 (Lowell H. Hattery & George P. Bush eds., 1964)
(stating:
The small journal will tell you that photoduplication actually increases its
circulation rather than decreases it .... We have talked to many librarians
who have told us that, after seven or eight requests for an article that may
have appeared in a rather obscure journal, they have found it desirable to
begin to subscribe to the journal .... ).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 123-127.
144. David S. Hilzenrath, Online Publishers Wage a Battle Over Frame and Fortune,
T HE WASH. PoST, Feb. 11, 1997, at D4. "'A lot of news organizations are very pleased by
what [TotalNews is] doing,' because TotalNews generates more visitors to their sites, said
Lisa Farringer, a Washington attorney representing TotalNews." Id. (emphasis omitted).
145. See Michael Robertson, Artists Use MP3 To Reach More Fans, Sell More CDs
<http://www.mp3.comnews/088.html> (stating:
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On their face, these advertising arguments make no sense. Even when
the arguments are true-and it has often been true that a new-use of
copyrighted works does promote the sales of an existing format'4---nothing
in copyright policy supports the obliging of authors to advertise their
creativity, and certainly not obliging them to advertise on terms and in places
that they may not desire. 147  If authors have a right to object to others'
advertising their works, in circumstances where withholding their objections
would benefit them, then the authors will simply withhold their objections in
order to gain the benefits of the advertising. After all, novelists have the
One strategy for artists to consider is to seed the Internet with one or more
songs. This enables music listeners to get a taste of an artist's style or a
sample from a CD. If they like what they hear they will spread the music and
a percentage will buy the CD).
The term "MP3" refers to a type of data compression technology that is especially suited to
compressing digital music files.
146. The music business has been particularly attuned to the desirability of advertising
music through new uses, from vaudeville and phonograph records, which initially advertised
sheet music sales, to radio, which advertised first sheet music sales then phonograph record
sales and now CDs. See generally SEGRAVE, supra note 70; see also id. at 13, 37, 51
(vaudeville advertising sheet music, radio advertising sheet music, and radio advertising
records). The number of new bands that voluntarily permit their music to be digitized and
available on the World Wide Web today suggests that these bands find the new-use of Internet
broadcasting to be valuable advertising. One popular music download site,
<http://www.mp3.com>, claimed that "MP3.com is the #1 music download site on the
Internet, with 3,000,000 visitors per month. In the past year, MP3.com has facilitated more
than 5,000,000 legal, original song downloads-approximately 75,000 songs daily." Michael
Robertson, Platinum Entertainment Offers Free MP3 Downloads Via MP3.Com
<http://www.mp3.com/news/123.html>.
147. Accord M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776, 779-80 (D.N.J.
1923).
There is another point which, although striking us as immaterial,
deserves some comment. The defendant argues that the plaintiff should not
complain of the broadcasting of its song because of the great advertising
service thereby accorded the copyrighted number. Our own opinion of the
possibilities of advertising by radio leads us to the belief that the broadcasting
of a newly copyrighted musical composition would greatly enhance the sales
of the printed sheet. But the copyright owners and the music publishers
themselves are perhaps the best judges of the method of popularizing musical
selections. There may be various methods of bringing them to the attention of
music lovers. It may be that one type of song is treated differently than a song
of another type. But, be that as it may, the method, we think, is the privilege
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right to object to someone else's publishing their novels, yet most novelists
are all too eager to waive that right in return for that very publication. That
is how copyright law works.
Behind these nonsensical facial arguments about advertising, we can
discover a much more principled assertion that focuses on authors'
incentives to create. In copyright terms, the advertising argument can be
understood as saying that because a particular new-use benefits copyright
authors, those authors do not need any further incentive to create for the
new-use medium. If they need no further incentive, then imposing
infringement liability for the new-uses merely penalizes the public by
requiring them to pay for something that would have been created and
available for free anyway.149
148. In the June 1906 hearings on what became the 1909 Copyright Act, the testimony
of witness Paul Cromelin of the Columbia Phonograph Company, went for pages and pages,
with numerous quoted letters from others to him, all designed to convince Congress that
phonograph record sales did indeed benefit music composers through the sale of sheet
music. At one point, Mr. Cromelin was interrupted by Representative John Chaney, who
asked how the granting of a right to composers to control recordings would make any
difference to that state of affairs:
MR. CHANEY. Let me ask you this question: There is not very much doubt
but what your theory of this is all right-that all these people [i.e.,
composers] want to get their music before the public, and they are seeking
every means of advertising it. Now, in this bill, should it pass [and give
composers the right to demand royalties from recording], is there anything to
prevent that continuing, and, if so, what is it that would interfere with it?
See BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part H at 333.
At which point Cromelin appeared mildly flustered and was saved when another
witness, attorney Albert H. Walker, quickly steered the discussion to other concerns, namely
that music publishers, acting on behalf of composers, would all sign exclusive contracts with a
single manufacturer of piano rolls, the Eolian Company, and hence create an unstoppable
monopoly:
MR. WALKER. [A]s soon as the Eolian contract goes into effect the
[music] publishers will no longer be at liberty to send these pieces to Mr.
Cromelin, and will be under an ironclad contract running for thirty-five years
to sell them to the 1Eolian Company only.
See id. at 334.
The arguments that music publishers would tie up composers in a web of exclusive
contracts, and that such exclusive arrangements constituted a harmful monopoly, seem a bit
hypocritical: recording companies like Cromelin's routinely signed exclusive contracts with
performers, contracts that at times included royalty payments based on the sales of the
records. See id. at 215-17 (testimony from various parties concerning recording companies'
exclusive contracts with certain performers).
149. See, e.g., GoLtsMN, supra note 129, § 1.14 at p. 1:40 (noting the argument that
"To give greater property rights than are needed to obtain the desired quantity and quality of
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Even understood in this more principled way, the arguments about
advertising and authors' incentives miss the mark. The question is not
whether an incentive is necessary when works of authorship like music
already exist and a technology like the phonograph, radio, cable television,
or the Internet is new. At its earliest stages-say, on the date of its first
invention-a new-use technology will obviously not have an effect on
authors' incentives. It would be silly to suggest that the day Edison first
achieved the playback of a recorded sound or the Internet first transmitted an
audio file of music, music composers everywhere suddenly had a need for an
additional royalty incentive in order to continue composing.
Obviously the day of invention--even if it could clearly be identified-
is too soon to look at the question of a new technology's effects on copyright
incentives. We should instead ask: will this new-use technology grow in
economic importance, at some point in the future, to the point that not
imposing royalty obligations on it would seriously diminish authors'
incentives to create? If that point never comes, then we should never impose
royalty obligations on the new-use. If it does come, then we should.
Determining the "right" degree of incentives, let alone when they
become necessary, is an issue fraught with difficulty. Rather than undertake
that task, we can make a simplifying assumption. Let us assume for
purposes of analysis that at the time a new-use technology arises, the
existing copyright incentives are already at the "right"-the necessary and
appropriate-level for all other technologies and uses. That is, instead of
trying to calculate a measure of incentives and asking when authorial
incentives in the aggregate, from all possible uses of copyrighted works,
have reached or deviated from the "right" level, we can instead ask the easier
question of when, if ever, will current incentives decline because of a new-
use technology? By assuming that current incentives are at the "right" level
to start with, if we can determine a point at which they decline from that
level, then we have determined the point at which incentives need to be
added to bring authorial creativity back up to the "right" level.
In short, we can focus on displacement: will a new-use technology
eventually displace existing uses of copyrighted works-the uses that do
generate royalty income and hence provide a present incentive? If the new-
use industry ends up displacing present forms of copyright exploitation, then
works would impose costs on users without any countervailing benefits to society") Id.
(footnotes omitted); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR.
L. REv. 19, 31-32 n.43 (1996) (stating "it is conventional to argue that copyright holders
should receive only such incentives as are necessary to impel them to create and disseminate
new works") (citation omitted); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLuM. L. REv. 1600,
1610 (1982) (stating "[c]opyright ... create[s] ownership rights in intellectual property, with
the primary goal of generating monetary incentives for the production of creative works").
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a new incentive in the form of royalties from the new industry's use will be
needed. If it does not ever displace present-day forms of exploitation, then a
new incentive will not be needed.
The problem, of course, is that without foresight, neither Congress nor
the courts can know which growth path a new-use industry is likely to
follow. Will the new-use remain forever an aside to some existing market,
potentially 50 only a minor source of income to copyright owners because the
primary sources are not displaced; or will it outgrow and dominate that
existing market, displacing it to become a major source of income for
copyright owners; or something in between?
The short and accurate answer is "no one knows." But this situation is a
classic case of the need for a decision maker - court or Congress - to
make decisions under uncertainty; techniques exist to help us in that
effort. The decision maker will be faced with what statisticians call "Type I
and Type II' errors.151 The labels themselves mean nothing and provide no
useful insights into the problem, but they do constitute a kind of shorthand
that makes further discussion a bit more convenient. The terms are used
here solely for that reason. A Type I error means that a decision was made
to do something that need not or should not have been done. A Type II error
means that a decision to do something was not made, but should have been.
In the context of technologies that allow new uses of copyrighted
works, that cryptic summary means this. A Type I error would be committed
if a decision-maker decided to impose royalty obligations on a new-use
industry when royalty payments were unnecessary because the industry was
destined to remain only marginally important to copyright owners. A Type
II error would be committed if the decision-maker concluded that the new-
use industry should not be required to pay royalties, and yet the industry was
destined to become a major market for copyright owners.
One way to address the problem of uncertainty in this copyright context
is to ask which of these two errors is the more likely and the more serious;
other things being equal, if one error is both more likely and more serious
than other errors, then that error should be avoided. That is, if one error is
likely to bring about a greater harm to the public than the other, and the
decision maker has no independent reason to pick one outcome over the
other, then the error most likely to cause the greatest harm should be
avoided. The question of infringement for new uses of existing copyrighted
works therefore reduces itself to an inquiry as to which harm is likely to be
greater, a Type I or a Type II error.
150. The new-use is only "potentially" a source of income because whether it is or is
not an actual source depends on how the copyright issues are decided.
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A. Type I Errors
A Type I error means that a decision is made that the new-use is an
infringement, and consequently that the copyright owner has a right to
demand royalties, even though it will eventually prove to be the case that the
new-use industry does not become a significant market for copyright
owners. What is the harm from that outcome?
Two related harms seem possible. First is that a requirement to make
royalty payments may be enough to stifle the new-use industry, leaving it to
founder when it might have survived, or perhaps leaving it weakened,
amounting to less than it might have amounted. We might call this a Type Ia
error-again, only for convenience; there is no special magic in labels. This
possibility of this type of error has been indirectly noted in academic
literature. Professor Jessica Litman has written about the many new
technologies that have not been required to pay royalties, but instead have
been allowed to grow up in the "shelter of a copyright exemption." 15 This
view, that being sheltered from royalty obligations fosters and promotes the
growth of desirable new industries, implies the contrary: that if these new-
use industries had been obligated to pay royalties, they would have been
stifled or suppressed s -and that would be what this article terms a Type Ia,
or "suppression" error.
Perhaps worse, a second type of harm from Type I errors would arise if
copyright owners were content with their own system of exploiting
copyrighted works and simply did not want any competition from new
uses. They might therefore deny a license to the new industry even if the
industry were willing and could afford to pay a suitable royalty. We can call
this a Type Lb, or "status quo" error, implying that the existing copyright
owners and copyright industries are happy with the status 57 uo and simply do
not care to authorize a change by licensing any new uses.
152. Litman, supra note 149, at 29 n.33; see generally id. at 27 (stating "copyright
shelters and exemptions have, historically, encouraged rapid investment and growth in new
media of expression").
153. Accord Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 166 (1975)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating "I had hoped, secondarily, that the reasoning of
Fortnightly and Teleprompter would be limited to CATV. At least in that context the two
decisions had the arguably desirable effect of protecting an infant industry from a premature
death") (emphasis added).
154. Litman, supra note 149, at 25 (stating "[m]ost [current copyright stakeholders]
would prefer that the new copyright rules for new copyright-affecting technologies be
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B. Type II Errors
A Type II error means that a decision is made that the new-use is not an
infringement, even though the industry is destined to become potentially a
major source of income to copyright owners. What is the harm here?
Most obviously, the harm is that the lack of royalties from the new
industry will mean a significant disincentive for authors as the old royalty
paying industry gradually shrinks in importance. In that event, the public
will lose the benefit of whatever a greater incentive might have brought.
Let us take the phonograph record industry as an example. In the early
days of the industry, the incentives for the creation of musical compositions
came almost entirely from the sale of sheet music, which dominated the
market for music in the home. 15 Yet eventually the phonograph recording
industry grew enormously more important in sales and dollar volume than
the sheet music industry. Had the recording industry been exempt from
royalty payments, for example, it is most unlikely that composers' income
from the sale of sheet music would have continued to this day to induce the
creation of the socially desirable amount of music.
C. Which Harm is Greater?
So which harm is the greater, a "Type r' or a "Type IT' error? The first
harm from a Type Ia error is that a new-use industry might be suppressed or
weakened by the obligation to pay royalties. That is only a harm, though, if
the public would have derived greater total benefits from the new industry's
presence and strength than its absence-that is, if the new-use industry had
survived and all other things had been equal.
Manifestly, however, all other things would not be equal. In particular,
authors unable to derive revenue from the new-use of their works are worse
off than they would be if they were able to derive revenue. In a rough sense,
what the new-use industry gains by not having to pay royalties is offset by
what authors lose by not receiving royalties. Conversely, under the
opposite copyright liability regime (one of full liability), the new royalty
revenues that authors can command from the new-use are offset by the
corresponding increased royalty costs for the new industry.
In short, we want to maximize the benefits-less the costs-of both old
and new uses of copyrighted works. A new-use industry strengthened means
155. See supra text accompanying note 70.
156. See FEIST, supra note 82 and accompanying quotation. See also the phonograph
company earnings figures listed supra note 72.
157. The trade-off will not necessarily be one for one: not all authors entitled to
demand royalties would demand them, or demand as much as they might.
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an old use industry weakened. And vice versa. Unless one is committed to
the proposition that new things are ipso facto superior to old things,158 one
cannot say that the stifling of a new-use industry is necessarily bad. So the
question of the Type I error becomes not just "was the new-use industry
stifled or weakened," but more precisely "was the new-use industry stifled or
weakened inappropriately, i.e., to the public's overall detriment?"
How might the "stifling of an industry to the public's detriment"
happen? Start with this assumption: Apart from the royalties question, the
new-use industry would have to bring benefits greater than its costs to
survive in any event. If it did not earn a profit, it would fail to survive in the
marketplace. Absent some sort of larger market failure, 5 9 an individual
business's or industry's failure would be a socially useful result because it
would free up resources to be used in more socially desirable ways. If a
new-use industry brought so little value to the public that it was destined to
fail even without paying royalties, then the requirement of paying royalties
might hasten its demise-and that would be a good thing.
On the other hand, if the new-use industry were so socially beneficial
that it was destined to earn substantial profits, then an obligation to pay
royalties within some reasonable range would not be enough to stifle it. At
least we know that an obligation to pay royalties does not necessarily
prevent an industry from growing-both radio and television, and for that
matter, motion pictures,16° have grown up under such royalty obligations.
We come to an important conclusion. Whether a new-use industry is
obliged to pay royalties or not makes the most difference when that new
158. Cf. Litman, supra note 149, at 27, where Professor Litman appears to hold the
view that new is ipsofacto better than old. (stating "[suppose] we imagined the viewpoint of
a hypothetical benevolent despot with the goal of promoting exciting new technology"). Id.
(emphasis added).
159. "Larger market failure" implies some sort of externality. Pollution is the classic
negative externality: something that affects others but with effects that are not captured in a
marketplace transaction and hence not reflected in the price of polluting company's
product. A firm with uncorrected negative externalities imposes costs on others that the firm
does not have to bear; that means that the firm might succeed when it "ought" to fail. A firm
might also generate "positive externalities," or benefits provided to others that the firm cannot
capture through appropriate pricing of its products. For example, a firm that designed
especially good looking Internet sites might find their sites used as "teaching aids" or models
for emulation by aspiring Internet page designers. To the extent that the aspiring designers do
not themselves pay for the "instruction" they receive from studying the firm's site designs, the
firm has conferred external benefits on those designers.
160. See Kalem II, 222 U.S. at 62 (1911) (stating that a motion picture made from a
novel infringes the novel owner's right to control dramatizations of the novel, even though the
right of "dramatization" in the statute was enacted at a time before the development of motion
pictures when stage plays were all that was expressly contemplated).
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industry is barely profitable. And-again, absent market failures-an
industry that is barely profitable is one that makes a comparably small
contribution to society. Finally, that conclusion leads us to a useful rule of
thumb: If a decision maker makes a Type Ia error, finding infringement
liability where the industry is of only slight significance and consequently
for which the obligation to pay royalties is likely to be a significant factor in
causing the industry to fail, the magnitude of the error is likely to be quite
small.
Now we must address the second type of harm, a Type Ib error:
Congress or courts impose infringement liability and a corresponding
obligation to pay royalties in a situation in which authors will refuse to
license the new-use in order to preserve their existing business. For indus-
tries destined to fail for want of providing any significant public value, we
are no worse off if copyright owners refuse a license. By hypothesis, a
copyright owner's refusal to permit licensing merely hastens the demise of
an nonbeneficial industry, a socially desirable outcome. But for those new-
use industries that might have provided significant value to society, a
copyright owner's refusal to license would presumably put the new-use
industry out of business, and that would be harmful to the public.
Is this outcome likely in practice? Do authors (copyright owners)
actually refuse to license uses of their works when it would be profitable for
them to do so? Of course, anything can happen. People can be motivated by
"irrational" forces: anger, spite, etc. But in the main, one would expect that161
if authors can make money by licensing, they will. It is in their self-
interest to do so. In other words, the likelihood that authors given both a
right and a market that permits them to demand royalties in some profitable
amount, would instead refuse royalties in any amount, seems small-far less
than the likelihood that they would happily receive them. At the very least,
if one has to make rules that govern most situations, most of the time, one is
more likely to be right if one predicts that when money can be made, the
people in a position to make it will try to make it.
161. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 316 (5th ed. 1998) (stating
in relation to patents that "it is always more profitable to license production to a more efficient
producer than it is to produce oneself'); ARMEN A. ALcHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE
AND PRODUCTION: CoMPETITION, COORDINATION, & CONTROL 292 (3d ed. 1983) (describing
in relation to patents the fallacy of "a commonplace of modem folklore that gasoline
producers have a new fuel or carburetor that would enormously reduce the demand for
gasoline, but to protect their wealth they have withheld the device"); ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMICS 138 (1988) (referring to patents: "[Tihe use of a patent
to suppress an invention is exceedingly unlikely. The far more common case is that the
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Summing up, we can see that the harm from a Type lb error is
significant, but the likelihood that such an error will be made-in which a
new-use industry would have prospered, to the public's overall benefit, but
the relevant authors refused, on economically irrational grounds, to grant a
license for that use-is low.
162
D. Type H Errors
A Type II error means that the new-use industry is found not to infringe
but is destined to grow in importance to the point that the industry's failure
to pay royalties will constitute a significant disincentive to authors. What is
the harm here?
The obvious harm is that with inadequate incentives, authors create (or
publishers publish, or distributors distribute, etc.) less than they might have
and the public is worse off as a result. Is that a likely harm? Surprisingly,
we have no examples of an important industry that was held to have no
royalty obligations and for which the lack of obligation persisted throughout
the industry's history. The examples that would likely have fit that pattern
all ended up eventually with some form of royalty obligation, frequently in
the form of a compulsory license. The phonograph and cable television
certainly fit this model, as did the jukebox until 1993.163
One might question, then, whether there is any harm at all when a court
declines to impose infringement liability and hence a royalty obligation on a
new-use industry. If the industry is destined to remain of little public
benefit, then the loss of its royalties to authors will not be significant. Yet, if
the industry does become important, then Congress will act to impose
compulsory license royalties. That has at least been something of the
historical pattern.
The problem with this reasoning is that it assumes two things: first, that
the royalty obligation (again, typically in the form of a compulsory license)
will be imposed at about the same time as the industry becomes significant
enough to justify the requirement and not earlier or later; and second, that
compulsory licenses-if that is the mechanism-are a desirable way to
accommodate the royalty obligation. The evidence to date suggests that the
162. One counterargument is that we do not care about "authors" literally. It is the old
use industry that matters, the industry that is not an "author" itself but a licensee of
authors. The counterargument fails, however: New authors arise all the time and have the
option to transfer their rights to old or new-use industries. To the extent that the old use
industry is itself the "author" of the works its sells, then the argument in the text holds
directly.
163. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (Supp. 1995) (phonorecords); 17 U.S.C. § 11 (c), (d) (1994)
(cable television); 17 U.S.C. § 116(b) (1988), repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-198, § 3(a), (b)(2), 107 Stat. 2309.
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first assumption is questionable and that the second is correct only as a
matter of politics, but certainly incorrect as a matter of economics.
The first assumption is that a decision to impose infringement liability
on a new-use industry will not just happen eventually, but will happen at
roughly the "right" time. The "right" time is the time that the need for an
incentive to authors arises. If the obligation is imposed later than that, then
the public will be the poorer for the delay; moreover a belated imposition of
royalties will almost certainly not be retroactive,' 6 so that the loss to the
public is one that can never be repaid. When exactly that time first arises is
obviously a difficult question to answer. Certainly authors and the new-use
industry would not agree on the matter: Authors are likely to believe that the
"right" time for royalty payments is from the beginning, whenever the new-
use first arose; the new-use industry is likely to believe that the right time is
"never."
The very difficulty of determining objectively when the right time
arises, coupled with a strong self-interest on both sides that effectively
prevents them from having an objective view at all, implies that there is little
or no incentive in either the legislative or judicial arenas for decision makers
to discover what the "right" time is for the imposition of a royalty
obligation. That is, no one in a position to take action-the parties, the
courts, or Congress-stands to gain by trying to determine the right time for
royalty imposition. Consequently, one must conclude that when
infringement liability and a royalty obligation is belatedly imposed on a new-
use industry, the assumption that this imposition will come at the "right
time" is probably wrong. At the very least, we can say that there is no built-
in incentive for the assumption to be true and hence, no reason to expect the
timing to be "right."
The point about economics-that compulsory licenses are wasteful of
resources-is easier to demonstrate. A compulsory license is a form of price
fixing: Congress or an agency sets the price for a broad class of
bargains --those that deal with the buying and selling of certain copyright
164. A retroactive imposition of liability would mean this: First, a new-use industry is
found (by a court or Congress) not to infringe some existing works; second, the new-use
industry grows in importance to the point that the lack of royalty payments becomes a
significant disincentive to authors; third, a decision is made (by court or Congress) that the
new-use industry should pay royalties; and finally, the decision maker extends this new
royalty obligation to past acts that have already been determined not to infringe. This last step
seems very likely to be a denial of due process and hence unconstitutional.
165. For example, for pre-1998 transactions, the license to record a musical
composition that has already been recorded is set in the statute at "either two and three-fourths
cents, or one-half of one cent per minute of playing time or fraction thereof, whichever
amount is larger." 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(2) (1994). After 1998, the decision maker shifts from
Congress to the Copyright Office, which has acquired the authority to establish license prices
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licenses; the parties have little or no room to change the price term. 166 As
such, a compulsory license has whatever drawbacks price controls
have. Absent significant market failures, 167 a compulsory license makes for
a wasteful allocation of social resources.'68
Compulsory licenses might be justified on two other grounds,
however. First, that such a license can reflect a Congressional policy
determination simply to favor one industry or activity over another. For
example, Congress might decide to favor cable television with compulsory
license payments that were lower than fair market value precisely to foster
the growth of cable at the expense of other activities. Whether this is a
desirable way to create subsidies instead of alternatives like tax deductions
or outright subsidy payments from general tax revenues is partly a matter of
politics and political philosophy.
In addition, there is a possibility that a compulsory license will lower
transaction costs. This is at times offered as a justification for such
licenses,' 69 but this point is misleading at best. Other things being equal,
under 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-803 (1994). In the case of cable royalties, the price is based on a
station's annual revenue and determined from a complex series of conditions. See 17 U.S.C. §
111 (d) (1994).
166. Under many copyright compulsory license provisions, the statutorily specified
price serves as a ceiling; the parties may reach agreement for a lower price. See, e.g., 17
U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(B) (Supp. II 1997) (stating "copyright owners of nondramatic musical
works and any persons entitled to obtain a compulsory license [for cover records] ... may
negotiate and agree upon the terms and rates of royalty payments"); 17 U.S.C. § 118(b) (1994)
(stating that owners of copyright in certain musical and other works and "any public
broadcasting entities, respectively, may negotiate and agree upon the terms and rates of royalty
payments"). From early on, lesser-known music recordings "covered" by better-known artists
have in fact received less than the statutory royalty. See SEGRAVE, supra note 70, at 18, 20.
167. See supra text accompanying note 159.
168. See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable
Television, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 77-79 (1981); ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note
161, at 62. Note that by hypothesis I am describing a new-use industry that has grown to the
point where royalties from an "old use" industry have fallen off significantly; consequently, I
am describing a situation for which a royalty obligation from the new-use industry is
consistent with overall reliance on copyright as an incentive for the public's benefit. One can
always assert that Congress is free to deny copyright to any activity and that it can certainly
extend a limited copyright in the form of compulsory licenses to any activity as well. I do not
gainsay that point; I am not talking about Congressional power but rather about a situation in
which anyone who agreed with the fundamental principles of copyright-an incentive for
creation that redounds to the public's benefit-would agree that a royalty is called for.
169. Transaction costs were offered as the reason for a statutorily specified compulsory
license for cable television in the 1976 Copyright Act: "[I]t would be impractical and unduly
burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose
work was retransmitted by a cable system." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 89 (1976).
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price fixing always lowers transaction costs because it avoids the need for
bargaining. If that were a suitable justification in general, then Congress
ought to establish prices for every transaction in every market, copyright or
otherwise. That Congress has never systematically attempted to fix the
prices of all goods and services in the United States marketplace suggests
that the transaction cost rationale alone must not in fact be a helpful
explanation for the existence of compulsory licenses.17
In any event, there is no evidence in our recent compulsory license
provisions such as for jukeboxes, 171 cable television phonograph17 3  
a
1 7 4  i
recording, public broadcasting, satellite transmissions, and others that
social welfare is improved by that mechanism. 176 Whereas there is reason to
think that the fair use provision-itself a kind of compulsory license that
operates in situations with additional indications of public benefit-
accomplishes overall socially desirable objectives.177
Economics aside, it appears that the large number of compulsory
licenses in copyright law is based on the fact that politically, the compulsory
license makes a great deal of sense. When a Type II error is made early on,
and an industry prospers without liability that should, at some point, be
obliged to pay royalties, it is politically difficult-perhaps impossible-for
Congress to switch the industry "cold turkey" from no liability to full
liability. Nor would that switch be fair to the industry which, after all, has
relied for its investments on a past decision that its actions did not constitute
170. See also Hardy II, supra note 112, at 446 (stating "[a] reduction in transaction
costs through legislation is beneficial only if all sides benefit from the reduction. If one side
benefits but only to the corresponding detriment of the other side, then Congress has merely
shifted resources from one side to the other by a form of price-fixing").
171. 17 U.S.C. § 116(a) (1988), repealed by Copyright Royalty Reform Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-198 § 3, 107 Stat. 2309 (1993).
172. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (1994).
173. Id. at § 115.
174. Id. at § 118(b)(3).
175. Id. at § 119.
176. Compulsory licensing may at times have even more pernicious and unexpected
consequences than a simple failure to promote the general welfare. The compulsory licensing
of recorded music, for example, which takes the form of allowing the making of "cover
records" without permission, has been said to have encouraged both racism and payola. See
SEGRAVE, supra note 70, at 18-19 (stating the compulsory licensing of cover records allowed:
"racism to be more prevalent, especially noticeable in the 1950s when racist radio stations
refused to play, for example, Little Richard, substituting instead a white cover by Pat
Boone. [The presence of multiple versions of the same song in] turn has put more pressure on
companies to dispense payola").
177. See Gordon, supra note 149, at 1602.
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infringement.17 8 A compulsory license, then, is often the only compromise
that can be reached at that stage in the growth of the new-use industry.17 9
Finally, whenever a decision about infringement liability reaches
Congress, one expects a fair amount of lobbying and arguing about the
outcome. The 1909 Copyright Act hearings, for example, were full of
witnesses and lengthy testimony about the issue of phonograph recordings
and piano rolls.1s The issue of cable television's copyright liability
consumed a substantial amount of debate during the 1976 Copyright Act
revision process-as, for that matter, did nearly every issue!81 In a sense,
whenever an important issue like cable television or recorded sound surfaces
in Congress during a revision effort, substantial "transaction costs" are
entailed in lobbying and testifying.
The cost of a Type II error, in sum, consists of three parts. First is the
cost of the public's loss of access to creative expression during the period in
which the new-use industry should have been paying royalties.182 Second,there is the cost of a compulsory license, which is essentially the waste of
178. For example, see the 1908 arguments of counsel for the Apollo Company (piano
roll manufacturer), Charles S. Burton and John J. O'Connell, that past court decisions holding
piano rolls not to infringe musical compositions constituted "prior decisions [that] have
established a rule of property and of business, and should be sustained under the doctrine of
stare decisis, unless greater injury would result from sustaining than from reversing them."
White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 7 (1908) (emphasis added);
Revision of Copyright Laws: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 59th Cong.
(1906), reprinted in BRYLAWSKI, supra note 22, Part J at 289 (statement of Frank L. Dyer, of
the Edison Manufacturing Company and National Phonograph Company) (stating
I submit, gentlemen, that a radical change in the law would seriously disturb
vested interests which have enormously developed under the present
law. The National Phonograph [company] has a pay roll of over $45,000 per
week, over 4,000 employees, and makes over 100,000 records and 1,500
machines daily .... The business has developed under the security of the
present law .... ).
179. For useful exposition of the events behind the adoption of the compulsory license
provision for cable television in the 1979 Copyright Act, see Litman, supra note 7, at 326-
32. See also Darlene A. Cote, Note, Chipping Away at the Copyright Owner's Rights:
Congress' Continued Reliance on the Compulsory License, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219 (1994).
180. See generally Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1994)).
181. See Litman, supra note 132, at 857.
182. I apologize for possibly beating a dead horse, but once again I remind the reader
that I am talking here about an industry that "should have been paying royalties" because, by
hypothesis, the industry has grown to the point that its failure to pay royalties constitutes a
significant loss of incentives to authors and therefore, a loss to the public.
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resources inherent in any price fixing arrangement.1 3 And finally, there is
the cost of the decision making process when authors line up against a new-
use industry during the process of copyright revision. These include:
lobbying costs, publicity campaigns, time consumed in Congressional
hearings by participants, time given up by members of Congress that might
have been applied to other issues, and whatever other expenses accompany a
major legislative battle between opposed industry groups.
E. Type I and H Errors: Summary
We can chart the various errors and their harms. As is so often true
with copyright issues, assessments of the magnitude of harm and its
frequency from various courses of action are largely subjective; this article
makes no claim otherwise. With the subjective nature of the following
assessments taken into account, on balance, we have something like this
chart:
Error type Likely frequency Likely harm
Type Ia ? insubstantial
Type Ib low substantial
Type II high substantial
Unless the expected frequency of Type Ia errors is extremely high, the
greatest expected harm from wrong decisions about the infringement liability
of new-use industries is that of a Type II error. That is, the error we should
be concerned to avoid is that of failing to impose infringement liability on
the new-use industry. In turn, this means that-all other things being equal,
and there being no other basis for a decision-the decision maker faced with
deciding whether a new-use industry should be obliged to pay royalties will
more likely be right when deciding "yes" than "no."
The history of various new technologies sketched out in this article
tends to confirm this general rule of thumb. The technologies discussed here
183. There is no requirement that the imposition of a belated royalty obligation take the
form of a compulsory license with its inefficiencies. It is just that as a practical matter, that
seems to be the usual course for Congress to take because it reflects a political
compromise. Note also that one may choose to put a high value on government decision
making such as price controls for its own sake. From that perspective, the "cost" of a
compulsory license in poorly allocated resources may perhaps be offset by whatever "gain"
inheres in the fact that a resource allocation decision was made by Congress rather than
privately.
184. See generally Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U.
Cm. LEGALF. 217, 252-58 (1996).
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that grew to enormous significance in American life have included the
phonograph and subsequent mechanisms for recording sounds, motion
pictures, radio, television, cable television, and the Internet. Motion
pictures, radio, and television were new-use technologies that were subject
to the usual copyright royalty obligations from the start. All have prospered
nonetheless. Recorded sound and cable television were not subject to such
obligations and have evolved under complex and economically wasteful
compulsory license provisions that have long since outlasted any
conceivable justification other than the inertia of the status quo. Though
anything is possible, one would be hard-pressed to conclude that either of
these latter technologies would have suffered a premature death under
copyright's usual royalty regime.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with this analysis, at the very least the
analysis shows what the relevant inquiry is. In particular, the relevant
inquiry is not merely looking at the new-use industry and its current financial
health alone, without considering the effects on the old use industries, and
without taking into account the various possibilities for the new-use
industry's future growth. Proper decision making about copyright's
application to new-use technologies requires instead an inquiry into the
future growth possibilities of the new-use industry and the potential for its
negative effect on existing copyright using industries.
VI. CONCLUSION
Copyright law seems never to be caught up with technology, with the
result that Congress is under constant pressure to amend the Copyright Act
to bring the law up to date with new developments. At first blush, this need
for continual amendment is puzzling: Congress expressly tried to make the
last major revision of copyright laws, adopted in 1976, flexible enough to
handle future technologies without need for frequent changes. A closer look
reveals, however, that Congress only solved one of at least four issues that
almost invariably arise with new technologies.
Looking back at technological developments over the last century that
include photography, piano rolls, phonograph recording, motion pictures,
radio, television, cable television, and the Internet, we can see copyright
issues emerging in four recognizable patterns: 1) the question of subject
matter coverage for new media of fixation; 2) the question of subject matter
coverage for new types of works; 3) the question of decentralized
infringement; and finally 4) the question of new uses of existing copyrighted
works.
We also see a checkered history of courts' and Congress's accom-
modation to these four issues, with the most success accruing to the first
issue, that of new media of fixation. By and large, the current Copyright
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Act's focus on intangible "works" as copyright's subject matter reasonably
well handles new developments in media of expression such as laser disks or
the like.
The other issues remain far more problematic. One of the most
intriguing is the last, that of a new technology that creates a new way of
using existing copyright works. Frequently, courts and Congress have
viewed this new-use issue in the wrong light. By focusing on the industries
and technologies prominent at the time the new-use issue first arises,
copyright decision makers have tended to assess the royalty obligations of
the new-use by examining the new technology's effects on existing
uses. Thus in hearings on the 1909 Copyright Act, Congress clung doggedly
to the argument that phonograph records would only enhance the "real"
market, the market for sheet music. 185 Radio broadcasters in the 1920s
argued that radio only enhanced that same market. The Supreme Court in
the 1970s was strongly swayed by the view that cable television was merely
an enhancement to the "real" market, the market for broadcast television.
In none of these cases did the decision maker focus on the more
important question: Will the new-use industry eventually grow to displace
today's technologies for exploiting copyrighted material? For if that
displacement occurs, then authorial incentives will decline unless offset by a
new royalty stream from the new-use technology. Given that no one can
predict the future growth of today's technology, copyright decision makers
should rely instead on an analysis that looks at this question: How bad could
it be if the decision maker guesses wrongly about the growth of a new-use
technology? By using the statistical concept of "Type r' and 'Type IP'
errors, this article concludes that, other things being equal, copyright
decision makers ought to resolve the issue of copyright royalty obligations
arising from uncertainty about the future of a new-use technology by
deciding in favor of royalty obligations.
185. See generally Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1994)).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the invalidation of the heart of the Communications
Decency Act ("CDA") by the United States Supreme Court, in the case of
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,' is there any way in which Congress
can constitutionally limit non-obscene speech on the Internet on the Fround
that such speech is "indecent," pornographic, or "harmful to minors"?
The CDA provisions which were struck down as violative of the First
Amendment essentially made it illegal to use the Internet to knowingly
* Copyright 1999, Marc Rohr. The author wishes to thank his Goodwin research
assistant, Judy Stroud, for her assistance in the production of this article.
1. 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997).
2. Even if Congress can constitutionally do so, it may well be that only Congress can do
so, because any similar regulation enacted by a state might violate the Commerce Clause, as
was held by a federal district court in American Libraries Ass'n. v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160,
169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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transmit an "indecent" communication to a minor, or to display a "patently
offensive" sexual communication "in a manner available to" a minor.
The question that remains is whether Congress can do anything to cure
the defects that led to the invalidation of the CDA. In exploring that
question, the first part of this article will briefly review the relevant pre-Reno
precedents at the Supreme Court level. It will then proceed to an analysis of
the Supreme Court ruling in Reno, as well as a brief consideration of the two
lower court decisions4 that held the CDA invalid prior to the Supreme Court
ruling. Finally, this article will consider, in light of those rulings, the
constitutionality of the recently enacted Child Online Protection Act.
5
II. THE RELEVANT PRE-RENO PRECEDENTS
Beginning in the early 1970s, the Supreme Court developed the general
rules governing the validity of regulations of speech under the First
Amendment. In the absence of a special rule applicable to the kind of
regulation at issue, the Court typically asks whether a regulation of speech is
content based or content neutral, and, if it is content based, the Court
scrutinizes the regulation strictly, requiring the government to employ means
narrowly tailored to accomplish a government interest of compelling
magnitude. 6 The regulation must be necessary to the achievement of the
important goal,7 and it must represent the least restrictive means of doing
3. See infra text accompanying note 69.
4. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Shea
v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 2501 (1997).
5. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1998)).
Freedom of speech issues involving the Internet have also arisen in other contexts, which are
beyond the scope of this article. Those contexts include: state regulations, see ACLU v.
Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D.N.M. 1998); Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Va.
1998); American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); ACLU v.
Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997); university policies, see Loving v. Boren, 133 F.3d
771 (10th Cir. 1998); county library policies, see Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees,
24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998); city web site limitations, see Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of
Cookeville, 23 F. Supp. 2d 822 (M.D. Tenn. 1998); other aspects of the Communications
Decency Act, see Apollomedia Corp. v. Reno, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D. Cal. 1998); federal
obscenity laws, see United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996); and the Federal
Child Pornography Prevention Act, see Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, No. C 97-0281VSC,
1997 WL 487758 (N.D. Cal. 1997). See also S.B. 97, 106th Cong. (1998) and H.R. Res. 368,
106th Cong. (1999), which would require blocking and filtering of Internet access via
computers in public schools and libraries.
6. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
7. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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so.8 While the point is not clearly established, there is also some basis in the
case law for contending that to survive this level of judicial scrutiny, a
regulation must be effective in achieving its goal.9 Because the CDA was
undeniably a content based regulation of speech, "strict scrutiny" was in fact
used by the Court in Reno.10
But some special rules, and some other important general principles,
had been established prior to the emergence of those general rules pertaining
to content based regulations of speech. In 1957, the Court held that
"obscenity," properly defined, was entitled to no constitutional protection, 11
a position to which it has adhered ever since. 12 At about the same time, in a
case called Butler v. Michigan,13 the Court ruled that a state could not
completely prohibit the distribution of literature deemed harmful only to
minors, because it would have the effect of reducing the adult population to
reading only that which was fit for children to read.14 That proposition,
stated at a time prior to the Court's development of the great bulk of the
rules that govern free speech cases today, was put forth as an independent
principle, and was apparently the basis for the result in Butler. In 1968, in
contrast, in a case called Ginsberg v. New York,' 5 the Court upheld a state
statute that prohibited the sale of certain materials-defined as obscene as to
16 17minors-only to minors; thus, the principle of Butler was not violated.
A general principle that appears to be well established, first articulated
in the 1971 decision in Cohen v. California and reaffirmed by laterrulings, 9 is that government may not suppress speech simply because
8. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
9. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994), which borrows oft-
quoted language to that effect from a commercial speech case, Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S.
761, 770-71 (1993). Since commercial speech is said to receive less protection than non-
commercial speech, it follows logically that strict scrutiny must be understood as requiring at
least as persuasive a justification for limiting non-commercial speech as is required in the case
of a regulation of commercial speech. See also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 915-16 (1996),
to the same effect, but applying strict scrutiny in the context of an Equal Protection Clause
challenge.
10. See infra text accompanying note 54.
11. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
12. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
13. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
14. Id. at 383.
15. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
16. Id. at 639.
17. Id. at 643.
18. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
19. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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unwilling viewers or listeners may be offended thereby. The Court has
never explicitly stated that the government interest in shielding unwilling
listeners from offensive speech fails to rise to the level of magnitude
required of a content based regulation of speech. Instead, the Court has
said, in effect, that we are inescapably subject to speech that offends us,
outside the privacy of our homes, and that we are obliged to "[avert] our
eyes" in such situations, at least when doing so is a feasible response to the
offensive stimulus.2' The Court has also recognized the difficulty of
drawing workable lines when one begins to contemplate regulating speech
according to its offensiveness or "outrageousness."
22
But FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, decided in 1978, was a special case,
and the government's victory therein predictably encouraged the government
to engage in further attempts to regulate in the name of protecting children
from "indecent" speech. Pacifica involved the famous George Carlin
monologue, which a radio station broadcast at midday, concerning the
"seven 'dirty words"' 5 that one could not say on radio or television. The
station was consequently sanctioned by the FCC, acting pursuant to a federal
statute which allowed the FCC to prohibit "obscene" or "indecent" speech
26
on radio or television. The Supreme Court, explicitly focusing only on the
FCC's application of the law to this radio station in this instance, upheld the
FCC's action, placing great weight on the facts that (a) radio broadcasts
come into the home; and (b) children are in the audience.27 The majority
strongly implied that the time of day of the broadcast made a difference."
Although the Court appeared to recognize the FCC's action as based on the
content of speech, references to strict judicial scrutiny were nowhere to be
seen. In upholding the FCC's action, moreover, the Court devoted no time
or energy to the constitutionality of the governing statute, which, again,
prohibited "indecent" speech over the public airwaves. "Indecency," it is
important to note, has never been a legal term of art, like obscenity,
embodying an established meaning.
It has become a familiar, if somewhat fuzzy, tenet of First Amendment
law that broadcasting receives less than the usual amount of First
Amendment protection, a maxim that provided some support for the
20. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 25; Hustler, 485 U.S. at 55.
23. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
24. Id. at 738.
25. Id. at 770.
26. Id. at. 731 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976)).
27. Id. at 763-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
29. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co., v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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holding in Pacifica. Partly for that reason, Pacifica has proven to be fairly
easy to distinguish from later cases involving different media of
communication. When government has sought to protect minors from
301
ostensibly harmful communications via mail or telephone,31 for example,
Pacifica has been distinguished-mail, because its impact on small children
was seen as so much smaller,32 and "dial-a-porn" telephone communications,
because they do not come into the home in an unsought and unexpected
manner.
33
The 1989 "dial-a-porn" decision, Sable Communications v. FCC,34 is
significant for another reason as well-namely the Court's use of strict
scrutiny, which by 1989 had become a fairly dependable judicial response to
a content based regulation of speech. Again, a well-established component
of strict scrutiny is the insistence that the government employ the least
restrictive means of regulating the targeted speech. In Sable, the Court
recognized a compelling interest on the part of the government in protecting
children from emotionally harmful communications,35 and appeared willing
to believe that the pornographic telephone conversations in question might
be harmful. But, because there was evidence in the record of alternative
methods of shielding children from these pornographic messages, the Court
was not persuaded that a total ban represented the least restrictive means of
doing so.36 The principle of the Butler case, meanwhile, was again set
forth.
37
With respect to cable television, it appeared for nearly a decade that the
Supreme Court perceived that medium as differing significantly from
38broadcast television, but in a more recent opinion a plurality of the Court
emphasized the similarities of those two media.39 In that case, which
involved federal regulation of "indecency" on cable television, a plurality of
the court declined to employ strict scrutiny, despite the clearly content based
nature of the regulation, because of uncertainty as to the appropriate
30. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
31. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
32. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 74.
33. Sable, 492 U.S. at 128.
34. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
35. Id. at 122. See also Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727, 755 (1996) (plurality opinion); id. at 806 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
36. Sable, 492 U:S. at 128-29.
37. Id. at 126-27.
38. Wikinson v. Jones, 480 U.S. 926 (1987), affg Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989
(10th Cir. 1986), aff'g Community Televison v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah
1985).
39. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727.
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standards to apply to a medium of communication seen as new and unique.4°
The dissenters on this point, constituting a majority of the Justices, would
41have employed strict scrutiny. A demanding level of judicial review was
utilized nonetheless, but the possibility that the Court would depart from its
general analytical framework, by virtue of the special nature of the medium
of communication at issue, had arisen.
III. THE STATUTE
The two statutory provisions at issue, to be codified as sections 223(a)
and (d) of Title 47, came to be known as the "indecent transmission"
provision and the "patently offensive display" provision.43
The "indecent transmission" provision, section 223(a), made it a federal
crime, inter alia, to do the following acts, "knowingly," "in interstate or
foreign communications," "by means of a telecommunications device": to
create and initiate the transmission of any communication "which is obscene
or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18
years of age."44
The "patently offensive" display provision, section 223(d), made it a
federal crime, inter alia, to do either of the following, "knowingly," "in
interstate or foreign communications," by use of an interactive computer
service:
to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age,
or... to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years
of age, "any... communication that, in context, depicts or
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs ....
Significantly, two affirmative defenses were provided by the statute, in
section 223(e)(5), precluding conviction of a defendant who
"(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and
appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent
40. Id. at 741-42.
41. Id. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting in part). See also id. at 832
(Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
42. Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (to be codified at
47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d) (1998)).
43. Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2338 (1997).
44. Id. at 2338 (citing 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (Supp. 1997)).
45. See id. at 2338-39 (citing 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d) (Supp. 1997)).
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access by minors to a [prohibited] communication... which may
involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such
communications, including any method which is feasible under
available technology; [sic] or
"(B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring
use of a verified credit card... or adult personal identification
number."46
IV. THE JUDICIAL REACTION TO THE CDA
A. The Supreme Court Decision in Reno
1. The Majority Opinion
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for a majority of seven Justices,
affirming the decision of a three-judge District Court,47 invalidating these
provisions, excest to the extent that section 223(a) bars "obscene"
communications.
In the first three sections of his opinion, Stevens summarized the
district court's extensive findings of fact pertaining to sexually explicit
material on the Internet and available mechanisms for restricting access
thereto,49 described the statute and the history of its enactment,50 and briefly
described the reasoning of the lower court.
51
a. Key Findings of Fact
Some of the District Court's important findings of fact, restated in Part I
of Justice Stevens' opinion, deserve restatement at this point.
Concerning sexually explicit material on the Internet, Stevens, quoting
in part from the findings below, wrote:
Though such material is widely available, users seldom encounter
such content accidentally.... Almost all sexually explicit images
are preceded by warnings as to the content. For that reason, "odds
46. Id. at 2339 n.26.
47. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 849 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
48. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2350.
49. Id. at 2334-37.
50. Id. at 2337-39.
51. Id. at 2339-41.
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are slim" that a user would enter a sexually explicit site by
accident. Unlike communications received by radio or television,
"the receipt of information on the Internet requires a series of
affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning
a dial. A child requires some sophistication and some ability to
read to retrieve material and thereby to use the Internet
unattended."
52
Concerning age verification, again quoting in part from the findings
below, he wrote this:
The District Court categorically determined that there "is no
effective way to determine the identity or the age of a user who is
accessing material through e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups or
chat rooms." The Government offered no evidence that there was a
reliable way to screen recipients and participants in such fora for
age.
Technology exists by which an operator of a Web site may
condition access on the verification of requested information such
as a credit card number or an adult password. Credit card
verification is only feasible, however, either in connection with a
commercial transaction .... For that reason .... credit card
verification was "effectively unavailable to a substantial number of
Internet content providers." . . . Moreover, the imposition of such a
requirement "would completely bar adults who do not have a credit
card and lack the resources to obtain one from accessing any
blocked material."
... [T]he District Court found that an adult password
requirement would impose significant burdens on noncommercial
sites, both because they would discourage users from accessing
their sites and because the cost of creating and maintaining such
screening systems would be "beyond their reach."
"Even if credit card verification or adult password verification
were implemented, the Government presented no testimony as to
52. Id. at 2336 (quoting ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844-45 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
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how such systems could ensure that the user of the password or
credit card is in fact over 18. The burdens imposed by credit card
verification and adult password verification systems make them




Justice Stevens began his analysis of the constitutionality of the CDA in
Part IV of his opinion. However, instead of beginning by identifying the
statute as content based, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny, he began by
addressing the government's argument "that the CDA is plainly
constitutional under three of our prior decisions,"54 Ginsberg v. New York, 5
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,56 and a clearly inapplicable case, City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.
5 7
Stevens distinguished Ginsberg on several grounds, including: 1)
Ginsberg involved a law that barred sales to minors, but not to adults;58 2)
"the New York statute applied only to commercial transactions[;] ' 59 and 3)
the forbidden material in Ginsberg, unlike the material prohibited under the
CDA, was defined in part by the absence of "serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value."
' 6 °
Pacifica was distinguishable on a variety of grounds as well, including
the observation-foreshadowed by Stevens' summary of the district court's
findings of fact-that, in contrast to the radio broadcast in Pacifica, "the risk
of encountering indecent material [on the Internet] by accident is remote
because a series of affirmative steps is required to access specific
material. 6'
In Part V of his opinion, Stevens considered, in essence, whether the
constitutional analysis in the case should be affected by the nature of the
53. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2336-37 (quoting ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844-47 (E.D. Pa.
1996)).
54. Id. at 2341.
55. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
56. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
57. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). The Court in Playtime Theatres, Inc. divined a theory which
allowed it to treat what appeared to be a content based regulation of speech as if it were
content neutral. Id. at 47-49. By contrast, said Stevens, quite accurately, "the CDA is a
content-based blanket restriction on speech." Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342.
58. Id. at 2341.
59. Id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 647 (1968)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2342.
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communications medium involved.62 The primary point of comparison, of
course, was broadcasting, long deemed to be subject to greater regulation
because of the "scarcity of available frequencies" and the "invasive nature"
of radio and television. 6 3 "Those factors are not present in cyberspace,"6
wrote Stevens, who went on to conclude there was "no basis for qualifying
the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this
medium.,
65
In Part VI of his opinion, Stevens toyed with the arguable vagueness of
the statutory provisions at issue, but stopped short of relying on that
vagueness as a basis, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
66for invalidating the statute. He began by noting the "ambiguities" in the
challenged provisions-namely, the word "indecent" and the phrase
"patently offensive."'67 In the discussion that followed, he actually seemed to
have regarded these words as "vague," yet, again, did not rest his decision on
68that basis. Notably, he devoted little time to the word "indecent," focusing
instead on the phrase "patently offensive," and rejecting the government's
contention that that phrase could not be unconstitutionally vague because it
constitutes one part of the Court's own three-part definition of unprotected
"obscenity. ' '69
But if the vagueness of these terms was not reason, in and of itself, to
strike down the CDA, what was the significance of these observations?
Early in this discussion, referring to the "uncertainty" that the CDA would
create, Stevens stated that "[t]his uncertainty undermines the likelihood that
the CDA has been carefully tailored to the congressional goal of protecting
minors from potentially harmful materials., 70 For this proposition he cited
no precedent, and, indeed, this author can think of no prior decision that
made this kind of connection between the problem of vagueness and the
requirement, under strict scrutiny, that a law be narrowly tailored to
accomplish the legislative goal. At the end of this section of his opinion,
Stevens said:
62. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2344.
66. Id. "Regardless of whether the CDA is so vague that it violates the Fifth
Amendment," he wrote, "the many ambiguities concerning the scope of its coverage render it
problematic for purposes of the First Amendment." Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2344-48.
69. Id. at 2345 (discussing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
70. Id. at 2344.
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Given the vague contours of the coverage of the statute, it
unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be
entitled to constitutional protection. That danger provides further
reason for insisting that the statute not be overly broad. The
CDA's burden on protected speech cannot be justified if it could be
avoided by a more carefully drafted statute.
71
But one would have expected the Court to have endorsed the latter
proposition in any event, and to have "insist[ed] that the statute not be overly
broad" regardless of any problems of vagueness.72 Arguably, then, this
discussion of vagueness contributed nothing to the Court's resolution of the
case. But it suggests that the terminology at issue, if used in future
legislation, might be deemed intolerably vague, even if Congress somehow
found a way to overcome the defects that did lead the Court to invalidate the
CDA.
Part VII of Justice Stevens' opinion contained the heart of his strict
scrutiny analysis, and it is to this part of his opinion that one must look to
determine, as best one can, precisely what was wrong, constitutionally, with
the CDA.
"[W]e have repeatedly recognized," he wrote, "the governmental
interest in protecting children from harmful materials." 73 That apparently
meant that the government's goal was of sufficient importance to satisfy
strict scrutiny; Stevens didn't say that explicitly, but the Court had
previously so stated.74
The problem, then, in general terms, was that the statute was not
sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny. But why not? Here
are the key passages from this part of Stevens' opinion:
In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the
CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults
have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another.
That burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive
71. Id. at 2346.
72. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346.
73. Id.
74. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). See also text
accompanying notes 8, 35. Precisely what harm would likely befall children as a result of
exposure to non-obscene sexually explicit materials has never been identified by the Supreme
Court. But see the discussion of this point in the Report of the House Committee on
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alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the
legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.75
The government interest in protecting children, he continued, "does not
justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults. As
we have explained, the Government may not '[reduce] the adult
population.., to ... only what is fit for children.'
' 76
The last sentence quoted represents, of course, the principle of the
Butler case. But the preceding sentences appear, in and of themselves, to
treat the Butler principle as something other than absolute; the burden on
adult speech, it is said, is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would
do the job as well. Because, under strict scrutiny, any burden on speech is
unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would do the job as well, the
reference to the Butler principle arguably becomes superfluous.
At this point Stevens detoured slightly from his statement of governing
principles, taking time to explain why communication between adults was
burdened by the CDA:
Given the size of the potential audience for most messages, in the
absence of a viable age verification process, the sender must be
charged with knowing that one or more minors will likely view it.
Knowledge that, for instance, one or more members of a 100-
person chat group will be minor-and therefore that it would be a
crime to send the group an indecent message-would surely burden
communication among adults.
77
As noted previously, the district court had found that existing technology did
not include any effective method for a sender to prevent minors from
obtaining access to its Internet communications without also denying access
to adults, and that the use of age verification devices would prove quite
burdensome for many speakers.78 Thus, the CDA would significantly burden
adult communication on the Internet.
79
Stevens continued, in characteristically unstructured fashion:
75. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346.
76. Id. (quoting Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989)).
77. Id. at 2347.
78. Id. at 2336-37.
79. At that point, Stevens added this: "By contrast, the District Court found
that... currently available user-based software suggests that a reasonably effective method
by which parents can prevent their children accessing sexually explicit ... material... will
soon be widely available." Id. at 2347 (quoting ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa.
1996)). The legal relevance of that observation is far from clear.
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The breadth of the CDA's coverage is wholly
unprecedented.... [T]he scope of the CDA is not limited to
commercial speech or commercial entities. . . .The general,
undefined terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" cover large
amounts of nonpornographic material with serious educational or
other value. Moreover, the "community standards"
criterion... means that any communication available to a nation-
wide audience will be judged by the standards of the community
most likely to be offended by the message.80
The regulated subject matter, he went on to say, might "extend to
discussions about prison rape or safe sexual practices, artistic images that
include nude subjects, and arguably the card catalogue of the Carnegie
Library. 8s
Stevens then invoked the government's argument that, in effect, the
First Amendment surely does not protect the communication of all
"indecent" or "patently offensive" messages to minors, regardless of whether
the message contains "value."8 2 The Court "need neither accept nor reject"
that argument, said Stevens.8 3 "It is at least clear," he continued, "that the
strength of the Government's interest in protecting minors is not equally
strong throughout the coverage of this broad statute."' 4 He hypothesized
further at this point: "[A] parent who sent his 17-year-old college freshman
information on birth control via e-mail could be incarcerated even though
neither he, his child, nor anyone in their home community, found the
material 'indecent' or 'patently offensive', if the college town's community
thought otherwise.
85
Was the problem, then, that Congress had gone too far by shielding
minors even from sex-related communication that contained serious artistic
or educational value? Was the law overinclusive, to that extent, because
such material does not give rise to the harms that Congress has a compelling
interest in preventing? If that is what Justice Stevens was thinking, he did
not say it.
Was there a particular constitutional infirmity stemming from the fact
that "indecency" might be determined through the prism of the "community
standards" of a distant, or nationwide, "community?" Stevens didn't say
80. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2347.
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that, either, nor has case law in the obscenity context suggested that such an
approach raises constitutional problems.
8 6
Instead of expressly basing the Court's ruling on any or all of those
concerns, Stevens concluded this key section of his opinion with the
following paragraph:
The breadth of this content based restriction of speech imposes an
especially heavy burden on the Government to explain why a less
restrictive provision would not be as effective as the CDA. It has
not done so. The arguments in this Court have referred to possible
alternatives such as requiring that indecent material be "tagged" in
a way that facilitates parental control of material coming into their
homes, making exceptions for messages with artistic or educational
value, providing some tolerance for parental choice, and regulating
some portions of the Internet-such as commercial web sites-
differently than others, such as chat rooms.
Was Stevens saying here that less restrictive alternatives existed? Or
merely that "possible alternatives" existed, which is to say that the existence
of such alternatives was possible, but not certain? If the latter, was the
constitutional infirmity a procedural problem of sorts-namely, that the
government had simply not satisfied its burden of proving that no less
restrictive alternatives existed? If so, was that a fair conclusion? Did any
such less restrictive alternatives exist? Did Stevens identify any, in the
language just quoted? Bearing in mind that a less restrictive alternative must
be employed when it will accomplish the government's goal at least as well
as the challenged regulation, can that be said of the "tagging" alternative to
- 9~~88,, •• ,
which Stevens referred? Of the other "possible alternatives" he cited, how
could it be said that: (a) "making exceptions for messages with artistic or
educational value; ' 89 or (b) regulating only "commercial" web sites,9° would
fully achieve the government's goal?
The final sentence of this apparently dispositive paragraph was this:
"Particularly in the light of the absence of any detailed findings by the
Congress, or even hearings addressing the special problems of the CDA, we
are persuaded that the CDA is not narrowly tailored if that requirement has
any meaning at all."9' A failure by Congress to utilize less restrictive
86. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
87. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2348.
88. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957); infra comments in note 129 and
accompanying text.
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available alternatives would lead to the conclusion that the statute was not
sufficiently narrowly tailored, which in turn would render the statute
unconstitutional. But why the sudden and unexpected reference to the
absence of Congressional findings or hearings? 92 Is Congress obliged to
make findings, or to hold hearings, when it legislates in a manner that affects
freedom of expression, or was the apparently hasty and spontaneous nature
of the enactment of this statute simply an aggravating factor in the minds of
the Justices? 93
In Part IX of his opinion, Justice Stevens responded to, and rejected, the
government's argument that the statute was constitutional by virtue of the
affirmative defenses provided therein:
First, relying on the "good faith, reasonable, effective and
appropriate actions" provision, the Government suggests that
"tagging" provides a defense that saves the constitutionality of the
Act. The suggestion assumes that transmitters may encode their
indecent communications in a way that would indicate their
contents, thus permitting recipients to block their reception with
appropriate software. It is the requirement that the good faith
action must be "effective" that makes this defense illusory. The
Government recognizes that its proposed screening software does
not currently exist. Even if it did, there is no way to know whether
a potential recipient will actually block the encoded material.
Without the impossible knowledge that every guardian in America
is screening for the "tag," the transmitter could not reasonably rely
on its action to be "effective." 94
As to the other affirmative defense, applicable when a transmitter
restricts access by requiring the use of a verified credit card or adult
identification, Stevens returned to the finding of the district court that "it is
not economically feasible for most noncommercial speakers to employ such
verification" techniques; "[a]ccordingly, this defense would not significantly
narrow the statute's burden on noncommercial speech."95 Additionally, the
government "failed to adduce any evidence that these verification techniques
92. Earlier in his opinion, Justice Stevens briefly described the process by which the
CDA had been enacted, observing that "[n]o hearings were held on the provisions that became
law." Id. at 2338 n.24.
93. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995), in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, commented on the absence of congressional findings, in
the course of striking down a federal statute on the ground that the subject of the regulation
did not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id.
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actually preclude minors from posing as adults. 96 Thus, an "unacceptably
heavy burden" on adult speech remained, and "the defenses do not constitute
the sort of "narrowly tailoring" that will save an otherwise patently invalid
unconstitutional provision." 97 But did not Justice Stevens' pronouncements
concerning the inefficacy of these defenses tend to discredit his earlier
suggestion that Congress had not employed the least restrictive means of
achieving its goals?
2. The Concurring Opinion
The only other opinion written by any of the Justices in this case was
that written by Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, partly
98dissenting and partly concurring in the judgment. O'Connor began by
stating that she viewed the CDA "as little more than an attempt by Congress
to create 'adult zones' on the Internet." 99 She then proceeded to set down
the following governing principles (which apparently exist, for her, outside
of any structured strict-scrutiny analysis):
The Court has previously sustained such zoning laws, but only if
they respect the First Amendment rights of adults and minors. That
is to say, a zoning law is valid if (i) it does not unduly restrict adult
access to the material; and (ii) minors have no First Amendment
right to read or view the banned material.
1°°
For this proposition she relied on the holdings in Butler v. Michigan,
101
Sable Communications v. FCC,10 2 and Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
Corp, 1 3 and distinguished Ginsberg v. New York,1°4 which upheld a statutethat in no way curtailed adult access to sexually explicit material.10 5
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2350.
98. Id. at 2351 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). O'Connor's
partial dissent was based on her view that the "indecen[t] transmission" provision and the
"specific person" provision were constitutional, to the extent that they applied to Internet
communications "where the party initiating the communication knows that all of the recipients
are minors." Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2356 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
99. Id. at 2351.
100. Id. at 2352-53.
101. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
102. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
103. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
104. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
105. Id. at 673-75.
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O'Connor then ruminated a bit on the nature of "zoning" in
cyberspace-via "gateway technology," (e.g., screening software)-and
ultimately concluded: "Gateway technology is not ubiquitous in cyberspace,
and because without it 'there is no means of age verification,' cyberspace
still remains largely unzoned-and unzoneable." °6 "Although the prospects
for the eventual zoning of the Internet appear promising," she continued,
"we must evaluate the constitutionality of the CDA as it applies to the
Internet as it exists today."'0 7 Given present conditions, she concluded, the
"display" provision was unconstitutional, because its prohibition would
"[impinge] on the First Amendment right of adults to make and obtain this
speech and, for all intents and purposes, '[reduce] the adult population [on
the Internet] to reading only what is fit for children.' 10s... As a result, the
'display' provision cannot withstand scrutiny."'1 9 For her, then, it appears
that the Butler principle controlled, independently of any other mode of First
Amendment analysis.
Returning to her two-part inquiry, stated above, O'Connor then
considered "[w]hether the CDA substantially interferes with the First
Amendment rights of minors."1 0 Her response was that it did not, but that
was because of the established rule that, for a statute to be stricken as
facially overbroad under the First Amendment, it had to be substantially
overbroad."' She did not deem the CDA to be substantially overbroad, but
did seem to think that it did violate the First Amendment rights of minors in
some of its applications." 2 In this analysis she was guided by the case of
Ginsberg v. New York," 3  which "established that minors may
constitutionally be denied access to material that is obscene as to minors."' 4
She explained:
Because the CDA denies minors the right to obtain material that is
"patently offensive"-even if it has some redeeming value for
minors and even if it does not appeal to their prurient interests-
Congress' rejection of the Ginsberg "harmful to minors" standard
106. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2354 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(quoting ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 846 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
107. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
110. Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
111. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2356 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
112. Id.
113. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
114. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2356 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Rohr
171
: Nova Law Review 23, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 1999
Nova Law Review
means that the CDA could ban some speech that is 'indecent' (i.e.,
"patently offensive") but that is not obscene as to minors."' 15
But, again, the CDA was not, in her view, substantially overbroad in
this regard: "In my view, the universe of speech constitutionally protected
as to minors but banned by the CDA-i.e., the universe of material that is
'patently offensive,' but which nonetheless has some redeeming value for
minors or does not appeal to their prurient interest-is a very small one."'
1 6
While this discussion did not affect the way in which these two Justices
would have disposed of this case, it did reveal their belief that even minors
have a First Amendment right to offensive, sexually explicit material when
that material "has some redeeming value for minors. If other Justices
were to join them in taking this position (as seems likely, considering that
O'Connor was joined in this opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist), it would
serve as an additional limitation on the ability of Congress to regulate speech
deemed harmful to minors.
B. The Lower Court Decisions
1. ACLU v. Reno
While it is the Supreme Court decision that counts, the opinions written
by each of the judges of the special three-judge court that initially decided
the case of ACLU v. Reno,18 may nonetheless shed additional light on the
possible judicial response to any future variations of the CDA that may
emerge from Congress. Those opinions foreshadowed Justice Stevens'
reasoning to a considerable extent, but contained some additional analytical
reactions to the CDA that were not addressed, and certainly not discredited,
by the Supreme Court decision. Thus, even if Congress could cure every
defect identified by Justice Stevens, a new statutory regulation of Internet
speech might yet run afoul of a principle put forth in one of these three
115. Id.
116. Id. Justice O'Connor clarified the role of "value" in this context, as follows:
minors do not enjoy a right to all material having "value," rather, "under Ginsberg, minors
only have a First Amendment right to obtain patently offensive material that has 'redeeming
social importance for minors."' Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633
(1968)).
117. Id.
118. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Following an introduction, findings of fact,
and a brief statement of conclusions of law, each of the three judges wrote an opinion
representing only his own views. Id. at 824.
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opinions. Those additional bases for striking down the CDA should thus be
explored.
Chief Judge Sloviter took a bit of time questioning whether the
government had a compelling interest "in regulating the vast range of online
material covered or potentially covered by the CDA!' 19-in other words,
whether the government truly had a compellinkmnterest with respect to the full
range of the CDA's potential applications. This approach appears to
confuse the question of whether the government's goal is one of compelling
importance with the separate question of whether the statute is narrowly
tailored to accomplish that goal. Still, a distinguished federal judge made this
argument, although he disclaimed reliance upon it in striking down the
statute.
121
In addition, Judge Sloviter made observations that, in effect, give
substance to an argument, though not explicitly offered as such, that the
CDA was not necessary to achieve the government's purposes:
Minors would not be left without any protection from exposure to
patently unsuitable material on the Internet should the challenged
provisions of the CDA be preliminarily enjoined. Vigorous
enforcement of current obscenity and child pornography laws
should suffice to address the problem the government identified in
court and which concerned Congress. When the CDA was under
consideration by Congress, the Justice Department itself
communicated its view that it was not necessary because it was
prosecuting online obscenity, child pornography and child
solicitation under existing laws, and would continue to do so.12
119. Id. at 853 (Sloviter, C.J.).
120. Chief Judge Sloviter concluded, for example, that "where non-pornographic, albeit
sexually explicit, material also falls within the sweep of the statute, the interest will not be as
compelling." Id. at 852 (Sloviter, C.J.).
121. This point found fleeting expression in Justice Stevens' opinion as well, when he
remarked that "the strength of the Government's interest in protecting minors is not equally
strong throughout the coverage of this broad statute." Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2348.
122. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 856-57 (Sloviter, C.J.). The existence and applicability of
federal obscenity and child pornography laws were noted by Justice Stevens only in a
footnote, accompanied by the observation that "when Congress was considering the CDA, the
Government expressed its view that the law was unnecessary because existing laws already
authorized its ongoing efforts to prosecute obscenity, child pornography, and child
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Judge Buckwalter, writing separately, concluded that the words
"indecent" and "patently offensive" were unconstitutionally vague.123 With
respect to the word "indecent," he did not regard the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Pacifica as having precluded such an argument.124 He
was troubled, as well, by the ambiguity attendant upon the statutory
reference to "community standards." 125
Judge Dalzell, the third member of the court, concluded his lengthy
opinion with this observation, bearing upon the inevitable ineffectuality of
the congressional act: "Moreover, the CDA will almost certainly fail to
accomplish the Government's interest in shielding children from
pornography on the Internet. Nearly half of Internet communications
originate outside the United States, and some percentage of that figure
represents pornography.
126
2. Shea v. Reno
In Shea v. Reno,127 the other 1996 decision of a three-judge court
striking down the CDA, the court, whose holding was based on reasoning
that anticipated that of Justice Stevens to a great extent, made a comment
similar to that made by Judge Dalzell regarding the likely ineffectiveness of
the statute:
It is ... unnecessary, given our holding .... to decide whether the
potential ineffectiveness of the CDA in eradicating the problem of
minors' having access to sexually explicit material on the Internet
renders the statute constitutionally defective. Because the CDA
only regulates content providers within the United States, while
perhaps as much as thirty percent of the sexually explicit material
on the Internet originates abroad . . ., the CDA will not reach a
significant percentage of the sexually explicit material currently
available.... [T]he apparent ineffectiveness of the CDA
underscores our holding today that the Government has failed to
123. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 858. Judge Sloviter indicated that he agreed with Judge
Buckwalter on this point. Id. at 856 (Sloviter, C.J.).
124. Id. at 862. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2342. Judge Dalzell, in his supporting
opinion, disagreed with Judge Buckwalter on this point. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 868-69
(Dalzell, J.).
125. Id. at 863 (Buckwalter, J.).
126. Id. at 882 (Dalzell, J.). This, too, was a point acknowledged by Justice Stevens
only in a footnote, as follows: "Because so much sexually explicit content originates overseas,
[appellees] argue, the CDA cannot be 'effective.' . . . We find it unnecessary to address those
issues to dispose of this case." Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2347-48 n.45.
127. 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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demonstrate that the CDA does not "unnecessarily interfer[e] with
First Amendment freedoms." 12s
This court made a link, it seems, between the ineffectiveness of the
statute and the requirement that a content based regulation be "necessary" to
the accomplishment of a compelling state interest. If an argument of this
kind is taken seriously, it may well follow that no regulation of Internet
speech can withstand First Amendment scrutiny.
V. WHAT DOES THE CDA LITIGATION SUGGEST, WITH REGARD TO THE
VALIDITY OF FUTURE LEGISLATION?
The United States Supreme Court decision in Reno makes clear that the
Courts' formal response to content based regulation of speech on the Internet
will be strict judicial scrutiny. Again, that means that the government's goal
must be a very important one-apparently not a problem when government
seeks to protect children from emotional and psychological harm-and that
any such regulation must be necessary to the achievement of that goal, and
narrowly tailored to do so, regulating no more, and no less, than is required
to accomplish the purpose. In addition, the law must represent the least
speech-restrictive means of achieving the government's goal.
Can any regulation of speech on the Internet pass that test?
While the Stevens opinion in Reno purported to find the CDA
inadequately tailored to the achievement of its goal, and, more specifically,
to have failed to satisfy the "least restrictive means" requirement of strict
scrutiny, his opinion is quite unclear as to why those conclusions were
reached. Indeed, as noted earlier, there appear to be no less restrictive ways
in which Congress might just as effectively achieve the goal of shielding
minors from sexually explicit online communications. The Court's unper-
suasive use of strict scrutiny makes it harder to evaluate the validity of
prospective future legislative initiatives of this kind-but the fact that the
United States Supreme Court said what it did will tend to lead lower courts,
in future cases, to effectively presume that a regulation of this kind fails
strict scrutiny, and perhaps to engage in similarly conclusory analyses.
Arguments flowing from the requirements of strict scrutiny that might
provide more satisfying bases for striking down such a regulation, however,
include the following: 1) such a regulation is unnecessary, because existing
federal statutes already prohibit those communications, online or elsewhere,
that pose the greatest risks to the emotional and psychological well-being of
minors; 2) such a regulation is inescapably and fatally underinclusive (and
thus not narrowly tailored to achieve its goal), because sexually explicit
128. Id. at 941.
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communications emanating from foreign sources effectively cannot and will
not be banned by American legislation; and 3) for the same reason, such a
regulation cannot be effective in achieving its goal.
But the real meaning of the Reno decision may have nothing to do with
the well-established "strict scrutiny" analysis. Instead, the decision may
simply (although not unambiguously) make clear, forty years after the
United States Supreme Court originally set forth this principle in Butler v.
Michigan," 9 that government really may not, consistently with the First
Amendment, shield minors from speech deemed harmful to them, but which
is protected speech with respect to adults, by means of a regulatory
scheme-even one limited to a specific medium of communication-that
effectively deprives adults of access to that speech via that medium. If that
is what Reno stands for, then no CDA-type regulation, taking the form of a
blanket prohibition of speech deemed harmful to minors, will stand.
If that is indeed the key to Reno, then none of the more detailed
grievances lurking in Stevens' opinion-including, most notably, the fact
that the speech banned by the CDA was not defined by the absence of
"value" 1(serious or otherwise)-should have any legal significance. Non-
obscene material lacking "value" would, after all, still be protected speech
with respect to adults. Likewise, the arguable vagueness of statutory terms
such as "indecency" probably drops out of the analysis, in effect, because the
Butler principle invalidates even a blanket prohibition that could survive a
vagueness challenge.
But what is to be made of Stevens' observation that the CDA was not
limited, in its application, to "commercial" websites?131 Is there any good
reason to believe that a CDA-like statute limited to commercial websites
would be constitutional? That would narrow the reach of the regulation, and
commensurately reduce-but not eliminate-the burden placed upon
protected speech.
The Butler principle would not, however, prevent Congress from
imposing upon online communicators an affirmative obligation to take
specified steps designed to minimize the likelihood that minors would come
into contact with sexually explicit communications. And that is what
Congress has done, in the wake of the failure of the CDA.
129. 352 U.S. 380 (1957). The Court reiterated the Butler principle in other decisions,
most notably in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126-27
(1989), and in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983), during the 1980s,
but none of those decisions depended on that principle.
130. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341, 2344 n.37, 2349.
131. Id. at 2347.
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VI. THE CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACr
Congress enacted the Child Online Protection Act132 ("COPA") on
October 21, 1998. In assessing the constitutionality of the Act, it is useful to
first consider two prior versions of the bill that ultimately became law.
When initially introduced in the House of Representatives on April 30,
1998, the Child Online Protection Act contained the following core
provision: "Whoever in interstate or foreign commerce is engaged in the
business of selling or transferring, by means of the World Wide Web,
material that is harmful to minors shall restrict access to such material by
persons under 17 years of age. ' 33
Criminal penalties were provided in the event of violations. The bill
went on to provide that one would not be liable if one restricted access to
said material "by requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult
access code, or adult personal identification number[, or in accordance with
such other procedures as the [FCC] may prescribe)."' 3 The phrase "harmful
to minors" was defined in a manner quite comparable to the definition, in the
New York statute upheld by the Supreme Court in Ginsberg v. New York, 135
of material which was deemed obscene as to minors, and which could not
legally be sold to minors. 36
Would this bill, if enacted, have survived strict constitutional scrutiny?
Unless the Supreme Court repudiates the definition that even Justice
Brennan found to be acceptable thirty years ago in Ginsberg, there appears
to be no problem with respect to the scope of the targeted communications.
Moreover, the concerns (of uncertain magnitude) expressed in Reno with
regard to: (a) the CDA's inclusion of material with "value,"'137 and (b) the
CDA's applicability to non-commercial sources of communications,"' are
here eliminated. Furthermore, the wording of this bill imposed an
affirmative obligation on those sources-to "restrict access"-rather than a
prohibition of the targeted communications.139 Culpability would thus not
have been imposed on communicators who are helpless to avoid making
online communications accessible to minors, other than by censoring their
communications to adults-the apparent primary vice of the CDA. Rather,
one would be culpable only for failing to utilize existing screening devices.
If one did utilize such devices, guilt would not be imposed simply because
132. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1998)).
133. H.R. 3783, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998).
134. Id.
135. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
136. Id.
137. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341,2344 n.37, 2349.
138. Id. at 2347.
139. Id. at 2339.
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some minors gained access to the targeted communications. Thus, Reno's
concern with the illusoriness of the CDA's affirmative defenses would
apparently play no role in an evaluation of this bill. While this bill might
still have been found to be unconstitutional, these points of distinction from
the CDA would have bolstered its chances of surviving a First Amendment
challenge.
However, by the time this bill emerged from the House Committee on
Commerce in early October, its core provision had been significantly
modified to read as follows:
(a) Requirement to Restrict Access.-
(1) Prohibited conduct.-Whoever, in interstate or foreign
commerce, by means of the World Wide Web, knowingly makes
any communication for commercial purposes that includes any
material that is harmful to minors, without restricting access to such
materials by minors pursuant to subsection (c), shall be fined ...
imprisoned.... or both.
140
Subsection (c) provided an affirmative defense, comparable to that in the
original bill, that would preclude liability on the part of a defendant who
took appropriate steps to restrict access by minors to "harmful" material.
41
The core provision of the bill had thus been transformed from a requirement
that access be restricted to a ban on certain communications, unless access
were restricted. The language of this provision evolved further during the
month of October. The key language of the statute, as it was enacted, is as
follows:
SEC. 231. RESTRICTION OF ACCESS BY MINORS TO
MATERIALS COMMERCIALLY DISTRIBUTED BY MEANS
OF WORLD WIDE WEB THAT ARE HARMFUL TO MINORS.
"(a) REQUIREMENT TO RESTRICT ACCESS.-
"(1) PROHIBITED CONDUCT.-Whoever knowingly and
with knowledge of the character of the material, in interstate or
foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web, makes any
communication for commercial purposes that is available to any
minor and that includes any material that is harmful to minors shall
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be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than 6
months, or both.1 42
"(c) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.-
"(1) DEFENSE.-It is an affirmative defense to
prosecution under this section that the defendant, in good faith, has
restricted access by minors to material that is harmful to minors-
(A) by requiring use of a credit card, debit account,
adult access code, or adult personal identification number;
(B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age;
or
(C) by any other reasonable measures that are feasible
under available technology.
143
(e) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this subsection, the
following definitions shall apply:
"(6) MATERIAL THAT IS HARMFUL TO MINORS.-
The term "material that is harmful to minors" means any
communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article,
recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene or
that-
"(A) the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, would find, taking the material as a whole
and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed
to pander to, the prurient interest;
"(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner
patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated
sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or
perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-
pubescent female breast; and
"(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value for minors.
"(7) MINOR.-The term 'minor' means any person under
17 years of age.
144
142. COPA, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §
231(a)(1) (1998)).
143. Id. (to be codified at47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)).
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The statute also created a Commission on Online Child Protection, "for
the purpose of conducting a study... regarding methods to help reduce
access by minors to material that is harmful to minors on the Internet."
145
As enacted, then, the COPA is no longer susceptible to being read as
merely requiring that Internet content providers take certain prescribed steps
to restrict access by minors to "harmful" material. Rather, like the CDA, it
prohibits certain speech on the Internet, but provides that the use of
prescribed methods of restricting access shall constitute an affirmative
defense to liability. Thus, the resemblance between the COPA and the CDA
is greater than we had been led to anticipate.
Still, there are significant differences between the CDA and the COPA.
As has already been noted, those differences include: 1) a redefinition of
the targeted communications that is probably constitutionally acceptable;
and 2) a limitation of the scope of the targeted communications to those
communicated: a) "by means of the World Wide Web; and b) "for
commercial purposes." 147 Moreover, a "minor" is now defined as a person
under seventeen years of age,148 a year younger than a minor protected by the
CDA.149 In addition, and very significantly, there is no requirement in the
COPA, as there was in the CDA, that a method of restricting access by
minors must, in order to serve as an affirmative defense, be "effective."
Recall that, in Reno, Justice Stevens stated that "[i]t is the requirement that
the good faith action must be 'effective' that makes this defense illusory."'150
Presumably, the elimination of that flaw greatly enhances the prospect that
the COPA will survive a First Amendment challenge. Note also that, for
whatever it may be worth, Congress did a better job "procedurally," this time
around, than it had in laying a satisfactory predicate for the ill-fated
CDA. Both houses of Congress, during 1998, held hearings pertaining to the
subject of this legislation, and, in its Report, the House Committee on
144. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 232(e)(6)-(7) (1998)). Also defined in section
(e), most notably, are the phrases "by means of the World Wide Web" and "commercial
purposes." Id.
145. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (to be codified at __ U.S.C. __ (1998)).
146. This limitation is given emphasis in the House Report, which observed that the
statute "does not apply to content distributed through other aspects of the Internet such as one-
to-one messaging (e-mail), one-to-many messaging (list-serv), distributed message databases
(USENET newsgroups); real time communications (Internet relay chat); real time remote
utilization (telnet) or remote information retrieval other than the World Wide Web (ftp and
gopher)." H. R. REP. No. 105-775 (1998), 1998 WL 691067 at *30.
147. Id.
148. Id. at *31.
149. See supra text accompanying note 3.
150. Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2349 (1997).
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Commerce set forth pertinent findings of fact with respect to both the need
for regulation and the absence of sufficient regulatory alternatives.
1 51
The COPA, then, is a more limited interference with freedom of speech
than was the CDA. But is it nonetheless likely to fall to a First Amendment
challenge? The answer may hinge on the extent to which even a prohibition
that is limited to those web sites operated "for commercial purposes" is seen
as placing too great a burden on freedom of speech.1 52 The Supreme Court
in Reno made much of the burdens placed by the CDA on those
communicators who could not easily utilize available age verification
devices. 3 In that part of his opinion in which he reviewed the district
court's findings of fact, Justice Stevens observed that credit card verification
was only feasible in connection with commercial transactions; by contrast,
using that approach "would impose costs on non-commercial Web sites that
would require many of them to shut down."'154 "Moreover," he went on to
say, "the imposition of such a requirement 'would completely bar adults who
do not have a credit card and lack the resources to obtain one from accessing
any blocked material."" 5 Later, in the core part of his analysis of the CDA,
Stevens noted that the district court had "found that it would be prohibitively
expensive for noncommercial-as well as some commercial-speakers who
have Web sites to verify that their users are adults.... These limitations
must inevitably curtail a significant amount of adult communication on the
Internet."' 56
Narrowing the reach of the statute to "commercial" providers thus goes
far toward reducing the extent to which online adult communications are
burdened, or suppressed, by a requirement that age verification devices be
employed. But Stevens' statement that "it would be prohibitively expensive
for... [even] some commercial.., speakers who have Web sites to verify
151. H. R. REP. No. 105-775 (1998), 1998 WL 691067 at *3-4. Note also that, in the
Congressional Findings that appear at the outset of the COPA itself, it is asserted that "(4) a
prohibition on the distribution of material harmful to minors, combined with legitimate
defenses, is currently the most effective and least restrictive means by which to satisfy the
compelling government interest .... " Id. at *4.
152. "The decision in ACLU suggests that the constitutionality of an Internet-based
'harmful-to-minors' statute likely would depend, principally, on how difficult and expensive it
would be for persons to comply with the statute without sacrificing their ability to convey
protected expression to adults and to minors." L. Anthony Sutin, Department of Justice Letter
on CDA II <http://www.aclu.org/court/acluvrenolldoj.letter.html>. (L. Anthony Sutin, as
Acting Assistant Attorney General, authored this letter dated October 5, 1998, to
Congressman Thomas Bliley, the Chairman of the Committee on Commerce, wherein he
outlined the Department's views on the COPA.).
153. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2337.
154. Id.
155. Id. (citing ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 846 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
156. Id. at 2347 (citing ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845-48 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
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that their users are adults,' ' 57 if still factually accurate, suggests that even
this drastic narrowing of the field of regulatory targets may not suffice to
save the statute. The clear argument to be made by a challenger is that a
requirement that "prohibitively expensive" devices be employed amounts to
a prohibition of protected communications between adults, with respect to
those speakers for whom the devices are "prohibitively expensive." That
would seem to bring the Butler principle back into play.
A legal challenge to the COPA has, in fact, already been launched. The
ACLU, along with several other organizations, has filed a lawsuit seekingto
have the COPA declared unconstitutional and to enjoin its enforcement.
In its complaint, the ACLU attempts to demonstrate the breadth of the
coverage of the COPA, notwithstanding its limitation to web sites operated
"for commercial purposes:"
The Act purports to restrict only content provided on the Web "for
commercial purposes," but in fact it explicitly bans a wide range of
protected expression that is provided for free on the Internet by
individuals and organizations.... [T]he Act targets all other
communications made publicly accessible on the Web "for
commercial purposes," defined very broadly as being "engaged in
the business of making such communications."... The Act's
definition of a person "engaged in the business" explicitly states
that "it is not necessary that the person make a profit" nor that the
making of the communications be the person's "principal
business.". . . Just like many traditional print newspapers,
bookstores, and magazine publishers, many Web publishers make a
profit (or attempt to make a profit) through advertising.... Thus,
the Act impacts a wide range of providers of free content, from fine
art to popular magazines to news and issue-oriented expression. 159
The ACLU goes on, in its complaint, to contend that, for many of these
targeted online content providers, the methods of restricting access that give
rise to an affirmative defense under the COPA are, in fact, "technologically
and economically infeasible."
'160
157. Id. at 2347.
158. ACLU in Court: ACLU v. Reno Complaint <http://www.aclu.org/court/
acluvrenolI_complaint.html>. [hereinafter ACLU Complaint]. In November 1998, a federal
district judge issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining enforcement of the statute.
ACLU v. Reno, No. CIV.A.98-5591, 1998 WL 813423 at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 1998). This
was followed by the entry of a preliminary injunction on February 1, 1999. ACLU v. Reno,
No. CIV.A.98-5591, 1999 WL 44852 at *27 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 1999).
159. See ACLU Complaint, supra note 158, 65.
160. See ACLU Complaint, supra note 158, H 67-69.
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The resolution of the constitutional question may, then, ultimately
depend on further empirical developments of a technological and economic
nature: are these means of restricting access to web sites technologically or
economically infeasible, "prohibitively expensive," or otherwise intolerably
burdensome? If they are feasible, and not prohibitively expensive, then the
COPA may be constitutional.
In issuing a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the
COPA (and denying the government's motion to dismiss the complaint),
Judge Reed made extensive findings of fact concerning the costs of
compliance with the new statute, 161 leading him to conclude that "the
plaintiffs have established a substantial likelihood that they will be able to
show that COPA imposes a burden on speech that is protected for adults."
162
Even if a significant amount of adult speech is burdened by the COPA,
does the Butler principle admit of any flexibility? Might the concededly
strong government interest, and the limited nature of the regulation, at some
point outweigh the fact that some online communications that are
constitutionally protected as to adults will not be permitted to be made? Of
course, if a court finds that the government could have achieved its goals
through less restrictive means, then the COPA will be struck down, just as
was the CDA. In his memorandum of February 1, 1999, Judge Reed
suggested that the case might be decided on that basis:
On the record to date, it is not apparent to this Court that the
defendant can meet its burden to prove that COPA is the least
restrictive means available to achieve the goal of restricting the
access of minors to this material.... The record before the Court
reveals that blocking or filtering technology may be at least as
successful as COPA would be in restricting minors' access to
harmful material online without imposing the burden on
constitutionally protected speech that COPA imposes on adult
users or Web site operators. Such a factual conclusion is at least
some evidence that COPA does not employ the least restrictive
means.163
The arguable defect in this reasoning is that, as Justice Stevens observed in
the process of invalidating the CDA, there is no assurance that parents will
actually employ such blocking or filtering devices.1
64
161. See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 488-92 (E.D. Pa.' 1999) for findings of
fact 41-64.
162. ACLU, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 495.
163. Id. at 497.
164. See supra text accompanying note 94.
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More persuasively, however, Judge Reed went on to call attention to
"other aspects of COPA which Congress could have made less restrictive[:]"
Notably, the sweeping category of forms of content that are
prohibited--"any communication, picture, image, graphic image
file, article, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind"-could
have been less restrictive of speech on the Web and more narrowly
tailored to Congress' goal of shielding minors from pornographic
teasers if the prohibited forms of content had included, for
instance, only pictures, images, or graphic image files, which are
typically employed by adult entertainment Web sites as
"teasers."165
Finally, if all other bases for a First Amendment challenge fail, would a
court invalidate this law simply because it cannot effectively rid the Internet
of all such "harmful" communications, particularly those that emanate from
abroad? Judge Reed made reference to this concern as well:
[T]his Court's finding that minors may be able to gain access to
harmful to minors materials on foreign Web sites, non-commercial
sites, and online via protocols other than http demonstrates the
problems this statute has with efficaciously meeting its goal.
Moreover, there is some indication in the record that minors may
be able to legitimately possess a credit or debit card and access
harmful to minors materials despite the screening mechanisms
provided in the affirmative defenses.... These factors reduce the
benefit that will be realized by the implementation of COPA in
preventing minors from accessing such materials online.
166
These seem to be the considerations that are likely to govern the
determination of whether the COPA is consistent with the First Amendment.
Thanks to the ACLU and its fellow plaintiffs, it appears that a final judicial
resolution of these issues will, in fact, be made in the near future.
165. ACLU, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
166. Id. at 496-97.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The electronic medium of communication known as the Internet is
rapidly becoming the home of a new virtual economy. Using the Internet, a
consumer has the ability to purchase products and receive goods in the
privacy of the home. This new ability to buy and sell goods online is quickly
becoming a major component of electronic commerce. It is within electronic
commerce that financial institutions have shifted to Intemet-based electronic
banking. Internet-based electronic banks and Internet banking open the
doors for financial institutions to attract new customers and lower the
institutions' overall costs.
2
1. Bret G. Wilson, Banking on the Net: How to Get Your Financial Services Client There
with Minimal Trouble, 43 PRAC. LAW. INST. CORP. L. HANDBOOK SERE 25,26 (Mar. 1997).
2. Id.
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Initially, financial institutions only had Internet or Web pages with
general information about banks.3 Banks expanded their Internet Web sites
to provide consumers with the ability to conduct their banking transactions
via the World Wide Web and the Internet as both banks and consumers
increased their Internet usage.4 Banking on the Internet has created several
choices of electronic alternatives to conventional forms of money, and
banking services by financial and nonfinancial institutions. Electronic
banking includes electronic fund transfers and electronic payment systems. It
also includes banking services provided by financial institutions as well as
nonfinancial institutions. The nonfinancial institutions are often referred to
as nonbanks. There are a number of nontraditional entrants in the banking
industry, including AT&T and Microsoft, that are competing with traditional
banks. Currently, there are three different types of electronic banking.8 The
first is "online banking," where an individual connects to a traditional bank's
private network to perform conventional banking transactions. 9 The second
is "web-based banking," where an individual connects to a traditional bank
over the public Internet to perform conventional banking transactions. 0 The
third type of electronic banking is through an actual "Internet bank."" The
Internet-based bank focuses on providing bank-like services without the
conventional structure, or even building of a traditional bank . Internet-
based banks offering services solely on the Internet are also competing with
the traditional banks. Because of such diversity in electronic banking, its
role within electronic commerce has changed tremendously within a short
amount of time. In particular, there is an increasing presence of electronic
money on the Internet, which is slowly impacting the entire financial
industry.
"Electronic cash.., refers to any electronic notation for money."' 3
Since electronic cash is the currency of the Internet, it promises to have a
wide impact on bank supervision and monetary policy. Electronic money is
3. Kimbrelly Kegler, Electronic Banking: Security, Privacy, and CRA Compliance, 2
N.C. BANKiNG INST. 427 (1998).
4. Id.
5. Marty Fisher-Haydis & Kara R. Yancey, Developments in Banking Law: 1996, 16 ANN.
REV. BANKING L. 76, 92 (1997).
6. Id. at 99.
7. Dan L. Nicewander, Electronic Banking-Smart Cards, Cyberspace and the Internet,
50 Consumer Fin. L. Q. Rep. 22 (1996).





13. Fisher-Haydis & Yancey, supra note 5, at 76.
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being marketed as a mechanism to facilitate commerce. This market can be
very lucrative, especially in light of the growth of the Internet. At the end of
1997 there were thirty million worldwide users of the Internet and thirt -five
million households in the United States with personal computers. In
December 1998, NUA, an Internet statistics company, reported that there
were 151 million worldwide Internet users, or three percent of the world
population, with over seventy-three million Internet users in the United
States.' 5 It is speculated that electronic money will replace approximatel6
400 billion dollars of the United States' currency circulating worldwide.
Indeed, it is predicted that the amount of cash in circulation will continue to
fall from 400 billion dollars to 200 billion dollars by the year 2005.17
Without a national monetary policy that manages "electronic money," such
money will potentially make the money supply infinite because electronic
money could possibly be infinite. Our current monetary policies and
regulatory agencies are not structured to deal with "electronic money," its
liquidity, and origination.
Internet banking presents new legal and regulatory issues regarding
banks and nonbank entities and their ability to gather, transfer, and store
money. The federal and international agencies that regulate banks are faced
with the problem of trying to apply existing regulations to banking on the
Internet or create new regulations. The banking functions being performed
on the Internet pose both legal and regulatory challenges. 18 Regulating the
movement of money and transactions is much more complex than regulating
a bank's web page. New regulatory issues also arise from using nonbank
entities to store money on the Internet. Additionally, the two key issues of
privacy of confidential information and security of financial transactions
must be addressed. 19 This article will focus on banking on the Internet, and
specifically the role of nonbank entities, privacy and security issues in
electronic banking, and regulatory issues regarding banking on the Internet.
14. Catherine Lee Wilson, Banking on the Net: Extending Bank Regulation to Electronic
Money and Beyond, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 671,673 (1997).
15. NUA Internet Statistics (visited Dec. 28, 1998) <http://www.nua.ielsurveys/
hovwmany-online/index.html>.
16. D. Lee Falls, Dateline 2005: Does Banking on the Internet Need to be Regulated? 14
BANKING POL'Y REP. No. 24 1, 10 (1995).
17. Id.
18. Melanie L. Fein, The New Business of Banking: What Banks Can Do Now, 912 PRAC.
LAW. INST. CORP. L. PRAc. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 91, 95-96 (1995).
19. Id. at 95.
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II. INTERNET-BASED BANKS
One of the most significant features of the Internet is the ability to
eliminate geographic barriers. It is this unique nature of the Internet that
allows a financial institution, as well as a nonfinancial institution, to exist
solely on the Internet. There are no brick walls, tellers, and no branch
offices. Services are offered twenty-four hours a day. Such advantages of
Internet-based banks are growing, but there are disadvantages for both the
consumer and the financial institution. For instance, one disadvantage for
the financial institution is that it is subject to uncoordinated and inconsistent
regulations by states because the financial institution offers banking services
over the Internet to customers in various states and across the world.
Furthermore, the Internet-based bank must comply with the Community
Reinvestment Act ("CRA") 20 because the CRA mandates that any Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") insured bank must address and
service the community needs in which the bank operates. 21 Being able to
determine exactly what constitutes the "community" on the Internet is a
22challenge that all Internet-based banks face.
While there are more than 840 banks that have Internet sites, the Office
of Thrift Supervision has granted thrift charters to only two Intemet-based
banks, Security First Network Bank 3 and Atlanta Internet Bank.24  The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") has also approved the
charter for CompuBank, N.A. The Security First Network Bank and the
Atlanta Internet Bank offer all of their services over the Internet. It appears
that such banking services will be able to compete with the larger banks,
such as Citibank and NationsBank, because more customers may be reached
and "fewer bricks mean higher returns." 26 With reduced costs, the Internet-
based bank can offer better interest rates on money market accounts,
certificate of deposits, and even checking accounts.27 Indeed, the customer
base of Internet banks have grown tremendously. For example, Atlanta
Internet Bank began with about twenty customers in late 1996, and now has
20. Consumer Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1994).
21. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-07 (1994); 12 C.F.R. § 25.11(b)(1) (1998).
22. The Security First Bank Network, an Internet bank based in Atlanta, concentrates its
CRA efforts in the Atlanta community. See Kegler, supra note 3, at 438.
23. Security First Network Bank (visited Dec. 1, 1998) <http://sfnb.com>.
24. Atlanta Internet Bank Home Page (visited Dec. 24, 1998) <http:llwww.
atlantabank.com> [hereinafter Atlanta] (as of Feb. 20, 1999, this site no longer available).
25. See New York Times (Cyber Times), Fewer Bricks Mean Higher Returns at New
Internet Banks (visited Feb. 25, 1998) <http://www.pcn.com> [hereinafter Fewer Bricks] (as of
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approximately 6,500 customers with deposits totaling near $95 million.2
Within eighteen months, Atlanta Internet Bank has acquired assets of $175
million.29 Now eighty percent of Atlanta Internet Bank's customers are
outside of Georgia and from twenty-one countries around the world.30
Security First Network Bank is also growing, and has about $45 million
dollars in deposits.3 1 Moreover, these Internet banks enjoy the same Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") protection for their depositors as
traditional banks' customers receive.
While these types of banks, as well as any nonbanks, can offer many
conveniences and advantages, the consumer should be aware of problems
that lurk on the Internet. The FDIC cautions the consumer about companies
"pretending to be banks offering unusually high interest rates," because such
institutions may not be FDIC insured. The FDIC recommends that the
consumer find out about a particular financial institution before giving out
personal information and conducting transactions. 3 The FDIC also suggests
that a consumer should be skeptical about any Internet site or any
advertisement that makes an offer that is too good to be true.34  The
consumer should be cautious about banking with international financial
institutions, because such institutions may not be complying with all of the
federal and state regulatory requirements, which may result in the institution
being here today and gone tomorrow.35 The FDIC offers an Internet site
where a consumer can either find out if a financial institution is FDIC
36insured or report any suspicious activity. The future of these types of
banks is uncertain, but the technology allowing all banking services to be
available at the stroke of a finger and in the privacy of the home is here to
stay.
28. Id.
29. CNN-Cyberbanks: Anytime, Anywhere (visited Apr. 18, 1998) <http://cnn.comf
TECHIcomputing/9804/18/online.bankinglindex.html>.
30. See generally Atlanta, supra note 24.
31. Id.




35. One such situation arose in Idaho. There, European Union Bank, a bank chartered in
Antigua, promoted itself to the residents of Idaho. The State Department of Finance issued a
cease and desist order on the grounds that the bank was soliciting deposits on the Internet to
Idaho residents without being chartered to operate a bank or any other form of financial
institution in Idaho. State Business of Banking Laws and the Internet, 21st Century Banking Alert
No. 97-9-10 (visited Jan. 29, 1998) <http://www.ffhsj.com/bancmail/ 21starch/ 9709 10.html>.
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II. INTERNET BANKING AND ITS MONEY SUPPLY
Electronic banking is not significantly different from traditional
banking concepts and activities. It simply represents an alternative delivery
system for traditional banking products. Electronic banking is very broad
in scope and includes electronic funds transfers, electronic payment systems,
global financial and banking systems, and personal computer ("PC") access
to bank services.38 Until recently, traditional banks and banking services
primarily used private networks to manage transactions for consumers,
corporations, financial institutions, and other entities.39 The Internet offers
an additional, but public, network for these services and systems. Recently,
there has been a shift to Internet-based electronic banking. Internet banking
is currently a small part of the world of electronic banking. However, since
Internet banking deals directly with the consumer market, it offers the
greatest potential for growth. The transition to Internet-based banking has
opened the door to many new technologies, financial opportunities, and
forms of commerce. For instance, electronic money is the result of such new
technology that has emerged as a potential new currency to be used by
banks, consumers, and merchants on the Internet.40 Some believe that this is
the beginning of the end of money as we currently know it. James Gleich
states:
Cash is quaint, technologically speaking-unless you're impressed
by intaglio-steel-plate-printed paper with embedded polyester strips
(meant to inconvenience counterfeiters). Cash is expensive-tens
of billions of dollars drain from the economy each year merely to
pay for the printing, trucking, safekeeping, vending, collecting,
counting, armored-guarding and general care and feeding of our
currency. Cash is obsolete.4
But not everyone shares that view. The U.S. Department of the Treasury
states:
37. An Introduction to Electronic Money Issues, prepared for the United States
Department of the Treasury Conference, Toward Electronic Money and Banking: The Role of
Government, September 19-20, 1996, Washington, D.C. [hereinafter Electronic Money Issues]
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Conversion of Treasury payments, now running at about 800
million a year, to an all electronic format will bring changes
permitting, for example, a consolidation of disbursing operations
that currently produce checks. [A]mong the less technologically
advanced countries, cash is the principal means of payment, the
dollar seems to be one of the currencies of choice, and the
infrastructure that will support widespread use of electronic money
seems many years away.
A. What is Electronic Money?
The term electronic money refers to the recording or storing of
information about the funds or "value" available to a consumer.43 This
information is stored on a device in the4possession of the consumer, such as
a personal computer, or "smart card." The device is then updated with
information over either a private network or a public network, like the
Internet.45 For example, a phone card with a preset value of five dollars is a
"smart card." While "smart card" technology is a type of electronic money,
electronic money also includes "electronic cash." The advantages of
electronic money are that it can: 1) offer new revenue streams for banks and
other issuers or nonbanks in the form of fees; 2) "float" interest on balances
stored and held by the issuer; and 3) cost savings from reduced cash
handling costs.46 Often, the term "electronic cash" is used interchangeably
with the term "electronic money." Electronic money provides a means for
consumers to purchase goods and for retailers to sell goods efficiently when
using a credit card is not feasible or desirable.47
Several private companies have created "electronic money . software
products." Three such software products that facilitate the creation and
management of electronic money are NetCash, ecash, and CyberCoin. These
emerging products focus on balancing the privacy aspect of credit cards with
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48the anonymity of cash. Currently, there is no one system that is universally
49accepted to make, issue, or manage electronic money.
NetCash is a form of electronic money that is distributed by an online
private bank, NetBank.5 The customer sends United States ("U.S.") dollars
to NetBank in exchange for a NetCash coupon.5 1 The customer receives the
coupon as an encrypted e-mail. It has three parts: "the 'NetCash U.S. $'
keyword, the dollar amount, and the serial number of the bill."52 When the
customer wants to purchase a product, the customer sends a coupon to
NetBank. Then, NetBank sends "digital coins" to the merchant as payment
53for the product. The merchant also has an account with NetBank, and may
then convert the "digital coins" back to dollars. 54
DigiCash, founded in 1990, is a leading pioneer in electronic payment
systems using public key cryptography.55  DigiCash uses "ecash," a
trademarked product specifically developed for the Internet, as a form of
56electronic cash. Customers and merchants use the bank's public key to
decode messages and conduct transactions.
57
DigiCash uses ecash "coins" which have a specified value.58  An
electronic "purse"59 is established for the customers and merchants. The
coins are then moved between customer, bank, and merchant to complete
transactions. 60 To receive the value, the payee confirms the validity of the
coins by depositing them online into an ecash account. This transaction will
not reveal the name or address of the payer because each ecash coin is
secured by a high-level encryption method. Like bank notes, ecash can be
48. North American Media Engines-Resource Centre-Articles-Net Money (visited Mar. 15,





53. North American Media, supra note 48.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. DigiCash-Profile (visited Jan. 14, 1999) <http://www.digicash.conrdigicash/
digicash/profile/index.htn1>.
57. Id.
58. ecash - An Introduction to ecash (visited Apr. 9, 1998) <http://www.digicash.
com/ecash/intro/index.html>.
59. Glossary of ecash (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.digicash.com/ecash/docs/
purse-manua/gloss.html>.
60. DigiCash - How ecash Works Inside (visited Apr. 8, 1998) <http://www.digicash.
com/ecash/docs/works/> [hereinafter How ecash Works Inside].
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withdrawn from and deposited into deposit accounts. The "coins" include
strings of digits, with each string corresponding to a different digital
"coin." 62 Each coin has a denomination, or value, so that a purse of digital
coins is managed automatically by the customer's ecash software.63 The
customer's ecash software chooses coins with the desired value from the
purse on the PC and then sends them over the network. When the
merchant's software receives the "coins," the software automatically sends
the "coins" to the bank. To ensure that each coin is used only once, the bank
records the serial number of each coin in its database. If no such serial
number has been previously recorded, the bank stores it and informs the
merchant that the coin is valid and that the deposit is accepted.
64
DigiCash's use of ecash has now gone one step further in providing
privacy and anonymity. DigiCash uses "blind signatures," which prevent the
bank from recognizing a particular account. Instead of the bank creating a
blank coin, the customer's computer creates the coin at random.66 The coin
is put in a "digital envelope" and sent to the bank.67 The bank then
withdraws one dollar from the customer's account and creates one dollar in
digital form, similar to an embossed stamp on an envelope, before returning
it to the customer's computer.68 The "blind signature" mechanism allows the
validating signature to be applied through the envelope.6 9  When the
customer's computer removes the envelope, it has obtained a coin of its own
choice, validated by the bank's stamp. However, because the bank is
unable to recognize the coin, "the bank cannot tell who made the payment."
71
Therefore, the customer is anonymous and privacy is maintained.
Another company that has developed electronic money is CyberCash,





65. The bank creates unique blank digital coins and validates them with its special digital
stamp. How ecash Works Inside, supra note 60. This would normally allow the bank to
recognize the particular coins when accepted in a payment and thus tells the bank exactly which
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used for purchases ranging from twenty-five cents to ten dollars. 72  The
"CyberCoin" provides a means of paying for smaller items, when using a
credit card would be inefficient.73 In other words, "CyberCoin" is the
equivalent of pocket change.7 4 CyberCash seems to be placing some much
needed emphasis on making the electronic cash transaction cost effective.
A principal disadvantage of electronic money in most of the current
products is that the mechanisms used to store values and perform
transactions use an electronic medium; therefore keeping track of all the past
transactions, certificates, and coins and preventing double spending, would
require massive databases.75 Furthermore, software technology would have
to be used to prevent an electronic purse and all of its contents from being
used over and over again.
Such money can also result in many issues for banks. As previously
noted, the makers of this money may not be banks, but rather private
companies that are acting as banks in some manner. Federal regulators of
banks are faced with the challenge of possibly regulating such companies as
traditional banks. Secondly, through encryption methods, the banks are
receiving money and depositing "money," without being able to trace such
money. This leads to the issue of whether such strings of characters are
indeed "money," as society knows it to be.
B. Is it Money?
One question facing regulators is whether a string of characters
constitutes "money." Traditionally, the federal government has had the,, - ,,76 ,
power "to coin Money, [and] regulate the Value thereof." "[T]he Federal
Government has not [always] been the sole issuer of currency."77 Private
and state banks also issued money until 1913, when the Federal Reserve
System was established as the central banking system.78
72. CyberCash - Free Wallet (visited May 16, 1998) <http://www.cybercash.comcyber-
cash/consumers/wallet.html>.
73. CyberCoin: Micropayments Revolutionize Web Commerce (visited Jan. 14, 1999)
<http://www.cybercash.com/cybercash/services/cybercoin.html>.
74. Id.
75. B. Clifford Neuman & Gennady Medvinsky, NetCheque, NetCash, and the
Characteristics of Internet Payment Services (visited Jan. 14, 1999) <http://www.press.umich.
edu/jep/works/NeumNetPay.htil>.
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
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Now, a new tender is being developed which involves private
companies generating "money." 79 "Whether on a card or the hard drive of a
personal computer, the current forms of electronic money involve the storage
of 'value' which is exchanged for goods or services. ' 0 Examination of the
underlying features and properties of electronic money is essential to
determining whether electronic money is money or something else that needs• - - 81
to be defined and possibly regulated, or even eliminated. It can be argued
that "electronic money," as a stored value, is a form of private money that
would be accepted as legal tender. "However, the new electronic money
82
systems lack [some] essential" traits of money. First, when executing a
transaction using an "electronic value," instead of cash or private money, the
83transaction is not completed in a single step. Unlike cash or private money
transactions, "electronic value" transactions require merchants to submit the
value to the issuing bank before they receive cash, with the electronic money
moving through various complex systems before the transaction is
completed.84 Second, electronic money does not qualify as a substitute for
private money, "because all current electronic money developments allow
the holder of the stored value to redeem it for the national currency,"
whereas private money may not be redeemed as such. 5
The question of whether electronic money is money also raises the issue
of customer confidence regarding the circulation of "electronic money."
Currently, a customer has confidence that a credit given by a bank is
redeemable for cash. Such confidence is largely due to the regulatory
scheme of the FDIC that protects against bank failure. There is a risk, that if
a nonbank becomes insolvent consumers would not be protected, and thus
would be susceptible to a complete loss of funds stored in the nonbank.8
6
Electronic money is invisible and lacks any physical characteristics. If
electronic money is to gain the confidence of the customer, it must fall under
regulatory schemes. Nonbank entities will issue "electronic value" in
exchange for U.S. currency. Under our current scheme, the entity would
have to qualify as a "bank" before federal banking regulators could examine
and control the activities of the issuer. Assuming the entities issuing smart
cards and other electronic forms of "electronic value" are not banks and are
not currently covered by our federal banking regulations, the issue then
79. Id.
80. Id. at 690.
81. Id. at 691.
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becomes whether the bank regulatory agencies should govern such entities or
if some other governmental agency should regulate them.
IV. THE ROLE OF REGULATORY AGENCIES
In the midst of advancements in using the Internet for banking services,
federal and international banking regulators continue to evaluate their roles
in managing and monitoring electronic commerce, money, and more
specifically, electronic banking. As new technology emerges everyday,
more and more regulatory agencies try to find ways to guide the institutions
they govern. There are also interagency bodies, such as the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council ("FFIEC") that are empowered to
prescribe uniform principles, standards, and report forms for the federal
examination of financial institutions.87 The FFIEC plays an important role in
disseminating wide-spread guidance among the federal agencies. There are
also international groups, such as the Bank for International Settlement,
("BIS"), who try to promote standards and principles regarding banking. In
the United States, the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency ("OCC"), and the FDIC have continued to address the
development of electronic banking and money systems and the appropriate
U.S. government involvement. These three agencies have different roles, but
they all regulate financial institutions. The FDIC is an independent agency
that focuses on insuring banks. The OCC focuses on chartering national
banks, and is part of the Department of the Treasury. The Federal Reserve
System is an independent agency that focuses on monetary stability.
Although these agencies have separate and distinct purposes, they often
work together to promote a secure national banking system. For example,
the FDIC has regulations to ensure a bank is safe and sound in order to be
insured, while the OCC has regulations to ensure our national banking
system is secure and stable.
On the global front the Group of Ten Nations ("G-10") and the BIS, are
taking an active role in the regulation, and management of electronic
87. "The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (Council) was established on
March 10, 1979, pursuant to the title X of the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate
Control Act of 1978 (FIRA), Public Law 95-630." The FFIEC is empowered to prescribe
uniform principles, standards and report forms for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, ("FRB"), the Federal Insurance Corporation, ('FDIC"), the National Credit Union
Administration ("NCUA"), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), and the
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banking. 8 Working together, these organizations must lead individuals,
corporations, and banking entities through these changing times.
A. The Bank for International Settlements and the Basle Committee
The Internet is helping to drive the integration of financial markets
worldwide. This integration depends highly on the world's banks, its
regulators, and the system's overall financial stability. The world's oldest
international financial organization that addresses globalization of financial
markets is the BIS.89 It primarily promotes the cooperation of central banks
and fosters international financial stability.90 The BIS is owned and
controlled by central banks and other international financial institutions.91
The Board of Directors is comprised of the Governors of the central banks of
Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the United States Federal Reserve System. 92 As of March
1998, forty-five central banks have voting rights at the general meetings of
the BIS.93
In promoting the stability of the international monetary and financial
systems, the BIS has been involved in the efforts of such groups as the G-
88. See generally Group of Ten, Electronic Money (Visited Dec. 26, 1998) <http:ll
www.bis.org/publ/gten0l.html>.
89. The Bank for International Settlements (visited Dec. 26, 1998) <http://www.bis.




93. Forty-five central banks included:
all the G-10 central banks, namely those of Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States of America - and the central banks of
Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland,
Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain and Turkey,
together with the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croatian
National Bank, the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, and the
Bank of Slovenia, which have been issued shares of the Bank pending a
comprehensive settlement of all outstanding questions in connection with the
legal status of the suspended Yugoslav issue of the Bank's capital.
1999]
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10.94  The G-10 is comprised of eleven industrial countries: Belgium,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 95 These countries
consult and cooperate on economic, monetary, and financial matters.96 In
1975, the G-10 set up a committee to improve collaboration between bank
supervisors known as the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision ("Basle
Committee").97 The Basle Committee provides a forum of discussion on the
handling of specific banking supervision issues, coordinates the sharing of
supervisory responsibilities, and seeks to enhance standards of supervision."
The BIS has participated in G-10 meetings since the Basle Committee was
formed, because the Governors of the G-10 central banks meet regularly at
the same time as the Basle monthly meetings. 99
In March 1998, the Basle Committee took an initial step in reviewing
supervisory issues related to technological advances. The Basle Committee
distributed an assessment of the risks, and recommended approaches to risk
management in electronic banking and electronic money activities to
supervisors worldwide. 1°° The risk management document suggests that
"operational risk, reputational risk, and legal risk [are] the most important




The risk management document identified operational risk as a risk
category that must be addressed in dealing with electronic banking and
electronic money. "Operational risk arises from the potential for loss due to
significant deficiencies in system reliability or integrity.' 02 Operational risk
94. The General Arrangements to Borrow ("GAB") of 1962, under which 10 member
countries of the International Monetary Fund ("IMF'), including Switzerland, agreed to make
resources available to the IMF outside their quotas, led to the countries participating in the GAB
being known as the Group of Ten ("G-10"). Bank for International Settlements, supra note 89.




97. See Report from Basle Comm. on Banking Supervision, The Year 2000: A Challenge
for Financial Institutions and Bank Supervisors (Sept. 1997) <http://www.bis.
org/publ/bcb531.pdf> (as of Feb. 20, 1999 this site no longer available).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Risk Management for Electronic Banking
and Electronic Money Activities (visited Dec. 24, 1998) <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs35.htm>
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includes security risks that have the potential of both external and internal
attacks and misuse of a bank's computing system.1°3 Controlling access to a
bank's system has become increasingly difficult with the expansion of
computer capabilities and the accessibility of a public network, such as the
Internet. Not only is there a potential for tremendous monetary loss, but
there is also the potential for tremendous liability in fraudulently created
activities. Operational risk also includes risks associated with a bank's
system design, implementation, and maintenance.1°4 The rapid change in
information technology poses the risk that a system adequate today will not
be adequate tomorrow.' °5 Even computer software given to customers for
online banking can quickly become obsolete and require updates.106 Further,
involvement of customers increases the potential of customer misuse of
products and services. 1°7 The amount of services and products that are
available to the customer is expanding everyday. Customers must be
educated about necessary security precautions that should be taken, or else
the risk of a security breach is heightened. Operational risk also includes
customer misuse of banking products and services. 108 An uneducated
customer can unintentionally open the door for security breaches by
conducting financial transactions in a non-secure electronic environment.
Criminals may then gain access to the financial transaction. Such access
may lead to financial losses both to the customer and to the bank.1°9
Another risk category is reputational risk, that is, "the risk of significant
negative public opinion that results in... critical loss of funding [for the
bank] or [a loss of] customers."' 10 Reputational risk can arise from systems
or products not working properly, or from a significant security breach.1 It
also can arise from mistakes, malfeasance, and fraud by third parties.
Reputational risk can be significant for a single bank and can also be
significant for the banking system as a whole. Such risk can lead to extreme
public distrust of any bank's ability to conduct business on the Internet. This
103. Id.
104. Id.
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distrust will hinder both the growth of banking on the Internet, and the
growth of electronic commerce collectively 12
A third category of risk identified by the Basle Committee is the legal
risk arising from violations of laws, rules, regulations, or prescribed
practices. 113 Legal risk also involves the lack of established legal rights and
obligations of parties in an electronic transaction. 14 Given the fact that
electronic transactions and electronic money are relatively new, no one is
sure of the rights and obligations of the parties involved, and what type of
consumer protection applies to the transaction.115 There is also a question
regarding the validity of agreements reached through an electronic medium,
because technological advances such as digital signature and encryption
methods that validate an agreement are still evolving. Further, there is the
risk of customer disclosure and inadequate privacy protection. Moreover,
the Basle Committee points out that the traditional banking risks may also
arise in banking on the Internet, especially with the use of electronic
money.116  Cross-border risks and issues can arise for banks as
well."i Customers across national borders expose the banks to different
and/or additional regulatory requirements.'
1 8
In assessing the risks above, the Basle Committee sets out possible
steps that bank management can take to manage and control risks associated
with banking on the Internet and the use of electronic money.119 The Basle
Committee suggests such measures as developing a security policy that lays
out the bank's plan and defines the bank's security risk tolerance.12 Putting
various security measures into place, such as encryption, passwords,
firewalls, virus controls, and employee screening can help to prevent both
internal and external attacks, as well as the misuse of electronic money and




115. Risk Management for Electronic Banking, supra note 100.





120. Risk Management for Electronic Banking, supra note 100.
121. A detailed discussion regarding security measures can be found in Bank for
International Settlements, Security of Electronic Money, Aug. 1996 <http://www.bis.org/
publ/cpss 18.html> [hereinafter Security of Electronic Money].
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a combination of security measures as opposed to just one. 122 For example, a
firewall12 can screen, or even prevent incoming messages but it does not
fully protect against virus-infecting programs that can be downloaded from
the Internet.12 A better solution would be to implement virus protection
protocols and software that also integrates well with the firewall software.
The Basle Committee suggested that in dealing with operational,
reputational, and legal risks, a bank's management should communicate with
staff members about key provisions regarding banking on the Internet, while
the technical staff communicates with the bank management on how systems
work and are designed.1 5 Protocols for the evaluating and testing of
products and services should be established and performed regularly, and
should include educating customers on those products and services. While
electronic banking and electronic money rely on external entities for
hardware and software, banks should insist that such providers conduct
regular testing and have fallback procedures in case of failure or invasion by
126
criminals. Basically, banks should constantly monitor and test their
systems and keep abreast of the latest electronic banking technologies. The
BIS and the Basle committee are both providing strong guidelines for nations
to follow while at the same time promoting electronic banking.
B. The Federal Reserve System
'The Federal Reserve System is the central bank of the United
States. It was founded by Congress in 1913 to provide the nation with a
safer, more flexible, and more stable monetary and financial system; over the
years, its role in banking and the economy has expanded."1  The Federal
Reserve Board, which governs the Federal Reserve System, has been willing
to allow financial institutions to move forward with new technology, such as
smart cards and electronic banking.
The Federal Reserve Board has taken other steps that will have an
effect on the development of electronic banking and electronic money
activities in the United States. For example, the Board approved a request
by various holding companies and banks, subject to the Bank Holding
122. Id.
123. A "firewall" is a combination of hardware and software that screens and limits
external access to internal systems connected to open networks such as the Interet. Id. at 12.
124. Id.
125. Id at 13.
126. Security of Electronic Money, supra note 121 at 15.
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Company Act, 128 to obtain a voting interest in Integrion Financial Network,
LLC of White Plains, New York ("Integrion"). 129 Royal Bank of Canada,
Northwest Corporation, and Stichting Prioriteit ABN AMRO Holding and its
subsidiaries requested to acquire more than five percent of the voting interest
in Integrion.13° The joint venture also includes twelve national banks,131 one
savings and loan holding company, 13 and Gemini Management Corporation,
a subsidiary of International Business Machines Corporation ("IBM").
Integrion was organized to design, develop, and operate a data processing
and transmission system, through which customers of banks can engage in
home banking and other electronic financial services with the financial
institution. 13  The Federal Reserve Board's order focused on the public
benefits of allowing such a joint venture. 134 Since the proposed activities
were data processing and transmission activities which were permissible for
128. The Bank Holding Company Act authorizes bank holding companies to engage in
nonbanking activities provided that such activities are "closely related to [the business of]
banking." The act also states that the bank's activities must "produce benefits to the public, such
as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible
adverse effects, such as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition,
conflict of interests, or unsound banking practices." Bank Holding Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(4)(c)(8)
(Supp. 1998).
129. Federal Reserve Press Release - December 2, 1996 (visited Jan. 14, 1999) <http:ll
www.bog.frb.fed.us/boarddocs/press/BHC/1996/199612022/> [hereinafter Press Release].
130. Id.
131. The national banks included:
Bank of America NT & SA; NationsBank, N.A.; Keybank, N.A.; Bank One,
Columbus, N.A.; Mellon Bank, N.A.; Barnett bank, N.A.; First Bank, N.A.;
PNC Bank, N.A.; Michigan National Bank; The First National Bank of
Chicago; Comerica Bank - Ann Arbor, N.A.; and Fleet National Bank. Each
of these national banks has applied to the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency of the Currency to invest in Integrion through an operating
subsidiary of the bank.
Id.
132. The savings and loan holding company is Washington Mutual, Inc., that had to
provide notice of its intent to be involved with Integrion with the Office of Thrift Supervision.
Id.
133. Customers can connect to Integrion, which serves as a gateway to the financial
institution, using such devices as personal computers, touch-tone phones, or any other electronic
communication devices. Id. The customer can connect through a private communication
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bank holding companies,135 the Federal Reserve Board believed that such a
venture would enhance consumer banking convenience by expanding the. ... .. .. 136
availability of remote banking services and providing new services. Such
a venture is also advantageous for financial institutions, because IntegrionS • 137
offers a secure means of banking online, as well as a selection of software
or programs for home banking. 38 As stated by the chairman and CEO of
IBM, Integrion will reach sixty million households and give those sixty
million people a reason to use the Internet for home banking.139  Through
policy, the Federal Reserve is encouraging the use of electronic banking at
this time, while it monitors the effect on the United States economy and its
financial systems.
C. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
The FDIC has been insuring deposits and promoting safe and sound
banking practices since 1934.24 The FDIC:
135. Engaging in data processing and data transmission activities is permissible under
section 225.28 of the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225.28 (1998) and
section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Act. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (c)(8) (Supp. 1998).
136. Press Release, supra note 129.
137. Integrion solves many security issues by providing both public Internet access as well
as private networks. 15 North American Banks and IBM Form Company to Offer Electronic
Banking and Commerce Services (visited Sept. 9, 1996) <http://www.ibn.com/News/bankingpr.
html>.
138. The customer can choose from whatever financial management software or Internet
browser program he or she would like to use. Integrion is intended to be compatible with such
software as Microsoft Money, Quicken and Managing Your Money, as well as Internet browsers
like Netscape Navigator and Microsoft Explorer. Id.
139. Amanda Meffert, Banking by IBM (visited Jan. 4, 1999) <http://www.worth.com/
articles/lntegrion.html>.
140. FDIC Symbol of Confidence (visited Feb 17, 1999) <http://www.fdic.gov/
consumers/symbol/index.html> [hereinafter Symbol of Confidence]. The FDIC was created to
"restore stability to a financial system that had seen over 9,000 bank failures and a severe
contraction in economic activity in the four years following the stock market crash of 1929."
Id. "But in passing this legislation, President Roosevelt and Congress became concerned
about the potential for deposit insurance to create 'moral hazard,' which is the tendency of
people to take on more risk when insured" and reduce their incentive to monitor and discipline
banks for excessive risk-taking. Id. Consequently, to limit the potential loss to the
government, "the legislation limited the amount of insurance-to $2,500 in 1934, $5,000 in
1935-and increased the amount of federal supervisory authority over insured institutions
(FDIC 1984)." Confidence for the Future: An FDIC Symposium (visited Dec. 26, 1998)
<http:llwww.fdic.gov/publishlsymplbackpap/panell.html> [hereinafter Confidence for the
Future]. "For the next 50 years, public confidence in the banking system was maintained even
through serious recessions and other major economic shocks." Id.
1999]
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Promotes the safety and soundness of insured depository
institutions and the U.S. financial system by identifying,
monitoring and addressing risks to the deposit insurance funds.
The FDIC also is the primary federal regulator of about 6,000
state-chartered "nonmember" banks (commercial and savings
banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System). 141
"The heart of the FDIC's mission is to maintain stability and public
confidence in the nation's banking and thrift systems."' 42 "The FDIC sign-
posted in insured financial institutions across the country has become a
symbol of confidence." 141 "Today, the FDIC insures deposits of u to
$100,000 in virtually all United States banks and savings associations.""
New technologies raise a wide range of supervisory issues. The FDIC
does not desire to impose regulatory restrictions that can hinder the
development of such emerging technology, but it does recognize the
importance of providing guidelines for new products and services. 45 The
FDIC has recognized the inherent risks of stored-value card systems,
electronic banking in general, and Internet-based banks. These rapidly
emerging banking activities on the Internet pose new questions regarding the
scope of deposit insurance and its applicability to electronic funds. The
purpose of federal deposit insurance is to maintain stability in the financial
system and thus promote economic growth. 146 Deposit insurance also
protects depositors from losses associated with bank failures and ensures the
viability of smaller banks. 147
One way to keep such confidence is by assuring consumers and
merchants that funds are available for a transaction. For a deposit of funds
to be recognized by the FDIC, it must qualify as a "deposit" under the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
4 8
141. Symbol of Confidence, supra note 140.
142. Confidence for the Future, supra note 140.
143. Id.
144. Symbol of Confidence, supra note 140.
145. Nicholas J. Ketcha, Jr., Examination Guidance on the Safety and Soundness Aspects
of Electronic Banking Activities-FDIC Financial Institution Letter FIL-14-97 (visited Feb. 26,
1997) <http://www.fdic.gov/banknews/fils/l1997/fi19714.html> [hereinafter FDIC Letter FIL-14-
97].
146. Confidence for the Future, supra note 140.
147. Id.
148. Under section 3(1) of the FDIA, "the term 'deposit' means"-
(1) the unpaid balance of money or its equivalent received or held by a
bank or savings association in the usual course of business and for which it
has given or is obligated to give credit, either conditionally or
unconditionally, to a commercial, checking, savings, time, or thrift account,
[Vol 23:739
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The FDIC published General Counsel Opinion No. 8 to address the
issue of, "whether and to what extent the funds or obligations underlying
stored value cards constitute 'deposits' within the meaning of section 3(1) of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA) and are therefore assessable and
qualify for deposit insurance.' ' 149 General Counsel Opinion No. 8 identifies
four types of stored value systems: 1) Bank Primary-Customer Account
or which is evidenced by its certificate of deposit, thrift certificate, investment
certificate, certificate of indebtedness, or other similar name, or a check or
draft drawn against a deposit account and certified by the bank or savings
association, or a letter of credit or a traveler's check on which the bank or
savings association is primarily liable: Provided, that, without limiting the
generality of the term "money or its equivalent", any such account or
instrument must be regarded as evidencing the receipt of the equivalent of
money when credited or issued in exchange for checks or drafts or for a
promissory note upon which the person obtaining any such credit or
instrument is primarily or secondarily liable, or for a charge against a deposit
account, or in settlement of checks, drafts, or other instruments forwarded to
such bank or savings association for collection.
(2) trust funds as defined in this chapter received or held by such bank
or savings association, whether held in the trust department or held or
deposited in any other department of such bank or savings association.
(3) money received or held by a bank or savings association, or the
credit given for money or its equivalent received or held by a bank or savings
association, in the usual course of business for a special or specific purpose,
regardless of the legal relationship thereby established, including without
being limited to, escrow funds, funds held as security for an obligation due to
the bank or savings association or others (including funds held as dealers
reserves) or for securities loaned by the bank or savings association, funds
deposited by a debtor to meet maturing obligations, funds deposited as
advance payment on subscriptions to United States Government securities,
funds held for distribution or purchase of securities, funds held to meet its
acceptances or letters of credit, and withheld taxes: Provided, That there shall
not be included funds which are received by the bank or savings association
for immediate application to the reduction of an indebtedness to the receiving
bank or savings association, or under condition that the receipt thereof
immediately reduces or extinguishes such an indebtedness.
(4) outstanding draft (including advice or authorization to charge a
bank's or a savings association's balance in another bank or savings
association), cashier's check, money order, or other officer's check issued in
the usual course of business for any purpose, including without being limited
to those issued in payment for services, dividends, or purchases.
Federal Deposit Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(i)(1)-(4) (1994).
149. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. General Counsel's Op. No. 8; Stored Value Cards, 61
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Systems; 2) Bank Primary-Reserve Systems; 3) Bank Secondary-
Advance Systems; and 4) Bank Secondary-Pre-Acquisition Systems.150
In the Bank Primary-Customer Account Systems, "funds underlying
the stored value card could remain in a customer's account until the value is
transferred to a merchant or other third party."'151 The merchant or third
party then collects the funds from the customer's bank. 5 2 General Opinion
No. 8 states that, "the funds underlying Bank Primary-Customer Account
Systems [are) deposits under section 3(l)(1) of the FDIA, 12 U.S.C.1813 (1)(1)."
In Bank Primary-Reserve Systems, a value is downloaded onto a card
and funds are withdrawn from a customer's account or paid directly by the
customer.154 These funds are then paid into a reserve or general liability
account at the financial institution to pay merchants or other payees as they
155
make claims. General Opinion No. 8 states that funds underlying Bank
Primary-Reserve Account Systems are not "deposits" within the meaning
of section 3(l)(1) of the FDIA. 156 The opinion stated that such funds are not
credited to, or obligated to be credited to a commercial or thrift account.
57
In Bank Secondary Systems,158 the electronic value is created by a third
party and the funds underlying the electronic value are ultimately held by
such third party.'59  In such systems, depository institutions act as
intermediaries in collecting funds from customers in exchange for electronic
value. In Bank Secondary Systems, the electronic value is provided to the
institution to have available for its customers. In Bank Secondary-Advance
Systems, the customers exchange funds for electronic value while the funds
are held for a short period of time and then forwarded to the third party.1
60
General Opinion No. 8 states that funds underlying Bank Secondary-
Advance Systems are not "deposits" within the meaning of section 3(l)(1) of
the FDIA, because the liability is owed to the third party and the bank is
150. 61 Fed Reg. at 40,490 (1996).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 40,492; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l)(1).
154. 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,494.
155. Id.
156. Id.; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1813(1)(1).
157. 61 Fed Reg. at 40,494.
158. In Bank Secondary Systems, the depository institution may have a contingent liability
to redeem the electronic value from consumers and merchants. As such electronic value is
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holding the funds in the usual course of business. 161 However, if the funds
are for a "specific purpose" and are held by the bank for a specific purpose,
then the funds would be considered a deposit.
62
In Bank Secondary-Pre-Acquisition Systems, the depository
institution exchanges its own funds for electronic value from a third party
and then exchanges electronic value for funds with the bank's customers.163
General Opinion No. 8 states that since the funds underlying Bank
Secondary-Pre-Acquisition Systems are received and held by a third party
and the depository institution, the funds are not "deposits" within the
meaning of section 3(1)(1) of the FDIA. 64
Regarding "electronic money," the FDIC is unwilling to recognize a
deposit of funds underlying most stored value systems as a "deposit."' 165 Not
recognizing the funds as a "deposit" means that those merchants who use a
stored value system are not assured that the transaction is properly funded
and that they will be paid for their services or goods. Therefore, the
merchants are reluctant to accept transactions using stored value systems,
consumer confidence is jeopardized, and electronic commerce is hindered by
using this type of electronic money system.
There are inherent risks with the emergence of electronic banking. One
way the FDIC attempted to reduce those risks was by establishing electronic
banking examination procedures. The examination procedures addressed the
safety and soundness aspects, as well as associated risks of electronic
banking. 166 The examination procedures were issued to FDIC examiners on
January 29, 1997.167 The FDIC produced guidelines as part of a
comprehensive four-part approach to evaluating the wide range of risks that
are inherent in electronic based activities. The first approach is the
examination procedures with the remaining parts being: 1) a training
program to educate FDIC examiners on how to use the examination
procedures; 2) another set of procedures that address the technical aspects of
electronic banking; and 3) a program to develop internal technical
expertise.1 68  The examination procedure included three levels of
examination based on the sophistication of the institution's electronic
161. 12 U.S.C. § 18130)(1).
162. Id.
163. 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,494.
164. 12 U.S.C . § 1813(1)(1).
165. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. General Counsel's Op. No. 8, supra note 149.
166. FEDERAL DEPosrr INs. CORP., ELcCrRoNIc BANKING: SAFErY AND SOUNDNESS
EXAMINATION FOR ELECTRONIC BANKING (Jun. 1998) [hereinafter SAFET AND SOUNDNESS].
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banking capabilities.169 The examination procedures required an evaluation
of six different areas of a bank's electronic banking capabilities. 170  The
areas to be evaluated include the bank's planning efforts and
implementation,17 operating policies and procedures, 172 audit procedures,1
73
legal and regulatory matters, 174 the bank's administration and systemS 175 • 176
operations, and vendors and outsourcing. The FDIC's examination
procedures, which the FDIC uses to review the worthiness of banking
institutions for insurance coverage, contain key guidelines in maintaining the
safety and soundness of the banking system.1 7 These practices ensure that
the electronic and conventional banking systems are secure and sound.
The FDIC is also addressing the risk associated with an Internet-based
bank, or any institution that represents itself as a legitimate financial
institution. The FDIC has recently launched a "Suspicious Internet
Banking" web site to help detect potentially fraudulent Internet banking
activity. 178 The web site provides the consumer and the industry a "user-
169. The three levels were: 1) information-only systems; 2) electronic information transfer
systems; and 3) electronic payment systems. SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS, supra note 166, at 3.
Level I systems can simply provide information as defined by the publisher or
allow transmission of non-sensitive electronic mail (information-only
systems); Level II systems can allow users to share sensitive information and
communicate (electronic information transfer systems and Level III systems




171. Planning and implementation risks include inadequate decision processes, system
design and capabilities not meeting customer demands, increased competition with nonfinancial
entities, and uncertain applicability of blanket bond/other insurance coverage to electronic
activities. Id at 8.
172. Operating policies and procedures risks include managerial incompetence relative to
electronic activities, and existing policies that may not address and control confidential electronic
information and electronic channels. Id.
173. The internal control structure of the institution is critical to prevent, detect, and
correct information security breaches. SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS, supra note 166, at 8.
174. Each system must be evaluated to determine its capability for initiating, completing,
and enforcing legal documents and financial transactions. Id at 3.
175. Guidelines relating to access levels and record retention must be established and
monitored on a regular basis. Efforts should be made to educate and support the consumers. Id.
176. Even if an institution outsources to a third party, the burden is still on management to
supervise and control all aspects of the bank's systems. Id.
177. Id. at 13.
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friendly" vehicle for reporting any entit that is misrepresenting itself as a
federally insured depository 
institution.Iit
D. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") charters,
regulates, and supervises national banks to ensure a safe, sound, and
competitive national banking system. 10 The OCC is an agency within the
U.S. Department of the Treasury that continues to remove barriers in
delivering banking services over the Internet.
181
In the last several years, the OCC has continued to foster financial
institutions delivering bank as well as nonbank services. In 1996, the OCC
182issued a bulletin that set forth guidelines relating to stored-value systems.
The bulletin not only describes different kinds of stored-value systems, but it
also discusses risks associated with participating in stored-value systems.
18 3
The OCC approved the involvement of national banks in such stored-value
systems as the Mondex system.184 The Mondex system,185 which is a smart
card system, can transfer value from one card to another card.186 The card
uses a digital signature to authenticate a transaction. 1 7 It can also be used to
make payments over the Internet. Mondex benefits consumers as well as
merchants, because Mondex cash is easily reloadable and transferred, and
179. Click on FDIC Web Site to Help Fend Off Fraudulent Internet Banks (visited Dec.
25, 1998) <http:llwww.fdic.govlconsumer/consnews/sum98/fending.html>.
180. Comptroller or the Currency Administrator of National Banks (visited Feb. 20,
1999) <http:ll www.occ.treas.gov>.
181. See, e.g., OCC Guidance on Stored-Value Card Systems, O.C.C. Bulletin 96-48, 5
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 49-971 (Sept. 10, 1996) ) (source on file with author).
182. Id.
183. The OCC divides risks into three categories: 1) transaction risk, that includes the
adequacy of internal controls, data integrity, transaction rules, employee performance, and
operating processes; 2) strategic risk that includes business goals and strategies; and 3) reputation
risk, that includes negative public opinion. IL See also OCC Issues Guidance on Smart
Card/Stored Value Card Risks, O.C.C. News Release 96-94 (Sept. 10, 1996).
184. Fisher-Haydis & Yancey, supra note 5, at 92.
185. The Mondex is a global electronic cash company formed by the U.K. based National
Westinister Bank. USA TODAY, Mondex Pitches New Way to Spend Money (visited Dec. 17,
1998) <http'J/usatoday.commoney/wealth/consumer/mcwOO2.html>. Mondex is not technically
money and it is not legal tender, because there is no requirement to accept it. Id.
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improves the efficiency at the point of sale.188 The OCC recognized the
issuance and redemption of electronic stored value as "functionally
equivalent" or a "logical outgrowth" of the business of banking by a national
bank.
189
In 1997, the OCC approved the first virtual national bank charter.1
90
Houston based CompuBank, N.A., was approved to deliver products and
services to customers primarily through electronic means, and has applied to
the FDIC for deposit insurance. 19  Such approval was in alignment with the
OCC's decision to allow a national bank to provide electronic data
interchange services, as well as electronic fund transfers.92
The OCC has recently issued bulletins that stress the importance of risk
management in dealing with technology in general, 193 and especially with
personal computer banking. 194  The guidance was put out to help the
estimated 2600 national banks that engage in some form of personal
computer banking. 195 The OCC identified online transactions as the most
common source of risk that includes unauthorized interceptions, data
alteration, system failures, and computer viruses. 196 The OCC recommends
that national banks implement risk management practices that establish
policies and procedures, internal controls, and system monitoring.197  To
assist in this effort, the OCC issued guidelines for examiners to follow when
188. Id. Making a payment through Mondex takes less than three seconds to complete and
the payments are exact. USA TODAY, supra note 185. Mondex also reduces the security risks of
storing and transporting currency. Id. It can even "hold up to five different currencies." An
Overview of Mondex (visited Jan. 14, 1999) <http://www.amdahl.comldoclproducts/
smartcard/overview.html>.
189. In evaluating whether the proposed activity was within the "business of banking," the
OCC evaluated: 1) whether the activity was "'functionally equivalent' to or a 'logical
outgrowth' of a recognized banking activity; 2) whether the activity would 'respond to customer
needs or otherwise benefit the bank or its customers;' and 3) whether the activity 'involve[s] risks
similar in nature to those already assumed by banks."' Wilson, supra note 14, at 714.
190. OCC Says OK to First Virtual National Bank Charter, 16 No. 18 BANKING POL'Y
REP. 6, 6 (Sept. 1997) (source on file with author).
191. Id.
192. The OCC revised 12 C.F.R. part 7 to include the "activities, functions, products and
services provided by banks via electronic means and facilities." 12 C.F.R. § 7.1019 (1998).
Prior to the revision, 12 C.F.R. part 7 authorized banks to utilize data processing equipment to
analyze financial data for itself and others. See 61 Fed. Reg. 4,853 (1996) (codified at 12 CFR §
7.1019 (1998)).
193. Id.
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reviewing a bank's technology risk management procedures. 198  The
Technology Risk Management guidance is one of the agency's most
comprehensive statements on technology issues that provides national banks
and examiners with a framework for managing technology as a vital part of
the bank's services. The OCC encourages security policies, awareness, and
controls that result in reliable access control, user authentication, data
integrity, data privacy, and transaction verification.' 99 The guidance also
suggests system "firewalls" to prevent system penetration.2°° Examiners will
evaluate senior management regarding sufficient knowledge and skills, as
well as their planning process to manage technology-related risks.01
The bulletin also addresses using third party personal computer
systems. The bulletin stresses the need to manage and review the third
party's financial conditions, its internal control practices, and rights if the
third party system should fail.2 2 Finally the OCC encourages all national
banks to keep abreast of new developments in electronic banking. 203 Such
monitoring should include both state and federal changes and
implementation of rules and regulations. 2 4
The OCC recognizes the importance of the banking industry's showing
of leadership in advancements in electronic banking. At the beginning of
1998, the OCC approved the application of a Utah Bank, Zions First
National Bank, to be the first financial institution to offer digital signature
products to its customers.205 It has also been working to address consumer
concerns by analyzing findings by such groups as the Consumer Electronic
Payments Task Force which the Treasury Secretary asked the OCC to chair
in 1996.6 Such findings show that consumers want adequate disclosure
about a company and less disclosure about themselves. At the same time, the
198. See OCC Warns Banks on Technology Risks (visited Dec. 25, 1998) <http:ll
wvv.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/98-13.txt> [hereinafter OCC Warns].
199. Id.
200. Id
201. These risks include risks associated with computer hardware, software applications,
and telecommunications services. Id. The risks fall into four categories: transactions, strategic,
reputation, and compliance risks. Id.
202. OCC Warns, supra note 198.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. OCC Approves a National Bank to Certify Digital Signatures (visited Dec. 22, 1998)
<http:llwww.occ.treas.gov/ftp/releaset984.htm>. Digital signatures are used for electronic
authentication of the sender of an electronic message. Id. As stated by Comptroller of the
Currency, Eugene Ludwig, 'The ability to verify and authenticate electronic signatures is
essential to the development of electronic commerce and electronic banking." Id. The Utah bank
plans to focus on certification services involving corporate and government documents. Id.
206. See Consumer Electronic Payment Task Force <http:llwww.occ.treas.govl>.
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OCC has recognized the need for limiting government restrictions and
20providing predictable government involvement whenever it is necessary.207
The OCC, through its broad range of banking policies, is promoting self-
regulation and is diligently working to show that public concerns about
privacy and disclosure of information can be addressed without requiring
externally imposed government solutions. 0 8
V. ELECTRONIC MONEY AND BANK RELATED ISSUES
A. Nonbank Institutions as Financial Providers
There are many types of financial institutions, including federal and
state chartered depository institutions, check-cashing organizations,
insurance companies, and brokerage firms.2°9 All of these institutions are
subject to extensive state and federal regulations to protect the integrity of
our monetary system. The dilemma is that if nonbank entities are not
classified and regulated as banks, but are allowed to provide limited bank-
like services put our monetary system is at risk because it is through
regulation that federal agencies protect the consumer and the United States
financial system. Part of the problem is that the federal banking regulations
do not provide a consistent definition of the term "bank." For example, the
Bank Holding Company Act defines a "bank" as any FDIC insured bank or
any institution that accepts demand deposits and engages in the business of
210making commercial loans. Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, a
"bank" includes an institution chartered as a bank or any other "banking"
institution that is engaged in the business of receiving deposits.21 Under the
National Bank Act, core "banking" functions generally include the receiving
212of deposits, paying checks, and making loans. If a standard definition is
established, the issue then becomes whether nonbank entities qualify as a
"bank" and should be required to meet banking regulations.
207. Julie L. Williams, Remarks at the Banking Roundtable Lawyers Council,
Washington, D.C. (May 8, 1995) (visited Dec. 22, 1998) <http:llwww.occ.treas.gov/ftp/releasel
98-2d50a.txt.>.
208. Id.
209. Wilson, supra note 14, at 671.
210. Melanie L. Fein, In Cyberbanking, When Do Non-Banks Become 'Banks'?, 15 No. 5
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A number of nonbank entities currently offer a variety of bank-like
services, including issuing and providing new electronic payment products
such as stored value cards and digital cash.213 Nonbank institutions have the
potential to be high-risk operations which regulation must address in order to
provide the consumer confidence and safety that traditional banking
institutions provide to their customers. Many of these nonbank entities are
using electronic money to provide different types of services. Again,
DigiCash and CyberCash Inc., have developed Internet payment systems and
are continuing to establish a trusted link between the Internet and banks.214
Therefore, it is likely that nonbank entities will issue electronic value in
exchange for United States currency. This situation generates two important
questions: 1) Where is the U.S. currency stored that is exchanged for
electronic value?; and 2) Is the U.S. currency insured while it is stored?
Just recently, the importance of these questions came into focus when
DigiCash filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11.215 A traditional
bank would have FDIC insurance. Currently, any currency held by a
nonbank such as DigiCash is not insured by the FDIC and the nonbank
retains control over it under a Chapter 11 ruling. Such a situation places our
monetary system at risk and would have a negative impact on the growth of
electronic commerce and Internet banking, because a lack of consumer
confidence is fostered.
Under the current structure, the entity would have to qualify as a bank
before federal banking regulators could examine and control the activities of
216the issuer. As mentioned previously, the FDIC does not treat the funds
stored in value cards as deposits and there is currently no indication that the
FDIC will insure nonbank entities.217 In addition, electronic money is yet to
218be considered legal tender. Assuming the entities issuing smart cards and
other electronic value do not qualify as banks, and are not covered by our
federal banking regulations, then the question remains whether the bank
213. See generally Digicash (visited Jan. 14, 1999) <http://www.digicash.com/
digicash/digicash/profile/index.htnb>.
214. CyberCash - Free Wallet (visited May 10, 1998) <http://www.cybercash.com/
cybercash/consumers/wallet.html>.
215. Welcome to DigiCash (visited Jan. 14, 1999) <http://www.digicash.com/
digicash/index.htmI>.
216. Federal Deposit Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (1994).
217. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(3)(1) (Supp. 1997).
218. Id. See also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., General Counsel's Op. No. 8; Stored
Value Cards, 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,490 (1996).
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regulatory agencies should extend their governance over such entities, or if
some other form of governmental intervention is needed to regulate them.
With these institutions using "electronic money," it is imperative that
such nonbanks be regulated and be required to adhere to the same standards
as a bank. If electronic money is to become equivalent to legal tender, then
it must also be as secure as money is today. Nonbank institutions providing
such money and services must rise to the same standards as banks and
provide the same level of consumer protection.
B. Privacy Issues
There are a number of privacy issues that arise for the financial
institutions and the consumers. One issue is whether electronic banking
services that are processed through the Internet compound the possibility of
confidential account information being obtained or tampered with by third
parties.2 19 Another issue is the potential disclosure of personal information
to third parties due to the consumer's unfamiliarity with new banking
products. The financial system relies on current privacy legislation to
define the limits of a third party's legal right to access a person's financial
information. However, current privacy legislation does not address the
heightened privacy concerns raised by the use of electronic money on the
Internet.221 Current legislation includes the Privacy Act of 1974("Privacy
Act"), the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1982 ("RFPA"), and the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA").224
The Privacy Act protects an individual's private information, regulates
the practices of federal agencies regarding personal information, and
balances the individual's need for privacy and the government's need for
such information to fulfill certain functions. 225 Each federal agency must
219. Robert G. Ballen & Thomas Fox, The New Business of Banking: What Banks Can
Do Now: Legal Issues in the New World of Cyberbanking, 912 PRAC. LAW. INST. CORP. L.
HANDBOOK SERiES 497, 503-4 (1995).
220. Id.
221. Catherine M. Downey, The High Price of a Cashless Society: Exchanging Privacy
Rights for Digital Cash?, 14 J. MARSHALLJ. COMPurER & INFO. L. 303,308 (1996).
222. In 1974, Congress enacted the Privacy Act, which was the first federal statute
recognizing the need to balance an individual's concern for information privacy with the
institutional practice of storing information in a computerized record-keeping system. 5 U.S.C. §
552(a) (1974).
223. 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (1982).
224. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1986).
225. H.R. REP. No. 95-1383 at 33-34 (1978).
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register the existence of every federal data bank in the Federal Register.226
Furthermore, no federal agency may disclose any record contained in its
system to any other person or agency without the written request or consent
of the individual.227
In 1982, Congress enacted the RFPA to further protect customer
financial records. Under the RFPA no government authority may have
access to, or obtain copies of, information contained in the financial records
of any customer from a financial institution, unless the customer authorizes
such disclosure.
229
The ECPA " protects the individual against the interception of
electronic communications by an unauthorized person. Titles I and III of the
ECPA pertain to common computer-to-computer communications, including
the transmission of financial records or funds transfers among financial
institutions.231 Title I focuses on electronic communications, and thus
directly aplies to most of the data exchanged between parties using the
Interet.23 Title II states that a communications service provider "shall not
knowingly divulge the contents of a communication" while in electronic
storage when communications arrive electronically, and the service provider
retains records solely for processing and storage.23
However, the potential for intrusions by unauthorized persons and
exposure of a user's financial information is still possible on the Internet,
which is beyond the protection of the ECPA. Without adequate privacy.
protections, transactions conducted on the Internet can be exposed to third
parties. One solution is increased usage of encryption.z 4 It can be argued
that without encryption there will be widespread invasion of privacy, and
increased criminal activity. Also, it can be argued that because consumers
may not be familiar with the potential disclosure of personal information to
226. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (1998).
227. Id. at 3. However, there are several exceptions to the Privacy Act through which
federal agencies can gain access to an individual's record to combat criminal activity. Id.
228. 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (1998). Furthermore, the Privacy Act allows an individual to copy,
correct, and challenge his personal information stored in the data banks of the federal agencies.
Id.
229. Id. In order to obtain a customer's financial records from a financial institution, the
federal government must follow the procedural requirements of the RFPA and submit a written
certification indicating its compliance. Id. However, the customer faces difficult obstacles in
challenging or blocking the disclosure of his financial records, and must usually wait until after
such disclosure to dispute the government's intrusion. Id.
230. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-18 (1994).
231. Id.
232. 1&
233. Id. § 2511(3)(a) (1994).
234. See infra text accompanying note 254.
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The Internet is "inherently insecure," 36 and the typical person using the
Internet is unaware of the risk, since a large portion of today's activities on
the Internet is based on information retrieval. However, financial
institutions face the difficulty of processing transactions in this same
environment. Transactions occurring on the Internet are over a public
network that is open and available to anyone, including criminals. A
knowledgeable person could trap, change, and redirect information and
transactions that occur on the Internet. The average person could not
perform this type of criminal act because it takes special knowledge,
software, and hardware tools to do so, but the number of people with these
skills is growing every day. A cyber criminal may transfer funds into
another account, make unauthorized purchases, or even obtain money from
others. With voluminous transmissions and open travel over the Internet, all
data transfers potentially can be read or monitored by a third party. In
particular, there are "sniffer" systems that are available to anyone, that can
be set up on any network at any port that look for and collect certain types of
data. While these systems are legitimately used in network management,
the systems can also be used in illegitimate activities such as theft of credit
card numbers or passwords.
Any connected data storage systems, and any data stored on an Internet
server may be susceptible to compromise, if proper security precautions are
not taken. Data integrity is also in jeopardy because the Internet can
potentially allow those with specific knowledge and tools to alter or modify
data during transmission. There are other security risks associated with
banking on the Internet. These include risks associated with authentication,
non-repudiation, and access control.2
39
It is essential to be able to verify that a particular communication,
transaction, or access request is legitimate and accurate.24° This verification
235. Ballen & Fox, supra note 219 at 503.
236. FDIC, Division of Supervision FIL-131-97: Security Risks Associated with the
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process is known as authentication.24 1 "[A] computer system... on the
Internet is identified by an Internet Protocol ("IP") address which works
[much like] a telephone.., number."242  The key difference is that this
number is set dynamically each time a user connects to the Internet.
243
Because it is dynamically set, the physical destination and origin of
transactions are difficult to verify or authenticate using conventional
methods. 244 Thus, the door opens for any person to intercept or pose as
someone else on the Internet. An intruder can use a technique called
"spoofing' 24 to gain access to the system and pose as an authorized user, or
can use a software program that generate passwords from the information
gathered from an unauthorized access to a program.246 Because of these
possible interceptions, authentication controls are necessary to identify all
parties to a communication.
Nonrepudiation is essential for validating data.247 "Nonrepudiation
involves creating proof of the origin or delivery of data to protect the sender
against the recipient denying that the data has been received or to protect the
recipient against false denial by the sender that the data has been sent. 248
Therefore, "to ensure that a transaction is enforceable, steps must be taken to
prohibit parties from disputing the validity of, or refusing to acknowledge,
legitimate communications or transactions."
249
Risks associated with access control of systems must also be addressed
by a financial institution. Access control refers to protecting the integrity of
the network and its supporting systems from unauthorized access by using
the most innovative software and hardware technology available. 2 0 "Risks
include the destruction, altering, or theft of data or funds; compromised data
confidentiality; denial of service (system failures); a damaged public image;
and resulting legal implications." 1 Constant monitoring of the system is
required because hackers, unscrupulous vendors, former or disgruntled
252
employees, or even agents of espionage may try to invade the system.
241. See also Security Risks, supra note 236; Randy V. Sabett, Cryptography, Smart
Cards, and Future Banking technology (visited Jan. 1, 1999) <http:llvenable.conilitlab/
eblcr5.html>.
242. Security Risks, supra note 236.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. "IP spoofing" is to have one computer set up to act as another computer. Id.
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Once an intruder has gained access, they could change advertised rates on
financial transactions or possibly even shut down an entire system. As we
work to protect the integrity of the Internet and this new emerging banking
system, there are intruders working to take advantage of whatever
weaknesses there are in the network. There are software programs that run
security scans on Internet servers, firewalls, and internal networks, which
can help an intruder identify and attack a system by finding its weak link. 3
Because of the security risks described above, a financial institution should
implement several security measures that are presently available.
One such security measure is encryption.254 Encryption, or crypto-
graphy, is a method of converting information to an unintelligible piece of
data and then, throuh decryption, changing it back to its original
understandable form. "The information is encrypted (encoded) and
decrypted (decoded) by... 'cryptographic keys." '25 6 The encryption renders
the information unreadable because it appears as a series of unorganized
characters. Thus, the encryption technology provides assurance of data
privacy, confidentiality, and integrity, with some methods providing
protection against forgery and tampering.
There are symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic key systems. "With
a symmetric key system (also known as secret key or private key system), all
parties have the same key" to encrypt and decrypt messages.2 7  The
distribution of a key to each party in a transaction over a large network is
impractical for widespread use. In an asymmetric key system (also known as
a public key system), there are two keys, with one being secret (a "private
key") and one being public (a "public key"). 8 The private and public keys
are mathematically related so that the corresponding public key can only
decrypt the private key. Similarly, the corresponding private key that is
specific to a party or computer system can only decrypt the public key. This
system, therefore, authenticates the private key holder. More importantly, "it
is nearly mathematically impossible for the holder of any public key to use it
to figure out what" or who holds the private key.Y9 The strength of the key is
253. Id.
254. Id. "Encryption techniques directly address the security issues surrounding data
privacy, confidentiality, and data integrity. Encryption technology is also employed in digital
signature processes, which address the issues of authentication and non-repudiation." Id.
255. Security Risks, supra note 236.
256. Id. "These 'keys' are actually values, used by a mathematical algorithm to transform
the data. The effectiveness of encryption technology is determined by the strength of the
algorithm, the length of the key, and the appropriateness of the encryption system selected." Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Security Risks, supra note 236.
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determined by the length of the key. Therefore, a longer key makes it harder
for high-speed computers to break the code. 2
A digital signature is another type of cryptography that can be used as a
security measure by a financial institution. Digital signatures authenticate
261the identity of the sender by using the private key. The digital signature is
derived from the content of the message itself, establishing a link such that
the message cannot be repudiated.262 "To generate a digital signature, the
original, unencrypted message is run through a mathematical algorithm that
generates what is known as a message digest.' '263 'The message digest is
then encrypted with a private key, and sent along with the message."2  The
recipient decrypts the message digest, and if the resulting message digest
matches the one sent with the message, the message has not been altered.2 65
Thus, data integrity has been verified. Because the message digest was
encrypted with a private key, the sender can be identified and connected to
the specific message and the digital signature cannot be reused.2
6
"Certificate Authorities" and digital certificates are other ways to
address security concerns, particularly in the area of authentication. "A
'Certificate Authority' is a trusted third party that verifies the identity of a
party to a transaction." 267 "The identities of all parties must have been proven
to the "Certificate Authority" beforehand. Digital certificates are messages
that are signed with the "Certificate Authority's" private key. 8
An individual bank's activities will dictate the level and type of security
measures required. This may, for instance, include encryption, digital
signatures, certificate authorities, and digital certificates.2 9 With technology
and implementation standards changing daily, the necessary legal
infrastructure will continue to evolve and possibly lead to further regulation.
In November 1997, the Electronic Financial Services Efficiency Act of
1997 ("Act") was introduced, granting legal validity and equal treatment to




263. Id. A message digest is a unique character representation of the data. Security Risks,




267. Security Risks, supra note 236.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. 21st Century Banking Alert, No. 97-11-13 (visited Jan. 29, 1998) <http:f/www.
fflisj.com/bancmail/21starch/ 971113.html> [hereinafter 21st Century Banking]. House Report
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authentication would be valid and legal according to this Act, if it "reliably
establishes" both the identity of the maker, sender, or originator of a
document, communication, or transaction and the fact that the document,
communication, or transaction, has not been altered.271 Therefore, any
record would be valid and legal according to the Act with a qualified
electronic authentication, unless state law prohibited it.272 For the
authentication to be valid, it must be:
(i) unique to the person making, sending, or originating a
document or communication;
(ii) capable of verification;
(iii) under the sole control of the person using it; and
(iv) linked to data or a communication transmitted in such a
manner that if such data or communication has been altered, the
authentication becomes invalid.
273
In particular, the Act authorizes that a digital signature, accompanied by
a certificate issued by a third party, can be used in lieu of a paper based
written signature in any communication that requires a signature within a
federal agency, a United States court, or other instrument of the United
274States government. The Act also established a National Association of
Certification Authorities ("NACA") as the central association with which
any person or grouy must register, in order to qualify as an authentication
service provider. Despite movement toward providing authentication
standards, the Act does leave some issues unresolved, including the liability
of the certification provider and the role of NACA. This emerging
technology, while providing additional security for financial institutions, is
still in its infancy, during which many new developments and regulations
will surface.
2937, the Electronic Financial Services Efficiency Act of 1997, was introduced by
Representatives Richard H. Baker (R-LA) and David Drier (R-CA). Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. A significant number of states have enacted or are considering enacting digital
signature or other electronic authentication laws. Id.









1. Regulation E and the Electronic Funds Transfer Act
Regulatory agencies are expected to provide the financial structure that
protects the average consumer as well as the financial systems. However, in
order for this to work, banks must comply with these
regulations. Regardless of whether a bank uses a third party provider for
Internet banking services, it must comply with applicable federal and state
laws and regulations when it comes to consumer protection.276  These
regulations help provide consumer protection and confidence. Many
consumer protection laws regarding wire transfers come from the Electronic
Fund Transfers Act of 1978 ("EFTA").277  The Federal Reserve Board
promulgated Regulation E ("Regulation E") to implement the EFTA.278
Regulation E covers all electronic funds transfers ("EFT"). 279 Both the
EFTA and Regulation E are consumer protection laws that amount to a
"consumer bill of rights" in electronic banking.280  The EFTA and
Regulation E provide for consumer protection through disclosures, liability
limits, documentation, and error resolution procedures.21 The EFTA and
Regulation E require that: 1) consumers are given an initial and periodic
disclosure statements of the terms and conditions of the electronic funds
transfer service; 2) there are safeguards with respect to pre-authorized debits
and credits; 3) limitations are imposed on consumer liability for
unauthorized use of credit and banking services; and 4) financial institutions
investigate and resolve billing errors through error resolution procedures. 2
On May 2, 1996, the Federal Reserve Board issued a proposed rule forthe apliction283
the application of Regulation E to stored value systems. Applying
276. Dan C. Aardal, Consumer Protection Issues in Home Banking, Electronic Banking
Developments: U.C.C. and Selected Regulatory Perspectives, 1996 ABA SEC. Bus. L. at 25, 31
(1996).
277. 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1994).
278. Electronic Fund Transfers, 12 C.F.R. § 205 (1998).
279. An electronic funds transfer ('EFT) is defined as "any transfer of funds that is
initiated through electronic, terminal, telephone, or computer or magnetic tape for the purpose of
ordering, instructing, or authorizing a financial institution to debit or credit an account." See 12
C.F.R. § 205.3(b); see generally Michael A. Fixler, Cyberfinance: Regulating Banking on the
Internet, 47 CAsE W. Rns. L. REv. 81, 90 (1996).
280. Aardal, supra note 276, at 31.
281. Fed Study Recommends Alternatives to Reg E for Stored-Value Cards, 16 No. 8
BANKINGPOL'YREP. 13, 15 (1997).
282. Barbara E. Matthews, Reg E and Stored Value Cards: Fed is on Right Track, 15 No.
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Regulation E to electronic money, especially through stored value systems,
has the potential of interfering with the use of electronic money, but it also
provides consumers with certain protections whenever a consumer's account
is accessed electronically. The proposed rule focused on the type of stored
value system rather than the entity issuing the card.2 4 The Federal Reserve
Board divided stored value systems into three types: "online accountable,"
"offline accountable," and "offline unaccountable."2 5 Online accountable
system is a system that only requests a transfer at the bank's central
286database. These systems were deemed to be subject to Regulation E with
modification for the particular nature of the system. Whereas offline
accountable system is one in which the transactions took place offline but
the bank had the ability to determine the impact of the transaction on the
customer's balance.287 The offline accountable systems have been regarded
as being minimally regulated, with the focus turning to adequate disclosure
to consumers. The third type identified was the offline unaccountable
system which are those systems in which the transaction took place offline
and there is no central database at the bank.288  This type of system is
deemed to be not regulated by Regulation E. The proposed rule outlining
these types of stored value systems were the first steps toward providing
consumer protection for electronic transactions. Such efforts will foster the
application of existing or creation of new consumer protection laws for
banking on the internet.289
2. Consumer versus Bank Liability
The question of consumer liability for unauthorized transfers was
debated in Congress and resulted in a compromise between banks and
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. John L. Douglas, Electronic Money, 17th Annual Corporate Counsel Institute
(unpublished) December 10, 1998. Online accountable systems were those systems where the
bank retained an account in the name of the customer, which was debited only when the
information related to the transaction was noted by the bank. See generally Richard L. Field,
1996: Survey of the Year's Developments in Electronic Cash Law and the Law Affecting
Electronic Banking in the United State, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 967, 976 (1997).
287. For an online accountable system, there is no authentication or authorization for the
transaction but there is still a central database that records values and keeps those transactions
apart from the card. See generally Field, supra note 286.
288. Id. The system allows for the stored value card involved to be used independently
when there is no centralized bank that maintains all the transactional information. Id. In other
words, the transactional information and reconciliation of the transactions occur on the card. la-
289. 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b) (1998).
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consumer groups' positions.290 An unauthorized transfer is a transfer
initiated by someone other than the customer and without actual authority
from the customer.29' The banks supported a "negligence" standard in which
a consumer has no liability unless the consumer's negligence contributed to
the loss. 292 Consumer groups pushed for a flat fifty dollars liability limit• 293
similar to the limit imposed for credit card fraud. Section 909 of the
EFTA and Section 205.6 of Regulation E represent the compromise of these
two groups by holding consumers liable for "unauthorized" electronic fund
transfers, but that liability is sharply limited. 4 Aside from two exceptions,
a consumer's liability for an unauthorized transfer is limited to the lesser of
fifty dollars or the amount obtained in the unauthorized transfer.
5
However, a consumer is held liable for unauthorized transfers which resulted
from the consumer's own negligence. 6
Another area in which there are limits on consumer liability is in an
unauthorized transfer from a breach of home banking security. 297  For
example, a "hacker 298 can break into a database containing access card
numbers and personal identification numbers, which are maintained by the
bank or a third party service provider, and use them to make transfers. Also
a consumer may transmit a transaction from home to the bank and the
transaction is intercepted by an unsuspected third party. In such situations,
analysis of the EFTA and Regulation E would suggest that the bank will be
held liable.299 Such breach of security constitutes unauthorized electronic
fund transfer in which the customer has limited liability. Therefore, with the
prospect of being liable for breaches of system security, it is imperative that
290. See generally Aardal, supra note 276.
291. Id. § 12 C.F.R. 205.2(m) (1998). An unauthorized transfer is defined in Section
205.2(1) of Regulation E. Id. 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(1). If a transfer is performed by someone who is
not authorized then the customer has limited liability. Id.
292. Id. § 205.6(a).
293. Id. § 205.6(b).
294. Aardal, supra note 276, at 32.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 33. Such negligence includes safeguarding a Personal Identification Number
(PIN). Id. at 34. Therefore, a bank can highly recommend that a customer safeguard a PIN but
can not hold that consumer liable if the consumer writes that PIN on the top of the access card.
Id.
297. Aardal, supra note 276, at 35.
298. A hacker is somebody who knows the ins and outs of an operating system, a
network, or computer language. A "bad" hacker defaces web sites with electronic graffiti, or
steals user names, passwords or credit card numbers from an operating system or network.
Adam L. Penenberg, Forbes Digital Tool: Entertainment - Hacking the Corporate Ladder
(visited Feb. 17, 1999) <http:lwww.forbes.conltoollhtml/97/octlOlO/feat.htm>.
299. Aardal, supra note 276, at 35.
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banks focus on security issues at all levels. The bank has the burden of
proving that the transaction was authorized.300 The consumer then can point
out that the bank should bear liability for breaches of security, since it was
the bank who selected the computer program, the mode of
telecommunications, the third party service providers who may be involved,
and the components of the home banking system.301 Thus, it becomes
important that the bank have strong agreements with home banking service
providers, processors, software vendors or developers to limit the bank's
liability due to failures attributable to third parties. 3°2
A consumer is also protected from a bank's failure to make an
electronic fund transfer through section 910 of the EFTA. Section 910 of the
EFTA protects the consumer by holding that the bank is liable for the failure
to make an electronic fund transfer and for all damages proximately caused
by such failure to make such a transfer.303 Shifting liability to the bank is
crucial in developing consumer confidence in using electronic payment
systems and performing banking transactions over the Internet.
VI. CONCLUSION
Entering the new millenium, the Internet has become a remarkable
convergence of break through technology for numerous information-based
and monetary-based industries such as banking. A whole new arena of
electronic commerce is emerging, which is reshaping and revolutionizing our
banking practices. As the printing press, the automobile, the telephone, and
the airplane brought the world together, so is the Internet transcending
borders. But, with advancement comes difficult strategic choices in
determining the path of a system as open as the Internet without hindering
progress. It is within this medium that regulatory agencies must become
leaders in setting precedent in dealing with the challenges of privacy,
security, and jurisdictional issues. Banks have gained the confidence of the
consumer in the past. The challenge now is to gain that some level of
consumer confidence in banking on the Internet. Therefore, it is vital that
regulations and standards dealing with security measures, such as encryption
and digital signatures, continue to evolve. Banks are faced with many
300. Section 909(b) of the EFTA places the burden of proving such a transaction was
authorized on the bank. Id. at 36.
301. Id.
302. See Wilson, supra note 1, at 33.
303. Id. A bank is liable to a consumer for all damages proximately caused by the bank's
failure to make an electronic fund transfer in the correct amount or in a timely manner or due to
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challenges, including the emergence of electronic money and criminals on
the Internet. Also, the lines between a traditional financial institution such
as a bank and nonfinancial institutions are becoming blurred, and banks are
now competing for the consumer's business. All these changes reflect the
impact of the Internet on our banking practices.
It is very necessary to establish a strategy and a roadmap for electronic
banking. Banking, unlike the remainder of electronic commerce, is a highly
regulated industry. It is important that nonbank entities fall under a formal
regulatory structure. With this structure two key items can occur. First, a
uniform set of enforceable regulations on banking worthiness can be
established. This will enhance customer confidence. Second, a strategic
plan can be developed on a global level by the G-10 and its member nations,
that can use the decades of banking experience to steer the new
inexperienced electronic banking industry away from potential pitfalls and
banking failures. It is good to remember what happened on October 17,
1987 ("Black Monday"). Part of the failure in the stock market was caused
by an uncontrolled "programmed sell-off.' '304  If regulations are not
established for all types of Internet banking, both banks and nonbanks will
be open to the same type of mass electronic flooding of systems, or an
electronic "run" on banks. A bank could be out of business in a matter of
hours.
Together the private and public sectors can establish a new electronic
banking and commerce environment that will enable new opportunities to
promote growth of and expand our world economy by reaching new
customers, lowering operating costs, and extending financial institutions and
nonfinancial institutions to new levels of service, delivery, and innovation.
Jacqueline Marcucci
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most monumental events of the last half-century has been
the marriage of computing power and communication technology. The
product of this union has evolved into what is commonly called the
"information superhighway."1 The newfound ability to access vast amounts
of information, coupled with the ability to communicate with man and
1. Al Gore, Communications; Networking the Future; We Need a National
'Superhighway'for Computer Information, WASH. POST, July 15, 1990, at B3. This term quickly
became part of the vernacular to describe the revolution of online communication.
2. The indexing of the Internet via "hyperlinks" allows for "information to be accessed and
organized in very flexible ways, and allow[s] people to locate and efficiently view related
information even if the information is stored on numerous computers all around the world."
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). See also
infra Part 1II.A.
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machine across global distances is revolutionizing the way we live. No
industry, profession, or enterprise has remained untouched by this
phenomenon.3 As each segment of society is confronted by the challenges
and opportunities brought on by the information revolution, it needs to adapt
and reinvent itself to meet the demands and capabilities of this medium. The
Internet in the legal arena is no different.4
When litigation concerns online contact, personal jurisdiction will be
considered a threshold issue. The Internet is a community without walls or
boundaries that encourages people to indiscriminately communicate and
conduct business over state and national borders. If litigation ensues from
such contact, the propriety of jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant will
invariably arise. Because the conventional methods of communication have
been altered, it must be determined whether the traditional tests employed by
the courts to determine personal jurisdiction issues still apply in this new era
of online communication.
This article will examine how the courts have dealt with personal
jurisdiction in the context of online communication. First, the modem
framework of personal jurisdiction as set forth by numerous United States
Supreme Court decisions is examined. Second, this article will briefly
describe the Internet and analyze the unique nature of the Internet as a
communicative device. Finally, this article will examine how the courts
have dealt with this issue and formulate some of the factors used by the
courts in making personal jurisdiction determinations.
One of the most important aspects of our legal system is its ability to adapt
to new and emerging areas. The elasticity of the law is what provides it with
enduring strength. Therefore, to best understand the future of online personal
jurisdiction, one must consider the design of existing law and determine how the
courts will adapt these principles to new and emerging areas.
IX. PERSONAL JURISDICTION: A MODERN FRAMEWORK
The doctrine of personal jurisdiction limits the parties upon whom a court
5may impose a binding and enforceable judgment. A court will always have
jurisdiction over the plaintiff in an action because by filing the lawsuit in a
particular forum, the plaintiff consents to the jurisdiction of that court. 6 On the
3. See generally Gore, supra note 1.
4. See John F. Delaney & Adam Lichstein, The Law of the Internet: A Swnmary of U.S.
Internet Caselaw and Legal Developments, 505 PRAc. L. INST. PAT., COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS,
& LrTERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERiEs 79 (Jan. 1998); LANCE ROSE, N~rLAW (Osborne
1995).
5. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957). See Kulko v.
California, 436 U.S. 84,91 (1978).
6. Naum v. Brown, 604 F. Supp. 1186, 1188 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
[Vol. 23:781
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other hand, defendants who need not consent to the jurisdiction of the court
will be safeguarded by the principles of personal jurisdiction. These
principles protect defendants from being unwillingly placed under the
jurisdiction of a foreign court in a manner that is unjust and inequitable.7
The current state of personal jurisdiction law is a blend of statutory law and
constitutional limitations. For a court8 to impose in personam9 jurisdiction
over a defendant, both the long arm statutes of the forum state and the due
process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment must be complied
with.10
A. Long Arm Statutes
Each state has a long arm statute that dictates the instances in which
nonresident defendants will be subject to the jurisdiction of its courts. Such
7. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (citing International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310,319 (1945)).
8. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure indirectly apply a state's long arm statute to the
federal courts. Under the Federal Rules:
Service of a summons or filing a waiver of service is effective to
establish jurisdiction over the person of a defendant
(A) who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general
jurisdiction in the state in which the district court is located, or
(B) who is a party joined under Rule 14 or Rule 19 and is served at a
place within a judicial district of the United States and not more than
100 miles from the place from which the summons issues, or
(C) who is subject to the federal interpleader jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1335, or
(D) when authorized by a statue of the United States.
FED. R. Cv. P. 4(k)(1).
Though jurisdiction is proper in a number of instances, it is most commonly found
pursuant to the long arm statute of the state in which the district court is located. Id.
9. Personal jurisdiction over a defendant, who does not consent to the jurisdiction of the
court, can be obtained in one of three ways. In personam jurisdiction is jurisdiction over a
defendant "where the entire object of the action is to determine the personal rights and
obligations of the defendants." Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,727 (1877). In rem jurisdiction is
jurisdiction in a "proceeding ... taken directly against property, and has for its object the
disposition of the property." Id. at 734. Quasi in rem jurisdiction is jurisdiction "based on
attachment or seizure of property present in the jurisdiction." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
196 (1977).
10. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 463-64 (1985). See also Savin v.
Ranier, 898 F.2d 304, 306 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating "In diversity cases, federal courts must look to
the forum state's long-arm [sic] statute to determine if personal jurisdiction may be obtained over
a nonresident defendant. If jurisdiction is appropriate under the relevant statute, the court must
then decide whether exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process.").
1999]
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a statute cannot broaden the reach of the court beyond what is
constitutionally permissible, but it can narrow the jurisdiction of a court and
limit it to even less than what is constitutionally acceptable." Long arm
statutes will commonly fit into one of two categories. The first type of
statute is one in which the state is looking to expand its jurisdiction to the
12limits allowed by its constitution. Such a statute will provide a court with
jurisdiction over any nonresident defendant so long as such jurisdiction is
not inconsistent with the United States Constitution. 3 The second type of
long arm statute is one that limits the power of the courts beyond what the
Constitution protects, thereby giving nonresident defendants greater
immunity from suit.14 These limiting statutes may allow for jurisdiction over
15
a nonresident defendant only in specific instances. For example, many
states allow jurisdiction only when the nonresident defendant has contracted
with a party in the forum state or has committed a tort in the forum state.'
6
Because each state has its own individualized long arm statute, there is
no uniformity. Nonetheless, regardless of a particular state's long arm
statute, jurisdiction must, at a minimum, be consistent with the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution. An assertion of jurisdiction that is
valid under a state's long arm statute but in violation of the Due Process
Clause will still be unconstitutional and nonbinding.
17
11. Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947, 950 (1st Cir. 1994)
(stating "The state statutes ... cannot provide for service of process on a defendant outside the
respective states unless the defendant has had the contact with that state that is required by the
fourteenth amendment.").
12. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (Deering 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5.33
(1997).
13. An example of such a statute is California's, which simply states that "[a] court of this
state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or
of the United States." § 410.10.
14. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (McKinney 1990).
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (1997) (invoking personal jurisdiction "[i]n any
action claiming injury to person or property or for wrongful death within or without this State
arising out of an act or omission within this State by the defendant.").
17. Lorelei Co. v. County of Guadalupe, 940 F.2d 717,720 (1st Cir. 1991)
mhe federal court must determine whether the state's "long arm" or
"doing business" statute authorizes it to exercise personal
jurisdiction over the foreign defendant. If it does, the court must
then determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction under
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B. Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in protecting
the fights of a defendant, limits the ability of a court to impose jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant who is not served process in the forum state or
who does not consent to the jurisdiction of the forum state. 18 It has long
been established that this protection is not absolute in that in personam
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant will be proper so long as "the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." ' 19 Over half a century ago, the United States Supreme
Court introduced the minimum contacts test to determine when a relationship
between the defendant and the forum state rises to a level at which
jurisdiction over the defendant would be fair and just.2° In questioning
whether such minimum contacts exist, the courts will measure the "quality
and nature" of the defendant's contact with the forum state in the context of
21the goals and ideals that the Due Process clause was designed to insure.
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,22 the United States Supreme
Court established the minimum contacts test, the backbone of any personal
jurisdiction formulation. 23 In his groundbreaking opinion, Chief Justice
Stone distinguished between three types of relationships that a party may
have with a forum state, each with different personal jurisdiction
ramifications. 24 First, a party may have a connection with the forum state so
substantial in nature that jurisdiction in that state will be justified in actions
arising from the party's activities within the forum or from matters "entirely
distinct from those activities." s For a defendant to be subject to such
jurisdiction, commonly known as "general jurisdiction,"' 2 there must be
contact with the forum that is "continuous and systematic" in nature. A
second type of jurisdiction will arise even when the defendant lacks the
substantial contacts necessary to give rise to general jurisdiction, but the
defendant nonetheless has some association with the forum state. When a
limited relationship exists and "the maintenance of the suit does not offend
18. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,733 (1877).
19. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
20. Id.
21. Id. at319.
22. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
23. Id. at 316.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 317.
26. "General jurisdiction" is the term used to explain "[w]hen a State exercises personal
jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant's contact with
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'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,"' jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant will be proper if the contact gave rise to the liability
sued upon. 8 Such jurisdiction is known as specific jurisdiction. 29 Unlike
these two relationships, which give rise to a finding of minimum contacts,
the Court recognized a third category in which a defendant has "no contacts,
30ties, or relations" with the forum state. In such an instance, there are no
minimum contacts, and personal jurisdiction is not constitutionally
31justified .3
International Shoe, which required the existence of minimum contacts
to ensure "fair play and substantial justice, ' 32 was subsequently manipulated
by the Court. Thirty-five years later, in World Wide Volkswagen Co. v.
Woodson,33 the United States Supreme Court held that a New York
automobile dealer was not subject to jurisdiction in Oklahoma when an
automobile sold by the dealer in New York was driven to Oklahoma and was
involved in an accident there.34 A critical element of the Court's analysis
was whether the defendant "should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court" in the forum state.35  The primary purpose of inquiring into the
reasonableness and fairness of the forum is "to protect[ ] the defendant
against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum."
36
Only when foreign litigation is foreseeable to the defendant will
personal jurisdiction be reasonable.37  Foreseeability requires more than
merely entering a product into the stream of commerce;3 8 rather, it requires
that the defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State. 39 Such "purposeful availment" will give
notice to the defendant of its susceptibility to suit in a foreign state, thus
providing the minimum assurances required by the Constitution.4
28. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
29. "Specific jurisdiction" is the term used to explain "when a State exercises personal
jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the
forum." Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8 (1984).
30. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
33. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
34. Id. at 298-99.
35. Id. at 297.
36. Id. at 292.
37. Kulko v. California, 436 U.S. 84,97-98 (1978).
38. World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
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The courts use an assortment of factors to determine whether it is
reasonable to require a defendant to litigate in the forum state. These
considerations include the comparative burden on the defendant and plaintiff
in obtaining effective and convenient relief, the interest that the forum state
has in adjudicating the dispute, and judicial efficiency.4 1 The reasonableness
of requiring a defendant to defend himself in a foreign court is an important
factor that determines whether personal jurisdiction exists. If it is
unreasonable to require a defendant to litigate an action in the forum state,
the court will lack jurisdiction even if the defendant purposefully directed
his activities toward that state. 
4
Personal jurisdiction will usually be found when a "defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."'43 Once
a party takes advantage of doing business or conducting other activities in
the forum state, he automatically submits himself to the obligations of that
state, and is subject to suit in that state.44 The need to maintain a predictable
legal system that provides a defendant clear notice that he may be summoned
to court in a foreign state45 is so important that the purposeful availment
requirement has become a 'sine qua non for in personam jurisdiction."'46
Purposeful availment is measured by the "quality and nature" of the
contact made and is not a quantitative mechanical test. A single act in the
forum state can give rise to jurisdiction if the activity is such that it shows
the party's intent to avail itself of the benefit of making contact with the
state. Once such contact is made, it is no longer deemed "random,"
"fortuitous," or "attenuated," and the defendant "should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there." 49
The minimum contacts test was not designed as a rigid and
indiscriminate factual examination. Every facet of the contact, and its
effect on a finding of jurisdiction, must be analyzed to determine whether
asserting jurisdiction is constitutionally justified. At the very least, a court
41. World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. See also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462,476-77 (1985).
42. Burger King, 471 U.S.-at 477-78.
43. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
44. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
45. World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
46. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Southern
Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., 401 F.2d 374,381-82 (6th Cir. 1968)) (emphasis in original).
47. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
48. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (finding that a California
court had jurisdiction over a Texas insurance company based on a single policy sold in
California).
49. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,474-75 (1985).
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can impose its authority over a nonresident defendant when minimum
contacts are found such that requiring a party to defend a suit in the forum
state is reasonable. If the defendant's contacts with the forum state are
inconsequential, then regardless of how reasonable such a suit may be,
jurisdiction will be improper.51 Likewise, even if substantial contacts
exist, if it is unreasonable for the defendant to litigate the matter in the
forum state, jurisdiction will not be imposed. 2
The courts have not totally disregarded the extent to which
technology factors into the personal jurisdiction equation. In 1957, Justice
Black recognized a trend that was "expanding the permissible scope of
state jurisdiction" over foreign defendants because of the increased
nationalization of our economy and the ease of "modem transportation and
communication." 53 In the past four decades the technological advances in
computing, communication, and transportation have increasingly diluted
the significance of our state borders and nationalized our economy. As
Justice Black recognized, an expansion of personal jurisdiction has
54followed . Nonetheless, the Court has repeattdly waed that it iS a
mistake to think "state lines are irrelevant," or that the nationalization of
our economy "heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the
personal jurisdiction of state courts. 56
As the increased use of online communication suspends the reality of
our geographic limitations, the personal jurisdiction barrier will only
become a finer line. The technological advances that Justice Black
envisioned have increased exponentially, and discerning what minimum
contacts and reasonableness are in the realm of the online world is the next
challenge before the courts.
50. Id. at 472-73.
51. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
52. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir. 1981)
(finding a sliding scale with regard to these elements, in that "[t]he smaller the element of
purposeful interjection, the less is jurisdiction to be anticipated and the less reasonable is its
exercise.").
53. McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958).
54. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
55. World Wide Volkwagen Co. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
56. Id. at 294 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)). The Court in 1987
made it clear that constitutional personal jurisdiction requirements are still a valid concern. Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. California, 480 U.S. 102, 114-16 (1987). In Asahi, the Court found that a
California court did not have jurisdiction over a Japanese manufacturer of tire tube valve stems,
because of the severe burden on the defendant to defend itself in a foreign legal system. Id.
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III. THE INTERNET AS A WHOLE NEW PARADIGM
The Internet is the intangible grouping of many individual computers
and small computer networks into a decentralized "network of networks. 57
Just as people can communicate over long distances, computers have the
ability to communicate with each other in their own unique language. This
long-distance communication is done by randomly relaying messages from
computer to computer, through an infinite number of intermediaries, until
58the desired recipient is reached. Unlike the schoolyard game of
"telephone," computers communicate in a digital format that guarantees a
rapid and flawless transmission.
The average person may not appreciate the intricate, technological
marvels of online communication, but everyone can appreciate the
uniqueness of this medium and recognize why it will have a strong impact on
our lives. Among the distinguishing characteristics of the Internet are its
vast cadre of ever increasing information, its use of multimedia, its global
insensitivity, and its low-cost and high-speed access. 59 The Internet is not
merely an improvement of existing technology or an enhancement of our
communication capabilities-it is a whole new phenomenon. 60 To
understand the impact that the Internet has had and will increasingly have on
our society, one must acknowledge a paradigm shift from our established
models of communication and realize the uniqueness of Internet
communication. By seeing how atypical the Internet is, we can recognize its
power and attraction.
A. Information Glut
The Internet is not a typical database that can store vast amounts of
information. Unlike a database, which will always have some limit on
capacity, the Internet is truly infinite. By networking many computer
databases together, the Internet allows one to retrieve information from
many varied data sources. Since its inception in 1969 as a joint project of
government and academia, the number of computers linked to the Internet
57. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (providing an in-depth
explanation of the technology and usages of the Internet).
58. Id. at 831-32.
59. See generally The Economics of the Internet: Too Cheap to Meter?, ECONoMIST, Oct.
19, 1996.
60. The term "online communication" encompasses all electronic communication of which
the Internet is merely one form. This author has chosen not to distinguish between the different
forms of online communication and to use the terms interchangeably.
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has grown exponentially. In 1981, there were 300 computers linked to the
Internet; in 1989, there were 90,000, and by 1996, there were nearly ten
million host computers.
62
Just as with any "real world" medium, the uses for the Internet run the
gamut of our social culture. With the click of a button, one can "surf' 63
material as diverse as the latest political developments in Slovakia, the
trajectory of Halley's Comet in 2061, or the best methods of contraception.
It is the ease of access and varied nature of the material that make the
Internet so alluring.
On the Internet, information is accessed via a novel method of indexing
called hyperlinking. Hyperlinking allows an Internet user to click, with a
mouse, on a word,6jicture, or image and to immediately be linked to a
different document. Unlike existing methods of indexing, hyperlinking
does not limit the relationship of information to a predetermined linear
format. One's imagination is his or her limitation, not the alphabet,
chronology, or any other indexing system. For example, one viewing the
Declaration of Independence on the Internet can click upon the words "John
Hancock" and be immediately transferred to a biography of our founding
father or an article about signatures. Another click on the name of the
article's author will transfer the viewer to the New York Times bestseller list
on which that author is found. This method of indexing allows for a fast
paced flow of information and unlimited opportunity.
B. Multimedia
In the quest for access to information and communication, society has
used many media, each one with its distinct benefits and drawbacks.
Newspapers, magazines, and other printed materials are strictly one-
dimensional media because they communicate solely through print, a single
sensory and tangible medium. The written word has effectively allowed us
to communicate for centuries, yet it has significant limitations. The high
costs of printing and distribution are barriers to a continuous information
feed. Radio, though still one-dimensional, breaks the cost and distribution
barriers and allows for a continuous and contemporaneous flow of
information. Television is a multidimensional medium that allows for a
continuous information flow but is limited by expensive production costs.
61. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
62. Id.
63. "Surfing" is the act of jumping from one document to another via hyperlinks contained
in each document. See American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 166 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
64. See supra text accompanying note 2.
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The Internet takes the best qualities of each of our communicative
media. It is essentially a low-cost print, audio, and visual information
device. One can read and print the latest stock reports, listen to the closing
bell, and watch the frenzied activity on the floor of the New York Stock
Exchange, all without changing communication devices. Additionally, the
communication can be tailored to one's particular interests. In the fifteenth
century, movable type changed the way we communicate; in the 1900s, radio
changed the way we communicate; in the 1950s, television changed the way
we communicate; and in the twenty-first century, the Internet will change the
way in which we communicate.
C. Global Insensitivity
The Internet is global in two senses: first, it has no governing body or
partisan allegiance, and second, it is unrestricted by terrestrial borders or
physical limitations. An uninformed person may ask: Where is the
headquarters of the Internet? While this question may be valid in any other
sphere, in regard to the Internet, it is unanswerable. The New York Times
has its headquarters in midtown Manhattan and CNN in Atlanta, but the
Internet is strictly intangible. "There is no centralized storage location,
control point, or communications channel for the Internet, and it would not
be technically feasible for a single entity to control all of the information
conveyed on the Internet." 65 There is no central location, there is no
governing body, and there are no limitations. Information can be posted on
the Internet by any person, on any continent, in any language, and in any
format; that information can be accessed in a like manner.
D. Advertising
In the past decade, the Internet has become an increasingly popular
mode of communication. This increased popularity and exponential growth
can be directly attributed to the commercialization of the Internet. Corporate
America has recently discovered what academics have known for nearly
thirty years-namely, that the Internet is an efficient and economic
communicative device. Internet advertising is powerful because it is
inexpensive, global, and asynchronous. A business advertising on the
Internet can set up a website with information about its product or service at
a fraction of the cost of television, radio, or print advertising. Additionally,
the website, unlike other media, allows Internet users to access that "Internet
ad" from anywhere in the world and at any time of the day.
65. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 832.
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The global nature of the Internet does have some drawbacks in regard to
its inability to target certain individuals or geographic locations. That is, one
cannot limit website access strictly to viewers in New York or Lebanon, nor
can the website be limited to viewers over the age of eighteen or under the
age of sixty-five.66 A business wishing to advertise over traditional media
can limit its geographic scope and target audience. For instance, advertising
in a local newspaper will reach the local market but avoid the national
market. Even a national print or television campaign will not reach an
international audience. Likewise, a spot on a late-night talk show only
reaches certain viewer demographics. On the other hand, the Internet will
allow all users from any location to access your "Internet ad." While global
exposure has its benefits, the legal consequences of such exposure must be
realized.67  For example, in the realm of personal jurisdiction, a small
business owner in Florida who advertises on the Internet may not realize that
he may be subject to personal jurisdiction and may need to litigate a lawsuit
anywhere in the country because of that ad. It is in this context that many
personal jurisdiction issues have arisen.
IV. INTERNET JURISDICTION
When it comes to determining Internet-related personal jurisdiction
issues, a business owner about to foray into the cyberworld will ask whether
his website might expose him to the jurisdiction of a foreign court. The
answer to this question is yes, no, and maybe. Certainly, personal
jurisdiction can be evoked based exclusively on online contact, such as a
website, but personal jurisdiction cannot be imposed if the tests employed in
the "real world" are not met. Unfortunately, there is no perfunctory test to
determine whether personal jurisdiction exists; rather, such a determination
is dependent on the nature of the website and the online contact.
The court's opinion in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn,
Inc.68 sets forth an elucidating framework for analyzing online personal
jurisdiction issues.6 9 Other courts have cited'this framework with increased
frequency.70 A premise of this structured analysis is that not all online
66. Id. at 831. See also American Libraries, 969 F. Supp. at 171.
67. See Christopher W. Meyer, World Wide Web Advertising: Personal Jurisdiction
Around the Whole Wide World?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1269, 1297 (1997).
68. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
69. Id. at 1124.
70. See Mieczkowski v. Masco Corp., 997 F. Supp. 782, 786 (E.D. Tex. 1998);
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 55 (D.D.C. 1998); Blackburn v. Walker Oriental Rug
Galleries, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 636, 638 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Resuscitation Techs., Inc. v. Continental
Health Care Corp., No. IP 961457CM/S, 1997 WL 148567, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997);
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contact is of the same "nature and quality."71  Online, there are active
contacts with a foreign state, which will give rise to personal jurisdiction,
and there are passive contacts, which will not give rise to personal
jurisdiction. Active contact is online communication that fosters an ongoing
business relationship, whereas passive contact is online communication that
does "little more than make information available to those who are interested
in it. '
There is no brightline test to distinguish between online contact that is
active and passive. The courts look to all aspects of the contact to determine
whether such contact should be considered active, giving rise to personal
jurisdiction. In making such a determination, the level of "interactivity and
[the] commercial nature" of the contact is of paramount importance.7 As
discussed infra, the greater the level of interactivity on a website, the greater
the chance that the website will be considered active and give rise to
personal jurisdiction.74 Likewise, a website with little or no interaction
between the user and the website will be considered passive and will not
give rise to personal jurisdiction.75 In summary, when a court is presented
with an online personal jurisdiction issue, it must look to the specific facts of
the case and determine whether the online contact is active or passive. Upon
a finding of active contact, personal jurisdiction is proper. If the contact is
deemed passive, no personal jurisdiction shall be found.
What conduct is considered active and what conduct is considered
passive can best be understood by examining the factual polarity of
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson76 and Bensusan Restaurant Co. v. King.
77
CompuServe, a Sixth Circuit decision, depicts the quintessential active
contact and typifies the instance in which personal jurisdiction is proper.78
On the other hand, Bensusan, from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
provides an example of what the courts consider to be a passive website that
will not give rise to personal jurisdiction.79 With these cases as reference
Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327, 333 (D.NJ. 1997); SF Hotel Co., v. Energy Invs., Inc.,
985 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (D. Kan. 1997).




75. See Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y 1996), aff'd, 126
F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997); Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1997).
76. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
77. 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
78. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1257.
79. Bensusan, 126 F.3d at 25. To date only three United States circuit courts of appeals
have decided this issue. The Sixth Circuit in CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1257, the Second Circuit in
1999]
238
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
points, an examination of the spectrum between them will provide an
understanding of the factors to which the courts look in determining online
personal jurisdiction issues.
A. Active Contact: CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson
The first opinion by a circuit court on the issue of online personal
jurisdiction was CompuServe, in which ft held that an Ohio court had
jurisdiction over a Texas defendant based strictly on the defendant's online
contacts with the State of Ohio. 80 The defendant, Mr. Patterson, was a
subscriber and shareware' provider to CompuServe, Inc., an Ohio
82
corporation. As a shareware provider, Mr. Patterson had signed an online
contract, known as the Shareware Registration Agreement, which provided
that any litigation regarding the agreement would be construed and governed
in accordance with Ohio law. The relationship between Patterson and
CompuServe existed for three years, during which time Patterson u~loaded
thirty-two software programs to CompuServe's computers in Ohio. Once
uploaded, Patterson's shareware programs could be downloaded and
purchased by any CompuServe subscriber. In effect, Patterson used
CompuServe's computer network as "a distribution center to market his
software" programs.84  Patterson advertised these programs on the
CompuServe network, payment for the programs were made to CompuServe,
and the programs were available exclusively on the CompuServe network.
For over three years, Patterson sold programs to only twelve residents in
Ohio and received less than $650 in fees. In December of 1993, Patterson
claimed that CompuServe had incorporated some of his trademarked terms
into its own software product. Patterson contacted CompuServe via e-mail
about its alleged trademark infringement and eventually demanded $100,000
to settle the claim. CompuServe filed a complaint seeking a declaratory
judgment that it did not infringe upon Patterson's trademark. The district
Bensusan, 126 F.3d at 25, and the Ninth Circuit in Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d
414 (9th Cir. 1997) and Panavision Int'l, LP. v Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
80. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1268-69.
81. Shareware is software that an Internet user downloads for a trial period, paying the
author a fee only if he or she decides to continue using the software. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo
Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 n.6 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
82. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1260. CompuServe is the second largest provider of Internet
computing and information services. Id.
83. Id. at 1260-61. Mr. Patterson's program was a software program that was designed to
help people navigate the Internet. Id. at 1261.
84. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 417.
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court dismissed CompuServe's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction
over Patterson, but the Sixth Circuit reversed.
85
Judge Brown, writing for the court, rejected Patterson's position that
"contacts with Ohio, which have been almost entirely electronic in nature"
are insufficient to support personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant.86 The court recognized that online communication "represents
perhaps the latest and greatest manifestation of these historical, globe-
shrinking trends;" however, the court refused to allow the nature of the
medium to alter the due process examination used in conventional personal
jurisdiction analysis. 87 If anything, "there is less perceived need today for
the federal constitution to protect defendants from 'inconvenient litigation'
because all but the most remote forums are easily accessible for the pursuit
of both business and litigation." 88 Physical presence, the court emphasized,
is not necessary "'[s]o long as a commercial actor's efforts are "purposefully
directed" toward residents of another State."' 89 In finding that Patterson had
"purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing business in Ohio," 9
the court characterized Patterson as a "third party provider of software who
used CompuServe... to market his wares. This depiction of Patterson's
relationship with CompuServe was "crucial" to finding that minimum
92contacts existed. Having a contract or even injecting a product into the
"stream of commerce, without more, would be at best a dubious ground for
[personal] jurisdiction." 93  Only by finding a deliberate, repeated, and
ongoing commercial relationship was the court able to find that a substantial
connection between Patterson and Ohio existed, despite a "'minimal course
of dealing"' and a paucity of tangible and physical evidence of Patterson's
relationship with Ohio.94
The CompuServe decision is based primarily on the fact "that Patterson
purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing business in Ohio." 95
The court emphasized Patterson's purposeful link with Ohio but made little
85. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1259-61.
86. Id. at 1262, 1268-69.
87. Id. at 1262-63. See also Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119,
1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (stating "Different results should not be reached simply because business
is conducted over the Internet").
88. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1262 (citing World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980)).
89. Id. at 1264 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,476 (1985)).
90. Id. at 1266.
91. Id. at 1264.
92. Id.
93. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1265.
94. Id. at 1264-65.
95. Id. at 1266.
1999]
240
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
inquiry into whether it was reasonable to require Patterson to defend himself
in Ohio. 9 6  The CompuServe court chose to ignore the Worldwide
Volkswagen reasonableness inquiry; however, it is important to recognize
that other courts have found the issue of reasonableness to be
determinative. 97 Additionally, the CompuServe court, in trying to limit the
scope of its opinion, specifically stated that it did not decide whether a
shareware provider would be subject to suit in the state of the shareware
purchaser, or whether a subscriber to an online service can be sued by the
service provider in its home state.98 What is clear from the CompuServe
decision is that an active commercial venture that has "knowing and
repeated" online contacts with a foreign state will be subject to the
jurisdiction of that state even if the sole basis for such jurisdiction is the
online contacts.99
B. Passive Contact: Bensusan Restaurant Co. v. King
At the other end of the spectrum is the "passive" website, which merely
makes information available for those who wish to access it.1° Such were
the facts in Bensusan, a case decided and upheld primarily on the basis of
the New York long arm statute, but which is nonetheless instructive. 1' 1
In Bensusan, a New York-based chain of jazz clubs known as the "The
Blue Note" brought an assortment of trademark related claims against a
Missouri club also known as "The Blue Note.' ' 0 2  The claims, filed in
federal court in New York, asserted personal jurisdiction based upon the fact
that the defendant had set up a website on the Internet's World Wide Web.
The website, in addition to providing general club information and a
schedule of events, also furnished the telephone number of the club box
office for charging and reserving tickets by phone. While tickets could be
ordered and purchased by phone, the actual tickets had to be picked up at the
box office on the night of the show.
103
The district court, in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction, held that the mere fact that the defendant's website
96. Id. at 1267-68. The extent of the court's inquiry is a conclusory statement that when
purposeful availment exists, it can be inferred that the suit is reasonable. Id.
97. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1267-68. Compare Expert Pages v. Buckalew, No. C-97-
2109-VRW, 1997 WL 488011, *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1997) with Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356 (W.D. Ark. 1997).
98. CompuServe, 89 F.3d. at 1268.
99. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
100. Id. See also Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327, 333 (D.N.J. 1997).
101. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25,29 (2d Cir. 1997).
102. Id. at26.
103. Bensusan Restaurant Co. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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could be accessed from the forum state does not give rise to jurisdiction,
even if the consequences of such access are foreseeable. 104 The simple
creation of a general access website, like entering a product into the stream
of commerce, may have nationwide impact, but without additional contact
"is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum state."' 05 To find
otherwise would subject the operator of a website to national if not
worldwide jurisdiction, which "is not consistent with traditional personal
jurisdiction case law nor acceptable... as a matter of policy."'1 6
The beauty of Bensusan is its simple fact pattern. There were no other
facts, aside from the defendant's website, upon which the court could base
personal jurisdiction. The Blue Note club in Missouri had no other contacts
with the State of New York.1 7 Unlike the defendants in many other cases
the Missouri club in Bensusan, received no revenue from New York, did not
advertise in New York, and had no 800 number that was accessible in New
York. Its sole contact with New York was the website upon which it
advertised. This, the court held, did not give rise to personal jurisdiction in a
New York court.
08
C. The Middle Spectrum
Bensusan and CompuServe are important because they provide some
measure of clarity in the otherwise murky realm of online personal
jurisdiction law. These two cases may be viewed as reference points on a
hypothetical personal jurisdiction spectrum. At one end of the spectrum is
CompuServe, which holds that knowing and repeated electronic contacts
with a foreign state will give rise to personal jurisdiction. At the other end is
Bensusan, which holds that a strictly passive website will not give rise to
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. These reference points
will decide cases in which the fact pattern can be clearly characterized as an
active or passive online contact.
Unfortunately, not all cases have Bensusan's uncomplicated facts or
CompuServe's extensive contacts. Many online contacts will be somewhere
in the middle of the personal jurisdiction spectrum. In this middle spectrum,
the courts must determine whether online contact, coupled with other factors
104. Id. at 300. .The Bensusan decision in both the district and appellate courts was
determined on the basis of New York's long arm statute.
105. Id. at 301.
106. Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL) (AJP), 1997 WL 97097, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).




Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
such as toll-free numbers,10 9 print or direct mail advertising,110 or even the
filing of a lawsuitII will be considered sufficient contact with the foreign
state to give rise to personal jurisdiction.
The courts are still exploring the chasm between Bensusan and
CompuServe. What follows is a look at the factors that some courts have
found to be significant in deciding whether an online contact should be
considered active or passive. A single factor will rarely be dispositive of the
issue, but we can glean from court opinions what factors are important in
finding that the required minimum contacts exist with the forum state.
1. Contracts
The United States Supreme Court held that the mere existence of a
contract between the defendant and a resident of the forum state would not
automatically give rise to personal jurisdiction." 2 Though a contract in itself
may not give rise to personal jurisdiction, the existence of a contract is an
indication of the expectations of the parties, which consequently may give
rise to personal jurisdiction." 3 The factors surrounding the formation of and
compliance with the contract will often be more important than the contract
itself. "[P]rior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along
with the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing" are
determinative, not the fact that a contract exists.14
An example of the role that a contract plays in finding jurisdiction in a
non-online setting is Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 5 The defendant, a
Michigan resident, was sued in a Florida court for breaching a franchise
agreement with the Burger King Corporation. The Court found that the
defendant was subject to the jurisdiction of a Florida court despite the fact
that "the defendant did not physically enter the forum State." 116  The
existence of a franchise contract was indicative of a "substantial and
109. Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996)
(exercising jurisdiction based on an Internet website that included a toll-free 800 number).
110. Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding jurisdiction
based upon the defendant's Internet website and the defendant's newspaper advertisement).
111. Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *12 (discussing whether litigation related e-mail will give
rise to jurisdiction). See also CompuServe, Inc. v, Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1266 (6th Cir. 1996)
(considering the fact that the defendant sent e-mail messages about his claim as an indication that
the defendant "originated and maintained" contact with the forum state).
112. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,478 (1995).
113. Edias Software Int'l, L.L.C., v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 418 (D. Ariz.
1996).
114. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479.
115. Id. at 462.
116. Id. at 476.
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continuing relationship" between the parties. 1 7 By seeking out the inherent
benefits of such a relationship, the defendant had reached out to the forum
state in a manner that "can in no sense be viewed as 'random,' 'fortuitous,'
or 'attenuated.'
1 18
In adapting the Burger King holding to online situations, the court in
CompuServe found that sufficient contact with the forum state existed when
the defendant had an online service and shareware provider contract with
CompuServe located in Ohio.1 9 Likewise, in Thompson v. Handa-Lopez,
Inc., the court looked toward the existence of a contract as grounds for
finding personal jurisdiction. 121 In that case, the defendant was a California
company that operated an arcade website called "Funscape's Casino
Royale," on which one could play such games as blackjack, poker, keno,
slots, craps, easy lotto, and roulette.122 To play the games, one would have
to agree to an online contract and use a credit card to purchase tokens,
known as "Funbucks." The contract included a provision stating that all
disputes would be governed by the laws of California. If a player won a
game, he or she would be paid with "Funbucks," which could be redeemed
for cash or prizes. When the plaintiff, a Texas resident, attempted to claim
$193,728.40 in winnings, the defendant refused to pay, and, after suit was
filed, moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court
found that jurisdiction in Texas was proper because the defendant "entered
into contracts with the residents of various states knowing that it would
receive commercial gain."124 The fact that the enrollment contract provided
for California law to apply was inconsequential to the court in light of the
interests that the State of Texas had in protecting its citizens.1
5z
Though evidence of a contract, online or otherwise, will not be
conclusive of the personal jurisdiction issue, it will be a significant factor in
determining whether sufficient contacts exist to give rise to personal
jurisdiction. 126
117. Id. at 485-87.
118. Id. at 480 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
119. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264 (6th Cir. 1996) (comparing the
contracts with CompuServe to the franchisee's contract with Burger King).
120. 998 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
121. Id. at 744.
122. Id. at 741. As of February 5, 1999, the Defendant's website could be found at
<http://www.funscape.com>.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 744.
125. Thompson, 998 F. Supp. at 745 (the court avoided finding jurisdiction based solely
on the contract by identifying the contract as providing a "choice of law," rather then a "forum
selection.").
126. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,478-79 (1985).
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A second factor considered by the courts is the defendant's commercial
interaction with the forum state. In Zippo Manufacturing, the court stated
that "the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that
occurs on the Web site." 27 While the exact level of interactivity necessary
is unclear, a website must be more than strictly passive.
28
A case from the Eastern District of Texas provides a good example of
how an interactive website can give rise to personal jurisdiction, even when• 129
the contact is unrelated to the cause of action. In Mieczkowski v. Masco
Corp., 13a products liability suit was filed in Texas against the defendant,
Rose Furniture Company, a North Carolina entity. The plaintiff had
purchased a bunk bed in North Carolina and a year later moved to Texas.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs son was asphyxiated when he got caught
between the bed railings. The defendant had no offices, employees, agents,
or property in Texas, nor did the defendant advertise in Texas. The
defendant had, during a six-year period, sold over five million dollars worth
of merchandise to Texas residents, but this alone, the court determined,
would not give rise to personal jurisdiction.' 31 What gave rise to jurisdiction
was the defendant's maintenance of an interactive website that was
accessible by Texans. 132
The court relied on the fact that the defendant's website 33 was quite
extensive. 34 The website's "Shop Online" section provided the user with an
extensive list of furniture selections from which individual pieces of
furniture could be chosen. Once a specific piece of furniture was selected,
the viewer would see a picture of the furniture, informational material
regarding the construction of the furniture, and the price of the selected
furniture. To order, one had the choice of either printing an order form or
127. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
(citing Maritz, Inc., v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996)).
128. Id.
129. When a court finds personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on contact unrelated
to the dispute it is commonly referred to as general jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying
note 25.
130. 997 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
131. Id. at 783-85.
132. Id. at 787-88.
133. As of February 5, 1999, the defendant's website could be found at
<http://www.rosefumiture.com>. Id. at 786 n.4.
134. Id. at 787.
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communicating with an online sales representative in the "Internet Sales
Division." Additionally, one could check the status of a purchase online.
135
In finding jurisdiction, the court stated that such a website was clearly
"designed to solicit business in a manner that exceeds traditional notions of
advertising." 136 When a party solicits rather then merely advertises, he may
be subjecting himself to personal jurisdiction in that forum. This distinction
was crucial in Maritz v. Cybergold, Inc.,137 a trademark infringement case
from the Eastern District of Missouri. 13  In that case, the defendant, a
California company, operated an Internet website139  that provided
information about a forthcoming mailing list. Upon registering with the
website, a user was provided with a personal mailbox to which
advertisements, tailored to the specific interests of each user, would be
forwarded.14° From the time the website was set up to the time that the
lawsuit was filed, the website was accessed by Missouri users 131 times.
141
The court found Cybergold's relationship with the State of Missouri
significant enough to supply the required minimum contacts.142 The court
rejected the characterization of the defendant's website as a "passive site" 143
and found that the defendant was soliciting names and addresses for the use
of its mailing list.144 The court found that by interacting with the website
visitors, "Cybergold automatically and indiscriminately respond[ed) to each
and every Internet user who accesses its website."145 It was this automatic
interaction between the website and the foreign state that caused the online
communication to cross the line between passive and active contact, thereby
giving rise to personal jurisdiction.146
135. Mieczkowski, 997 F. Supp. at 787.
136. Id.
137. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
138. Id.
139. As of February 5, 1999, the Defendant's website could be found at
<http://www.cybergold.com>. Id. at 1330.
140. Id.
141. Id. Though the site was actually accessed 311 times, the court discounted the 180
contacts made by the plaintiff. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330.
142. Id. at 1334.
143. Id. at 1333.
144. Id. at 1335.
145. Id. at 1333 (comparing an interactive website to the receiving of a inquiry letter and
the mailing a response via traditional mail).
146. Maritz went one step beyond Mieczkowski and found an active contact even though
the interactivity was not with a live representative. See Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc.,
568 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (finding a website advertising a forthcoming online
gambling service to be interactive).
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3. Quantity of Contact
It has long been recognized that we must look to the "quality and
nature" of the contact with the forum state rather than to a "mechanical or
quantitative" measure of such contact. 47 A single contact with the forum
state that is substantial in nature may supply the required minimum contacts,
whereas repeated contacts which are only minimal in nature may not.'
48
Nonetheless, the number of contacts that are made with the forum state will
be indicative of whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting business in the forum state. This is especially true
online, where the number of hits a website receives is the primary method of
measuring the popularity and effectiveness of a website.
In looking at the quantity of contacts, the Maritz court found that a
defendant's website which received 131 hits from Missouri residents was
subject to jurisdiction in Missouri, in part because the number of hits
suggested that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
doing business in Missouri. 149 Likewise, the 248 hits from Minnesota that
were received by an Internet site advertising a future online gambling service
were important in finding that the State of Minnesota had jurisdiction over
the nonresident corporate defendant which operated the website. 150 In
playing the numbers game, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that if 131
hits were enough for Missouri to find purposeful availment, then 248 hits
would afortiori show such an intent.151
In using the quantity of contacts such as hits as a factor in determining
whether jurisdiction is proper, there are a number of problems. First, as with
any statistic, such numbers are malleable. Do you look at the number of hits
received by a site individually, or do you look at the hits as a percentage of
Internet users in that state? Alternately, do you look at the number of hits in
relation to how popular other websites are, or do you look at what
percentage of the hits at a specific website come from the forum state? 152
Second, the amount of hits a website receives is not indicative of the amount
of people with whom the website communicates. Often, one will reach a
website by mistake and just "surf" on, yet such a contact is still considered a
147. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
148. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
149. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333.
150. Humphrey, 568 N.W.2d at 718-19.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., id. at 718 (using the fact that computers in Minnesota were among the 500
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"hit. 153 Finally, parties to an action can easily inflate the number of hits a
site receives by contacting the site themselves. Indeed, in Maritz, there was
evidence that over half the recorded hits were caused by the plaintiff, and the
court therefore discounted the inflated number of hits from 311 actual hits to
131.154 Using the number of hits a website receives as a method of
determining jurisdiction is a poor way to measure a defendant's contact with
the forum state and has fortunately not been used by many courts.
4. Financial Success
Some courts, in making a determination of whether minimum contacts
exist, have looked toward the success of the Internet site. In Expert Pages v.
Buckalew, 1 5 the court denied jurisdiction over a defendant who had
infringed the copyright of Expert Pages, a website which provides
information regarding expert witness and litigation consulting.' 6 The court
found that the defendant's "business does not appear to have been terribly
successful," for he never had more than twelve paying customers. The
court found that to require such an unsuccessful endeavor to defend itself in
a foreign state would be an undue burden upon the defendant and would
violate due process principles. 58 On the other hand, in CompuServe, the
court rejected the argument that such a "de minimis amount of software
sales" should not give rise to personal jurisdiction.15 9 The court specifically
stated that it is "not their number or status [of the contacts] that determines
whether they amount to purposeful availment."'
6
While the financial success of a party, by itself, may not be an
important factor, the financial success of the defendant may indirectly play a
role in determining whether it is reasonable to require the defendant to
litigate the matter in a foreign state. Obviously, a financially successful
defendant will find the cost of foreign litigation less burdensome than a
cash-strapped, upstart enterprise. In Digital Equipment Corp. v. Altavista
Technology, Inc.,161 a complicated trademark infringement case, the court
dealt with this issue by stating that the costs involved in litigating a suit in a
153. Robert J. Samuelson, Out of Print: Infatuation with the Information Superhighway,
Part 10, NEwswEEK, Sept. 11, 1995, at 59.
154. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330; see supra text accompanying note 137.
155. No. C-97-2109-VRW, 1997 WL 488011, *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 1997).
156. Id. at *5.
157. Id. at *4.
158. Id.
159. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1265 (6th Cir. 1996). The defendant
had made only $650 worth of sales to 12 residents of the forum state. Id. at 1261.
160. Id. at 1265 (citations omitted).
161. 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass 1997).
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foreign state "may well be the price of its agreeing to do business involving
the Internet."'162 While such a viewpoint may be realistic, it is especially
harsh when the defendants are small companies or individuals who are not
"experienced and sophisticated businessmen."'163
5. Electronic Mail
One of the most common forms of online communication is the use of
electronic mail, or e-mail, as it is commonly called. Where the defendant
has been in contact with parties in the foreign state via e-mail, the courts
have been willing to find personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The
reason for this is twofold. First, e-mail does not exist in a vacuum. It is
usually only one method of communication that supplements other
telephone, written, or in-person contact. Even if e-mall alone does not
provide sufficient contact with the forum state, the totality of the relationship
with the forum state will. Second, e-mail, unlike a website, is targeted
toward a specific person or group of people. When one sends an e-mail
message to a specific person or group, it will be easier for a court to find
purposeful activity directed toward the forum state than it would with an
open-ended Internet website.1
64
Electronic mail, even if sent regarding pending or future litigation, may
give rise to personal jurisdiction. In CompuServe, the court, in finding
jurisdiction, took into account the e-mail messages that the defendant sent to
CompuServe about his claim. 165 Likewise, in Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger,166
the court closely examined the defendant's litigation-related e-mails before
finding a lack of jurisdiction. 167
6. Passive Plus
The instances in which websites gave rise to personal jurisdiction
usually present other factors upon which courts can rely to support a finding
of personal jurisdiction. 168 Such was the case in Inset Systems, Inc., v.
162. Id. at 471.
163. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,484 (1985) (citation omitted).
164. Cody v. Ward, 954 F. Supp. 43, 47 (D. Conn. 1997) (finding jurisdiction based upon
the defendant's telephone calls and e-mail messages to the plaintiff); see also Hall v. LaRonde,
66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399,400 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (finding jurisdiction based on e-mail contact).
165. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1266.
166. No. 96 Civ. 3620 (PKL) (AJP), 1997 WL 97097 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997).
167. Id. at *4, *5, *21.
168. Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997). In any case
where jurisdiction is found "there has been 'something more' to indicate that the defendant
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Instruction Set, Inc.,, 69 which reached "the outer limits of the exercise of
personal jurisdiction." 170 Inset and Instruction were two software developers
located in Connecticut and Massachusetts, respectively. When a trademark
infringement issue arose over Instruction's use of "inset.com," as a domain
name, Inset filed suit in a Connecticut court. The court found personal
jurisdiction based on the defendant's strictly passive Internet site and the
toll-free number posted thereon.' 7 1 In recognizing the uniqueness of the
Internet, the court stated that "unlike television and radio advertising, the
[Internet] advertisement is available continuously to any Internet user.'
72
The fact that Internet advertising is a continuous medium which, at that time,
had the ability to reach 10,000 Connecticut users, coupled with the
defendant's toll-free number, was in the court's eyes indicative of the
defendant's intent to solicit business and "purposefully avail[ ] itself of the
privilege of doing business within Connecticut."'173
Similarly, in Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Foundation,174 the court found that
the Heroes Foundation, a New York charity that helps fight cystic fibrosis,
was subject to the jurisdiction of a District of Columbia court based in part
because of its Internet website. 175  Heroes Foundation was sued for
trademark infringement by Heroes, Inc., a Washington, D.C.-based charity
that assists families of firefighters and police officers killed in the line of
duty. 176 The court found that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of doing business in the forum state by expressly soliciting
donations and providing a toll-free number on its Internet websiteY77 The
text of the website was:
How Can I Help?
You can help by donating to the Heroes Foundation. For information
on how to make a donation, call (800) 789-HERO(4376). No
donation is too small, and every donation counts. With your help, we
can find a cure to this deadly disease.
178
purposefully (albeit electronically) directed his activity in a substantial way to the forum state."
Id.
169. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn 1996).
170. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
171. Inset Sys., 937 F. Supp. at 165.
172. Id. at 165.
173. Id.
174. 958 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
175. Id. at 5.
176. Id. at 2.
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Such a website, the court found, would satisfy the minimum contacts test and
give rise to personal jurisdiction. 179
However, not all courts will find jurisdiction in such instances. In
Shapiro v. Santa Fe Gaming Corp.,'18 an attorney claiming to be the "critical
impetus" in discovering a short swing violation of section 16(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 sued for his attorney's fees in an
Illinois court.181 The court found no jurisdiction over a Nevada corporate
plaintiff even though the company maintained a website and a toll-free
number. 82 The court held that having a website and toll-free number, even
one that is solicitous in nature, is not a lethal combination that automatically
submits a defendant to personal jurisdiction. 18  Likewise, in Graphic
Controls Corp. v. Utah Medical Products, Inc.,18a the court found that the
defendant's Internet site and toll-free number "do not demonstrate [the
defendant's] purposeful availment of the benefits and protections provided
in each or any of such fora." 185 This matter is clearly still in conflict among
the district courts.
The most recent circuit court opinion on this issue is Cybersell, Inc. v.
Cybersell, Inc.,' 86 a Ninth Circuit decision. In Cybersell, the court refrained
from finding specific jurisdiction based solely upon the maintenance of an
Internet website.187 The court found that an essentially passive website
"does not qualify as purposeful activity invoking the benefits and
protections" of the forum state.188  In this case, an Arizona Internet
marketing service sued a Florida Internet consulting service for trademark
infringement and related actions in an Arizona court. The defendant,
Cybersell of Florida, maintained a website189 on the Internet that contained
the allegedly infringing materials. The website allowed the browser to enter
his or her name, address, and an indication of whether he or she was
interested in Cybersell's services. One could not sign up over the Internet,
nor was there a toll-free number on the website. No one in Arizona, aside
179. Heroes, 958 F. Supp. at 5. What is especially intriguing is that the court seems to
hold that such activity will even give rise to general jurisdiction. Id. at 4-5.
180. No. 97-C 6117, 1998 WL 102677, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 1998).
181. Id.
182. Id. at *2.
183. Id.
184. No. 96-CV-0459E(F), 1997 WL 276232, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. May 21, 1997), aft'd,
149 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
185. Id. at *3.
186. 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).
187. Id. at 415.
188. Id. at 420.
189. Id. at 415. The defendant's website address could be found at <http:llwww.
cybsell.com>. Id. As of February 20, 1999, this website is unavailable.
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from the plaintiffs, ever accessed the website. The court found Cybersell's
website to be essentially passive in that the defendant never encouraged
people to access the site and therefore never "invok[ed] the benefits and
protections of Arizona law."
190
Cybersell remains true to the holding of Bensusan that a strictly passive
website will not give rise to personal jurisdiction in a foreign state.
Cybersell also goes a step beyond Bensusan in deeming the website strictly
passive despite the fact that the browser's name and address could be entered
on the website as an indication of interest in the services provided. This case
should not be read to require online activity similar to the facts in
CompuServe before personal jurisdiction can be established. What it does
indicate is the court's distaste for finding personal jurisdiction based solely
on an essentially passive website that includes a toll-free number.
V. CONCLUSION
In trying to fit new technology into existing law, the courts have
extended the principles of International Shoe to the outer limits. The courts
that do find purposeful availment based on minimal online contact fail to
take the geographic insensitivity of the Internet into account.' 91 The Internet
does not yet allow for targeted postings, which would permit access to a
website only in certain geographic areas, and one cannot purposefully avail
oneself of something that is not optional. By finding personal jurisdiction
based on such minimal contacts, the courts will in effect limit Internet
advertising only to those enterprises that can afford to litigate matters in
foreign and distant jurisdictions.
When Chief Justice Stone wrote his opinion in International Shoe, it is
doubtful that he envisioned his principles being applied to a medium such as
the Internet. What he did recognize was that any personal jurisdiction
doctrine would need to be flexible and adaptable to changing circumstances.
Even if the minimum contacts of the cyber era are found to be different than
the minimum contacts of fifty years ago, the guiding principles and doctrines
of International Shoe and its progeny will certainly endure.
In the next decade, the issues surrounding online personal jurisdiction
must be watched from both a legal and technological perspective. As the
issue of personal jurisdiction makes its way through the appellate courts, a
more organized structure and formulation will be developed, which will
allow for a clearer application of the law. Personal jurisdiction is a threshold
issue that the United States Supreme Court has continuously addressed;
190. Id. at 419.
191. See Meyer supra note 66, at 1301-02.
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hopefully, in the near future, it will feel compelled to address its application
to the world of online communication.
Online personal jurisdiction must also be monitored from a
technological vantagepoint. The Internet, despite its massive size, is still in
its infancy. Anyone who has followed the computer and communication
industry will recognize that what is new and novel today may be obsolete
and antiquated tomorrow. In this era of rapidly changing technology, new
devices and programs may be developed that will resolve many of the
personal jurisdiction issues that we have today. Until such time, we must
apply existing law to this new area and remain truthful to the time-honored
principles of personal jurisdiction.
Motty Shulman
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